

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

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Political Prospects and Reflections	By AUSTIN HOPKINSON, M.P.	1
Britain through Foreign Eyes	By MAJOR E. W. POLSON NEWMAN	11
The Round Table Conference	By PROFESSOR J. COATMAN	24
sometime Director of the Department of Public Information in the Government of India		
Disarmament		
(1) The Freedom of the Seas		
By LIEUT. COMMANDER THE HON. J. M. KENWORTHY, R.N.		35
(2) Some European Difficulties		
By COLONEL SIR THOMAS MONTGOMERY CUNINGHAME, Bart., D.S.O.		49
The Statute of Westminster	By RICHARD JENN	61
Dumping	By R. A. SKELTON	73
The Defaulting States of America	By MAJOR ARCHIBALD J. CAMPBELL	84
French Art at Burlington House		
By THE RIGHT HON. W. ORMSBY-CORE, M.P.		91
a Trustee of the National and Tate Galleries		
Hannibal in the Alps	By SPENSER WILKINSON	96
The Duke of Newcastle a Conversation	By DONAMY DODDIE	106
The Milner Papers		
By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FABIAN WARE, K.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.B.		115
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
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CONTENTS OF VOL. CXI

AUTHOR	PAGE
APPLEYARD, Robin .	Our Criminal Highways . . . 305
ASTON, Right Hon. Viscount .	Wheat . . . 310
BLACKER, Dr. C. P. .	Birth Control and Eugenics . . . 454
BLACKETT Sir Basil	Recovery . . . 325
BURNETT Dr. (Newbury) .	Farming, Its and Compulsory Marketing . . . 376
BURY, Dr. Kálmán de .	The Dairymen Problem . . . 344
CAMPBELL, Major Archibald J.	The Industrial States of America . . . 84
CANON, A. D. H. .	Charing Cross - a Time for Reflection . . . 208
CAUTION Bernard	Marital Fidelity as a Delicacy . . . 486
CAULMAN Fred J. .	The Round Table Conference . . . 84
COHEN-PORTNOY Paul .	Come to Britain . . . 513
COWPER, J. G.	The Neutral - a Commercial Discovery . . . 320
COWLINGHAM Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery	Disarmament - some European Difficulties . . . 69
DARWINSON Right Hon. Lord Dorchester	Disarm or Re-arm? . . . 120
DOUGLAS Hon. C. E.	The Duke of Newcastle - a Commemoration . . . 206
ELLIS, Geoffrey	The Problem of Church Patronage . . . 180
ELIAS S. M.	Terror and After . . . 237
FITSGERALD, W. L. (Ignatius Phelps)	Alfred the Great . . . 730
FRASER Captain Ian	Educating The American People . . . 157
GABRIEL A. G.	The State and the Island . . . 443
GARDNER R. E. Gordon (Robert Seaton)	Two Journeys - C. P. Scott and Northcliffe - a Contrast . . . 247
GARDNER Fred T. J.	A Year of the Spanish Republic . . . 307
GORDON Fred A.	Whether the Second? . . . 430
GUTHRIE David	Literature in 1930 . . . 470
HARRY R. W.	Ireland after the Plunketts . . . 410
HARRISON Austin	Some British Birds and their Small Talk . . . 112
HUTTON Dr. Graham	Industrial Prospects and Restrictions . . . 1
HUTTON Edward	Wanted - a Foreign Policy . . . 240
Irish Richard John O'Connell	The Conversion of Edward (John) . . . 360
KEENE, Lord Canning the Hon. J. M.	The Statute of Westminster . . . 62
LAWSON	Tariff Disputing . . . 513
LEITCH Air Vice-Marshal C.	Disarmament - The Freedom of the Seas . . . 33
MACCOLL, Dr. D. H.	The American Sense . . . 664
MACCARTHY, Edward	The Air Requirements of Great Britain . . . 100
MAGNAN, Louis	Footprint to the French Exhibition . . . 470
MAGNAN, Louis	Wanted Bridge . . . 403
MAGNAN, Louis	Chaos - a Revolution . . . 203
MAGNAN, Louis	Growth a Hundred Years After . . . 170

AUTHOR	PAGES
MATTHEW, Hilda	The Future of B.C. Talks 330
MATTHEW, Theobald	Judicial Salaries 332
MENKIN, Jules	Mr Wells Surveys Mankind 330
MERTON, Right Hon Lord	India To-day and To-morrow 335
MITCHELL, Naomi	Religion and Nationalism 340
MOLSON, Hugh	The Domestic Task before the National Government 332
NEWMAN, Bertram	Walter Pater a Revaluation 633
NEWMAN, Major E. W. Polson	Britain through Foreign Eyes 71
	Ottawa and British Foreign Trade 641
ORANGE, Sir Hugh	Legislation by Whitehall 682
ORRISBY-GORE, Right Hon W	French Art at Burlington House 61
PERRY, F	Wealth, Riches and Debt 172
PETRIE, Sir Charles	The Irish Free State To-day 161
PICKERING, Ernest H	The Jew of Monkey-Hall 706
RAVEN HART, Major R	The Development of Electrical Music 603
SAUSMAREE, Fred H de	Early Theatricals at Oxford with Prologues by Lewis Carroll 235
SHADWELL, Dr Arthur	The Irish Question and the Royal Commission 140
SHELTON R A	Thumping 71
SOLOVEYTSNIK, George	The Kingdom of Germany 601
	The Integrity of the League 601
STRED, Wickham	France after the Election 637
STEELE, MAITLAND, Right Hon Sir Arthur	British Policy in the Pacific 305
STRONG, L. A.	Industry, Value and True 303
	Psychic Phenomena - Suggestions Towards a Revaluation 354 454
WINE, M., General	The Miller Papers 113
FABIAN	Money and the World (have a Dime) 130
WHALLESWORTH, Adm	How Man's Power is Measured 130
WILKINSON, Spencer	How Man's Power is Measured 130
WHITE, Fred	How Man's Power is Measured 130
WYLLIE, Sir Frederick	The League Assembly and the Far East 130
WYLLIE, Sir Robert	How Man's Power is Measured 130

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*



NO. DCLIX—JANUARY 1912

POLITICAL PROSPECTS AND REFLECTIONS

As General Election succeeds to General Election the more difficult for the student of politics becomes the task of identifying the motives which have persuaded the electorate to favour the candidates of the one party or of the other. The election which took place in October would appear at first sight to be an exception to this rule. Yet there were circumstances in connexion with it which merit careful consideration, and he would be a rash man who should declare that it marks a definite and permanent abandonment of those collectivist ideas which have benighted the peoples of all European States for two generations. When contemplating the enormous Conservative majority it is easy to forget that about one-third of the electorate supported Socialist or semi-Socialist candidates. That such an important fraction of the voters should have cast their votes in favour of a party whose failure in office cried aloud to heaven has surely some significance, and well may cause us to doubt whether a violent reaction may not characterise the next General Election. Such a reaction might have results of a most dangerous nature, and it

behoves us to examine the present political situation with the object of recognising and minimising the perils which undoubtedly exist.

For the moment, democratic and parliamentary institutions in this country appear to be safe. But we must bear in mind that had a Socialist Government resulted from the recent election it is highly probable that political freedom would have disappeared, as it has done in other countries where contempt for the elected assembly added to the fear of economic ruin has persuaded the people that security is more to be desired than self-government. Indeed, it would not be easy to refute one who should say that our electorate, by setting up a Conservative Government unrestrained by any effective Opposition, has signified a general approval of the principle of dictatorship. I write 'Conservative Government' advisedly. For it would be a transparent hypocrisy to maintain that it is 'national' in the true sense of the word or that the Conservative Party machine will be used for any other purpose than that of forcing into one mould all those who compose the Government.

The student of politics would, I think, find his studies much forwarded by constant and careful perusal of Edward Gibbon's *magnum opus*. For my part, I know of no book which touches so closely and so appositely the problems of modern politics in Great Britain. We have now, it would appear, reached the later Byzantine phase of our imperial history, and palace massacres may be expected whenever one faction or the other proves to be entirely though momentarily dominant. Hence the Socialists and the Liberals who have joined the coalition would do well to conform to the behests of their masters, lest haply the browsing or the dagger await their recalcitrance. The past careers of the Prime Minister, of Sir H. Samuel, and of Mr. J. H. Thomas give reason for hope that an adequate adaptability to circumstance will enable them to preserve their Conservative colleagues from the scandal and guilt of assassination. But grave fears may be felt that Mr. Walter Runciman, despite his recent recantation, will fail to display the agility which alone can save him from a tragic fate. Nor is it beyond the bounds of possibility that Mr. Stanley Baldwin's obvious prejudice in favour of the observance of the loyalties which are involved in the idea of a 'National' Government may prove his undoing. Those who long for a return to the happy days of the Coalition period

Where every morning brought a noble chance
And every chance brought out a noble knight

are impatient to see the country once more handed over to them, again to be snatched from end to end.

Already the faction in power has effectively stirred up the

population. The approach of Christmas was marked, as usual, by the arrival in our ports of a number of ships bearing goods appropriate to the season. If these ships were somewhat more numerous than is normally the case, that increase may well be attributed to fears on the part of importers of a further depreciation of sterling, and even more, perhaps, to the desire on the part of foreign manufacturers, notably of iron and steel, to forestall the imposition of a tariff which with a Protectionist majority in the new Parliament they naturally supposed to be inevitable. Nor must we fail to take into account the increase of coal and textile exports, which were stimulated by currency depreciation and which naturally tended to bring about a corresponding higher level of imports. Yet the party newspapers lashed their readers to a frenzy of protest, and there arose a loud and melancholy cry that the horrific influx of dumped goods was shaking the Empire to its foundations.

Hence the first step of the all-powerful Government has been a yielding to an ignorant popular outcry, and the imposing of import restrictions which can have little result save that of contracting exports. Such a policy at the least enables us to gauge the intellectual calibre of those who have forced it upon the new Government. For it is based upon the denial of the obvious truth that prosperity consists in the possession, not of money, but of things. Indeed, a little consideration will enable the reader to perceive that the chief disadvantage of sterling depreciation is to be found in the fact that it forces us to take less imported goods in exchange for those which we export. While we preserved the gold standard, a given tonnage of exported coal put us into possession of a certain tonnage of imported wheat. To obtain a similar amount of wheat under existing conditions we have to give the foreigner much more of our coal. Who then, is the gainer by the altered conditions?

Furthermore, if ignorant political busybodies could have been restrained from interfering, the balance would automatically have been restored. The foreigner, growing weary of well-doing, would have made fewer donations to us. Eventually he would have begun to pay his bills in that worthless mineral called gold if he possessed any, and we should have been forced to accept it, since he would refuse to remit anything really valuable. Then we should have been able to return to a gold basis for our currency. But, if such conditions were to arise, we must not allow our foreign customers to think that they may continue indefinitely to send us worthless metal in return for valuable goods. If we do so, we shall find ourselves in the same unfortunate position as that now occupied by the United States, a country which a few months ago was forced to deny to its debtors the privilege of

paying their debts, in order to avoid the loss of the whole of the export markets. Let the reader make no mistake on this point—the international debt moratorium was forced upon the United States by the desperate condition of the farmers. The Americans, like our Protectionists, had said: 'We must not let money go out of the country. Hence we will buy nothing from the foreigner, while we strive furiously to sell our products to him.' Circumstances enabled the United States to act in accord with this plan of operations; the gold of the world naturally accumulated in New York, and American farmers and manufacturers had to decrease their output and their prices because hardly anyone could buy. The repayments made by debtor nations accentuated the difficulty. The Hoover moratorium may, therefore, be regarded as the first step of the United States in the path of Free Trade.

For filling hollow teeth and for the manufacture of wedding-rings gold is I believe valuable. It is useful also owing to the rareness of its occurrence in the earth, to the fascination it exercises over the imagination of the Indian peasant, and to its resistance to oxidation, as a standard of measurement for currencies. And it is in its latter capacity that it forms by far the best controller of the unruly wills of foolish men. For it at once sounds the alarm if a nation imports more than it can afford, and gives equally prompt and definite warning when a nation is giving away its real wealth and receiving in return too much money. Not only does it sound the alarm but as long as most currencies are related to it, it automatically brings into operation forces tending to correct the lack of balance. In our own case we had for years been consuming more than we were producing. Sterling insisted, despite our efforts, upon drawing our attention to this fact by slipping off a gold basis. The forces mentioned above immediately began to operate. Hence we are now producing more and consuming less, not because we wish to do so, but because monetary conditions force us to do so. If we now raise money wages to counterbalance the present imminent rise in the cost of living, our exports, owing to the higher costs, will begin to dwindle, and our imports, owing to higher purchasing power, will increase. But, before any damage is done, sterling will automatically depreciate still further and will thus reduce real costs and purchasing power simultaneously. The foreigner will then have to be content with smaller sales of his goods to us, or, if he is a fool, will maintain the volume of his sales by letting us have more goods in return for less goods. In other words, he will 'dump,' and we may praise the gods by whom the foreigner was deprived of understanding. For the 'dumper' is either a fool or a philanthropist, and the latter alternative is unlikely.

It would be a delight to the writer, but an insult to the intelli-

guide of the reader, were I to pursue the obvious further through this digression. My excuse for having gone so far is to be found in the fact that the present House of Commons is mainly manned by persons to whom the obvious in economics is an impenetrable mystery. Being obsessed by socialistic ideas, they cannot conceive it possible that any human activity can prosper if the State does not constantly interfere with it. They are horrified when they see a larger and larger proportion of the nation earning its living by means other than manual labour. It is nothing to them that the brown man, the yellow man, and the black man are now capable of ousting us from the more laborious occupations, and thus force us, by making use of such intellectual superiority as we still maintain, to earn our living without taking off our coats. For my part my insular prejudices are so acute that I feel content that foreigners should do the hewing of wood and the drawing of water while my own fellow-countrymen organise, finance, and direct their labours. We are, indeed, at the parting of the ways and must decide what future we desire for our country. Are we to go on fighting a losing battle against those who are willing to do soul-destroying manual work for a less wage than we can live upon, in the vain hope of maintaining our present excessive population, no matter upon how degraded a standard? Or are we to become a people small in numbers but great in all real things, no longer exporting bulls and rams or coal and calico, but furnishing the races of mankind with human blood-streak and fertilising the minds of the nations with great ideals and ideas?

What I have written above appears to me to constitute the ultimate problem which must be borne in mind when framing policies to meet the immediate situation. The test of the new Government will, however, come very quickly, and will take the following form.

The only real beneficial work that the Government can do is to lighten the burden of taxation both local and national. Approximately £1,000,000,000 are taken annually from productive industry by these methods. This is roughly equivalent to £2 10s. per week on the average from each family. In other words, the breadwinner has to produce £2 10s. per week for the State and the municipality before he can begin to produce anything for the needs of his family. Such a burden is, as might be anticipated, too great for industry to bear. The present Government has not yet taken any effective steps to reduce the burden, and a reduction of annual expenditure of not less than £150,000,000 would appear to be the smallest measure of economy which can give industry a chance to prosper. Up to the present, I repeat, the Government has made no effective contribution to the solution of the real problem before the nation. It has reduced expenditure by a

totally inadequate amount, and has neutralised the benefit of the reduction by a heavy increase of taxation. To this fact, more than to any other reason, is due the failure of sterling to appreciate despite the larger flow of exports. Balancing a Budget by increasing taxation does not really improve the state of the national finances, and the confiscation of all the wealth of the rich in order to show a Budget surplus would merely precipitate a breakdown of industry.

Unhappily, therefore, it is impossible to re-establish our financial position by any method which does not involve a reduction in the weekly monetary receipts of the mass of the people, including those sections which are already little, if at all, above the poverty line. When writing 'monetary receipts' I mean, of course, the ratio of those receipts to the amount of wealth produced by the recipients. For, if there is an expansion of demand for the products of any given industry, and if the workers content themselves with existing wage-rates while giving increased output, then there need not necessarily be any reduction in the amount of cash received weekly by those persons. But in the case of State and municipal workers, as in that of the unemployed, no such alleviation of the situation is possible. Hence we are faced with an inexorable need for reducing the incomes of large numbers of people who are already receiving comparatively small sums weekly.

This cruel but necessary reduction coincides with an inevitable rise in the cost of living figures, and that rise will merely be increased if inflation is employed with a view to avoiding the reduction of monetary receipts.

Up to the present there has been no general or appreciable increase in the prices of those commodities which are of especial importance to the economy of the households of the manual workers. It is apparent failure of retail prices to be influenced by currency depreciation has given rise to considerable surprise on the part of interested observers. But it may probably be attributed to the previous existence of a wide discrepancy between wholesale and retail prices. The former, being mainly world prices, were chiefly affected by the competition of producers, and were thus abnormally depressed. The latter, being internal prices, were more under the control of the competition of consumers. Injudicious inflation of wage-rates by Government interference, and the vast sums of money disbursed as 'social reform,' rendered that competition ineffective and forced up retail prices to an artificially high level. The steps taken by the Government and by private citizens since the crisis of last August have undoubtedly made it far less easy to maintain the excessive margin between wholesale and retail prices. Hence it has been possible, by closing the gap, to avoid an increase of retail prices

though wholesale prices have advanced. It should be noted, however, that this state of affairs is distinctly unstable, since the gap must soon be narrowed to the minimum necessary for free marketing of the commodities in question. Hence there is every reason to anticipate a serious rise in the figures of the Cost-of-Living Index. The efforts of the Government, by means of a series of protective duties, to check the depreciation of sterling will naturally, if they effect that object, tend to inflate wages in the protective industries and thus to neutralise any advantage obtained in the direction of currency stabilisation.

It would appear, therefore, that there is no way of evading the difficulty. It must be faced, or ruin will overtake the nation. The fallacy of 'increasing purchasing power' is at length recognised, and the terrible results of that policy are now but too manifest. One Government after another has acted upon that fatal delusion and has thus contributed to that exhaustion of our capital resources which is the root cause of our present discontent.

The politicians may writhle, and twist, and double in vain endeavours to evade the issue. But, sooner or later, it must be faced courageously, and the time is becoming short. A tariff, as I have already pointed out, is but a red herring, which may distract the attention of the people for a moment. The longer their attention is thus distracted, the more difficult will become the subsequent application of the only effective remedy for national bankruptcy.

Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. The Government, unless it is prepared to make a confession of complete failure, must take immediate action involving cruel and increased hardship to those sections of the population which are already suffering severely. It must issue orders which will strain to the utmost the wonderful patience of the poor. It must do this moreover, when political trade unionism, smarting from defeat at the General Election, will do everything possible to embitter the feelings of the workers and the workless.

Thus baldly stated, the problem may well cause politicians to tremble. But what I have written is but a reproduction of what I said during the election at every meeting in my constituency. The latter is a part of one of the most depressed areas in the country, and my neighbours have long been experiencing misfortunes almost too heavy to bear. Yet they were brave enough, not only to hear the truth, but to elect the man who spoke it, despite the soft words and the alluring promises of Socialist and Conservative opponents. To secure such a result it was of course necessary to throw reticence to the winds and to tell those courageous and patient neighbours of mine the story of a life lived among them and for them during the last twenty-five

years. The barriers of convention thus broken down, we allowed one another to know the depth of feeling long concealed.

Yet, making every allowance for the peculiar circumstances of that case, it is impossible not to recognise that the result of the General Election as a whole indicates that the people of Britain were prepared to trust their rulers and to submit with patience to the increased privations which constitute an inevitable prelude to the restoration of national solvency. But how far is that patience to be strained? How long are they to await the justification of that faith?

The efforts of the Protectionists in Parliament had, up to the beginning of the present recess, prevented the Government from carrying out the mandate of the electorate. The House of Commons was mainly occupied during the session with pettifoggery measures of Protection which, even if they fulfilled the wildest anticipations of their promoters, could have no appreciable effect upon the main problem. In actual fact they have done little save provoke retaliation and have dammed up one or two of the little trickles of international trade, which had hitherto escaped the notice of the enemies of commerce. Much of the time not thus occupied was absorbed by Mr. Winston Churchill's advocacy, in regard to India and Ireland, of the policy of rattling a scabbard which contains no sabre, and shaking a fist which is not mailed. In short the session was wasted, and to that extent Parliament has accentuated the difficulties of the problem which, sooner or later, must be faced.

Most of the ills, both public and private, wherewith mankind is afflicted can be resolved by the application of a moderate degree of courage and common sense. Others demand the exercise of an extreme measure of intelligence. There remain, however, a few crises in the affairs of men insoluble by such means, and yielding only to a higher wisdom. Let every intellectual effort be applied to the task of revealing our problem in the simplest possible form, by ruthlessly stripping away all side-issues and all extraneous matters. But, when that task is done, and the Ahrim stands before us naked and grim, the incantations of ingenuity can never bend him to our will. One master-charm, however, remains and, if we dare to use it, will prevail. That charm lies in the application of what I have termed the Aristocratic Principle when writing in this Review and elsewhere during the last dozen years. The Aristocratic Principle is this, that the well-being of the many can be secured only by the self-sacrifice of the few. Or, in other words, that progress arises, not from the enlightened self-interest of majorities, but from the enlightened self-sacrifice of minorities.

The application of this principle to the immediate problem

becomes manifest when we recognise that the first serious difficulties will be those arising from the policy of the Government in boldly refusing any longer to pretend that 'transitional' benefit under the Unemployment Acts is anything other than poor relief. Logically, therefore, it must not be granted unless the applicant can prove that he would otherwise be destitute. This new policy cuts at the very root of the upas-tree of 'Lloyd Georgism,' which term I use to indicate the system of granting enormous sums from tax revenue in lavish outdoor poor relief, and calling it by other names in order that no man may be ashamed to accept it. The prosperity of Great Britain in the nineteenth century arose from the hatred of the poor for the Poor Law. And the decline in real prosperity which began in 1910, is mainly due to the removal of that hatred by the simple device of calling poor relief by the name of insurance.

Many thousands of those who till recently received 'transitional' benefit are now faced, not only with the destruction of a pleasing hallucination, but also with a serious diminution of income. The battle will range around the 'means test' necessarily applied by the public assistance committees and will be embittered by the efforts of political trade unionism to raise anger and discontent among those who will undoubtedly suffer severely. There is, as I believe, but one way by which this great reform can be brought to fruition without serious danger of civil discord, and that is by convincing the people that Parliament is worthy of their trust and fit to enforce obedience to its decrees. At present, unhappily, the reputation of the House of Commons does not stand high. A careful analysis of its personnel leads to the conclusion that many constituencies are represented by members who by no conceivable criterion could be adjudged suitable for the positions which they hold. Fortunately, however, the electorate is but dimly aware of this state of affairs. Yet there is one weakness of the House of Commons which is patent to all and has done more than anything else to degrade the reputation of that body in the eyes of the people. I refer, of course, to the habit, to which members of Parliament are addicted, of taking from the public purse a considerable yearly sum of money which they use for their own purposes.

I would, therefore, put to the reader the question: Is it right, is it just, is it wise, is it even safe, for those who give orders inflicting privation upon thousands to continue to take that money? Surely those who give orders should uphold a higher code than those who obey orders. And surely, if a 'means test' is applied to the unemployed poor, it is only right that it should also be applied in the case of members of the House of Commons before salaries are granted to them.

Should the reader disagree with this proposition, it is well that he should ask himself whether there is any other policy which can so rapidly and so effectively convince the nation that Parliament and people are at one in their determination to face the situation, to endure the privations which are essential to economic recovery, and to climb undaunted the steep and stony path which alone can bring us to a brighter and a happier future.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

BRITAIN THROUGH FOREIGN EYES

It would be interesting and most helpful to us as a nation if, in our present time of crisis, we could really see ourselves as others see us. Unfortunately, this is not altogether possible, owing to the varying differences of mentality, outlook and interests which separate us from those of other countries, whose eyes are constantly focussed on what takes place within our shores. The foreigner looks at us through his own spectacles, while we can only hope to see ourselves in our own looking-glass. At the same time, much useful information about ourselves is to be obtained by discovering what the foreigner really thinks about us, in contrast to what he says on his best behaviour and writes in books and newspapers, where he feels bound to suppress what is likely to cause offence. It is important, indeed, for our own future guidance, that we should have as much knowledge as possible of how we appear to those who help to make up the world in which Britain must play a leading and responsible rôle, and it is possible that twenty years' experience of foreign travel in thirty-five different countries, and intimate conversations with foreigners of all kinds and of every class, may enable me to throw sufficient light on the subject to be of some value. But the utmost frankness is essential, if the best results are to be obtained. Since the Peace Conference the study of foreign affairs has spread in this country to sections of the people which seldom gave the matter a moment's thought before the Great War, but, unfortunately, there is reason to believe that the interest of many is centred on international movements of a Socialist or pacifist nature rather than on the factors composing the attitudes of one nation to another. This is nowhere more apparent than in the left wing tendencies of such institutions as now exist for the study of foreign questions. There is too much internationalism of a doctrinaire nature, and too little British foreign affairs of a practical kind. Consequently, questions are studied from the Geneva rather than the British angle, and such matters as form the subject of this article receive little attention where other sympathies are predominant.

We British are a peculiar race, with a special psychology that

stupifies almost every foreigner who tries to analyse it; and there is scarcely a foreign diplomatist in London to-day who would go so far as to say that he understands the British mentality. The task of foreign diplomatic missions in England is one of extreme difficulty at times when serious events are taking place, and it is not surprising that ambassadors and ministers are mystified by the British attitude to matters of vital importance. Indeed, it would have been strange if our reaction to the abandonment of the gold standard and fall of the pound had not caused some bewilderment; and it is not to be wondered at that diplomatists scratched their heads when they saw the reception accorded by the House of Commons to Mr. (now Lord) Snowden at the introduction of his Emergency Budget, and the sudden awakening of the nation from deplorable apathy to a keen sense of reality, followed by an unprecedented majority for the National Government at the General Election. Socialist leaders do not put patriotism before party on the Continent, where the action of Mr. MacDonagh, Mr. Snowden, and Mr. Thomas appeared in great contrast to the general attitude of international socialists. But perhaps the greatest shock came with the Prince of Wales's appeal to 'Buy British,' with a response so general that foreign goods can now scarcely be sold in the great London stores. These strange ways are typically British, and similar happenings could not possibly take place in any foreign country. The foreigner is as amazed at the effect of a national crisis in England as he is perplexed at the inconsistency of a highly responsible public and an irresponsible popular Press.

The policy of successive British Governments with regard to the Empire is incomprehensible to most foreigners, who cannot fathom the progressive principle of independence applied to the British Commonwealth of Nations. They cannot understand the British contention that the greater the degree of independence, self-reliance and responsibility progressively assumed on sound lines by the Dominions, the greater the real (although perhaps not the apparent) strength of the British Commonwealth, which has been built up on this principle, and not on the principle of dependence characteristic of other empires. Progressive stages of our Imperial policy are too often regarded abroad as signs of disintegration, regardless of the fact that, if there is one policy calculated to bring about disintegration, it is that of exercising control beyond the stage of development where control ceases to be essential. Foreigners also fail to realise that the future of the Empire's component parts is determined, not by restrictive measures, but by the wish and will of their people; and that, therefore, one of the main objects of British policy is to encourage the desire for unity and to remove anything that might produce

to wish for separation. As no restrictive legislation can possibly deter the people of any Dominion from carrying out their wish to throw off their British ties and become an independent State, the British Government have wisely removed such legislation as soon as sufficient strength for independent action has developed. Whereas we regard recent Imperial developments as wholesome and encouraging, the average foreigner, being of another psychology, places upon them an entirely different interpretation. Yet the process of reasoning which leads foreigners to their conclusions on this subject can be readily understood. They follow lines of logical reasoning, when logic plays quite a minor part in our Imperial system. If the British race had been logical throughout, there could never have arisen a structure on the lines of the British Empire, although we employ logical methods where they are considered to be beneficial. The practice of ignoring accepted principles and following the course best suited to circumstances is quite out of keeping with foreign ideas, so that the flexibility of our system is a cause of wonder and astonishment abroad. In foreign opinion our strange doings should lead to trouble according to the recognised political axioms which we disregard, and yet success is our portion. It is not surprising that this should be the cause of a certain form of jealousy, accompanied by secret admiration. The Germans, for example, have long been jealous of our achievements, and although superficially they have not disliked us as they have disliked the French, they have subconsciously disliked us more. They can admire French intellectual activity and organised French effort, and can understand and appreciate French successes, but it deeply offends them sometimes to see their own carefully planned schemes surpassed by the work of people who seemingly are apathetic and only put forward their best efforts as occasion demands. Germans find it difficult to appreciate the quality of 'common sense' inherent in the British nation, which is often more valuable than the results of pure organisation, and I believe this to have been responsible for much of the anti-British feeling in Germany. While it is quite logical that the Dominions should now have independent diplomatic representation abroad, it is contrary to all diplomatic precedent that the same sovereign should be represented by two embassies in one capital, or that the representative in London of His Majesty's Government in a Dominion should present his credentials to the very sovereign whom he represents. Yet it looks as if this system can be made to work among people of the elastic British mentality although it is difficult to imagine the result of such action by any foreign Power. Our methods lead the foreigner to believe that we cannot be anything but fools, and yet results prove that we must be

clever fools. Hence the contention that we are crafty has gained ground, and a popular pastime of politicians in foreign capitals consists of attempts to discover what the British Minister is thinking about, when his thoughts at the particular moment are quite likely concentrated on the prospects of the grouse season and his forthcoming leave of absence. Our secret, if there is any, consists merely of our capacity to regard men as human beings, and not as living units of a more or less mechanical nature who must follow certain definite laws in response to the application of various forms of pressure.

When it comes to India, the average foreigner cannot see how any nation in its sane senses can for one moment contemplate giving self-government to a vast Oriental territory of such racial, religious, and political complexity, with unlimited capacity for disturbance. The loss of India to the British Empire is regarded as a foregone conclusion, although few stop to consider what they mean by this, in their incapacity to appreciate British-Indian policy as being a natural outcome of our policy towards other territories which have now reached their goal within the British Commonwealth. Some contend that we should treat the Indians as equals, regardless of the fact that the term 'Indians' comprises a most complicated collection of races, religions and castes, many of which would be unwilling to treat us as equals, and that generalisation in this matter is out of the question. Others argue that it is only by rigid control and repressive measures that India can be governed and safeguarded from chaos. The only answer to this argument is that we believe in exercising control wherever necessary, and in withdrawing it as soon as it has proved itself to be unnecessary. Our Indian policy aims at a stage when India's capacity for independence and equality will be reached, and, although the process of reaching that stage must in this case be long and arduous, it will follow the same principle as in the case of the Dominions. There is nothing illogical about that, but we will not allow this logical process to override common sense. If circumstances arise where the most rigid control is demanded, that control will be exercised, not as a principle in itself, but in order to safeguard the logical process of evolution from damaging interruption. Whereas the foreigner is inclined to become a slave to principle, we British adopt principles as our guides, but we never fail to follow the line that seems best in particular circumstances without losing sight of the principle which we are following. Such conceptions confuse the purely logical mentality of the Latin and some Slav races, but they are becoming more and more understood by others abroad, especially by the northern peoples, who are renowned for their clearness of vision, and by such people as the Czechoslovaks, who have wriggled out of mental ruts found

to be to their disadvantage. The Round Table Conference and British relationships with Gandhi have given rise to much foreign comment, most of which is attributable to reasons already stated, and to the reluctance of many to admit that it is better now to face difficulties and unavoidable setbacks than blindly to go forward to worse obstacles and more painful experiences later on.

The term 'Dominion status' is the cause of much misunderstanding on the Continent, where it is too often deprived of its elasticity. It is forgotten that such Dominions as Canada and New Zealand have been Dominions for some time, although with a very different status from that laid down in the Statute of Westminster; and they enjoyed self-government for a long time before they became Dominions at all. The foreigner cannot, therefore, argue correctly that, because the most advanced degree of Dominion status is obviously impossible for India to-day, no form of that status can ever be applied to that country, except possibly in the very remote future. But this is the very form of argument which he likes to put forward. He cannot regard Dominion status except in a staid form, and he cannot see that the people of India have it in their own power to attain varying degrees of independence subject to advancement according to their own capacity and efforts. If you tell a foreign observer that the destinies of India in the matter of independence are in the hands of the Indians themselves, who should do everything in their power to prevent any situation arising which would justify a reconsideration of British pledges, he will reply that India is a British possession and we are great fools to let it slip from our grasp. The British answer to that is that we neither regard the people of India as our property, nor control India for our own selfish purposes, any more than a good parent would bring up his child as a possession rather than as a human being who has to make his way in the world. To adopt the former course is to stimulate separation in both camps, while the latter course is much more likely to lead to good mutual relations. This, however, is not as a rule the foreign view. I have dealt at some length with the foreign view of British Imperial policy, because there is every reason to believe that this will from now onwards occupy more and more the minds of the British public.

Let us now turn to European affairs. While the men and women of this country were busy making up their minds how to vote at the recent General Election, foreigners of every nationality were breathlessly awaiting their decision, as it was vitally important to most foreign nations whether the British electors decided to support a common sense policy of sobriety, stability, and national strength, or whether they cast their votes for supreme folly and ultimate ruin. Far from being due to a desire for our

downfall, this attitude was an outcome of the fact, scarcely realised in this country, that the world looks to Great Britain as a pillar of support in time of need, and naturally wants that pillar to be strong. Our special position in the world has imposed upon us certain responsibilities which no other country can undertake in the same way, and most foreign nations want us to be strong enough to make use of our special qualities of clear vision, honesty, and justice for their benefit and protection. They feared that, without the help of British influence, they might be at the mercy of Powers with doubtful intentions and methods, and they were convinced that the return to power of a Socialist Government in England would have so much reduced the world position of this country as to render negligible British influence in world affairs. I do not suggest that it is through love for us that foreign nations are so deeply concerned about our future. It is solely because a strong Britain can do a great deal to help others in their difficulties. Not only do they want us to be prosperous with a good and steady influence on international trade, but they are anxious that we should be in a position to say 'No' with sufficient force to back it up. As long as European nations, especially the smaller nations, know that Britain is strong enough to enforce justice and fair dealing they feel secure; otherwise, they feel more or less at the mercy of greedy and unprincipled neighbours. If Britain were to sink to the level of a second or third class Power, Europe would be in much the same position as a country without a police force, for, although this is seldom admitted, Britain does in fact serve as the diplomatic policeman of Europe and this service is universally appreciated. Having been a regular visitor to most of the European capitals I have heard what foreigners have to say on this subject in a way which seldom reaches British ears.

If the different nations have different reasons for wishing Britain to be strong, they are almost unanimous in their desire to have an honest, reliable, and disinterested friend to consult in time of need, and they are convinced that no other nation can take our place. Our crisis is therefore also a crisis to them. The northern countries of Scandinavia and the Baltic look to England to insist that the Baltic shall remain an 'open sea,' and vigorously to oppose any attempt of Germany or Russia to close it, and few sights give more satisfaction in the northern capitals than that of the white ensign fluttering in the breeze. A prominent Danish statesman once assured me that, 'in the event of trouble with Russia or Germany, he would recommend his Government to throw themselves unreservedly on Great Britain'; and in Holland I was told by a minister with long experience of European affairs that, as far as the possibility of a Russo-German conflict-

tion were concerned, 'Great Britain has the whole matter in the palm of her hands.' Further south, the Germans look to us to help them to get their fair share in the policy of Locarno, to sympathise with their desires for Treaty revision and with their Reparations difficulties, and to see that they get a fair deal with France. The French, on the other hand, want our strong support against possible German aggression; and have even gone to the length of heavily increasing their strength in submarines and other naval craft with a view to maintaining our support by means of a threat to our overseas food supply. They also expect our restraining influence in the Mediterranean zone, where the Italians regard Britain as a safeguard to their outlet from a sea in which they are virtually prisoners, and look to us for help in their disputes with France. Then, with Gibraltar in British hands, the Spaniards feel secure, which might not be so if this important strategical point were in the possession of others. In Central Europe the nations of the Little Entente would welcome British influence to counterbalance the weight of French domination, which, the people say, interferes with their independence. This is a daily topic of conversation in the coffee-houses of Prague and in the cafés of Belgrade and Bucharest, and in one country the advances made to our legation with a view to increasing British friendship have been positively embarrassing.

On the other side, Hungary has long regarded us as the Power most likely to help her to obtain justice in the matter of frontiers, and is bitterly disappointed that our present financial weakness has forced her to borrow from France who uses her financial strength for political purposes. Only a few months ago the Hungarian Prime Minister expressed to me his deep regret that Britain had given up her position of leadership in Europe. Austria is in much the same position and during a recent visit to Vienna I was assured by Dr. Schober, the Federal Vice-Chancellor, of Austria's deep gratitude to this country in her financial difficulties. When, however, British financial help was withdrawn, Austria was at the mercy of France, who made use of her financial strength to frustrate the plan for an Austro-German Customs Union. This was the direct result of British financial weakness, and is only a small indication of what would occur elsewhere if British restraining influence were withdrawn. Further afield, Egypt looks forward to an alliance with a powerful nation; she wants Britain to help her to hold a good position in the world, and to be strong enough to persuade the other Powers to modify, and finally to abolish, the Capitulations. These obsolete privileges are still the cause of untold injustice to the Egyptians, and only Britain, with her special position in Egypt, can really help in this matter.

Different is the case of the United States, a former part of the British Empire which has broken away politically but still retains to a large extent the attributes of Britain across the seas. The American people are still largely of British origin and mentality ; and, although a century of independence has brought about certain racial, cultural, and even linguistic changes, there is little fundamental difference of general outlook other than that produced by geographical conditions. Most Americans in their inner hearts look to Great Britain as the country from which they derive much of their culture, if not their origin, whatever they may casually think or say to the contrary ; and owing to the high percentage of British blood there is somewhere far down in the depths of most Americans a very warm feeling for this country. Being of a mentality very similar to our own, Americans understand the significance of the actions and reactions of the British people in the present crisis, which have inspired confidence in Washington and New York, and it is well to know, though unwise to misuse the knowledge, that this confidence in our power to overcome our difficulties is not easily shaken.

While foreign opinion of political Britain often falls wide of the mark, we have much of value to learn from the foreigner's criticism of our commercial methods. Foreign eyes have been wide open to the fact that since the conclusion of peace a marked degree of apathy has beset these islands, and that this has influenced British policies, internal and external, during the course of successive Governments, Conservative as well as Labour. They have seen the development of a dangerous form of lethargy, partly resulting from the Great War itself and partly from conditions of intensive prosperity stretching back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and they regard this as having been encouraged by the country's insular position, though actually precipitated by the difficulty in meeting changing world conditions. A striking example of this showed itself in British commercial methods, and it was obvious to them that British manufacturers could not, or would not, grasp the fact that the British manufacturing monopoly was a thing of the past, and that with changed economic conditions they now had to compete with other nations, modifying their methods in accordance with the new needs of the world markets. They saw the British nation on the drift, and became somewhat uneasy about the detrimental influence on world affairs resulting from our national weakness, intensified by the incompetence of the late Socialist Government. But, on the other hand, these same foreign eyes were shut to the fact that we were suffering from a debility which a first-class crisis could dispel. The foreigner was inclined to think that Britain was definitely on the decline ; and, when the crisis came, he could

scarcely believe that it was the beginning of the end, but he never thought of regarding it as the prelude of a great awakening.

Among the chief points of criticism and complaint put forward by foreigners throughout the world are those concerning our lack of commercial initiative, our inadequate and often unsuitable representation abroad, our diminished desire for work, and increased interest in sport and amusement. In order to illustrate the first two of these points I will give representative examples from my first-hand knowledge of the Baltic, South-Eastern Europe, and South America. There is no doubt that we enjoy the commercial good-will of Finland, and that there does exist in that country a demand for high-class goods and a readiness to spend; but British firms do not exert themselves to provide for Finnish wants, nor do they send to Finland suitable or sufficient representatives. In some cases they appoint sub-agents under Stockholm, which offends Finnish susceptibilities, while in other cases men are chosen owing to their knowledge of the Russian language and Russian methods for work in a country which has just thrown off the yoke of Russian domination. Neither course is likely to lead to good results, and it seldom seems to occur to the heads of firms to carry out personal investigations themselves. Finnish merchants complain that British manufacturers expect to be approached from the Finnish side, and make no effort on their part to obtain a footing in the market. For every British commercial traveller in Finland there are at least ten Germans, who push their goods with vigour and are successful. Yet the Finns want to trade with us and prefer dealing with us, but are compelled to buy from Germany and America in order to obtain the goods they want, although they would willingly pay up to 10 per cent. more to have British goods.¹ It is much the same story in the Baltic States, where I was told that even Japanese commercial travellers had broken ground unknown to British firms. It is contended that the superior attitude of the British manufacturer and merchant has deprived them of ready markets in the Baltic, and that they have largely themselves to blame for the loss of what must be added to a long list of lost opportunities which have characterised British foreign trade since the end of the Great War. Again, in Yugoslavia, where the people are so anxious to trade with us that they are making a serious and determined study of English in their spare time, it is quite depressing to hear them ask why British business men seldom visit their country, and why so much of our business with Yugoslavia is done through agents in Berlin, Vienna or Prague. The Yugoslavs want us to go and talk to them about their requirements, and to see what they have to offer; but, as

¹ This was the position before the world economic crisis.

there is so little attempt to establish good commercial relations, they have to give their orders to the continual stream of Germans, who give the country a good 'combing out' on their way to and from Roumania and elsewhere. Although a good part of the Yugoslav market consists of small trading, the same applies to several of the adjacent countries, so that this area as a whole is one which cannot be ignored. We cannot now afford to regard any trade area as beneath our dignity and remain a great commercial Power. The Germans have gained a footing in these markets by means of determination and hard work, and thereby deserve admiration and respect. We, on the other hand, have despised such paltry forms of commerce, and unless we radically change our outlook in this direction we have little hope of rebuilding our foreign trade. The foreigner knows that we have the capacity to turn our hands to commerce great and small in every land, but he also knows that we suffer from such an overwhelming conceit of our past commercial leadership that we still wish not only to pick and choose our markets, but actually to decide what class of goods each market should have.

In the Argentine I have known of cases where British firms have positively refused to supply a particular pattern of article specially suited to local requirements on the ground that the pattern was not being manufactured at the time and was not so good as that which they were offering. Indeed, many have been the occasions when agents in Buenos Aires have written and cabled in vain for the special kind of goods for which the local market was clamouring. As the Argentine is one of our best foreign markets, it was deplorable that such a state of affairs should have been allowed to prevail, as well as unfortunate that our commercial representation was far from what was to be desired.² The commercial traveller sent to the Argentine had in many cases no knowledge of Spanish, and usually made no attempt to associate with the people of the country, confining his attention to the British community in whatever centre he happened to be working. It is no exaggeration to say that the British community in Buenos Aires, chiefly composed of commercial representatives of a permanent or semi-permanent nature, know practically nothing of the people of the country among whom they live. These British residents, who live in a kind of water-tight compartment in the suburbs of Hurlingham and Belgrano, have practically no intercourse with the Argentines, whom they despise and refer to as 'Dagos,' although in many cases and in some ways the Argentine has just as much reason to adopt such an attitude. I was once told by a member of this community that 'it was not the thing' to associate with the

² This refers specially to the years 1900-01.

Argentines, and that any British resident marrying an Argentine was ostracised by his fellow-countrymen. It is unnecessary to comment on this state of affairs, but one may well ask whether such conditions are likely to promote the one purpose for which these men were sent to the Argentine—to promote British trade and commerce. I think it says a very great deal for the Argentines that their friendly feelings towards this country are what they are to-day; for, although the visit of the Prince of Wales must have had a neutralising effect, it could not change a permanent situation of long standing. This brings me to the all-important question of foreign commercial representation. In the traveller who represents British firms abroad the local prospective buyer often sees an efficient salesman of the 'bacon and eggs' variety, who has little or no experience of the ways of dealing with foreigners and has to do business through an interpreter. Seldom does the foreign merchant find a man who can adapt himself to the manners and customs of the country, or as fully to appreciate that country's wants, and on still rarer occasions does he see a British traveller ready to come to terms of personal friendship, although this is quite usual among travellers of other nations. The language question is no doubt a national failing, partly due to our insularity and partly to the increasing use of the English language abroad; but in the profession responsible for the representation of our foreign trade it is essential that this failing should be eliminated. It is not the fault of the travellers themselves, but of the whole system under which they are employed. British commercial travellers throughout the world are an exceedingly fine body of men, who have often been chosen on account of their selling capacity at home, but have seldom been encouraged to develop the qualities necessary for building up foreign trade under changed trading conditions. In view of recent developments the responsibility of these British trade envoys has been greatly increased; and, if we are going to undertake with determination the task of developing our export trade, we must see to it that our foreign travellers not only possess all the necessary qualifications of character, adaptability and education, but that they are fully equipped with a special technical training which is better than that of any other nation. Their numbers should also be greatly increased, and their whole status raised to that of a most honourable profession bound together by ties of loyalty and co-operation.

In dealing with the last two points of foreign criticism the plainest speaking is essential, even at the risk of unpopularity. Foreign business men who come to England bitterly complain that it is almost impossible to find the heads of the British firms with whom they want to do business. They say that it is almost

hopeless to look for them in their offices, as that is the last place in which they are likely to find them. The fact that British trade fails to capture foreign markets is no mystery to the visitor from abroad, who says that the leaders are merely 'playing at work,' while those of other nations are really working. Under normal conditions the senior members of business firms in England are rarely to be found in their offices before 11 a.m. or after 4 p.m., and during this brief working day there is an interval of, say, one and a half to two hours for lunch. Then there is the long week-end, not to mention the Derby, Ascot, and all the other weeks when practically no work is done. At holiday times, such as Christmas and Easter, the subordinate staffs have a long week-end, but the chiefs extend this into a long week or ten days. Then at the annual holiday season, when the subordinate has a fortnight's holiday, the men on whom the responsibility rests absent themselves for an indefinite period. Is it to be wondered at that foreign firms, wishing to make contracts, go where they can find people with whom to do business? Important decisions cannot be taken without the principals, and in England the principals are very often not there to take them. In America, France, Germany, or any other commercial country, the chiefs of firms confine their holidays to reasonable limits, while in England they throw away valuable opportunities in their enthusiasm for almost everything except work. In most countries business is in full swing by 9 a.m. at the latest, whereas in London, if you ring up an office at 10 a.m. and ask for a responsible member of the firm, you are told that there is nobody there. While complaints on these lines are perhaps a little exaggerated by irritated business men from the Continent who have wasted a good deal of their valuable time, there is unfortunately much solid truth in what they say. London is by far the worst offender; and what can be said of the Lowlander's dislike for work does not apply in the same way to the business houses of Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, or Glasgow. The fact, however, should be realised that we as a nation have got into the habit of regarding work as a secondary matter, and this applies to all classes of the community. What has mattered most has been sport and amusement, work being merely a means to this end. Football, cricket, tennis, golf, etc., have long been the matters uppermost in the English² mind, and the interest taken by all classes in cricket matches played thousands of miles across the ocean is out of all proportion to that taken in matters of vital importance to the nation at home. Here the foreigner is undoubtedly right, and there is urgent need for the most far-reaching change in our whole attitude to this question if we are to regain our position

² On the whole, this does not apply to Scotland.

in the world markets. Not many months ago my attention was drawn to a street poster of one of our great newspapers, containing in the largest type the words 'Four Pages of Sport.' This speaks for itself, and was the subject of much comment by foreigners in London at the time. Now that we are, and will for some time continue to be, faced with grave national and international difficulties calling for determined and sustained effort, it would surely be more appropriate to devote spare time to voluntary service rather than to 'knocking balls about,' or watching this process being carried out by others. Let there be no mistake about it that the present crisis will not be solved by men alone, but by men under the pressure of events, and there is no saying what these events may be. In view of this, it may well be asked whether we, as a nation, yet fully realise the gravity of the times in which we live.

In this article I have endeavoured to show how essential is the strength of Britain to the nations of Europe and the world in general. At the League of Nations honest, disinterested, and well-balanced influence is badly needed at a time when even great Powers are inclined to use Geneva as a means of furthering their own selfish designs. With Europe in its present state of instability and political tension, the greatest safeguard for peace is Britain with a strong foreign policy able to back up her influence for good with the peaceful power of the British Navy. I have witnessed many visits of the British Fleet to foreign ports, and on every recent occasion the value attached to our ships of war has been their power to safeguard peace, and, if there is one fundamental reason why foreign nations see the need of a strong and prosperous Britain, it is for the purpose of holding in check the selfish ambitions of any Power that proves to be an obstacle to the reconstruction of Europe. Hence these nations consider it to be of the utmost importance that Great Britain should maintain her contact with European affairs rather than adopt a policy of detachment with a British Commonwealth orientation, and they are anxiously awaiting our decision. In view of the uncertain outcome of the Disarmament Conference, with its important bearing on the question of the peace treaties and the *status quo*, as well as that of Reparations and debts, the only possible indication of our present intentions must be wrapped up in the phrase '*ça dépend*'.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

THE first session of the Indian Round Table Conference, which ended last January, presented no very formidable puzzles to the intelligent observer in this country. The outlines of the Indian problem had been vividly drawn for him in the first volume of the Simon Report, and the proceedings of the Conference itself were not too obscure or too drowned in discussion of details to be understandable. The emergence of the grand and inspiring ideal of a Federation of All-India, which was accepted by every section of opinion, both British and Indian, represented at the Conference, and the absence of other major attractions from the political stage in London, focussed and held attention on the Conference in a quite extraordinary manner. Even the problem of the future of the minority communities seemed fairly simple then, because it appeared to be mainly a question of the future relations between the Hindu and the Moslem communities, with even the Sikh problem occupying a somewhat minor position.

But the second session, which ended on December 2, was conducted in very different circumstances. In the first place, the Conference was all but crowded right off the stage by events of vast importance and thrilling interest, both at home and abroad, amongst them being the major diversion of one of the most important and extraordinary General Elections in our history. Further, the work on which the Conference was engaged had hardly any of the dramatic quality of the first Conference. Voyages of exploration and pioneering were replaced by the more humdrum if not less vital tasks of road-making and home-building, with all the infinitely dull details associated with such occupations. Reports in the Press of the day-to-day discussions in the Federal Structure Committee over the size and shape of the different parts of the constitutional and administrative machinery for the new Federal Government of India could not mean much to, or arouse any great interest among, those not actually concerned in the process of constitution-making. Until towards the end of the Conference there were no speeches of general interest and importance, like those of Lord Reading, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Muhammad Shah, the Maharaja of Bikanir, and others,

at the first Conference, if we except from this statement one or two speeches by Mr. Gandhi, which, however, were more concerned with the point of view of himself and of the Congress Party than with the work actually before the Conference.

A large part of the recent session was taken up with the work of a sub-committee of the Federal Structure Committee, which was set up to attempt to come to some agreement on the very thorny subject of the financial arrangements in the future federated India. Besides the Federal Structure Committee, the only other committee of the Conference which had occasion to meet during this second session was the Minorities Committee, and this met only once or twice to announce that no general agreement had been reached on the matters at issue between the majority and the minority communities. Throughout all this time the newspapers were full of constantly changing rumours as to the action which Mr. Gandhi, or the Moslems, or the Sikhs, or the depressed classes, or one or other of the many interests and communities represented meant to take if this, that, or the other conditions were, or were not, fulfilled. It was quite obvious that an immense amount of activity was going on behind the scenes, outside the Conference, but it was absolutely impossible for even the shrewdest outsider to know what really was happening, or to what end things were moving. It is not surprising, therefore, that the general impression left by the Prime Minister's statement of December 1, which wound up the Conference, is one of bewilderment.

As far as the main issues of the Conference are concerned, the statement went to leave things much as they were left by the Prime Minister's previous statement of January 19, with which he closed the first session of the Conference. It is true that certain most important and, it is to be hoped, fruitful arrangements have been made for carrying on the exploratory work of the Conference continuously, and for ensuring continuing contact between the Conference and the British Government between now and the time when the Conference shall meet again. But, superficially, it does look as though the really vital questions connected with the future status and place of India in the British Commonwealth and the extent of autonomy which she is to receive have merely been shelved for a further Conference. In order to show that this superficial impression is far removed from the truth it will be necessary to go into the doings of the Conference in some detail.

Let us begin by reminding ourselves exactly what it was that the second session of the Conference was summoned to do. The object, and certainly the hope, with which it assembled was to take the sketch of a Federal Government for All-India, as outlined

at the first session, and to discuss, and to get as complete an agreement as possible on, the details which had to be filled in before the various parties at the Conference could know what the future Federal Constitution to which they were committing themselves would be like. These details related to the size and composition of the various legislative bodies; the allotment of seats in the Federal Legislature between British India and the Indian States; the distribution of financial resources between the Federation and its units, the Ministry and its relations with the Legislature; the distribution of legislative powers between the Federal and Provincial Legislatures; and the authority by which the Constitution should be interpreted in case of dispute. Also, it was realised that the vastly important details of the safeguards, as outlined by Lord Reading, in the matters of defence, finance, foreign relations, and commercial discrimination would have to be further examined and more explicitly defined. Lastly, it was hoped that an agreement might be reached on the subject of the future relations between the majority and the minority communities and the safeguards demanded by one side or the other in the new Constitution.

Those who followed the proceedings of the first session of the Conference will remember that it resolved itself into nine sub-committees, which, collectively, covered the whole immense field of government in India and the relations between India and Britain. These sub-committees were

- (1) Federal Structure
- (2) Provincial Constitution
- (3) Minorities
- (4) Burma
- (5) North-West Frontier Province
- (6) Franchise
- (7) Defence
- (8) Services
- (9) and

The Federal Structure Sub-committee was set up to explore the problem of the machinery of the All-India Federal Government, whilst the Provincial Constitution Sub-committee was to perform the same office for the Provincial Government. The purposes of the other committees are clear enough from their titles, and, as is well known, with the exception of Burma (which is now the subject of a Round Table Conference all to itself), the minorities question, and the Federal Structure, all the questions comprised in the work of the other committees were disposed of as far as they could be by the Round Table Conference. Thus, the present session of the Conference had to concern itself only

with the work of the Federal Structure Sub-committee and the Minorities Sub-committee.

As we have seen, all the basic and really difficult problems arising out of the adjustment of the relations between the Indian States and British India and the proposed new Federation on the one side, and between the Federation itself and Great Britain on the other side, had still to be settled, and it cannot be denied that their settlement was not likely to be rendered more easy by the inclusion in the delegates of Mr. Gandhi as representative of the Congress point of view, and of one or two other delegates, who, whilst not officially representatives of Congress, nevertheless were closely identified with it and adhered to the greater part of its policy. From the beginning, the minorities question overshadowed all the work of the Conference and severely restricted the freedom of the members of the Federal Structure Sub-committee in dealing with such important parts of the machinery of government as the composition of the Federal Legislature, and the relations between this and the Federal Executive. More than this, it became apparent fairly early in the proceedings that the Moslems, the depressed classes and a section of the Indian Christians were not prepared to discuss the basic problem of transitional limitations on the autonomy of the proposed Federal Government in the four important branches of government mentioned above—namely defence, finance, foreign relations, and commercial discrimination—until the question of minority safeguards had been got out of the way.

It was precisely for the purpose of discussing the future relations between the British Government and the All-India Federation that Mr. Gandhi had come to England, and it was in these that most of the delegates representing the various Hindu sections of politics were most keenly interested. The dangers of an absolute deadlock were therefore not inconsiderable. However, negotiations between Mr. Gandhi and certain leading representatives of the various minorities were at once undertaken, and for a time it was hoped that these might lead to a settlement. Therefore, in the meantime, the Federal Structure Committee dealt with such matters as the election of members of the Federal Legislature, the relations between its two Chambers, the creation of a Supreme Court, and certain other more or less technical details into which communal interests and claims did not enter. Also, during this time, one very important piece of work was accomplished by a sub-committee of the Federal Structure Committee. This sub-committee, which met under the chairmanship of Lord Peel, went into the distribution of financial resources between the Federation and its different units, and submitted a Report which ultimately received the assent of the Federal Struc-

ture Sub-committee. It is true that this Federal Finance Report dealt with general ideas and principles and not with details, and that the work of planning the Federal Budget, and distributing the burden of raising the revenue required equitably between the different units of the Federation, has still to be done. Nevertheless, the sub-committee achieved a large measure of agreement on certain general principles, and, by its suggestion of a further examination of the whole question by expert committees (a suggestion which was accepted after some modifications by the Federal Structure Sub-committee), it does seem to have pointed the way to a solution of the very formidable problems raised by the financial arrangements of the proposed Federation.

The sub-committee further provided an opportunity for certain of the Indian States to ventilate their grievances in regard to the contributions which some of them are required to make to the Government of India, and there is no doubt that the frank and open exchange of views between representatives of British India and representatives of the Indian States was beneficial to both sides and will prove helpful in the future. There was no part, in fact, of the Federal Finance Sub-committee's work which did not bristle with possibilities of misunderstanding of a grave kind, and that it should have been able to achieve a unanimous Report—largely inconclusive though it may be—was no mean achievement.

But, while these proceedings of the Federal Structure Committee were going on, it had become quite clear that no settlement of the minorities problem could be hoped for by agreement between the members of the different communities represented. Nothing could be more foolish than to attempt to apportion blame for the breakdown of these negotiations, because they were dealing with fundamental things in which the delegates concerned felt that matters of principle were involved. The representatives of the minorities, with the exception of Dr. Datta—one of the Indian Christian representatives—were quite immovable on the subject of separate electorates for their communities. They wanted their representatives in the Legislatures to be elected by constituencies organised on a communal basis—that is, Moslem members to be elected entirely by Moslems, depressed classes representatives to be elected entirely by depressed class voters, and so on. Mr. Gandhi was prepared to admit separate electorates for Moslems and Sikhs in existing conditions, but resolutely opposed them for all other communities. Some of the other Hindu representatives at the Conference, however, were not disposed to accept separate electorates for anybody. But the most formidable difficulty of all centred in the arrangements to be made for the two provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, in which

the Moslems are in a majority. There, the Moslems demand that they shall be given an absolute majority of the seats in the two Provincial Legislative Councils. In both the Punjab and Bengal, then, they demand that 51 per cent. of the total numbers of members shall be Moslems elected by Moslem constituencies. This particular demand aroused unrelenting opposition from the majority of the Hindus, and, in the Punjab, the difficulty of the problem is greatly accentuated by the position of the Sikhs. The Sikhs number 11 per cent. of the population of the Punjab, but they claim 30 per cent. of the representation in the Provincial Legislative Council, where they at present occupy about 18 per cent. of the seats. They will fight for this representation with all the traditional stubbornness of their race, and, in any case, they will never willingly agree to a statutory Moslem majority in their Provincial Council. The Hindu-Moslem-Sikh triangle thus presented sufficient complications for those who wanted to solve the communal problem, but additional complications were introduced by the claims of other minorities, particularly the depressed classes and the Europeans, for separate representation and certain other safeguards. We have seen that Mr. Gandhi declined to admit these other claims and especially he set his face absolutely against the recognition of the depressed classes as a separate minority entitled to separate electorates. Thus, the negotiations between him and the various minority representatives ended ineffectively, and, ultimately, the representatives of all the minorities, except the Sikhs combined and drew up a memorandum of their own which they presented to the Prime Minister, to be included in the proceedings of the Conference. This memorandum demanded statutory safeguards for the protection of the religion, personal law, and culture of the minority communities, and for a fair share in the government of the country and in the Government services. An annex to the Report showed the demands of the different minorities for certain proportions of the seats in the various legislative bodies to be set up, and especially asked that the depressed classes should have separate electorates and reserved seats for at least twenty years, and until direct adult suffrage for the community was established. Other sections set forth the special claims of the Moslems, depressed classes, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans. The special claims of the latter were for rights and privileges equal to those enjoyed by Indian-born subjects in all industrial and commercial activities, and for the maintenance of existing rights in regard to procedure at criminal trials. The various claims set forth in this document are very definite and positive, and if it had been possible to secure the adhesion of the Sikhs it would have cleared the ground to the extent of making one comprehensive, harmonized demand out of

what had hitherto been a number of separate and, to a large extent, conflicting demands. The Hindus would then have been able to look at the position of the minorities as a whole, and have bargained, had they so desired, with a small and workmanlike committee of minority representatives. However, the abstention of the Sikhs from these subsequent deliberations of the minority communities has left the very thorny Punjab problem very much where it was before.

The failure to arrive at a settlement of the communal question was in itself a very serious setback to the work of the Conference, which was still further upset by the General Election and the change of Government. Many of the British members of the Federal Structure Committee were away from its work for about three weeks whilst they were fighting their elections, and, as Lord Reading was fully occupied with the very heavy responsibilities of the Foreign Office until after the election, Lord Sankley was left with Lords Peel, Lothian, and Snell to represent the three British parties. Naturally enough the air was thick with rumours as to the effect which the change of Government would have on the Conference, and the fact that the rumours were different every day and that they invariably contradicted each other did nothing to detract from their depressing effect. Nevertheless, Lord Sankley and his British and Indian colleagues persevered gallantly with their work, discussing innumerable tedious details until the election should be over, and until the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers should be able once more to turn their attention to the affairs of India. It cannot be denied that by the beginning of November the affairs of the Conference had reached a critical stage. Its wheels had been moving more and more slowly. The somewhat formal and less important parts of the projected new Indian Constitution and of the work of the Conference had been ground slowly but exceeding small, and now the machinery wanted grist of a more satisfactory and important kind. In a word, practically the whole of the Hindu delegation of the Conference wanted to go on to the big subject of the powers to be given to the Federal Government and the future relations between Federal India and Great Britain. But here the difficulty already referred to cropped up, for the Moslems and the depressed classes made it known that they were not prepared to discuss these vital questions until they knew where they stood with regard to their claims for safeguards for their own communities in the new Constitution. On the other hand, it was quite certain that if these subjects were not discussed the Hindus would regard it as a breach of the agreement on which they had been brought to the Conference, and, consequently, they would regard the Conference as a complete failure, with the results of which they

would have nothing to do. Further, opinion among the Indian Princes in regard to the immediate steps to be taken to achieve Federation had become divided, and an influential group, including the rulers of Patiala, Dholpur, and Indore, had drawn up and circulated a scheme which insisted on the attainment of a certain measure of organisation and unity among the Indian States themselves before these proceeded to federate with British India. The representatives or rulers of certain other States also differed in some important particulars from the Maharaja of Bikaner and the Nawab of Bhopal, who represented, so to speak, the official view of the Chamber of Princes in India and adhered to the principles set forth in their speeches at the first session of the Conference.

Thus, from various causes, a measure of doubt and uncertainty was imported into the atmosphere of the Conference, some of whose members accordingly became more susceptible to rumours than they would otherwise have been. Unfortunately, certain English newspapers did not hesitate to give circulation to rumours of a kind calculated to excite the most lively apprehension, particularly in the minds of the delegates belonging to the various sections of Hindu political opinion. The most upsetting of these rumours, which was repeated in slightly different forms several times, was to the effect that the National Government in England had been coerced by the reactionary elements in Parliament into a decision to close down the Conference as early as possible, and ultimately to offer to India nothing more than provincial autonomy with no responsibility at the Centre. The effect of this rumour on many of the delegates, conscious as they were of the formality of much of the work on which they had hitherto been engaged, and oppressed by the failure to solve the communal problem, and by other discouraging features—notably the differences of opinion which had come about in the ranks of the Indian Princes—was serious. It was very largely believed, and, in fact, it induced some of the leading delegates to the Conference, including men like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mr. Sastri, and Mr. Jayakar, to issue a letter to the Press in which they stated that if this were the intention of His Majesty's Government they would have nothing whatever to do with working any Constitution which might be set up. The matter was brought up inside the Conference, and the representatives of the English Labour Party joined the signatories to the letter in asking for a clear statement of the Government's intentions with regard to the future of the Congress and the future Government of India. The sequence of events and the attitude taken up at the Conference by Lord Searcy, Lord Reading, and Sir Samuel Hoare, himself, in the end dispelled these suspicions, and the Conference proceeded

to discuss the vital matters aforesaid, but, unfortunately, without the participation of the Moslems and the depressed classes. Nevertheless, the discussion had the effect of very largely dispelling the gloom which had previously hung over the Conference, and it was with what might fairly be called hopeful expectancy that the majority of the delegates awaited the Prime Minister's statement. The speeches at the plenary session of the Conference showed clearly the developments in the grouping of opinion, which have been noticed above. Thus the hesitancy of certain of the States to take at once the full step to Federation was expressed, notably in the speech by His Highness the Maharajah of Indore; the Hindu delegates all round the table showed that they would look at nothing but a simultaneous advance both in the Provinces and at the Centre, whilst most of the Moslem spokesmen reaffirmed their known desire for immediate provincial autonomy, leaving the changes at the Centre to follow as conditions became suitable.

The Prime Minister was therefore in a position of no small difficulty in trying to reconcile these various points of view, and also, of course, in having to harmonise divergent opinions in his own Cabinet. If all these considerations are borne in mind, it must be admitted that the statement with which Mr. MacDonald closed this session of the Conference on December 1 is a masterly document. In its opening paragraphs it reaffirms, without hesitation or limitations, the promise contained in his earlier statement of January 19, 1931. Speaking as head of the National Government, he repeated that the view of His Majesty's Government was that responsibility for the government of India should be placed upon Legislatures Central and Provincial, with certain provisions which may be necessary to guarantee during the period of transition the observance of certain obligations and also to guarantee the political liberties and rights of the minorities. As regards the Central Government, it was again stated that, subject to defined conditions, the present Government repeats the pledge of the late Government that they would recognise the principle of the responsibility of the Executive to the Legislature if both were constituted on an All-India Federal basis. The statement then quite frankly revealed the difficulties in which His Majesty's Government had been placed by the failure to arrive at a settlement of the communal question, and also by the position of the Indian States. Mr. MacDonald, however, explained that he mentioned these difficulties so that they should be recognised as important factors in the situation, and not as insuperable barriers to further progress. Of particular weight and importance are the words in which he refers to the possibility that the leaders of the different communities might not be able to reach agreement

among themselves on the matters in dispute. In such an event His Majesty's Government would be compelled to apply a provisional scheme, for, as the Prime Minister informed his hearers, even such a formidable difficulty as this would not be allowed to block progress. But the consequence would be that the settlement of the disputed points, and decision as to the constitutional safeguards necessary for the various communities, would have to be left entirely to His Majesty's Government. Clearly such a solution is in every way inferior to a settlement by consent, and Mr. MacDonald in stressing this aspect made it the basis of an appeal for further endeavours by the community leaders to come to a mutual agreement.

Turning next to the future of the Round Table Conference and to the work which it had been doing, the Prime Minister said that since the Conference had indicated their desire that no change should be made in the Constitution of India until this could be done by one comprehensive statute covering the whole field, His Majesty's Government would not here and now come to any irrevocable decision on the subject of immediate advance by way of provincial autonomy with advance at the Centre later on. He further proposed to carry forward the whole work of the Conference on these present lines by nominating a working committee of the Conference to remain in being in India, and, through the Viceroy, to keep in effective touch with the Government of this country. Also a franchise committee would be set up to investigate and advise on the revision of the franchise of constituencies. Further, the two financial committees referred to above would also be formed and set to work as soon as possible. The announcement of the coming formation of these working bodies, and of the intention to set them to their tasks at the earliest possible moment, is of particular value, for it not only provides a guarantee of good faith, but also ensures that the work of the Conference shall not, so to speak, grow cold. Last January the Conference dispersed in a glow of enthusiasm which was allowed very largely to die down during the delay of several months in which nothing very tangible was done. This time, however, the public, both here and in India, will be able to watch the continuous progress of work vital to the building up of the new Federal Constitution.

It is certain that the vast majority of the Indian representatives at the Conference warmly welcomed the statement, and even Mr. Gandhi did not condemn it outright. It would, however, be unwise to speculate on the Mahatma's future course of action, for it will be decided by events in India. The state of affairs in Bengal and in the United Provinces, which forces the Government of India into necessary measures of a somewhat extreme kind to

guarantee law and order, will not provide a particularly favourable atmosphere for co-operation by the Congress. But co-operation by all other organised sections of Indian political opinion is reasonably assured. If Mr. Gandhi is wise he will not only do his utmost to discourage the troubles in Bengal and the United Provinces, but also he will abstain from civil disobedience, for, in the present condition of Hindu-Muslim relations, widespread unrest is bound to be followed by very grave communal disorders. The bearing of these on the future of the Round Table Conference and all that it stands for need not be emphasised.

To sum up, the Prime Minister's statement keeps the Conference not only in being but in active work. It retains the grand ideal of an All-India Federation and maintains the conditions in which its achievements can be striven for by Indian Princes, British India, and Great Britain alike, and, inside British India, by the leaders of both majority and minority communities. This achievement will not be a thing of to-day or of to-morrow, and it may be that by general consent a beginning will be made through the adopting and working of provincial autonomy. But however that may be, the Prime Minister's statement is a vindication of the good faith and an earnest of the goodwill of this country. The rest is in the hands of the people of India themselves.

J COATMAN

DISARMAMENT

I. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

LITTLE public attention was paid in England during the latter part of 1931 to the subject of armaments and the forthcoming World Conference. Quiet preparatory work was done behind the scenes, but little of this received either public or parliamentary attention. Two defects of modern democratic government are that public opinion can only concentrate on a very few subjects at a time, and without the drive of public opinion and agitation the political Government of the day, meaning the Cabinet and the House of Commons, is apt to let even the large problems drift. Fortunately the other Government can be relied on to function. I refer to the able civil servants who man the departments. These continue steadily with a task once they have been put to it, and especially when they know that decisions will have to be taken by their political masters in the future. But then, unless the politicians have had their minds prepared, there are further delays. And to induce the politicians to prepare their minds it is usually necessary for a public demand to be forthcoming.

Apply the above conditions to the particular case of the forthcoming World Disarmament Conference. As I write these words it is still expected to meet in February, as the outcome of over six years of steady work by the international civil servants of the League of Nations, aided by the officials of the diplomatic services and the experts of the fighting forces of the States members of the League. This preliminary work, done on the Preparatory Commission and its various committees, was wound up by a supreme effort of the politicians in 1930. There are rumours of postponing the World Conference till May; for which there are many favourable arguments. But, assuming that this momentous Conference begins in February, it is, to say the least, regrettable that little has been done to prepare the public mind, or to mobilise public opinion, especially in Great Britain. For we are as much concerned as any other nation. Indeed, as the principal trading Power, it can be argued that we are more con-

cerned than any other nation. Peace, and the conditions of peace, with the absence of uncertainty and apprehension that go with these conditions, are more necessary than ever for international commerce. The actual drive to-day comes from the United States of America and Germany.

True, there is a continuous campaign of propaganda for the League generally, and disarmament in particular, by the branches of the various League of Nations societies and unions in this and other countries. In the United States of America various peace societies, religious organisations, business men's 'brotherhoods,' the Rotarians, women's organisations, and many other similar bodies, have paralleled this European activity, not particularly in support of the League of Nations, but for disarmament. And in the United States of America this movement is the most powerful in the world. The German drive is strong because of a feeling of national inferiority, bound up with the war guilt question, caused by the slow progress made in world disarmament compared with the swift and compulsory disarmament of Germany and her former allies after the war. And the Germans are beginning to claim the right to re-arm in the absence of positive results in other countries. But efforts of this kind in most of the countries concerned have been made for over a decade. There have been many conferences concerned with armaments, or means of preventing war, the Preparatory Commission itself being the most important.

Yet the melancholy fact remains that during the year 1931 the six strongest nations, strongest in the military sense, spent more than £467,000,000 between them on the mechanism of war. The work of the last ten years has been preparatory to the forthcoming Conference. Yet the public mind appears lethargic. It is as if a great stage drama had been rehearsed for a long period, with adequate advertisement, but the public lacked interest in the opening night and even in the run of the piece itself. With public opinion, national and international, still unaroused, with the days running on, and with the momentous meeting at Geneva approaching, there is a disquieting lack of public pressure on Governments and Parliaments. That is not all. Public opinion can usually be mobilised for a great cause. But in this case the issues are not simple, and cannot be explained in a hurry. Educational work is badly needed, and it has hardly begun.

If success is to be achieved at this forthcoming World Conference, some departure from the methods hitherto pursued will probably have to take place. Without a *political* complexion being given to the Conference it is likely to become embogged in a *series* of statistical calculations on the size and power of *armies*, the number of foot-soldiers and cavalymen, the details

of tanks and aeroplanes, the size and gun-power of warships, and the amount of money to be spent on all national armaments in the future. Indeed, as much progress as can be made in this direction has been made. And a study of the elaborate tables of the Draft Convention of 1930 will strengthen this view. The arithmetical method carries us no further. For example, it is far easier to limit naval armaments by agreement than land and air forces. Navies depend so much on material, the actual ships and their armaments, that it should be comparatively easy in theory to reach agreement on the size and strength of fleets. There is not the complication due to the fact that it is easy to raise armies for land warfare in a comparatively short time, however much nations are artificially disarmed, or that civil aviation as a means of transport has come to stay and is rapidly extending. Where there are civilian pilots, mechanics, and commercial aeroplanes, military air forces can be rapidly mobilised. It takes three years to build a battleship and actually longer to construct the heaviest of the artillery carried afloat—longer indeed, than the hull and engines.

There have been three Naval Conferences for the limitation of fleets, and there are only five nations that really matter here. In 1921 the heavy ships of the line were limited by international agreement, in 1927 an unsuccessful attempt was made to limit other types of warships. In 1930 the London Naval Conference made a third great attempt, which resulted in complete disagreement between France and Italy and complete agreement between Britain and America. But the latter agreement was extremely expensive. Far from reducing naval armaments, it has meant an actual increase of the British Fleet—while the American Navy has to be strengthened, to bring it up to parity with our own, that the agreement will cost the American people \$1,000,000,000. As the comparatively simple task of limiting the navies of a handful of Powers has been so costly, it is not difficult to sympathise with those who dread the outcome of a World Conference on all armaments if it is merely to be an attempt at arithmetical limitation of weapons, soldiers and sailors, and aeroplanes.

It is the fashion in certain quarters to blame the French for standing in the way of an all-round reduction of armaments. Yet the French have been perfectly logical throughout. If they can be assured of security, they agree to play their part in all-round reductions, and security to the French means that other nations are prepared to stand by France in resisting an aggressor. It is also customary, in pleading for an accelerated pace in bringing about armaments reductions, to quote the obligations in the Treaty of Versailles and in the Covenant of the League of Nations, together with the memorandum to the German Government

signed on behalf of the Governments of the Allies, in which the undertaking was accepted to follow Germany's example in disarmament.¹ But it is not so customary to remember that, simultaneously with the signature of the Versailles Treaty, a treaty of military guarantee for France was initialed on behalf of the United States and Britain. The Senate refused to ratify either the Treaty of Versailles or this treaty of military aid. The Treaty of Locarno has, to a certain extent, taken its place. Here England and Italy must defend France's frontiers against German aggression, and also Germany's frontiers against French aggression. The elaborate series of treaties and alliances concluded between France and Poland, and France and the Little Entente, are part of the same search for security. France's political and military alliance with Poland is a successor to the political and military alliance with pre-war Russia. France fears for her two land frontiers; and it is an object of French policy, accepted by all political parties, to seek further reassurances.

The old proposal for an international police force, which figured largely in the war-time conversations out of which grew the idea of the League of Nations itself, has been revived. The idea is apt to be treated with hostility in America, and derision in England. The French treat the suggestion very seriously. It is not at all unlikely that it will be put forward by France, or one of her friends, at the forthcoming Disarmament Conference. Except in a very small circle, it has hardly been discussed in England during recent times.

What will certainly have to be discussed, and with great seriousness, if anything substantial is to result from the forthcoming Conference, is some machinery for mutual aid that will be more elaborate and will give more confidence than the existing sanctions in the Covenant. This will come up with regard to commerce protection at sea in case of a breach of the peace. Unless England is prepared to meet the American, French, and Italian points of view with regard to the safety of seaborne commerce, it is extremely unlikely that any progress will be made towards the further reduction and limitation of naval armaments; and then it will be extraordinarily difficult to reduce land and air armaments. And it is an unfortunate fact that public opinion in Britain, the country most concerned for strategical, hereditary and sentimental reasons, is almost totally unprepared for a reconsideration of this question in the light of modern conditions and developments.

I have referred already to the difficulty of focussing even informed public opinion on anything but the most immediate

¹ Cf. Clemenceau's promise on behalf of the Allies to the German observation on the Treaty terms, June 1904.

problems. I refer to political and allied problems. Thus the last five or six months of 1913 saw the public mind occupied with political and financial questions of great magnitude and urgency. And some of these were in unfamiliar guise. Such questions as the formation of new Governments and the realignment of old parties, the balance of budgets, the imposition of taxation, the gold standard, the balance of trade, the value of the pound sterling on foreign exchanges, protective tariffs and anti-dumping legislation—these were the front-page questions exercising the public mind, using the journalistic term. Other front-page news included India and the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria. The latter, indeed, was a bad preparation of the atmosphere for the World Disarmament Conference.

Anyone who has seen a Cabinet agenda at any time during the last seven years will realise that only the most immediate problems have any chance of receiving attention. And problems only become immediate when Parliament, its members interpreting public opinion, applies the necessary pressure. So far as the British public is concerned, the discussion of the problem of disarmament has not progressed beyond the stage of counting heads and guns and warship tonnage. Nor is this surprising when we turn again to the Draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission.¹

Let us first examine the proposals of this Preparatory Commission. They consist of a skeleton treaty, the flesh and blood in the shape of agreed figures to be made acceptable to sixty nations, including the United States of America, Abyssinia, Russia, and Uruguay. It is proposed to limit or, as the case may be, to reduce armaments under three main heads—personnel, material, and expenditure. For the first there is to be limitation or reduction of effectives and their period of service. Some common basis must be found for Britain, America, and Germany, with their long-service professional armies, on the one hand, and France and Italy, with their conscript armies, on the other.

One of the curbs that we on this side of the English Channel sought to apply was the abolition of conscription. We met with the difficulty that democratic opinion in France clings to conscription as a safeguard for liberty. French Socialists and Radicals distrust the idea of a professional long-service army, declaring it to be undemocratic and involving dangers of coup d'état. I only mention these considerations to show some of the difficulties in the way of the arithmetical method. As regards head and material, all attempts to limit heavy artillery, tanks and the like have been abandoned. The method sought is by a limitation of annual expenditure. This is probably the most feasible in all

¹ League of Nations publications C. 25, 1918, 292.

the circumstances. The material of naval armaments is to be limited by categories and annual expenditure.

Those who followed the proceedings of the three Naval Conferences will know the extreme difficulty of agreement over naval material. Thus one of the causes of disagreement in the abortive Conference at Geneva in 1927 was whether light cruisers should carry 7-inch guns or 6-inch guns; and at the 1930 Conference as to whether 6-inch-gun cruisers should be limited in size within the 10,000-ton category of warships. However, agreement was reached between the three leading naval Powers—Britain, Japan, and America—but with unfortunate results for the taxpayers concerned, as mentioned above. So the skeleton may be clothed and appear as a well-nourished body.

With regard to air armaments, it is proposed to limit the number and horse-power of aeroplanes and dirigibles. Here we meet grave difficulties owing to the increasing importance of civil aviation. In passing, I would draw attention to a proposal, that has been canvassed for some years now, to internationalise air transport, beginning with the continent of Europe. All passenger- and freight-carrying machines would be owned by a company somewhat on the model of International Sleeping Car Company. The building or ownership, nationally, of war aeroplanes would be prohibited. If the French proposal for an international police force for the safeguarding of the peace of the world is ever translated into fact a start might well be made with an international aerial police. This proposal is not so fantastic as might appear at first sight. The air arm is the youngest of the military forces, and has not, therefore, a long tradition deeply interwoven with national sentiment behind it like that of the French Army or the British Navy. The pilots and mechanics could be recruited at an early age, trained together in an international college, and should develop a sound international spirit.

But to return to the proposals in the Draft Convention, the third method is that there should be a limit on the total annual expenditure on all land, sea, and air forces. There are a number of students of this subject who think that this third method alone has the best chance of general adoption. There is, of course, the difficulty of varying rates of pay and the standard of living of the fighting men in different countries, but it is not insuperable, and, in any case, the principle has already been adopted.

Supplementary proposals include the setting up of machinery for the exchange of information. We have the beginnings of this in the detailed information supplied by the intending participants in the forthcoming Conference, already held at Geneva. There is to be a prohibition on the use of poison gas in time of war. A

number of nations have already adhered to this Convention, subject to reciprocity. And, finally, there is to be a Permanent Disarmament Commission, a kind of international inspectorate, in the event of a treaty being drawn up and ratified.

The above, therefore, is the frame of the skeleton; and it will be observed that the Disarmament Convention did not in itself propose any reduction or limitation; indeed, all the figures are left blank. If the will exists to reduce armaments, and if the nations are in earnest, the Convention could be used to bring about almost complete disarmament. As Viscount Cecil, in his dispatch to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on December 10, 1930, remarks

Until the figures have been filled in it is impossible to estimate how complete will be the first general Disarmament Treaty. All that can be said now is that within the ambit of the present document almost any degree of reduction is possible.

But will the desire be there?

If the World Disarmament Conference could be attended only by Finance Ministers and Treasury officials from the various countries, reinforced by the presidents of the Central Banks, its success would be assured. For the most important factor is the general financial situation. Even the United States and France, despite their great stocks of gold and their stable currencies, are faced with heavy budget deficits, and suffer from high taxation with the prospect of more. It is known also that American public opinion, especially in the powerful Middle Western States, desires that international debts, America being the greatest creditor, shall be used as a lever for bringing about drastic reductions. But against these favourable factors—that is, favourable to armament reductions—are the old fears for security. And whole battalions of naval and military experts, all of them professional fighting men, will be in attendance.

The French have steadily adhered to their demand that there shall be pooled security, and they used this argument with effect at the Naval Conference of 1930. I will quote, only briefly, from the French memorandum setting forth the views of the French Government on naval limitations presented by the French Ambassador immediately prior to that Conference.

Only in proportion to such assistance as they may be able to rely upon from without could the nations be in a position actually to reduce their armaments. Just as a general technical agreement upon armaments implies a previous political agreement, so does a complete naval agreement presuppose an understanding on the question of the freedom of the sea, defining the rights of belligerents and the rights of neutrals, and providing for the prospective co-operation of other States against that of an aggressor country.*

* *The Times*, December 17, 1930.

Although directed especially to the question of naval armaments, this accurately describes the French point of view. And Italy, while apparently prepared to go even further than France in actual reductions, supports this point of view with reference to naval armaments. Thus the chief Italian delegate, Signor Grandi, made it very clear in the discussions that Italy insisted on some guarantee for her seaborne commerce if she dispensed with a proportion of her naval forces. The Italian Foreign Minister pointed out that Italy is dependent on seaborne supplies of coal, iron ore, and, to a certain extent, food-stuffs. And with a hostile Power holding the Straits of Gibraltar and the approaches to the Suez Canal, and declaring a distant blockade, she would be starved out. He had in view, apparently, the possibility of a war with France, the latter in alliance with Yugo-Slavia, and therefore Italy's land frontier practically closed.

These arguments find a ready response in the United States of America. The Americans uphold a hereditary doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas almost as sacred as the Monroe Doctrine. The only war fought between the Union and Britain was on this issue. The United States intervened in the great European War largely because of the interference by German submarines with American seaborne commerce. But, prior to the final rupture with Germany, there had been friction between the Government of the United States, then neutral, and the British Government over the exercise of our blockade against the Central Powers. At one time it was not an impossibility that the United States might intervene against the Allies.

The second of President Wilson's Fourteen Points for the cessation of hostilities reads as follows:

Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

The British Government, supported by Paris, made a reservation just before the Armistice, but for the sake of bringing about a cessation of the fighting President Wilson postponed the matter until the Peace Conference. He had no more success there. This was one of the reasons why the Senate rejected the Treaty.

This doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas was the skeleton in the cupboard at the Naval Conferences of 1921, 1927, and 1930. It will certainly be in the cupboard when the World Conference assembles at Geneva. And, undoubtedly, it will be dragged out of the cupboard by France, probably assisted by other Powers; because if the doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas is accepted, as following on the Pact of Paris for the Outlawry of War, there must be some international arrangement for safeguarding the

trade routes for the peaceable commerce of all nations in case of a breach of the peace. This means pooled security; and if the principle of pooled security is accepted at sea, it will be a considerable advance towards a general security pact. In any case naval assistance would be the utmost that could be relied upon in the present state of world opinion, for the checking of an aggressor, from at least three of the most powerful nations—Japan, the United States, and Britain.

How far may the United States be expected to contribute to such a pool?

The Briand-Kellogg Pact for the Outlawry of War resulted from a long campaign in the United States. American sentiment was capitalized by M. Briand in his famous offer to the American Government. There are at least three documents in existence in this connexion of great importance. They are resolutions submitted, two of them to the Senate and one to Congress, by important American public men. The first I will cite is the resolution for the Outlawry of War by Senator Borah, then, as now, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. It falls into three parts, the first calling for the outlawry of war, and the second demanding an international code of peace. This second part of the resolution reads as follows:

That a code of international law of peace based upon the outlawing of war and on the principle of equality and justice between all nations, amplified and expanded and adopted and brought down to date, should be created and adopted.

The third part deals with the establishment of a World Court, and reads as follows:

That, with war outlawed, a judicial substitute for war should be created (or, if existing in part, adapted and adjusted) in the form or nature of an international court modelled on our Federal Supreme Court in its jurisdiction over controversies between our Sovereign States; such court shall possess affirmative jurisdiction to hear and decide all purely international controversies, as defined by the rule of acting under treaties, and its judgments shall not be reversed by war under any name or in any form whatever, but shall have the same power for their enforcement as our Federal Supreme Court, namely, the respect of all enlightened nations for judgments resting upon open and fair investigations and impartial decisions, the agreement of the nations to abide and be bound by such judgments, and the compelling power of enlightened public opinion.

The second resolution was introduced by Senator Capper, and included the principle of the contracting Governments discouraging their nationals from supplying an aggressor nation, or indeed trading with it. Note that the aggressor nation is defined, in the now well-known manner, as one which begins hostilities without having submitted its difference to "conciliation, arbitration, or

judicial settlement.' The actual wording of this part of the resolution is:

That it shall be the policy of the United States by Treaty . . . to declare that the nationals of the contracting Governments should not be protected by their Governments in giving aid and comfort to an aggressor nation.

The third resolution was introduced by Congressman Burton, and declared for the prohibition of the export of arms, munitions, or implements of war to any country engaging in aggressive warfare.

If these resolutions still represent the policy of the United States, they point to a readiness to assist in an international blockade. But if the international blockade is recognised, the private blockade must go. *vide* the Wilsonian doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas. And if the private blockade is to go and the reduction of naval armaments to be part of the bargain, and if Britain is to give up this weapon, she has a right to demand assistance in keeping the trade routes clear of the raiding cruisers and submarines of an aggressor.

The resolutions referred to were all prior to the Briand-Kellogg Pact. This was signed in Paris on August 22, 1928, and has been adhered to by sixty nations, including the United States of America and Russia, and the signatories agree that

they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. Article I.

and

that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

It will be observed that there are no sanctions and no mention of a World Court. It is, indeed, unfortunate that, for domestic political reasons, the United States has not yet adhered to the existing World Court. I refer to the Permanent Court of International Justice set up in 1922 and used, to quote only two instances, in the Mosul Boundary dispute between Britain and Turkey and in the dispute over the Austro-German Customs Union. Several times the United States Government has appeared to be on the point of adhering, but always, for some minor reason or another, this has been delayed. Yet if there is to be the obligation to pool armed forces for defence against an aggressor all the nations so agreeing must surely adhere to a World Court in order that an aggressor may be defined. It is at once clear that the United States can be expected to be most helpful

in applying sanctions. But the maritime law of nations must be modernized.

Now let us examine the British attitude towards the Freedom of the Seas. For I would repeat that, if agreement can be reached here, considerable progress will have been made towards that general political agreement for pooled security on which so much depends, especially with regard to French armaments. During three centuries this country has relied upon the weapon of blockade and capture at sea in warfare. It was effective in our great Continental wars, notably against Napoleon, and in the last war against the Central Powers. The nation with command of the sea can exercise a close or distant blockade against an adversary and prevent supplies reaching him. The control of communications is the principal function of navies. Naval battles, as such, are of secondary importance. If the German High Sea Fleet had never put to sea at all in the Great War it would have made no difference, because the Allied naval forces were cutting off German supplies and only a defeat of the main British Fleet would have raised the blockade. In international law belligerents now have the right to visit and search merchant ships under neutral flags in order to see that they are not carrying contraband. If a blockade is declared, and made effective, all supplies, whether contraband or not, can be seized. In any case merchant vessels belonging to the adversary can be captured; and all these belligerent rights can be exercised anywhere on the high seas outside the three-mile limit.

The contraband list has been extended to meet modern conditions, and whereas in the old days it practically consisted of actual weapons and military stores, under modern practice fats and cotton, because they can be used for the manufacture of explosives, are included as a matter of course, and food supplies have been deemed to be good prize because they might be going to the support of the adversary's armed forces. In the Great War almost the only article of commerce that was not declared contraband was ostrich leathers. In the early days, before the declaration of unlimited submarine warfare, a German submarine captured and destroyed a Spanish fruit schooner with a cargo of oranges, German diplomacy upholding this action on the ground that the oranges might have been going to refresh the troops of the French and British armies.

The British public, without adequate explanation, are more than likely to demand that this right of capture at sea and blockade should be maintained. It is certainly the present point of view of the French Admiralty, which made its influence felt at the Peace Conference as mentioned above, and, particularly, in the preliminary conversations prior to the Naval Com-

serence of 1930. It is known that President Hoover broached this subject of the Freedom of the Seas to Mr. MacDonald during the Rapidan conversations; and Mr. MacDonald had publicly expressed himself on this very subject in a sense favourable to the doctrine not long before. Thus, just prior to the General Election of 1929, which placed a Labour Government in office, Mr. MacDonald, as leader of the Labour Party, signed a foreword to an official Labour Party declaration on this very subject. He then said:

The Freedom of the Seas . . . is pre-eminently an Anglo-American problem, and, until it is removed from the field of dispute, Anglo-American co-operation in world affairs cannot be securely founded. It could not be removed from the field of dispute until the right to use war and blockade as an instrument of national policy had been renounced.

Yet when Mr. MacDonald as Prime Minister went to the United States for the vitally important preliminary negotiations he was not in a position to commit the British Parliament to the acceptance of this doctrine because British public opinion had not been prepared. And because no agreement was reached on this subject the Five-Power Naval Conference that followed in the next year was only partially successful. Yet we are about to enter into a World Disarmament Conference with British public opinion no better prepared, and no recent authoritative statement by any British Cabinet Minister.

Apparently it is still considered that British public opinion will not survive the shock of being invited to abandon this weapon of maritime blockade in exchange for a greater security and a lightening of the burden of armaments. Yet there need be no shock to public opinion if the actual facts are properly presented. Let me attempt a summary of these facts.

(1) The power to impose a blockade, involving neutrals, presupposes predominant naval strength. But we have agreed to the American Navy being raised to a position of parity with the British Navy; and without the assent of the United States Government it would be impossible to use this weapon.

(2) Modern conditions of commerce and transport have much weakened the blockade weapon unless used in very favourable circumstances. It was most effective when land communications were difficult, slow and expensive, and seaborne traffic far cheaper and more convenient. In the Napoleonic Wars depriving France of her sea communications meant that her overseas supplies had to come on the backs of mules or in horse-drawn waggons over indifferent roads. To-day, on the mainland of Europe, there is an elaborate railway and canal system, good roads and modern motor transport.

Consider, only as an example, an attempted blockade of France. This would mean stopping supplies passing through Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland. If 'continuous voyage' can be proved, it has been held that supplies passing through neutral countries may be intercepted; but it would be a very difficult task to supervise the seaborne traffic of all these countries, which, in the case I am examining, are presumed to be neutral. When Germany and her allies were blockaded, the Allies almost surrounded her geographically; and the neutral countries—Holland, Denmark, etc.—were small and weak. It was possible to ration these neutrals and to supervise their whole seaborne trade, but could we expect to be able to do so again single-handed in some future war?

(3) An island nation like Britain can be effectively blockaded providing she lost command of the sea, and, even if this command is not destroyed, the submarine and, still more in the future, the aeroplane, acting as a commerce destroyer can inflict terrible damage on our seaborne traffic.

Taking into consideration the above facts, which will not be disputed, it would appear that our ancient weapon of controlling the trade routes is not nearly so effective as it used to be, but blockade could be used against us with effect if we lost command of the sea. On the other hand an international boycott can be very effective. If it is really decided to isolate an aggressor, municipal laws can prevent the nationals of the boycotters from trading with her, not only in implements of war, as suggested in the resolutions before Congress referred to above, but in all articles of commerce. But these considerations require to be explained to the public, in this and other countries, in non-technical language, and little attempt has been made to do so. No doubt world opinion is not yet in a condition to accept the French proposal for an International Police Force. The existing World Court depends on public opinion for its sanctions. But, obviously, something more is required to reassure the opinion of the French and other peoples if the forthcoming World Conference is to be successful.

Some pooling of methods of defence would appear to be required. An agreement to use naval force to assist the victim of aggression would appear to be a practical proposal. So also is the proposed strengthening of the Permanent Court of International Justice by the adherence of those nations who do not yet recognise it. And the international weapon of economic boycott might well be agreed upon as a sanction for this Court. It is difficult to visualise the non-Continental nations agreeing to send armies for the coercion of a breaker of covenants; but the economic boycott, reinforced by pooled naval forces,

combined possibly with financial assistance, would be a powerful sanction.

Agreement on such sanctions would not become operative until real all-round reductions of armaments had actually taken place; while the linking of disarmament with a general scaling down of international obligations, debts and reparations, providing always that the American creditor position was not used too brutally, together with a lowering, again by international agreement, of tariff walls, would go far to restore that international confidence and sense of security on which economic and commercial revival so largely depend.

J. M. KENWORTHY.

DISARMAMENT

II. SOME EUROPEAN DIFFICULTIES

THE most hopeful lesson which the world has learned from the disasters of the World War is that war does not pay. The victors lose as much as the vanquished. The aftermath of disturbance, unrest, and insecurity obliterates any conceivable gain that may have been gleaned in any part of the world. Least exaggerated hopes be built upon the effects which so severe a lesson is likely to have in the future, it is as well to recognise that it concerns a war of world-wide extent, and is not necessarily applicable to smaller disturbances where the economic life of large populations is not put out of gear. It is desirable, therefore, to extend, as far as possible, recognition of the unperishable nature of all forms of war (economic wars as much as conflicts waged with weapons), and efforts in that direction are laudable so long as practical considerations are not ignored and provided that sympathetic understanding of the peculiar difficulties of certain countries is not withheld.

Omitting the naval problem, which stands by itself, and confining the issue to disarmament on land, it should be accepted as a principle that little can be achieved by attempts to force disarmament on reluctant countries by pressure or coercion, nor is it wise to crystallise such reluctance into open defiance of a general wish to disarm. There are some countries that cannot disarm as long as the world remains in its present distracted state, and common sense demands that they should be treated as exceptions and with the sympathy that their special situation obviously justifies. For practical reasons the moral argument in favour of disarmament should be kept in the background and reliance placed upon a universal and growing conviction that only by the closest co-operation will the nations of Europe extract themselves from the industrial and economic morass in which they are floundering to-day.

It is natural for an outsider, especially if a citizen of a powerful State, to preach to the peoples of the Continent the virtue of sinking differences and combining, in the interests of humanity,

to banish the whole conception of war from their mental horizons. Such exhortations have, however, an irritating under-meaning to those who have to listen to them. They imply that nations of small population have no right to separate tariffs, to separate armies, or, indeed, to separate existence. They express, in fact, the view of a man outside a beleaguered fortress looking in, and not the view of a man inside the fortress looking out. It is easy to be impatient with the little troubles of little peoples, to ride rough-shod over susceptibilities, to brush away, as immaterial, hopes or jealousies too minute for general notice. This imperial attitude is familiar to the smaller States of Europe, and, with whatever kindly motives it may be assumed, it is none the less part and parcel of a policy of force which should have no place in a plan that aims at success by common consent. It does not serve the objects of such a plan to stress the truth—if it be a truth—that small independent communities are a nuisance and out of place in a modern industrial universe. When the agitation for the famous Peace Pact was at its height, it was pointed out that the only nations who were qualified to give an effective pledge of peace were those who were in a condition to wage effective war. The rest would do as they were told, pledge or no pledge. Great nations impose peace on little ones. They have been known to provoke them into war also; but that is another story. It is not wise, however, to associate the notion of force with an appeal for spontaneous adherence to an ideal as fine as that of general disarmament. The presence of force should be disguised. It cannot be dispensed with, because the conditions of the Peace Treaties rest upon force. In the Peace Pact propaganda it was naively suggested that the nations of the world, for the settlement of their differences, should come to a world court 'to receive justice and equity'. The answer, not less cogent for being unexpressed, was that a court which maintained the conditions of the Peace Treaties was not competent to dispense either justice or equity. Treaties imposed by force for reasons of expediency must be maintained by force. Switch off the current, and the edifice collapses into fresh ruin. As an Austrian Socialist at the time of the Treaty of St. Germain expressed it, 'It is a shocking treaty! But now that you have made it, for God's sake stick to it.' The bitternesses of the Peace Treaties prevent the nations of Europe from living spontaneously in amity with their neighbours, and these bitternesses will not lose their hold until a fresh generation comes to the guidance of the injured peoples. Until then, and as long as the hammer of force hangs over the natural aspirations and policies of the European States, so long will counsel to forswear the use of force, on the grounds of high morality, appear insincere.

There remains then the appeal to common sense—the incontrovertible argument that nations, like individuals, cannot prosper when in conflict, or under conditions where a war cloud may spring up out of a clear sky at short notice. It has been pointed out that the financial stringency of the last two years has done more to stop the accumulation of war material than all the preaching of the peace prophets and all the efforts of the League of Nations. So far as it goes, that is no doubt to the good. It may have acted as a restraining factor in times of particular bitterness. It is, however, a temporary stoppage. When the money flows in again, leeway will be made up, unless some definite self-denying agreement is reached in the meanwhile. The argument, so often used, that money spent on the manufacture and storage of war material might be better employed in other directions has a learned force in times when industry is demoralized and unemployment is rife. Even allowing that there is a gain to the local treasury the stoppage of work in the armaments means increase in the number of unemployed without opening for the profitable employment of the money saved. This, we hope, is an ephemeral phenomenon also, slated to disappear when the sun of prosperity shines again, and work for all becomes possible to find. Theoretically, it is the same, even to-day, whether 1000 men are taken off ammunition making and turned on to public works. Practically, it is not at all the same from the point of view of the Minister of National Defence, because skilled workmen are turned out into the street. The transfer of effort and money from the making of war material, and from the training and upkeep of large armed forces to peaceful and profitable pursuits, demands a simultaneous effort to stimulate trade before it can in itself invite attention as a helpful policy. This is but one example of the close relations existing between prosperity and a peaceful outlook. We shall encounter others. It is easy to say that ploughshares are of more value than swords. Under old economic conditions that assertion was unanswerable. But are we so sure about it to-day? Is there not now a definite limit to the number of hands that can be employed in industry simultaneously? Is over-mechanization but a passing sport in balance, or a perpetual astringent of labour? To employ ammunition-makers on other work is a good cry. It would be a better one if we could see more clearly on what they can be employed.

This question of employment is at the bottom of nationalistic policy. The watertight compartments of Europe, which make co-operation so difficult, have an industrial as well as a sentimental reason for their existence. The desire on the part of the smallest country to possess a completely balanced industry and to be self-supporting, even though its area is proportionately so

larger than a dish-plate, is not wholly wiffel. At the bottom of everything lies the fortune of the farmer. He is the man whose purchasing power must be maintained at all costs. His products, therefore, must find a market. The relative price of overseas cereals restricts European farmers to the home markets, and these, therefore, must be expanded to the maximum. Under cover of tariffs a home industry is therefore developed for the primary purpose of producing townsmen to consume the farmer's produce. So long as the balance is exactly maintained, no harm is done. An exact balance is, however, difficult to maintain because it depends on so many uncontrollable and shifting factors. When the balance is destroyed difficulty ensues. As Alexander Hamilton remarked, 'the country in which agriculture or industry attained a disproportionate influence would suffer the inconveniences of a lopsided development'. Over-mechanisation has upset old calculations when assessing this balance. The volume of grain per farmer and the output of goods per workman have both largely increased. The result is that the number of townsmen required to absorb the farm products of a country is now so large that the greater part of the goods they manufacture are unsalable in a glutted world.

When a number of nations pursue independent policies of this kind simultaneously, a war for markets is the inevitable result. Highly differentiated tariffs are the first symptom of it, national armies the final buttresses. Children of townsmen and peasants alike are caught up into the ranks. 'Happy is the giant that has his quiver full of them'. One infantry division per million inhabitants is about the strength that can be developed, and a formidable army begins at about ten divisions.

The Disarmament Conference aims at the removal or reduction of the national armies. It would appear desirable to aim at the same time at the removal or regulation of all that necessitates the upkeep of such armies. Amongst the latter are particularly the high tariffs which have been erected in recent years between State and State. However important it be for us in Great Britain to adopt a tariff policy for the express purpose of preventing the further fall in the value of sterling by checking imports, it is essential simultaneously to recognise that the tariff wars on the Continent have led in the past, and will lead in the future, to dissension and strife. Highly differentiated tariffs are the trump cards in a game of 'Beggars-my-neighbour'. They have aggravated, if they have not caused, the present stagnation of trade and the present maldistribution of gold, and so helped to bring about the disturbance in the world's economy which has culminated in the financial crisis from which Great Britain is particularly hampered. Apart from all this, tariffs are essentially

weapons of offence, indicating that Europe is not living in a state of peace, but in a state of war. Certainly it is desirable that people living in a state of war should have weapons even more deadly than tariffs taken out of their hands, but it is not easy to accomplish this unless some convincing inducement is simultaneously offered.

An Economic Conference has been suggested by Dr Cartier, but has so far not received the support it deserves. People are disillusioned about international congresses. Too many of them have been abortive. Lest the Disarmament Conference should be so also, it is greatly to be hoped that some lead will be given in the direction of international co-operation on a rationalising basis, aiming at the prevention of trade wars and including particularly the stabilisation of cereal prices on an economic level for Europe generally. Inasmuch as it is the highly differentiated tariffs—the real protective tariffs—that cause the mischief, it has been proposed that the whole world should adopt a low all-round general tariff, not greater than 20 per cent of the value of all goods and commodities including grain. Such a procedure would do away with the necessity for commercial treaties between nations, and, *à fortiori*, the constant patching of them and the expense thereby incurred, which now goes on increasingly. It would protect industries that require a certain measure of protection, and it would safeguard agriculture on the Continent, which is the most important matter of all. From our point of view it would facilitate the granting of preferences to our Dominions and Colonies. It would re-establish free circulation of goods between various countries and, by tending to the restoration of prosperity, introduce gradually an atmosphere favourable to more drastic schemes of disarmament than can be advanced at present. Such a proposal, therefore, would seem to have much in its favour, but the main thing is that some scheme of international co-operation should be speedily initiated, which would have the result of inducing the nations of Europe to look beyond national armaments for their salvation.

No scheme of disarmament in Europe is, however, of any avail that leaves Russia out of account. Russia is the key to disarmament to-day as far as Eastern Europe is concerned. The Russian giant, like Father in *The Ring*, has retired to a fastness to undergo transformation. The gigantic larva is to become a gigantic imago, and nobody, least of all Russia herself, knows in what form she will emerge. The voltage of ferocity in her adrenals on the day of apothecosis is the all-important question. 'The fool hath said in his heart there is no God,' and Russia has emulated him. She deems herself mistress of her fate, but it may not turn out to be so. She may be entangled in the meshes of her own greed.

plan, and be carried by it whither she knows not. She may even be tamed by it in the end, if she is held captive long enough.

The people of the United States, secure in their remoteness, are assisting the process of new birth in Russia by the loan of a few thousand engineers. A little Yankee 'pep' is an ingredient not to be despised in a lethargic land. It lessens the likelihood of the egg being addled. The egg may yet produce a snake long enough to reach across the Pacific and bite its quondam wet-nurse, though not presumably until it has first swallowed the greater part of Europe. It is also just possible that it will after all produce a kindly, peace-loving snake, prepared to co-operate with the world in the world's way, and no longer fired by an insane desire to impose Oriental despotism upon Western methods of 'give-and-take'.

While the whole civilised world will hope for the more agreeable alternative, no nation can take it for granted, least of all any one of those that live within reach of the reawakening monster. Those that are far away may believe that even now there is some 'metanosa, some change of the mind, some saving grace of repentance, the first-fruits of the Borstal regime on which Mr Lloyd George relied. Visitors to the country see little of it. Prominent Russians vehemently repudiate it, but it is proverbial that the new tide begins to flow before the old tide has ceased to ebb. Far beneath the surface the seeds of sanity may have begun to sprout. The neighbours of Russia, however, must wait for some definite indication that a 'lat' Russia will be good, before they can put faith in it to the extent of relaxing their precautions.

Russia is therefore an obstacle to the growth of the peace idea in Europe and not less so because she has signed the Peace Pact. On the plea of being herself the target of hostility, she is forging the weapons of counter-hostility. On the plea that the offensive is the best defensive she is preparing the means of world conquest. We can catch the echo of the old German argument in her protestations. 'It is not that we harbour aggressive intentions, but that we cannot sleep quietly in our beds unless we feel assured that we can, in case of necessity, smash utterly all who may at any time try to attack us, whether severally or in union.'

The fear of attack by outside forces, whether military or economic, amounts to a mania in Russia to-day. Both Mr. Hindus in his *Humanity Uprooted* and Mr. Knickerbocker in his *Soviet Five-Year Plan* bear eloquent testimony to it. It is a legacy from the teaching of Lenin,

Russians (says Mr. Hindus) are so convinced of the inevitability of war with a foreign foe as they are of the ultimate success of their revolution;

they knew that they have crashed brutally into the capitalist front, therefore they are convinced that the capitalists of the world must make another attempt to smite them down, and that soon.

It takes two to make a quarrel. It is Soviet Russia that fears attack because she has a guilty conscience. It is not the outside world that threatens her. Knowing only the philosophy of Lenin, she places no reliance on any way of circumventing an enemy other than by cutting his throat. The outside world, perceiving that the Russian system is not Communism at all, but merely an exaggerated extension of State Capitalism, realises that Russia is just as vulnerable to economic upset as any other country. Even more so, in certain directions, as recent events have proved. The power latent in Russia does not depend upon the difference of her political system. It depends upon the possession of vast undeveloped resources, which would make any country formidable under any system. The Russian Government, having taken into its hands the whole income of the country, aims at maintaining the whole population as State employes. So far, in times of comparative ease, she has managed to apply the system to the industrial part of the population, whose situation after thirteen years of it is thus summed up by Mr. Knickerbocker: 'Illfed, illclothed, illhoused and partly terrorised, the population is wretched, but not yet desperate.'

More recently, in times of much greater difficulty, she has begun the industrialisation of agriculture. Ten million peasants, with their households, have already been communised, and fifteen millions more await similar enlistment into the economic army of the State—an agrarian reinforcement of at least one hundred millions of people. With grain a glut on the market, and likely to remain so, the inside and outside effects of this extension will be watched with interest and concern. Having committed 80 per cent of her people to the task of growing cereals on unprofitable times, Russia has given hostages to Fortune. The State will have the produce, the growers will have the money tokens, which will procure for them what the State can give them, on a system with which price has very little to do. The possession of so much corn in future years will oblige the Government to get rid of it on terms which cannot in practice be other than dumping. For the next two years the wheat export is apparently earmarked for France, as part of the trade arrangement made recently with that country. In future years, however, either the volume of exportable wheat will enormously increase, in which case Russia will enter on a wheat war, or the whole system of agricultural industrialism will break down, and the peasants will be more utterly ruined than they are at present. Even if the capitalist world despairs then of Russian repentance, or deems the

stabilisation of her system a menace to its own, it can rely on better methods of defence than open hostility. The Russian system as applied to the Russian plan, and the plan as applied to the system, in spite of all the prophecies of Marx, teems with unexpected difficulties of all sorts, and the kindest as well as the most effective policy is to leave the Russian chauvinists to stew in their own juice. The fear, deliberately encouraged by the Russian Government, that world antipathy will culminate in open warfare—military or economic—is but one of a thousand subtle methods for polarising public opinion. If the Communist leaders ever believed in it (and there is reason to doubt even that), they have long since ceased to do so. They deem it good policy, however, to keep it in the forefront of their unceasing propaganda, partly as an excuse for their own military preparations, and partly as a strand in the rope that keeps a gigantic absurdity together.

In the planning and progress of the Five-Year Plan the military aspect of each step taken is never ignored. It appears in the tracing of new railways in the siting of new factories, in the grouping of new workmen's communities, in the provision of transport of all kinds. At the end of the Five-Year Plan Russia is to be militarily stronger as well as industrially stronger, than she is now. We know that she is not formidable to-day. We know that last autumn she began to mobilise in anticipation of a conflict with Japan, and then, fearing the result, abandoned her intention of intervening drastically in the Sino-Japanese quarrel. If to-day she sings low it is because her whole energies are being put into the comprehensive scheme of national regeneration from which she hopes so much. No secret is made of her ambition to be one of the dictating nations of the world. All good citizens are urged to prepare themselves for the day of awakening, as much by familiarity with lethal weapons as by anything else. Rifle-shooting has been so encouraged that it is a universal and popular sport.

How can Russia's neighbours daunt in the face of such a movement? After the Five-Year Plan a fifteen year plan is foreshadowed, in which the possibility of armed conflict is more closely treated. The sufferings of the Russian people are to find their reward in the massed resources of a conquering fanaticism.

As far as the actual invasion of foreign countries, in the interests of world revolution, is concerned, the teaching of Lenin was opposed to any such idea. Lenin, however, was a man of limited intelligence and little originality of thought who propounded no new philosophy. He was an opportunist in thought and action. His followers will switch from doctrine to doctrine as he did. They are probably sincere—to-day, at least—when they declare

that they seek the military overthrow of no country. As far as that is concerned, their adherence to the Peace Pact is genuine. Litvinoff has proposed further-going schemes of disarmament than have been suggested by the Western nations themselves. A non-aggressive economic pact has also emerged from the same fertile brain. We may even see Russia represented at the Disarmament Conference. Their protestations in favour of Peace do not cover the ground, however. The 'Comintern,' though temporarily out of action owing to lack of funds, is still alive. Willing to hurt, it is not allowed to strike just now. Such money as exists is wanted for purposes more immediately important. More and more money is wanted from the capitalist countries before their future attacker is in a position to deal on equal terms with them, and, as the Austrians say, 'there is no snow in going begging in an armoured cruiser.'

The schools for foreign propaganda are, however, active. Zealous young Communists come from all parts of the world to study how 'a revolutionary situation should be handled, when it arises.' The Russians avow that their teaching goes no farther, that they themselves send no agitators to make deliberately such a situation in unfavourable circumstances. Not even, according to them, is encouragement given to the subversive efforts of natives. The situation must arise naturally, they say, and then we will take hold of it.

We may believe these disclaimers or not as we like. It is all the same. The one power is as deadly as the other. Our system is destined to conquer the world, is as much the boast of the ordinary Russian, and the hope of his leaders, as it ever was. As long as this itch for interfering in the internal affairs of other nations persists, with the avowed intention of dragging them down to her own degraded level, so long will Russia be rightly regarded by her neighbours as essentially unfriendly and potentially dangerous, and, however great may be the interest of the world in disarmament, the natural fear of Russia, in spite of her lip-service to the cause of peace, cannot be brushed aside.

'Without guarantees for security,' said Count Zolinski, 'Poland cannot disarm. Who can dispute the truth of this statement? And what guarantees can she get? 'Disarm Russia first,' say the Poles, 'and then come and ask us again.' Nor will it avail to point out that Russia is only half-armed to-day, that she has signed the Peace Pact and suggested universal disarmament herself, that she is short of supplies, stores and transport, that she is so occupied by her own plan, so inwardly turned, that she has no energies left for outside action, that, so great is her need for workers, she is using the recruits of her army for work in factories. It is not with the Russia of to-day

that Poland is concerned, but with the Russia of the future. For Poland is the one country in Europe between whom and Russia a war might break out for reasons having nothing to do with world revolution. There is the background of mutual aversion: historic scores to settle, both ancient and modern. If war were to break out between Russia and Poland it would be of a particularly violent and unpleasant kind. Little quarter would be given by either side. It would definitely be a war of conquest—of people over people, of system over system: '*Vae victis*' with a vengeance! Treason and revolution behind, racial hatred to fan the flames of slaughter, and, in the event of a Russian victory, a blood-red Poland! There is no clear-cut national line between the Pole and the Russian. Racially they overlap, and, for that reason, hicker continually over spies. For either side to find a pretext for war at any time is a simple matter.

Poland to-day, recognising that Russia may become formidable in the future, and seeing no signs of any reversal of her nefarious policy of plotting against the liberties of democratic peoples, rightly considers herself as the bulwark of civilisation against Asiatic barbarism. She deserves our helpful sympathy. Behind Poland lies France, and there is no reason to doubt the loyalty of the French towards their eastern *protégé*. It is difficult to see, however, in what practical way they can help if the worst happens and war breaks out. When the Russians and the Poles were last in conflict—and it was in the words of General Weygand, '*Misère contre Misère*'—it was possible for France to send a mission of generals to the effective help of her ally. Something more than this will be necessary next time. Doubtless one of the effects of the Franco-Russian trade arrangement will be to put France in the position of an intermediary between Poland and Russia. Even so the existence of an unarmed Poland before an ever-growing Colossus would be an anxious one. Nor must we forget that Poland has obligations towards her allies. A military convention exists between her and Roumania, and a diplomatic *entente* embracing the Baltic States as well. Some years ago Russia expressed herself ready to sign a pact of non-aggression with Poland, but the latter stipulated that she should sign it jointly with her associates. This Russia was not willing to do. This year again the same point was raised. Russia expressed herself ready to sign unilateral pacts with each of the States mentioned, but not a multilateral pact with all of them jointly. The Poles again declined and the negotiations collapsed. Formalities such as these should not blind us to reality. Non-aggression agreements and peace pacts do nothing to insure anyone against a form of hostility that concerns itself with subversion and political undermining.

Epoch [says Mr. Nisden] is the significance of Russia's support of the Kellogg Pact. She was among the first nations of the world to sign it, and she even used it as a basis to bind together a group of her neighbors including Poland and Roumania—her staunch foes—in a protocol of her own. Of course her diplomats dinned with cutting irony the notion that the Kellogg Pact is a panacea for peace. But it invites an atmosphere and a psychology of peace and may hold in leash, longer than would otherwise have been possible, the dogs of war, and that is itself in to Russia in her present state of internal distress, a welcome boon. Every day of peace is victory. To be relieved of the fear of war during the period of reconstruction would be an immense gain for the Russia of the Soviet Union. To strip the bourgeoisies of the world of weapons with which to hold down colonial peoples and to suppress the uprisings of proletariats would be even more of a boon to the Russia of the Communist.

There is a fear, then, that the readiness of Russia to fall in with any proposal for the limitation of armaments which may be made at the forthcoming Congress may blind us to the danger of trusting her. She is so remote and so inaccessible that the fulfillment of any promises made cannot be controlled, apart from her treacherable practices. She will certainly use all her arts to put herself in the right with the world and her opponents in the wrong. Into the natural apprehensions of Poland and Roumania an aggressive intention may be unjustly woven. The interest of Europe in immediate disarmament is based on the declared opinion of the United States that the investment of capital in Europe is not attractive as long as war preparations are continued there partly because they make the future uncertain, and partly because large sums of money are diverted from more profitable investment. Some demonstration is no doubt required to show that Europe is peacefully minded, even though by the stresses of economic difficulty she is plunged to-day into a catch-as-catch-can struggle for individual existence. Mr. Ramsey MacDonald has made public reference to the view of the United States on this point, and considers a measure of disarmament the necessary preliminary to any scheme of economic rescue. Political expediency in fact seems to necessitate 'putting the cart before the horse'. It is reasonable to suppose that to the United States the investment of money in Europe is also unattractive if there is a danger of revolution and Bolshevism in Europe. This second possibility is much nearer than that of any inter-State war. It may take place with or without Russian assistance. If it happens in the near future—and the situation of Germany is precarious—it will probably be independent of Russia. But if disaster is merely staved off and the underlying causes of the present trade stagnation are not removed, and if, as a consequence of that, the present hand-to-mouth system of existence continues until Russia is ready, she may take a hand.

and move deliberately to plunge Europe into ruin. There is still a margin of time to forestall such a disaster by the immediate initiation of a scheme for the restoration of confidence, which will by itself allow much further-going schemes of disarmament than can be thought of to-day. Economic recovery should at least accompany disarmament, even if, as would be preferable, it cannot precede it. And not only because it would lead to a better feeling between the various States of Europe, but because it would consolidate them against Russian malevolence. Once out of such a tangle as exists to-day, no nation will desire to return to it, nor to listen to the visionary promises of a New Jerusalem preached by half-baked fanatics who, after thirteen years of oppression, have reduced their own country to the lowest level of comfort and culture that has ever been experienced by a suffering people.

T. M. CUMINGHAM

THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER

When the Canadian statesman Sir John Macdonald suggested some sixty years ago that the newly confederated Colonies should be called the 'Kingdom of Canada' he was expressing an idea with a future. The idea was that the new countries of the British Empire, for the most part settled by our own race, and possessing natural resources adequate to very large future populations, should gradually be freed from Imperial control and become constitutionally the peers of the mother country, united by allegiance to the single Crown. But such equality of status was only one half of the conception. To Sir John Macdonald, as to succeeding leaders both in Canada and other Dominions, a substantial guarantee of permanence and prosperity for the associated kingdoms was to be created by means of reciprocal trade preference - a development which has had to wait all these years for the necessary abandonment of Free Trade here.

Nevertheless the elimination of Imperial control has steadily proceeded, culminating in the recent Statute of Westminster. If this remarkable Act of Parliament could really fulfil the intention of its promoters, it would give all the security of law to a relationship of mutual independence and absolute equality under the Crown between Britain and the several Dominions named therein - namely Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland. India has necessarily been omitted, being still controlled from Whitehall and Westminster. But since it is the avowed intention of the Round Table Conference, including both sides, that India shall sooner or later acquire the same 'Dominion status' (a post-war term for the position of freedom and equality), it is important that its implications should be properly understood not only by the constitution-makers themselves, but also by the British Parliament and public - which certainly is not the case at present. It should help towards a true understanding if we briefly review the motives and successive stages of this development in the Dominions.

It has been characteristic of British political evolution, both at home and overseas, that agitation for the transfer of power

from one 'Estate of the Realm' to another, or within Parliament from one class of the people to another, by extension of franchise or alteration of legislative powers, have never really been inspired by any theory of government or political rights, but were first actuated by the practical desire for some class advantage, usually economic. The political theory has always been an afterthought, brought out to make the sectional demand look respectable. To take a modern instance, the suffragettes demanded the vote in the name of sex equality, but they obviously did not want it for its own sake so much as a lever for raising the economic status of women. So in India, when 'responsible government' is demanded, our own history should warn us to look beneath the surface of 'nationalism' or 'democracy,' or whatever the political cry may be, for some motive of a less general nature, which it may or may not be desirable to satisfy. During the first phase of the movement in the Dominions—say, up to the end of the last century—the real impulse was clearly economic, testifying to the soundness of the belief that the destiny of the Empire to draw together or to disolve would mainly be decided by economic factors. The successful assertion of freedom to establish tariffs, even against the mother country, was followed by freedom to negotiate separate commercial treaties with foreign countries, at first through the good offices of the British Government, but in recent years independently. When at the end of the last century Mr Chamberlain dared to revive the forgotten doctrine that Empire Preference was more important than one-sided free trade with all the world, he procured the termination of our treaties with Germany and Belgium, which had interfered with the liberty of the Dominions to give Britain exceptional favours.

Out of the Chamberlain campaign for Imperial Preference arose the Colonial Conferences of 1902 and 1907. This may be taken as opening the second phase, in which the elimination of Imperial control came gradually to be regarded as a political end in itself rather than in the interest of trade primarily. As has happened so often since, with melancholy regularity, what the Dominions have always regarded as the main objective of these gatherings—namely, the policy of mutual preference—was doomed to failure. But the 1907 meeting was signalised by the unanimous decision to drop the title 'Colonial Conference' and establish instead the 'Imperial Conference' with a definite constitution of its own. It was resolved that the Conference should be restricted to ministers of Britain and the self-governing Dominions. Decisions were to be by vote, on the basis of one Government one vote. India was excluded, because her Government was controlled from London, and giving her a vote would only have meant

doubting Britain's vote—against Preference, for example. Until recent times India was represented in the Imperial Conference by the Secretary of State or his nominee. Throughout these discussions, and in all the further proceedings from time to time, the Empire relationship was thus conceived as one between Governments as such, each representing a country whose internal political system was its own affair and irrelevant to the issue. It is important to emphasise this feature, owing to the common fallacy in connexion with India that Dominion status is only compatible with one particular form of internal administration—namely, 'responsible government'.

Early in this second phase Imperial control was challenged in a new direction—namely, Defence. The South African War of 1899-1901, to which the Dominions sent contingents, had stimulated nationalist sentiment in each, having shown that their own men were at least as good as Britain's, although somehow a different sort. They had come to feel fully capable of looking after their own military defence. Then came the German menace, creating naval alarm in Britain. As the Dominions were anxious to strengthen the naval defence of the Empire, the question arose for each whether to do so by subsidising the British Admiralty, or by starting a navy of its own, which should be co-ordinated with that of Britain. Advantage was taken of the circumstances by a new and capable society of Imperialists in London (whose chosen title ominously anticipated the fatal name of 'Round Table') to revive the ideal of Imperial Federation, a scheme which would provide centralised control of foreign affairs and defence for the Empire as a whole. It was hoped that the Dominions would vote grants to Britain for use by the Admiralty, and consequently demand representation in an Empire Parliament. But Australia had already initiated a squadron of her own; and Canada—where the issue became a bitter party question, dividing French and British—followed suit. Though New Zealand preferred the subsidy method, and South Africa was in no position to create any 'fleet unit,' the question of principle was virtually settled by the refusal of the two leading Dominions to forego their national control, at least in time of peace. Thus full political autonomy was becoming an end in itself.

The centralists continued to work for Imperial Federation throughout the war, especially behind the scenes in London. Reproting a mistake which had been made by their predecessors during the South African War fifteen years earlier, they assumed that the spontaneous rally of the Dominions in defence of the Empire signified enthusiasm for the ideal of Imperial Federation; whereas in reality it again signified precisely the opposite—as also

in India—being a fresh and more confident manifestation of the awakening consciousness which is apt to exaggerate freedom. This became clear at the Imperial Conference in 1917, which was to have been the occasion of the grand pledge of federal union. Already the Dominion premiers had been sitting regularly with British ministers, and by an unfortunate misuse of terms the joint body had been given the name of Imperial War Cabinet. It was now suggested, in effect, that the Imperial 'Cabinet' should be perpetuated, and that the anomaly of a Cabinet not responsible to any one Parliament should be remedied by creating a federal Parliament for the Empire. But the Dominions would have none of it, the Conference passing a resolution which put the idea out of court once for all. The reactions of this abortive movement were unfortunate. The extreme section of autonomists, particularly among the politically powerful non-British races in Canada and South Africa, were thoroughly alarmed, persuading themselves that a sinister plot was on foot in London to regain the substance of Imperial control. In order to conciliate them, Dominion statesmen—including so staunch a supporter of Empire unity as Sir Robert Borden, who was then Prime Minister of Canada—had to seize every opportunity of demonstrating that the real result of the war was more Dominion independence and a nearer approach to equality with Britain. Under this influence, when the League of Nations was founded, the Dominions entered as separate members, thus denying in effect the unity of the Empire, although they illogically allowed the 'British Empire' to figure also in the list as a single member represented by the British Government—to the annoyance of other countries, which did not see why the Dominions should have double representation.

A little later the Irish Free State came upon the scene, entering the Imperial Conference in 1923. This had a critical effect upon its character and proceedings. Hitherto the Conference, while steadily enlarging the bounds of Dominion liberty, had always professed quite sincerely that the main object of its existence was to find practical ways of strengthening the Empire by free co-operation for common purposes. The fact that, apart from emergency arrangements in the war, no real progress in this direction had—or has—yet been made was due to lack of incentive when Preference was ruled out by Britain. But the Irish Free State joined the assembly without any pretence of desiring to strengthen the Empire, or of having any other object than to use the Conference as an instrument for dissolving whatever ties remained. There was no contractual impediment to the movement except the existence of the Crown, this having been secured in the so-called 'treaty' of 1921, on which the Free State was based.

In the ensuing developments the Free State ministers were strongly backed by Mr. Hertzog as Prime Minister of South Africa and, in a more half-hearted way, by his colleague from Canada, Mr. Mackenzie King, who was no separatist really, but liked to be in the running with the 'party of progress.' Events abroad gave plenty of opportunities for excursions in separatism. A series of treaties fell to be negotiated and ratified, raising the question of how far the Dominions had, or ought to have been, consulted by the British Government, and of how far, if at all, any of them could be committed except by its own independent action. The climax came in 1925, over the vital Treaty of Locarno, which pledges us to fight again in Europe in certain contingencies. It is drafted in such a way as to suggest—though the Government denied this—that if ever Britain had to fight, a Dominion might remain neutral, i.e. not merely abstaining from taking any active part, as it properly might, but avoiding the liability to be attacked by Britain's enemy, and obliged to treat both belligerents exactly alike. This would be the same thing as secession.

But how could that ever be done consistently with the allegiance to the Crown which South Africa and the Free State had successively acknowledged? Though never officially nor precisely formulated, the answer emerges from a study of the many diverse debates on the treaties, and on proceedings of the Imperial Conference, in the Legislatures at Ottawa, Capetown, and Dublin especially. It lies in the tacit assumption that the British Crown is no longer single but has become several, in other words, that it is now a separate Crown for Britain and each Dominion, though happening to be worn by the same head. Logically, such a Crown could quite well be at war and peace at the same time, supposing Britain went to war while South Africa, for example, decided to be neutral. The theory assimilates Dominion status to sovereign independence.

The same theory is apparent in the persistent claim that, on the principle of equality, His Majesty's Dominion ministers have precisely the same right of directly advising His Majesty as his British ministers, and, therefore, British ministers can on no circumstances advise him either to accept or not to accept advice tendered by the ministers of a Dominion regarding any matter, whether domestic or external, with which the Dominion Government has had to deal. At most, on this theory, the British ministers may be a mere 'channel of communication,' but only if the Dominion Government cares to use them as such rather than its own representative in London. Here the theory is seen to put the King in an impossible position, supposing two or more of his already seven Governments were to tender conflicting advice.

Such, nevertheless, has been the logical idea underlying the attempt of the Free State to get its 'treaty' with the British Government registered as an international instrument at Geneva, and the suggestion that any disputes between the Britannic States ought to be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice instead of to the Privy Council. The theory done away with the British Empire as an international unit in any legal shape or form. Actually an important step in this direction has already been achieved, when it was agreed at Geneva that in future the 'British Empire,' as an official member of the League, should mean Britain with her Dependencies only, excluding not only the Dominions, but also India, their memberships being now entirely separate. It was the late J. X. Merriman, of South Africa, who exclaimed, 'Set up your League of Nations and you destroy the British Empire.' But the League of Nations is not yet the world. Legally, as we shall see, the traditional British Empire still survives, and no one can yet say which of these rival institutions—though they never ought to have been put in rivalry at all—is fated to outlive the other since they cannot coexist indefinitely.

At the Imperial Conference in 1921 the recent bogey of the 'plot' in London to restrict Dominion autonomy had led to discussion of the suggestion that the Conference should define by resolution the existing relations of the Dominions to Britain. But it was unanimously decided that—as Bonar Law afterwards told the House—any such attempt would be unwise and might be disastrous. Such a resolution he said might even have the effect of suggesting that 'their powers are less than we know them to be and they believe them to be.' Once more, therefore, the Conference had affirmed the principle of 'growth' rejecting the stereotype of sealed covenants or formal declarations.

But with the accession of the Irish Free State the demand became insistent, and could no longer be safely resisted when the Conference met in 1926, however strongly New Zealand and Australia might continue to deprecate it. So it was agreed to appoint a Committee on Imperial Relations to consider the position, under the chairmanship of the late Lord Balfour, who is said to have drafted with his own hand the vital paragraphs of the Committee's Report. Of these the principal, which was printed in italics, is the famous definition of the 'group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions.' It runs:

They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Indeed, it was an effort worthy of the genius who, when Chamberlain was on the war path, had averted a party rupture by suavely offering 'fiscal reform' as the equally true expression of Free Trade or Protection. What was the meaning of common allegiance to the Crown? Did it mean 'common' in the sense of a tool possessed in common by members of a group, and therefore not to be abused by any without impairing its utility for the rest? Or 'common' in the sense of an identical belief held in common by several persons, which any of them might renounce without spoiling it for the rest? In other words, was the Crown single or multiple? For the time being it did not matter: the Report could be, and was, unanimously approved. But the vital question remained to be answered.

The prominence given, both then and later to the magic formula has distracted attention from the qualifying observations which follow it in the Report. Thus

The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially if not formally on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects. Though every Dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the extent and nature of its co-operation, no common cause will in our opinion be thereby imperilled.

Further

Equality of status, so far as Britain and the Dominions are concerned, is thus the first principle governing our Inter-Imperial Relations. But the principles of equality and solidarity appropriate to states do not universally extend to factotums. Here we require something more than immutable dogmas. For example, to deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence we require also double machinery—mechanisms which can from time to time be adapted to the changing conditions of the world.

On this Report, and the consequent proposal to appoint a subsidiary Conference with the duty of drawing up a definite form of legislation to give it effect, a further series of debates took place in the Dominion Parliaments. Everywhere, except perhaps in Dublin, a cleavage was manifest between those who hailed the projected statute as the 'magna carta' of Dominion independence, and those who deprecated the whole business as unnecessary, if not mischievous. One such debate occurred at Ottawa while Mr. Mackenzie King was still in office, and Mr. R. B. Bennett leading the Opposition. Like some other competent lawyers in other Dominions, Mr. Bennett could never tolerate sloppy gush about 'new status' and 'absolute equality' with Britain. As the draftsmen of the Statute were afterwards to show, it is not legally possible for the Parliament at Westminster to divest itself of its power to legislate for the Dominions—a

power which it is equally impossible for any Dominion Parliament to assume in respect of Britain. Our Parliament cannot bind its successors, and whatever it may declare or enact to-day, it or its successor can equally revoke to-morrow. The legal fact is that the British is a 'sovereign' Parliament, and itself created the Dominion Parliaments. The latter are not sovereign, and therefore not legally equal in status, nor could they ever become so except by revolution, 'cutting the painter' by a declaration of independence, as the American Colonies did. Sir John Macdonald's famous challenge, 'A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die,' has been echoed by Mr. Bennett's downright statement (June 11, 1928)

There can be no such thing in international law as equality of status between Canada and Great Britain until such time as this country has the powers of a sovereign State and absolute independence both within and without our country. As far as I am concerned, I propose to die protesting against that independent condition being achieved.

Since this hundred-per-cent Canadian has not died protesting, but has lived to assist, as Prime Minister of Canada, the passage of the Statute of Westminster, we may confidently anticipate that it does not contain anything fatal to the legal unity of the Crown or its Dominions. But before being introduced at Westminster in November last, the draft Bill was circulated to the Dominions for their approval. It was discussed in all the Legislatures, and from each a resolution was forwarded requesting the British Parliament to enact it. To them the main point of interest at this stage was that the new Statute would give them complete authority, generally speaking, to legislate how they pleased and on what they pleased. This raised the question of whether or how far a Dominion should have the power of altering the constitution which had been conferred upon it by British legislation, especially in cases where the constitution had been based upon some definite agreement virtually between races, as in Canada and South Africa, or actually between separate provincial or State units, as in those instances and Australia. Canada and Australia met this difficulty by procuring the insertion of safeguarding clauses, applicable only to themselves, in the Bill itself. South Africa contented herself with a declaratory resolution of her own Parliament, renewing as a matter of domestic good faith the original stipulations on which the Union had been founded. New Zealand, British to the core, had always intensely disliked the whole business. As her Prime Minister, Mr. Forbes, said, her representatives at the Imperial Conference had been more concerned to consolidate the Empire than to define principles of Dominion status; but, in the same spirit, it was also always their

policy not to press their own views to the point of preventing united action. Therefore he now proposed the enabling resolution, but with a reservation that no provision of the intended Act should extend to New Zealand unless adopted by her own Parliament. Until then, the old position would virtually be maintained. A similar reservation was made by ancient Newfoundland. In the draft Bill as approved by these two Legislatures the reservation is in the form, identical for each, of an additional clause in the Bill. But for some reason or other these clauses were not in the Bill as afterwards presented at Westminster. Perhaps they were found superfluous.

We may now consider the Statute itself. The draftsmen of the Bill, faced with the problem of how to meet the demand that it should legally achieve a legal impossibility, resorted to the device of declaring the political ideas of its originators in a preamble to the legally operative sections, borrowing from the Balfour formula for this purpose. The principal paragraph runs:

And whereas it is meet and proper to set out by way of preamble to this Act that, inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position of all the members of the Commonwealth in relation to one another that any alteration in the law touching the Succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the Parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

'British Commonwealth of Nations' is a new term which has been officially adopted, since its appearance in the Irish 'treaty,' to denote the whole British Empire in its modern aspect as a group of autonomous States, including Britain with her remaining dependences as one such. A better term might have been 'Britannic Commonwealth,' because it avoids racial arrogance, and suggests the tie of common allegiance to His Britannic Majesty, as the Crown has always been called in diplomacy. But now it is too late. Of more immediate importance, in this paragraph we seem to have, at last, the decisive answer to the separatist theory of multiple monarchy. If the Crown must not be tampered with except by general consent, it is plainly regarded as a single indivisible Crown, not a duplicated or shared-out Crown, which any of the associated kingdoms might diminish or aggrandize in respect of itself at its own discretion. But the latter part of the paragraph has a special interest of its own. It is a first example of the Britannic nation-States surrendering by agreement a portion of their independence to the ideal of unity. The Dominions had already restricted themselves much more in signing the Geneva covenant; but, paradoxically enough, they

have hitherto refused to sacrifice an iota of autonomy for the sake of making the Imperial Conference an effective organisation. At the same time, one may perhaps imagine a delicate situation, supposing some day the Parliament at Westminster had to deal with the Succession or the Style in a manner tolerable alike to the Protestant majority here—if it still should exist—and to the Catholic majority at Dublin, besides the powerful Catholic congregations in Canada and Australia. But this is only one of the permanent risks in the great experiment of the *Britannic Commonwealth*.

The legal enactments in the Act are mainly designed to remove whatever limitations had remained upon the legislative powers of a Dominion. Thus section 2 terminates the application to a Dominion (but not to a Crown Colony) of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865. Here the time was ripe in any case. That old Act had originally served to enlarge the powers of Colonial Legislatures; but incidentally it prevented them from passing any law conflicting with British statute law. In practice it had already become an appreciable nuisance. Section 3 gives a Dominion the power to legislate with 'extra-territorial' effect, without which a State cannot control the activities of its citizens abroad. Section 4 provides that in future no British Act shall extend to a Dominion as part of its own law, unless the Dominion has asked for it. This only confirms the established usage; but the enactment is important for the implied assertion of Britain's power to legislate in certain circumstances for the Dominions, confirming the legal supremacy of the British Parliament. The same appears also in the preamble, as quoted above, which assumes that only the British Parliament can initiate legislation regarding the Crown. If ever the separatists should succeed in submitting the constitution of the 'British Commonwealth of Nations' to a foreign tribunal, their theory of equal sovereignty would surely be embarrassed by the same up-to-date Act which they had intended should fortify it, whereas, had they been content to rely upon the force of 'constitutional conventions,' as had always been the *Britannic* way, they might have pleaded that the original supremacy had lapsed by usage. In the same way, the implicit assertion in the preamble of the singleness of the Crown seems a renewed safeguard for any institutions derived from the Crown, especially the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (i.e., private or personal) Council.

Sections 5 and 6 give the Dominions power to legislate independently about merchant shipping, which hitherto has been controlled by our own Merchant Shipping Acts—excepting as regards coastal trade—and to administer the law in their own courts in their own way. This was really the most dubious pro-

vision in the Bill, since it enables the Dominions to create laws for our shipping—and their own. But the British law still stands in any Dominion until that Dominion changes it, and one may expect that business interest will be strong enough to secure a new uniformity by agreement, before what exists and serves is deliberately destroyed.

Thus, on the whole, there appears no cause for alarm about the probable effect of this somewhat unfortunate Statute. It seems to defeat the purpose of its wayward promoters, but also to expose the convenient subterfuge that 'equality of status' is accompanied by 'difference of function'—which is found to mean inequality of status. It has been commended by some as clearing the ground of misunderstandings or suspicions which were a bar to co-operation. Perhaps so; but one can only hope that when its true implications are more fully appreciated in certain quarters disappointment will not produce an opposite effect. Without this Act, the intractable legal situation would not have been adverted, and should never have made any practical difference to anybody or anything.

Westminster was wise to bless its god-child without musing it about; not because the Bill was not susceptible of improvement, but because the only mode of Britannic co-operation is now that of concurrent legislation—where legislation is necessary—by the several Parliaments after consultation through the Imperial Conference, which in this case had been protracted and thorough. In a lengthy debate the only cogent criticism was directed to the risk of giving the Irish Free State the apparent power of altering its own Constitution and especially of abolishing the right of appeal to the Privy Council, which the Free State had already tried to repudiate and to suppress. But an amendment in the Commons excluding the right of the Free State to tamper with its Constitution was defeated by 350 votes to 50. It was pointed out that the similar reservations respecting the Canadian and Australian Constitutions had been inserted at the behest of those Dominions, and that it would be invidious to dictate a similar limitation to the Free State against its will. As to the actual risk, it was argued that the Free State Constitution rests ultimately upon the 'treaty,' rather than the Constitution Act of 1922 which followed it, and a letter was read from Mr. Congrave, protesting against the proposed amendment, in the course of which he said, 'we have reiterated time and again that the treaty is an agreement which can only be altered by consent.' But the Free State's position, it seems, is that the appeal to the Privy Council is not secured by the treaty, and in the other House Lord Haldane suggested that, if the Free State persisted, 'it should be a matter for interpretation by an independent tribunal' in that event

In such circumstances, however, it may be of interest to call attention to one small area of the fiscal controversy upon which Free Traders and Protectionists may find common ground. No one pretends to like 'dumping.' On the one hand, it has perhaps made more converts to Protection than any other fact or argument. On the other hand, Mr Lloyd George has said that Free Trade must not be saddled with 'the monstrous baby' of dumping; and economists, as will be seen, while they would hardly accept the epithet 'monstrous,' at least regard the practice with disfavour.

Dumping, in the popular sense of the word, was the occasion, if not perhaps the whole political explanation, of the Abnormal Importations Act. One may be permitted to begin with a definition of the term. For 'dumping' is not really a mere term of reproach, to be applied to the importation from foreign countries of any goods which are or might be made at home, nor even to goods which are thought to compete 'unfairly' with a rival British product. Historically, it has a more precise meaning—namely, the device of maintaining output by selling a proportion of it for export at a price below the producer's average cost of production.

Modern economists¹ have defined it more widely as 'the disposal of commodities in a foreign country at one price, and to domestic purchasers at another and higher price.' Both definitions were enshrined in the Safeguarding Act of 1921, inasmuch as an anti-dumping duty was made chargeable on goods 'imported at a price below the cost of production' while a workable definition was attempted by arbitrarily defining 'cost of production' in terms of the seller's price for domestic consumption.

For legislative purposes, the term 'costs of production' is indeed extremely elusive. Although every producer may have a shrewd idea of his costs sufficiently accurate for his practical purposes, it is only a minority of large manufacturers who employ scientific methods of 'costing.' And, even when such methods are employed, there is indefinite room for controversy as to what items of general expenditure are properly chargeable to production. It is, however, important to notice that the feature of price differentiation may not exist in that very common form of dumping, as the term is popularly understood, where a manufacturer, or dealer in produce, is compelled from lack of working capital to dispose of surplus stock regardless of cost. Dumping in this sense was practised on a national scale in 1931—first by the Russian Government, and later² by Germany. In the one case by the Government itself as a deliberate act of policy; in

¹ Vide Forth (Sir William Beveridge and others), p. 103.

the other case by individual manufacturers and traders, constrained by financial pressure. But the kind of dumping which has most concerned protagonists in the fiscal controversy is the voluntary and deliberate sale of goods for export at a price below the producer's average cost. It is with dumping in this, its historical sense, that the present article is mainly concerned.

That dumping may, at least in theory, be to the producer's advantage can readily be seen from the following simple exercise in arithmetic :

(i.) Consider the case of a manufacturer whose fixed charges—rent, salaries, local rates, etc.—are £10,000 yearly and his maximum output 20,000 articles costing in labour and materials 40s. each. It will be seen that, when working full time, his total cost of production is 50s. each. Let us further suppose that he can normally sell his entire output in the home market at an average price of 60s., thus gaining a very satisfactory profit of 10s., or £10,000 a year. Then there comes a year of depression, when his sales at home are reduced by one-half. It is clear that, in consequence of his fixed charges of £10,000 yearly, his total cost of production is increased to 60s.—so that if he accepts the situation, while maintaining his former price he will be without either profit or loss. But, if he can 'dump' in some other market a further quantity of his goods—not necessarily his whole surplus—at any price above 40s. (the bare cost of his labour and materials), the excess price will be a clear profit to him. And this notwithstanding the fact that, on the lowest computation, his (total) cost of production cannot be less than 50s. Actually, in fact, his cost of production will be somewhere between 50s. and 60s., according to the actual total amount of his sales.

(ii.) The foregoing example illustrates sporadic dumping. It can easily be made to illustrate the extreme theory of continuous dumping, as advanced by the early 'Tariff Reformers,' on the very questionable assumption that the manufacturer could double his plant and output without appreciably increasing his fixed charges. It will obviously pay him to do so if he can find a market for the additional output, even though at little more than the bare cost of labour and materials. Even if his establishment charges are materially increased, it will still pay him to double his output, provided that they are not *proportionately* increased—i.e., not doubled. But in this event his dumping price must clearly be high enough to provide for the additional establishment charges.

(iii.) Finally, if we assume the foreign manufacturer to be continuously dumping in Great Britain in competition with an unprotected British manufacturer, then the latter, other things being equal, will be unable to sell any part of his product, except

at a loss; e.g., he may in no case be able to obtain a higher price than 45s.

The foregoing statement of the theory has the advantage of showing with more than customary precision the important rôle played by what are variously known as fixed, establishment, or overhead charges. It must be borne in mind that the proportion of fixed charges varies greatly, not only in different trades, but in different firms engaged in the same trade; in cases within my experience the proportion varies from 3 per cent. to as much as 300 per cent. of the cost of labour and materials. The theory illustrated in these imaginary examples seems to be unavailable, if these are seen in their proper light—not as exhibiting a true picture of what really happens, but merely as explaining certain tendencies which may be, and frequently are, obliterated by opposing factors. These tendencies towards dumping do exist, and, as will be shown, they are translated into practice to an extent sufficiently important to merit serious consideration. In order, however, that they may be seen in proper perspective it will be as well, before proceeding, to take note of the errors in the picture and of the counteracting tendencies.

First, as to the errors in the picture: All such examples tend to suggest an unreal degree of control or foresight in respect of prices and sales. The manufacturer of a 'proprietary' article, or quasi-monopoly, does, of course, determine his selling prices. But in the staple industries which constitute the bulk of the world's production, prices are determined by fluctuations in the general supply and demand, and the producer's function is merely to discover by trial and error, from day to day, what is the 'market' price. Still less can the manufacturer foresee with certainty the extent of his future sales. Anxiety as to the disposal of his output is usually a paramount consideration, and must often deter a manufacturer from enlarging his factory when it would really be to his advantage to do so.

The conception in (i) of dumping in order to increase the producer's profit is also rather wide of reality. When a manufacturer 'cuts his establishment charges' it is usually with no other conscious motive than to keep his men and plant employed, to which he might add that he seeks thereby, not to increase his profit, but to avoid a loss, or greater loss. Some further corrections to the picture are sufficiently indicated in the following list of opposing tendencies.

The principal hindrances to the application of the dumping theory are briefly these:

(1) Articles designed to suit the needs and tastes of the home market may be unavailable at any price in other countries. Even when there is a potential foreign market, it may not be possible

to exploit it without first creating an elaborate organization of agencies, a process which takes time.

(2) Industries which export the major part of their production—e.g., the Lancashire cotton industry and the steelworks of Luxembourg—cannot afford to sell so large a proportion of their output without profit.

(3) When a manufacturer, finding himself short of orders, is anxious to practise dumping, this is usually owing to a general depression in his trade, so that, on the one hand, there is nowhere the usual disposition to buy, and, on the other hand, the seller is faced with the keen competition of his fellow-manufacturers, equally anxious to dispose of their surpluses.

(4) Costs of production are not necessarily reduced by increasing the scale of production. On the contrary, large concerns are often top-heavy, so that it is quite commonly observed, for example, that a small manufacturer or contractor has been able to undersell his rivals because, as it is said, 'he has no establishment charges.'

(5) The disastrous consequences to the unprotected manufacturer in case (iii) are on the assumption that 'other things are equal.' But they never are. In any given industry costs of production vary greatly as between one country and another, and also as between individual makers in the same country. In particular, the tariffs which facilitate dumping also tend² to raise the internal level of prices and wages and consequently of costs of production. Where the internal price level is so high as in the United States most industries cannot afford to accept, even for dumping purposes, prices which yet leave a reasonable margin of profit to the British manufacturer.

When regard is had to all these opposing tendencies one is no longer surprised by the fact that, notwithstanding the theoretical advantages of dumping, probably at least 90 per cent. of the world's manufactures are retained for home consumption; and that, in times of depression, protected and unprotected industries and countries are equally liable to short-time working and unemployment. As previously intimated, however, the conclusion to be drawn from all these qualifications is not that the dumping theory is wholly false, only that its influence has often been grossly exaggerated. As a tendency it certainly exists; whether the object be to gain a profit or to avoid loss, the manufacturer really has every inducement to 'dump' his surplus goods abroad, if he can. And this inducement has been intensified in recent years by the more general adoption of mass production, since many modern labour-saving appliances are apt to be

² It is only a tendency, as may be seen from the fact that wages and salaries in the protected countries of Europe are, in general, much below our level.

intolerably expensive when they are not working to something approaching their full capacity. It must also be conceded that dumping can be practised boldly and effectively in proportion to the extent that an industry is enabled by combination and a protective tariff to maintain relatively high prices in its home market.

As to the extent to which dumping is really practised, there are obviously no statistical sources of information. One is reduced to intelligent conjecture, partly from general considerations, partly from the evidence given before Tariff Commissions and similar public bodies. The persons familiar with all the available data, and best fitted by their training to form a sound judgment—namely, the economists—seem to be generally agreed that 'dumping,' to quote Sir William Beveridge,¹ 'in any reasonable sense of the term is a rare process.' I cannot altogether accept this conclusion, though the difference is perhaps more in language than substance. To begin with Sir William Beveridge must clearly mean selling below cost, since he is well aware that dumping, in the sense of price differentiation, is by no means uncommon. It is not unlikely that economists have been unduly impressed by the fact that the complainants have so rarely been able to satisfy an impartial tribunal that their competitors really are dumping. But this may be mainly due to various practical difficulties in the way of obtaining the information required—e.g., the costs of a rival foreign producer. However this may be, the true view seems to be that while dumping in the full sense of the theory is a rare phenomenon, it is *partially* practised to a very large extent. That is to say, price differentiation seems to be rather the rule than the exception in all the industrial countries England included. Furthermore, it is probable that, in many cases, the export price, though not actually below the seller's actual cost of production, includes so small a margin of profit that the manufacturer could not continue in business if he were compelled to sell his entire output at so low a price; he would neither be able to attract fresh capital, nor to build up any reserves for the purpose of improving his plant.

We have next to consider whether dumping, having regard to all its consequences, is injurious or otherwise to the country which resorts to it and to the countries thus invaded. Here also it is by no means easy to arrive at a just conclusion. Sir William Beveridge² does not fail to point out that 'cheap goods, in themselves, are an advantage rather than a disadvantage to the country which receives them.' Nevertheless, he concludes that, on the whole,

¹ *Tariff*, p. 231.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 131, 132.

monopoly dumping from behind a tariff wall is a form of competition which it is certainly desirable to discourage. It is an irritant all round, to the domestic consumers who are exploited, and to the rival producers who are put out of business. It is, in fact, one of the strongest general objections to Protection that it makes this kind of thing possible.

With this conclusion I would respectfully associate myself, on the following general grounds

(1) From a purely economic standpoint one might possibly arrive at the conclusion that dumping benefits the community which receives the goods more than it injures the home producer, or that the evil is too small in its dimensions in relation to the whole volume of our trade to be worth troubling about. But the question has also a moral aspect, which forbids such nice calculations when both benefit and injury are founded on injustice. When a British subject is murdered abroad, no one thinks of stressing his numerical insignificance.

(2) If dumping does admittedly help certain subsidiary British industries—e.g. the re-rollers in the steel industry, depending on cheap supplies of steel semi-products—these industries, if they really depended on dumped materials, would exist only on an artificial and precarious footing. It cannot accord with the principle of Free Trade to encourage a mischievous and unnatural form of competition even though a section of the community may benefit from it.

(3) While it is true that the extent to which dumping is or can be practised against a Free Trade country has always been grossly exaggerated, it does exist, it is a constant threat, and with the increasing elaboration of mass production it is a growing one. So far as it exists it is an injustice to the British manufacturer. So far as it is a threat, it saps confidence and checks enterprise.

Finally, as to remedies. Do these considerations lead irresistibly to a general tariff and is a tariff a sufficient remedy? The answers are not so obvious as they may appear to the Protectionist. For, in reply to the first question, the Free Trader might well contend that for every injustice and economic evil created by dumping the Protectionist system substitutes a hundred. It is, however, unnecessary to consider the general arguments for and against protective tariffs, because the one argument that can certainly not be advanced in their favour is that they offer an antidote for dumping. On the contrary, a general tariff—unless inordinately high—is nicely calculated to exclude foreign goods precisely in proportion as they are offered at a fair price, and to admit foreign goods only to the extent that they are dumped. Like many another net of State manufacture, a tariff has the remarkable property of effectually stopping sprats while allowing

whales to pass freely through its meshes. This consideration may carry no weight with a confirmed Protectionist, who has many other strings to his bow, but should at least convince him that he can not quite honestly pretend that his object is to prevent England from being made a 'dumping-ground.'

A more conclusive objection, perhaps, to tariffs as a remedy for dumping is that a tariff only protects the home market, whereas England's vital necessity is to regain her export trade so that she may continue to pay for her food and raw materials. It is accordingly in the great neutral markets—India, China, South America, etc.—that our manufacturers are most in need of a *régime* of fair competition, yet, to the extent that we exclude foreign goods from our home market, we must necessarily provoke intensified foreign competition in our overseas markets. The possibility of some increase of business with our sparsely populated Dominions cannot possibly compensate for this. The 'Empire Free Trader' is looking too many generations ahead. It is the world that, for many years at least, England is compelled by her economic situation to regard as her market. From this point of view, it must be repeated, the sole effect of a British tariff will be to divert foreign goods from one corner of our world market into the outlying areas.

It is indeed often suggested that the adoption of tariffs by a country like England whose market is so important to other countries, will produce 'a general scaling down of tariffs' ³—a new world in which the foregoing considerations will no longer apply. In short, we are led to hope for universal Free Trade, obviously the best of all solutions. This argument has been doing duty ever since the beginning of the 'Tariff Reform' campaign in 1903, and has not been neglected by Mr. Runciman. But can it be contended seriously that the United States, for example, which exports on the average barely 8 per cent. of its manufactures—to all markets ⁴—will be so perturbed by our tariff as to abandon Protection and so to jeopardise, as she will suppose, the domestic 92 per cent. The suggestion is as ludicrous as it is contrary to all experience.

It follows, then, that a tariff offers no remedy for dumping. It can only assist our manufacturers to make their own contribution to a vicious system more complete. Thus, of course, is precisely what many of them intend. Thus, we have the director of the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers recently declaring that 'he wanted to see industrialism of a like

³ *The Times*, October 26, 1901.

⁴ Statistical abstract for the United States, 1920, p. 479. The percentage of exports varies, of course, greatly in different trades—e.g., in 1920, Hardware 50 per cent., Typewriters, 40 per cent., Leather Shoes and Skins, 20 per cent. (*Continued Year-Book*, 1920).

hind co-operating to eliminate wasteful competition at home and to pool their selling resources in order to develop an aggressive and forward selling policy in all the consuming markets of the world.'¹

An 'aggressive' policy, it is true, conveys a prospect of retaliation which, to some minds, outweighs all argument. But, when one considers the gross injustice of extorting monopoly prices from the British public in order to supply below cost to the foreign buyer, this form of retaliation is no more attractive to a reasoning mind than would be a proposal to punish cannibals by eating them.

Other remedies that have been tried or proposed may be discussed more briefly. In the first place, the United States, and all our Dominions, have found it necessary to supplement their high tariffs with elaborate anti-dumping regulations. All such measures, however, depend in the main on elaborate declarations to be made by the foreign exporter, and have not proved very effective except in harassing legitimate trade and stimulating perjury.

The authors of *Tariffs* suggest an International Convention providing for

(1) The reimportation into any country free of duty of goods originally made in that country

(2) A recognition of the right of each country absolutely to prohibit imports when their price has been artificially cheapened by subsidies.

These proposals do not appear to afford a sufficient solution. The former especially appears to be inadequate and even a little fantastic.

The method I suggest is one which, if practicable (and the main object of this article is to submit it for consideration), would be far more effective. It is a bold one, certainly. But the nations alarmed by a trade depression and financial crisis beyond all precedents seem ready to consider bold, concerted measures in the economic sphere. The proposal in question, reduced to its simplest terms, is just this: *That the Governments of the chief producing nations shall agree (i) to abstain from all State subsidism on exports², and (ii) to prohibit their nationals from selling to foreign buyers more cheaply than to their own people.*

The first article is suggested as a natural corollary to the second, and calls for no special comment. The main proposal, as embodied in the second article, undoubtedly suggests many serious difficulties, and still more numerous objections.

¹ Vide *The Times*, October 20, 1931.

² This need not preclude a State from granting bounties on production, provided that the bounty is confined to the properties exported.

It must suffice, for the present, to indicate the main considerations which have led me to believe that this proposal is at least in the right direction, namely :

(1) It will be observed that the proposal disregards costs of production, for reasons explained at the beginning of this article.

(2) *A priori*, any proposal for State interference with trade and industry must certainly be approached with the utmost suspicion. It is to be observed, however, that this proposal involves no such continued interference with trade as does the policy of Protection. And that, in lieu of uncertain, shifting principles, constant changes and unintelligible customs regulations, it offers a simple, intelligible, and permanent policy to which industry can adapt itself once and for all. Nor are the changes involved so great as some may suppose. For example, it by no means compels restriction of output. On the contrary, when trade is bad, it only demands that makers shall maintain their output by reducing their prices to all and sundry, instead of confining this favour to their foreign markets.

(3) It leaves every country, our own included, free to maintain, or to adopt, either Protection or Free Trade. Politically, indeed, it is far more practicable than a demand that other nations shall lower their tariffs. For whereas public opinion is easily marshalled against any proposal to admit foreign goods, it is difficult to conceive any effective agitation against this scheme. On the contrary, it seems calculated to afford a highly popular item in the electoral programme of any party and in any country. If the scheme errs it is in practicability, not in plausibility.

(4) It offers protection to the British manufacturer, not only in his home market, but in the neutral overseas markets.

(5) It attacks the evil at its source, which, as experience of the drug traffic indicates, is the only sound basis.

(6) Could such a prohibition be enforced? Would dumping, like the drink traffic in America, or bribery everywhere, merely be driven underground?

There seem to be quite good answers to objections of this character. Dumping, unlike bribery, has hitherto been carried on openly, and cannot, in the nature of things, be practised secretly on a large scale. The greater the works or combine, the greater its difficulty in concealing its prices and its operations.

(7) As to enforcement, the Act of 1906 for the Prevention of Corruption is doubly suggestive. By declaring secret commissions to be illegal it has gone far towards abolishing them by the mere fact of creating a healthy public opinion on the subject. It also suggests the appropriate sanctions—namely, that, in addition to conventional fines, the manufacturers' customers

should be given a civil remedy, enabling them, on proof of differentiation, to recover the difference in price. A manufacturer tempted to allow an illicit discount on a particular transaction would incur the risk of having to allow a similar discount on the whole of his sales over a given period. In the face of such a risk few manufacturers would willingly defy the law.

(8) The remedy against offending foreign exporters, if their Government should be supine, might take various forms—e.g., prohibition of entry, or prosecution by the aggrieved manufacturers either in the country itself, or against the exporters' agents here.

(9) To the legally minded, it may well appear impossible to frame a single statute prohibiting price differentiation in terms applicable to every trade and industry. Or so far-reaching an experiment may seem too dangerous. Neither objection is fatal, since there is no need to proceed in so direct a fashion. It may well be that, in the first instance, the contracting States would only agree to the suggested terms 'in principle'. That is to say, they might agree, in lieu of article (ii)—first to adopt all practicable measures to 'discourage' price differentiation, and, secondly, to introduce prohibitory legislation, to begin with, only in certain specified trades or classes of goods, or, perhaps, only to 'concert' suitable measures as and when applied for by an aggrieved State. One 'practicable measure' available to our Government would be an express public declaration of its disapproval of price differentiation and of its intention, where necessary, to introduce penal legislation. As already suggested, it is probable that, in such circumstances, public opinion would render the legislation in fact unnecessary.

(10) On ultimate analysis, therefore, it would seem that the practicability of my scheme depends entirely on whether public opinion, at home and abroad, can be roused to the conviction that dumping, as defined, is a bad and immoral practice—a gross injustice to one's own people and a thoroughly unneighbourly act in relation to foreign countries, a commercial scandal as indefensible as bribery.

R. A. SKEELTON

THE DEFAULTING STATES OF AMERICA

WHEN I mentioned to a friend that I proposed to write an article on 'The Defaulting States of America,' he said, 'You will have a job to get it published.' At this I smiled; but I know better now.

The first able editor I approached, a fair sample of the others, was perfectly frank. He said, 'I cannot encourage you to write such an article; indeed, I have already rejected a paper—quite a good one—on that subject.' I asked why. 'Well,' he said,

- (1) Everyone knows that Americans are like that
- (2) Nobody cares
- (3) It will only make bad blood between us and them
- (4) Nothing we can say will do any good.

From these four propositions I profoundly dissent

(1) Using the editorial ellipsis, Americans are not 'like that.' They stand by their business engagements as well as other people.
 (2) We have striking evidence that many Americans do, in this matter, care very greatly for the honour of their country, and as for our own people, who have been suffering silently for several years under the sanctimonious admonitions of America on the sacred duty of repaying debts, the knowledge that America is herself an arch-offender against this duty will come as a very helpful surprise. They will be able to make should occasion offer, if not the 'counter-check quarrelsome' at any rate 'the retort courteous,' to any such admonitions in the future. Very few Englishmen are aware of the stupendous and determined default in question, and I am assured that the vast majority of the citizens of the Republic are in the same condition of ignorance, and would care very much about it if they knew the facts.

(3) As to the danger of making bad blood between the two countries, if the aggrieved party states its grievance clearly, it has no substance. The arrest and execution of a murderer or the conviction and sentence of a blackmailer may, and probably does, annoy murderers and blackmailers and those who sympathise with these crimes; but civilisation does authorise these measures of self-protection and continues on its way very cheerfully.

(4) That nothing we can say will do any good is demonstrably untrue. Our leading case in this matter is that of Charles Dickens. Having suffered severely in pocket and temper by the

theft, as he regarded it, of the produce of his brains through the issue of numberless editions of his books without any payments to himself, he seized the opportunity, when a banquet was given in his honour in New York, of reproaching America vigorously for her conduct. His friends were aghast at his temerity, and perhaps not pleased with his tact, while his audience generally were furious. Next day the Press went mad and attacked him in unmeasured terms.

Dickens concluded that what was in other people's eyes simply dishonest dealing was, in the eyes of Americans, laudable business 'smartness'. In the American section of *Martin Chuzzlewit* he emphasised this belief, and penned the most terrific indictment of the habits and customs of a friendly nation which has ever been written. The storm broke out afresh, and no wonder. Even now I doubt whether an American could read those passages without getting hot all over. Genius, when combative, is not to be outraged with impunity. But the Americans are a generous nation, and, in the end, they forgave him.

In 1868 the International Copyright Bill was introduced in America too late to benefit Dickens. But can one doubt that the publicity given to the case by Dickens' action led directly to this result?

There is, unfortunately, no Borsal Institution for misbehaving States or nations—though the League of Nations does propose, in extreme cases, to send them to Coventry. Still, there is one force before which even States and nations must bow—the force of public opinion. But public opinion does not grow—as Mark Tapley suggested of public buildings in Eden—'Spontaneous'; it must be nourished by facts, and it is the simple facts which, after this exordium, I propose to give.

The story, though complicated in regard to details, is indeed, in essentials, as simple as a fairy tale and nearly as incredible.

From 1830 up to 1840 certain States raised loans for industrial purposes; Mississippi defaulted twice, in 1842 and 1852. Florida defaulted in 1845. After the Civil War further loans were raised by the following States, which made default on the dates given below:

	Dates of Repudiation Act.
Florida	1876 (second default)
Alabama	1876
North Carolina	1879
South Carolina	1873
Georgia	1872, 1875, 1876
Louisiana	1874
Arkansas	1884

Many of these debts, in the main owed to British nationals, were wholly repudiated.

Some States, however, avoided the reproach of total repudiation by 'scaling down' their liabilities. They cancelled their old bonds and issued new ones for a smaller amount in their stead. The debts were scaled down in varying amounts from 24 per cent. to 50 per cent. In certain cases the bondholders agreed to this composition, in others they did not.

The States which took this course were:

	Date of 'Settlement.'
Alabama	1873, 1876
North Carolina	1879
South Carolina	1879
Louisiana	1874
Tennessee	1882, 1883
Minnesota	1881
Michigan	1842
Virginia	1882, 1892

It is necessary to deal as briefly as possible with the legal position.

Article 1, section 10 of the Constitution of the United States of America contains the following very definite clause:

The creditor of a State has a contract right which the legislature cannot impair by subsequent enactment.

Also:

No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contract.

However, in 1798 Amendment XI became law. The relevant clause reads as follows:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.

That this amendment was not understood as authorising or excusing repudiation is sufficiently obvious from the following sentence in *Senate Documents*, vol. 118, concerning Amendment XI., under 'Leading Cases, Suits on State Contracts':

Those who deal in bonds and obligations of a Sovereign State are aware that they must rely altogether on the sense of justice and good faith of the State, and the courts of the United States are expressly prohibited from exercising jurisdiction.

This reads somewhat ironically in the light of what actually occurred. (This gloss on the amendment does not correctly

express its meaning. The amendment did not prohibit legal action by the creditor if a citizen of the defaulting State. Indeed, certain States, contrary to the express direction of Article 1, section 10, above quoted, did pass legislation which prevented their own citizens from taking action. I am not aware that the Federal Government ever did anything in the matter; but that is America's own affair.)

In 1925 the Section of Statistics, Secretary's Office, Treasury Department, issued a paper entitled 'Repudiation of State Indebtedness,' and a copy was forwarded to the Council of Foreign Bondholders, London.

The Department states that it is 'simply a summary of the results of the investigations of others and is based very largely on "The Repudiation of State Debts, published in 1893," compiled by Mr Scott

The document is generally accepted as a very fair statement of the case, and the total sum repudiated, owing to the more ample material available to Mr Scott, is calculated to amount to 77,650,000 dollars, some 17,500,000 dollars more than the estimate by the Council of Foreign Bondholders. Anyone who takes the trouble can calculate the accrued simple or compound interest over an average of sixty-three years at 5 per cent.

The paper expressly states that the debts in question had nothing whatever to do with 'War Debts,' which were voided by Amendment XIV. The debts which were incurred before the Civil War were for industrial development and after the war for reconstruction.

The department, of course, makes no attempt to excuse the default, but does give the causes which led to it.

(1) The earlier repudiation followed the disastrous financial crisis of 1837, the later occurred in the reconstruction period following the Civil War.

(2) Reckless finance and fraud.

(3) In some States 'the cry of illegality was raised, the question got into politics and the bonds were repudiated.'

(4) The Civil War greatly reduced the taxable basis and the financial situation was desperate.

(5) The Civil War greatly weakened the idea of State sovereignty and the feeling of State responsibility. Amendment XIV. required the repudiation of all debts contracted in the United States in aid of the rebellion, and it was not easy for the Southern States to discriminate between these and their other debts.

There is no doubt that all these causes operated; but they had nothing to do with the unfortunate bondholders.

As to No. 5, the suggestion of difficulty in discriminating

between the debts is childish. The dates of issue of the loans settled the question definitely and finally.

The grievance of the existing charge against the defaulters is this : that they who were poor, largely through their own action, and unable to discharge their liabilities, are now rich and refuse to do so ; and that they even decline to submit the matter to arbitration.

We only ask that they should display the common honesty of the solvent and respectable bookmaker, who pays his debts though not legally bound to do so, but they prefer to imitate the behaviour attributed to one of their countrymen by Dickens. It was the custom of this amiable citizen, in moments of stress, to 'run a moist pen slap through everything and start fresh.'

That this course of conduct does lead to certain difficulties—for instance, in the matter of credit—is certainly true.

The Council of Foreign Bondholders, which has doggedly stuck to its task of ventilating the subject for over fifty years, in its report for 1912 states that when North Carolina appealed for a small loan, it (the Council) called the attention of investors to the record of the defaulting States, with the result that practically no subscription to the loan was received from outsiders. In the end the loan was taken up by the State's own citizens. The Council, however, was informed that, in order to persuade these citizens to subscribe, the new bonds had to be exempted from taxation.

In the report for 1913 it is stated that, when Louisiana tried to raise a loan, the Council took similar action and the attempted issue entirely failed.

America is like a man of moderate means who has suddenly become rich beyond the dreams of avarice. When he was comparatively poor no one paid much attention to him, but now his softest whisper—if he ever does whisper—is listened to with bated breath. His once indifferent neighbours say 'Don't offend him ; he is so rich, he could buy us all up.' Besides, we owe him money, and if we are civil he may let us off some of it', and so all the nations grovel—especially England. It is a pitiful spectacle.

In this pass let us turn again to one who in no circumstances was capable of assuming the attitude of a chicken spaniel—Charles Dickens. In *American Notes* he wrote

Another prominent feature is the love of 'smart' dealing which gains over many a swindle and gross breach of trust, many a defalcation, public and private ; and makes many a knave hold his head up with the best who well deserves a halter, though it has not been without its retributive operation. For this 'smartness' has done more in a few years to impair the public credit, and to cripple the public resources, than dull honesty, however such, could have effected in a century.

There is another important personage who, on the subject of debt repudiation, was not afraid to speak his mind :

Humble Petition of the Rev. Sydney Smith to the House of Congress at Washington.

A great nation, after trampling under foot all earthly tyranny, has been guilty of a fraud as enormous as ever disgraced the worst king of the most degraded nation of Europe

Again :

Nor is it only the gigantic bankruptcy but so many degrees of longitude and latitude which your Petitioner deprecates, but he is alarmed also at that total want of shame with which those things have been done, the callous immorality with which Europe has been plundered, that deadness of the moral sense which seems to preclude all return to honesty to perpetuate this new infamy, and to threaten its extension over every State of the Union

Strong words from a 'Humble Petitioner' who was, in general, a devoted admirer of America, and her valiant defender when she was unjustly attacked

He was, as he says, 'abused in the grossest manner by many of the American papers', but he stuck to his guns, and the devastating character of the shots which he fired can be judged from the above examples

It has been asked before and may well be asked again, why does not the Federal Government assume the debts? With this question the Section of Statistics, Secretary's Office, Treasury Department, deals very summarily thus 'to the European mind especially this is not an illogical idea because the European is not generally familiar with the dual nature of the American form of government—to the American mind, however, the suggestion has little appeal'

Let us take a parallel case. Suppose that British county councils had wide borrowing powers and floated loans for development work which were, in the main, subscribed by the citizens of foreign Powers. Suppose these county councils got into financial trouble and defaulted. Would not the British Government, any British Government, assume those debts and extract the money from the defaulting councils as best they could? Of course they would. Would it allow the defaulters to take refuge behind a law most certainly not enacted *ad hoc*? Of course not.

A British Government would assume the debts and severely restrict the borrowing powers of the councils in the future.

If the Federal Government did not choose to take that course it could cancel Amendment XI and thus restore the status quo ante which gave the defrauded bondholders a legal remedy.

If anyone wishes to know what many present-day good

Americans think about the matter they cannot do better than read *Honour or Dollars*, by a distinguished American lawyer, Mr. F. W. Peabody.¹

The pamphlet deals mainly with European debts to America, but on pp. 63 to 65 refers shortly and drastically to the defaulting States.

I will end this short and imperfect summary of the case by quoting the words of the Hon. Daniel Webster (twice Secretary of State of the United States) in a letter addressed to Messrs. Baring Brothers in 1839

The States cannot rid themselves of their obligations otherwise than by the honest payment of their debts. They possess all adequate powers of providing for the case by taxation and internal means of revenue. They cannot get round the duty nor evade its force. Any failure to fulfil its obligations would be an open violation of public faith to be followed by the penalty of dishonour and disgrace—a penalty it may be presumed, which no State of the American Union would be likely to incur. I hope I may be justified by existing circumstances in closing this letter with the expression of an opinion of a more general nature. It is that I believe that the citizens of the United States like all honest men regard debts whether public or private and whether existing at home or abroad to be of moral as well as legal obligation. If it were possible that any of the States should, at any time, so entirely lose its self respect and forget its duty as to violate the faith solemnly pledged for its pecuniary engagements, I believe there is no country upon earth—not even that of the injured creditor—in which such a proceeding would meet with less countenance or indulgence than it would receive from the great mass of the American people.

'Sweet—sweet vision! Foolish—foolish dream!'

ARCHIBALD J. CAMPBELL

¹ Published by Sampson, Marshall, Hunt & Co. Ltd.

FRENCH ART AT BURLINGTON HOUSE

WHEN we look back on the wonderful exhibitions of Flemish, Dutch, Italian, and Persian art that have adorned the galleries of Burlington House in recent winters, we are broadly conscious that each display revealed a general unity of artistic purpose, a characteristic national tradition emerging in each individual artist through successive centuries. In spite of the amazing individuality of Italian painters and of the different schools of Italian painting, there was always something that revealed an impress that is specifically Italian. On the eve of the coming French exhibition I wonder whether we shall be able to gain any like impression. I rather think not. France, the country *par excellence* of logic and of a nationalism carried to the point of its becoming a religion, reveals in its art not so much a continuous purpose or national tradition, but a series of apparently contradictory impulses, at once accumulative and revolutionary. The chain of tradition is found to be continually broken by the impact of individual artists who changed the whole course of French national taste. In France the struggle between Northern and Southern elements in its racial complex has been the battleground between Roman and Gothic, between classical and romantic ideals in almost every age. The result of this battle has seldom been fusion, but rather the emphasis of each by rival and contemporary artists.

One thing, however, we can predict with certainty of any exhibition of French art—namely, the continuous excellence of French craftsmanship, whether in painting, in ivories, in textiles, in porcelain, in goldsmiths' work, in furniture or any of the applied arts. All through the centuries the wonderful '*goût français*' reveals itself in a fineness and dexterity of handicraft such as no other nation, not even the Chinese, has surpassed.

Any exhibition at Burlington House is almost necessarily dominated by one form of art, and that is painting: and, though France has had her great painters, it is not by the contribution of her painters alone that her artistic legacy to the world can be adequately assessed, as can that of Flanders, Holland, or Italy.

France's greatest contributions to the world's art can never

be seen in an exhibition gallery, for they can never be seen apart from their native setting. I refer, of course, to the cathedrals of the thirteenth century. Between 1170 and 1270 the French built eighty great cathedrals, and not only built them architecturally in a style which was her own creation and developed to so high a degree of excellence, but embellished them with carving and sculpture, and above all with coloured glass, which are among the very highest revelations of the creative spirit of man. Chartres, Bourges, Amiens, Reims, and Beauvais are the greatest achievements of the French genius at any time, and they were carried out on such a scale of originality and ambition that few other people of any age can compete. To those who know what was involved in the making of any one of these great cathedrals the effort seems positively superhuman. And of this, France's most distinctive glory, we can see nothing at an exhibition in London.

French painting began as ornament of her churches, as did her tapestries, her book illuminations, her ivories, her wonderful goldsmiths' work. It emerges in picture galleries, i.e., in the easel picture as the derivative of mural painting and of the illuminated missal or book of hours; perhaps I should even add of the amazing craft of the glass-workers. Little of early date remains, and we are suddenly confronted by that isolated masterpiece, the great *field* of the School of Avignon now in the Louvre, the most tremendous of all French primitives. The original impulse of the Provençal school, of which it is the greatest product left to us, was undoubtedly the visit of Simone Martini of Siena to decorate the Palace of the Popes, but this Sienese tradition was soon lost under the impact of the early Flemish masters, under whom the Maître de Moulins, Fouquet and others learnt their craft. In painting the North won the first battle over the South. One great early French masterpiece we are to see—the *Coronation of the Virgin*, by Charanton, from the Hospice of Villeneuve-les-Avignon, a picture as peculiar in colour as it is striking in design, a curious blend of Northern and Southern ideals.

Strangely enough there are no outstanding names in French painting in the sixteenth century. At this time of the High Renaissance in Italy France was content to summon Italians, including the great Leonardo, to supply a deficiency of French painters. The later but secondary Italians employed at Fontainebleau brought a tradition which had a lasting influence on French art. But perhaps the outstanding native painters of the century were the portraitists—Corneille de Lyons and the two Closets. Consciously or unconsciously these portrait painters derived from Holbein. In his best portrait drawings Closet almost attains the quality of Holbein, but he rarely achieved Holbein's substance or richness of colour in handling oil paint.

*4 Early in the seventeenth century the South had a period of ascendancy in the persons of Claude and Nicolas Poussin, who left their native France for Rome. But even so great a classicist as Claude retained at moments elements of that Northern Romanticism, as we shall see in Mr. Loyd's *Enchanted Castle*. The real genius of Claude is seen not so much in his carefully constructed oil paintings as in his brilliant pen and wash sketches, of which the Oxford University galleries have so rich a collection. In these we see Claude making new discoveries in the capture of light, and new ventures in landscape composition which at times seem to anticipate Hokusai of Japan.

When Claude and Poussin were studying Raphael and Titian a new meteoric figure from Flanders once again determined the course of French painting. This figure was Rubens. Watteau, the greatest of French eighteenth-century artists, owes more to Rubens than to any other man. But in addition to Rubens he owes debts to the Venetians of the High Renaissance, to Claude, and to that very European version of Oriental ideals which we call '*chinoiserie*'. This last element which led to French rococo taste in porcelain and furniture is of importance in the history of French taste. The artistic life of France became centred in the luxury and refinement of the highly artificial Court of Versailles. Lancret, Boucher, Pater, and Fragonard—the last a most brilliant craftsman—carried on the Watteau tradition in the service of that Court. Emerging from their work is not merely the vision of scenes of gallantry and amusement, but of a new genre which may best be described as '*L'art des mœurs*'.

There is, however, one eighteenth-century French painter, an isolated figure, whose debt is to Holland—to Vermeer and his contemporaries. I mean Chardin, that most exquisite and delightful figure in the whole story of French art. As a craftsman Chardin has rarely been equalled. His taste in colour and design is unsurpassed, and visitors to Burlington House will have the pleasure of seeing Baron Henri de Rothschild's magnificent series of Chardins.

But I imagine that what will really interest visitors most will be the pageant of French nineteenth-century painting, beginning with David, Ingres and Delacroix—two classicists and one romantic—all three very great masters, and ending with Cézanne and Gauguin. For it was not until the nineteenth century that France, whatever her achievements in other forms of artistic expression, definitely took the lead over other countries in painting, and so, for the foundations of most of our contemporary art, it is to recent French example that we have to turn. The Romantics, the painters of Barbizon, the Impressionists and the post-Impressionists have provided a series of prophets which the

whole world has been shouting after. Are we still too near the controversies that each have aroused to assess these prophets at their true value? Will Renoir, perhaps the greatest of French painters, emerge triumphant from the ordeal, and be given a seat with Piero, Raphael, Titian, Greco, Velasquez, and Rembrandt, or will his immense modern reputation be scaled down a little? Can any French landscape painter stand beside our own Wilson or Constable? The prospect of seeing Gallery No. III at Burlington House filled with select examples of the great names of nineteenth-century art is exciting, to say the least of it. How will men like Sisley and Corot stand up to the standards of comparison that must be set?

It is in the nineteenth century that French pioneers set the pace for modern painters. Manet, Monet, Renoir, Degas, and many others owe something to Velasquez and to Goya, and something to the master of the Japanese colour print whose vogue was so intense in the Paris of the *Salons*. Above all they showed a research into the æsthetic values to be obtained from the use of their medium. Manet's brilliant painting *à la prime* has revolutionised the craft of the oil painter. But even more important than their technical achievements, the modern mind is attracted by their outlook upon the subject-matter of their pictures. Here the Impressionists carried through a lasting revolution. Degas has immortalised the ballet girl. Claude Monet the moods of colour that pass momentarily over the west front of Rouen Cathedral. Manet the contrast of the black clothes of contemporary male costume with the vivid light of a French spring day. Boulin the wonders of the seaside sky. Above all we are indebted to these great men for a renewed vitality of design, that mysterious essence of all great art, and thereby they did more to free painting from the long traditions that had come down the ages.

Looking back on the recent exhibitions certain figures emerged from the general background with renewed vividness. Roger van der Weyden, Pieter Breughel the elder, and Rubens at the Flemish Exhibition. Vermeer at the Dutch, the early Sienese, Piero della Francesca, and the drawings of Raphael at the Italian. Seen against a microcosm of the national output extending over centuries, the work of these men stood out, partly no doubt because those responsible for selecting exhibits were able to array such fine examples. There is always this discount to be made at these exhibitions, and the unexpected usually occurs.

The Louvre is too big and too scattered for any but the most highly trained and experienced student of pictures to form a just estimate of the moderns. In spite of the wonderful Camondo bequest, even the Louvre as yet has no adequate representative

of the great Impressionists. Accordingly the coming exhibition may have an unusual number of surprises for us. France is making a bold bid to challenge the claims of Italy, Flanders, and Holland in the realm of painting. May be that she will prove that it is in other arts where the competition of other European countries is not so strong that she is pre-eminent rather than in painting. It was a Frenchman, Paul Lamerie, whose work as a silversmith in England raised the standard of English plate to its undisputed height. Constable and Bonington had more influence in determining the course of French painting after 1825 than any native masters. Not the least interesting aspect of the exhibition will be the actions and reactions of our own art upon that of our nearest neighbours.

One other point. Whereas our own National Gallery in Trafalgar Square has a permanent exhibition of Italian, Dutch, and Flemish pictures, which for quality if not also for range is probably higher than that shown at the Burlington House exhibitions, the same is not true of the French school. At Trafalgar Square we have some good Poussins, and a 'still life' by Chardin that could hardly be better, but otherwise the collection is not of the first order. Eighteenth century France is, however, probably better represented at Hertford House than anywhere else in the world, and there are some fine things in the Jones and Louisa bequests at the Victoria and Albert Museum. At Dulwich there is a superb Watteau, which is to be lent to Burlington House. Finally, in the Tate Gallery, due mainly to the taste and foresight of Sir Hugh Lane and Mr. Samuel Courtauld, there is a small nucleus of French later nineteenth-century paintings of high quality. France still retains her chief treasures, and after France America is probably richest in her artistic products, especially of those of recent date. Accordingly France has a unique opportunity of showing England the full range and quality of her great achievement.

W. ORRIST-GORE.

HANNIBAL IN THE ALPS

With great expectations I opened the new volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History* to see what light had been thrown by quite recent research on the subject of Hannibal's route through the Alps. I was disappointed to find that the author of the chapter dealing with this subject appears to be unacquainted with some of the most important results of French research published many years ago. The Cambridge historian writes: 'The accounts of Livy and Polybius conflict and are vague, making the identification of topographical features impossible. Both contain much rhetorical colouring, such as the absurd story of the view of the plains of Italy from the top of the pass.' These statements are inaccurate, unjust to the ancient writers, and misleading for modern students. The accounts of Livy and Polybius do not conflict; they tell precisely the same story, though Livy, in one passage, gives details not found in Polybius but in no way inconsistent with the itinerary upon which both writers are agreed. The text of Livy might be a translation of Polybius but for Livy's practice of naming the author to whom he is chiefly indebted, as he does not in this part of his narrative refer to Polybius, scholars have inferred that both writers closely followed some earlier historian, probably a contemporary of Hannibal. In that case Livy has inserted a paragraph made up of extracts from two other previous writers. So far from the language of the ancient writers being so vague as to make the identification of the places named impossible, the language of Polybius is so precise as to leave no possible doubt as to the identity of the points intended. To begin with, the description of the pass—which the Cambridge historian regards as an absurd story—indicates with certainty the Col Clapier, for that is the one pass in the Western Alps from the summit of which there is a clear view of a great sweep of the plain of Piedmont. Again, Polybius says that when Hannibal approached the Rhone he immediately took in hand its crossing by the single stream. This means that marching up from the coast along the western branch of the Rhone delta Hannibal prepared his crossing as soon as he reached the point just above the bifurcation of the

river to form its delta. This point is the modern Fourques. Thus Polybius fixes the starting-point and the end of the route from the Rhone to Italy. He describes the Rhone valley as a corridor, of which the left-hand wall is formed by the Alps, which he says fill up all the space between the Rhone valley and the plain of the Po. He then explains that Hannibal marched from Fourques about 134 miles up this corridor and reached the point which he calls the 'ascent of the Alps,' and that from that point he marched 132 miles to the plain near Turin. These measurements fix the 'ascent of the Alps' at the point where the Isère issues from the mountains into the Rhone valley at the Bec d'Echaillon, from which the only way to the Col Clavier is by the Isère and its tributary the Arc. The first battle was at the 'ascent of the Alps' and the second in the neighbourhood of a 'strong white rock,' two days before the summit of the pass was reached. In the Arc valley, just below Saint Michel en Maurienne, is the Rocher de la Porte, a mass of rock half a mile long and 600 or 700 feet high, which blocks the valley from side to side. Its downstream face is precipitous, so that it can be passed only at its northern end, where it is traversed by a mule track. At its southern end there was just room for the river, though in modern times space has been quarried beside the river for the highroad and the railway. It is composed of white stone. This great rock corresponds accurately both in its site and its distance from Grenoble, believed to be the town of the Allobroges, and from the Clavier, to the strong white rock of Polybius.

The text of Polybius leaves no room for doubt as to the route followed by Hannibal from the crossing of the Rhone at Fourques to Avigliana, the point where the valley of the Doira Riparia opens on to the plain of Turin, but there are one or two passages which have puzzled some modern inquirers, and which, therefore, it may be well to examine carefully. Polybius says that when Hannibal was preparing to cross the Rhone his camp was four days' march from the sea. This may refer to the time taken by Hannibal's army between leaving the sea coast and reaching Fourques, or it may refer to the movements of Scipio. That general, transporting his army by sea, learned at Marsyllis that Hannibal had crossed the Pyrenees and was approaching the Rhone. He therefore landed his army at Foa, near the eastern branch of the Rhone delta, and sent a small force of cavalry to reconnoitre. This party met and defeated a party of Carthaginian cavalry, which it pursued to Hannibal's camp, and returned and reported to Scipio the same day; this was the day after Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone and the day before his infantry and cavalry left the camp. On the same day also Scipio, after re-embarking his baggage, set off with his army to

meet Hannibal, whose camp he reached on the fourth day, only to find it empty, for Hannibal had marched off three days earlier. Fes is about 30 miles from Fourques, and many writers think this too short a distance for four days' march, and have fixed



the point of crossing at Tarascon or at Roquemaure or at Pont Saint Esprit, according to the distance they assume to be a day's march. The actual length of a day's march has rarely exceeded 11 or 12 miles for a body of 15,000 to 20,000 men; for a larger body these distances are quite exceptional, and are greater than could be accomplished by a Roman army moving in order of battle as did Scipio's on this occasion. But in fact the current of the Rhone at all these points is far too swift for any such crossing as that described by Polybius to have been possible.

and, as the speed of the current is due to the steepness of the river bed, it must have been as swift in Hannibal's day as it is now. A glance at the river at any of these points will satisfy the observer that to try to swim three or four horses abreast, guiding them by leading-reins from the stern of a boat, would be quite impossible, and that the great raft for the elephants could never have been towed across. At Fourques, however, the current has dropped to about a mile an hour. It should be noted, moreover, that the distance from Fourques to Fos was covered by the cavalry after the skirmish in time for Scipio to start his march on the same day. It is highly improbable that any cavalry could have ridden much more than 30 miles in the time thus allowed. The Cambridge historian says 'Scipio's scouting force . . . won a slight success in a skirmish, but it was small consolation for the sight of Hannibal's deserted camp and the knowledge that he had safely crossed the Rhone.' Where was the deserted camp? The camp which the Roman cavalry saw contained the bulk of Hannibal's army. From my recollection of the ground, I doubt whether they could see the camp across the river, which, however, was not yet deserted, for the elephants were still there, though they might have seen the raft on which next day the elephants were to be ferried across. It was only when Scipio arrived there with his army that the camp was seen to be deserted.

Livy and Polybius agree in telling us that on the fourth day after leaving Fourques Hannibal found himself in 'the Island,' a fertile and populous region resembling in size and shape the delta of Egypt, as it lies between the Rhone and its tributary the Skaras, which form two sides of a triangle of which the third side is not the sea as in Egypt, but mountains. The late General Colin, in his masterly work *Annibal en Gaule* (of which, strangely enough, there is no mention in the bibliography of the *Cambridge History*), suggested that the Skaras might be the Sorgues, a view which I was at one time disposed to accept, but I now think it was much more probably the Durance, which Hannibal would reach in two marches from Fourques, for the region enclosed between the Rhone and the Durance is as large as the delta of Egypt, while that enclosed by the Rhone and the Sorgues is far too small to admit of the comparison. The Durance near its confluence with the Rhone is 200 or 300 yards wide, with an irregular gravelly bed, and in full stream would be very difficult to ford. At the present day it cannot be full except in flood time, because a large part of its water is carried to Marvilles by a canal which leaves it many miles before its confluence with the Rhone. Such a river could hardly have been crossed by Hannibal's army in a day. After crossing the Rhone he had

35,000 infantry, 8000 cavalry, 37 elephants, and probably as many as 4000 mules. In order of march on a good road the length of the column would be : infantry in fours, without spaces between the various fractions, 10 miles ; cavalry, 6 miles ; mules, 3 miles. Such a column would require eight hours to march across a bridge ; it would take at least twice that time to walk through a river, so that it would be impracticable to complete the crossing in a day, and it would be the fourth day before the army could be reunited on the north bank of the Durance. In 'the Island' Hannibal found two brothers disputing the chieftainship ; he supported the elder brother, who, thus established in power, helped Hannibal with supplies of all sorts and with his own army escorted the Carthaginians for some distance in their further march as a protection against the tribe of the Allobroges, who were hostile to Hannibal. Livy gives the name *Brancus* to the elder brother whom Hannibal supported, but he gives the name *Allobroges* to this chief's tribe. It is pretty certain that on this point Livy was mistaken, for the Allobroges, when the Romans came to deal with Gaul, inhabited the region between the Isère and the Rhone, from Grenoble to Lyons, but are not known to have held territory at any distance south of the Isère. Polybius evidently did not regard the fording of the Durance as a very special feat, and therefore allows the reader to infer that as the Skaras was one boundary of 'the Island' the army must have crossed it. Livy, however, though, with Polybius, he agrees that Hannibal crossed the Skaras in order to reach 'the Island,' and though his description of the *Druentia* is a faithful account of the Durance near its junction with the Rhone—imagines the river called *Druentia* to be distinct from the Skaras and to have been reached long after Hannibal had left 'the Island.' The explanation is to be found in Livy's method of compilation—he had before him various works which he regarded as authoritative, he copied pretty closely the one that he thought the best, but he inserted into his text passages from other writers which seemed to him to be specially interesting or to add colour or detail to the story. The authority from whom he takes almost the whole of his account of Hannibal's march through the Alps is the same as that which has been followed by Polybius, but Livy was attracted by a passage which he found in a Greek writer named Timagenes, his predecessor by a quarter of a century. A summary of this passage has been preserved by *Ammianus Marcellinus*. It runs as follows :

Hannibal . . . guided by certain Taurini, passing through the land of the Tridentini and the outer fringe of the Vercunni, came to the passes of the Tridenti. Starting thence, he marched by another route previously unsuspected ; having by an enormous fire and by pouring vinegar

blasted a rock that rose to an immense height and having crossed the river Draentia, made dangerous by its variable whirlpools, he gained the region of Etruria.

This passage seems to have been in Livy's mind when he wrote :

After settling the dispute among the Allobroges Hannibal set out for the Alps, not starting by the straight route but turning to the left to the land of the Tricastini, thence touching the outer fringe of the territory of the Vocontii he made his way to the Tricorii, meeting with hardly any hindrance until he reached the river Draentia

Then follows the account of the difficulties of fording the Draentia. It is quite clear that the Draentia of Timagenes was not the Durance, but a river in Italy. Livy seems to suppose that Hannibal in 'the Island' was facing eastwards looking up the valley of the Durance, and that to follow the Rhone valley he had to turn to his left. The Tricastini seem to have been near Saint Paul Trois Châteaux, and the Vocontii in the Vercoirs; the Tricorii were probably about the confluence of the Drac with the Isère. Livy had a confused notion of the geography of this part of the world. The statement that Hannibal met with hardly any hindrance until he reached the Draentia may well have been taken from the same source as the description of that river which immediately follows it. If this passage had been inserted after the statement that upon leaving his camp by the Rhone Hannibal made for the interior of Gaul as he did not propose to fight the Romans till he came to Italy, the only discrepancy between the story of Livy and that of Polybius would be removed.

From 'the Island' Polybius tells us that in ten days Hannibal marched 58 miles beside the Rhone until he approached 'the ascent of the Alps'. I take this to mean that he marched along what is described as the corridor. He then learned that the hostile tribe of the Allobroges was occupying a position which barred his route and which he could not turn. He sent Gallic spies, who reported that the hostile forces occupied the position by day but left it unguarded at night. He therefore marched to the foot of the position and there encamped. In the night, with a picked body of troops, he occupied the position and next day the army marched through it. The troops had to follow a road on corniche along the side of a mountain, and when the column was engaged on this route it was attacked by the Gauls from above. Hannibal then attacked and ultimately drove away the Gauls, but in the engagement he lost many men, and especially many mules. After the enemy was dispersed he pushed on and occupied a town of the Allobroges, where he halted the army for one day and supplied himself with several days' provisions and

other necessary. Colin thought that the position occupied by the Gauls was at Montaud above the Bec d'Eschallon. Until modern times there was no road round the Bec d'Eschallon, the foot of which was washed by the swift and deep Isère. The road ascended from Saint Quentin to Montaud and thence descended on corniche either to Vorey or Moyarey. The town of the Allobroges was Grenoble. The site thus suggested by Colin for the first battle seems more probable than any other that has been proposed, but I am not entirely satisfied with it, and think it possible that Hannibal may have had to follow a route through the defiles of the Vercors.

From Grenoble Hannibal marched up the left bank of the Isère to the valley of the Arc, which he reached either by following the stream or by crossing the pass of the Great or the Little Cucheron. On entering the Isère valley he was met by a deputation of chiefs with emblems of peace, who gave him hostages for their good behaviour and offered their services as guides. Four days later his column was attacked in a defile and suffered severe loss, but was saved by the infantry which drove away the enemy and passed the night on or at a 'strong white rock'. This must have been the Rocher de la Porte. On the second day after this battle Hannibal, with the cavalry, reached the pass, and there halted two days to allow the rest of the column to come up.

Polybius tells us that on the descent from the pass, which Hannibal reached after there had been a fall of snow, the army suffered very serious loss—that would be quite possible on the descent from the Clapier. A valley half a mile wide and 1 or 2 miles long crosses the main ridge of the Alps at a height of 7000 feet at the French end and rather more than 8000 at the Italian end. Here on the Italian side is a gentle slope downwards for 200 yards, after which the descent is exceedingly steep and, except beside the *benak*, which is the source of the Claven, precipitous. There are two ways down into Italy—one starting from the left side and the other from the right side of the crest of the pass. That on the left leads along the edge of a precipice to the side of the stream, which it follows, after passing down the face of a cliff by a cockscrow path impossible for horses; that on the right leads to a high and level path along the steep slope of the mountain side, and after 2 or 3 miles descends to the valley of the Dora. From the gentle slope on the Italian side of the crest there is a wonderful view of the plain, and here a very large number of persons can stand and see the prospect. Hannibal's infantry probably started down the left-hand path, and if it were snow-clad nothing would be easier than for many of them to fall over the precipices. The corniche route on the right-hand path had broken down for about a furlong. Hannibal attempted a

third route, of which the description suggests that it may have been a glacier which lies several hundred feet above the corridor path; this was found to be impracticable, and Hannibal then had the broken path repaired. After one day's work the horses descended by it, and after two more days the elephants. The army was collected in the Dora valley and marched in three days to the edge of the plain in the district inhabited by the Taurini—in other words, in the neighbourhood of Turin.

In the May number of the *Classical Review* Mr Dunbabin, writing 'Notes on Livy,' accepts the account of Hannibal's route propounded by Colin and here repeated by me. He thinks that Skaras might be the Eygues. This is a possible view, but I prefer to think that the Vaucluse is 'the Island,' because from the Rhone near Avignon Mont Ventoux looks like a great wall across the country from the Rhone valley to the Durance, recalling the words of Polybius about the third side of the triangle. Mr Dunbabin divides the 1400 stadia from the Rhone crossing to the Bec d'Echaillon into two sections, one of 800 and the other of 600 stadia, and supposes that the 600 stadia are to be measured from the crossing of the Rhone to the point where the ten days' march from 'the Island' began, but this 600 stadia must be divided into two sections, as the ten days' march left Hannibal still at least a day's march distant from his camp at Saint Quentin before the first battle. Mr Dunbabin apparently adopts a now discarded length for the stadium, of which the length now accepted is 177.5 metres, so that 100 stadia are 11 English miles. He also seems to have been misled by Vredenhant's article in *Hermes* (October 1919). That writer suggests that when Polybius wrote his narrative he had not himself made the journey, for he describes the Rhone as flowing from east to west instead of from north to south, but all the ancient geographers failed in their orientation of some of the most important geographical features. Strabo and Caesar both thought that the Pyrenees ran from south-east to north-west, and in Strabo's scheme the Rhone also flowed rather from east to west than from north to south. It should be remembered that the mariner's compass was unknown to the ancients, and the general directions they gave to important features were the result, not of observation on the spot, but of their attempts to make a map of the world. The incorrectness of Polybius' orientation of the Rhone valley cannot for a moment weigh against his own statement that he had himself followed Hannibal's route. But Mr. Dunbabin's careful and interesting paper contrasts favourably with some recent speculations about Hannibal's route. Our writer took Hannibal up the Durance to the Gail valley, where he made him fight two battles separated by a distance of only 11 miles and finally made his army cross the Col de la Traversette,

20,000 feet high, which until it was tunneled by Louis XI. could not be crossed by horses or mules. Another writer imagined that Hannibal went to Briançon by one of the routes that Napoleon suggested, then by the Col de Mahif to Abries, and thence crossed the Col de Malaure. The route described is inconsistent with the accounts given by the ancient writers and militarily impossible.

Before Colonel Perrin in 1883 saw the view from the Clapier and suggested that this must be Hannibal's pass, the commentators were divided in their allegiance between the four passes across which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cart-roads were constructed, but none of these passes corresponds with the accounts of Polybius and Livy. The Petit Saint Bernard has no view of Italy, nor is there on the descent any such dangerous place as the story requires. This route does not reach the plain near Turin, nor could the plain be reached from the pass in three days' march. The Mont Genève has no view of Italy, no dangerous descent, and is too far from the plain. It could only be reached by an exceedingly difficult route through the gorge of the Infirmité and over the Col du Lautaret. The Col de Larche is far from the plain, which it reaches, not near Turin, but at Cuneo; its descent presents no difficulties; it has no view of the plain and can be reached only from the Durance, which is inconsistent with the ancient authorities. The Mont Cenis is reached by the same route as the Clapier, but begins a day's march further up the Arc valley; it has no view of the plain of Italy. In 1853 Mr. Robert Ellis suggested the route of the Petit Mont Cenis, which is identical with the route to the Clapier until within a short distance of the summit. It then joins the Mont Cenis route before the descent from that pass begins. Mr. Ellis searched the neighbourhood of the route for a view of the plain. I have as far as possible followed his footsteps and am satisfied that there is no real view of the plain, but from a point to be reached by an hour's climb from the road there can be had through a chink in the mountains a tiny glimpse of the plain. A few years later, in a second essay, Mr. Ellis wrote that if he had known of the view from the Clapier, which he had never seen, he should probably have suggested that pass as Hannibal's. The late Mr. Condlidge rejected the Clapier on the ground that there was no view from the summit of the pass, which, however, he admitted he had never visited.

It seems a pity that the *Cambridge History* should lend the weight of its reputation to the view that the statements of Polybius and Livy are so vague as to render it impossible to identify the places described. This seems a reminiscence of Arnold of Rugby, who, having decided that Hannibal went by the Petit Saint Bernard, complained that the description of Polybius did

not fit that pass. Again, what is meant by the statement that the problem of Hannibal's route 'cannot be solved *ambiguë*'? How could the route be ascertained except by an inspection of the passes of the Western Alps? The century-long disputes which have caused the Cambridge historian to despair were due to insufficient knowledge of Alpine topography. It would have been more useful to have called attention to the work of Colin, which is too little known in this country. Within the last few years I have seen several school editions of the twenty-first book of Livy in which it is asserted that Hannibal went by the Col de Larche, a hypothesis which is absolutely irreconcilable with the text of Polybius and of Livy. I venture to hope that some of the younger Cambridge scholars will believe that Polybius at any rate was more careful than his critic in the *Cambridge History*, will read Colin's work, and examine for themselves the Rhone at Avignon, the Rocher de la Porte, and the Col Claper.

SPENCER WILKINSON.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN LORD CHESTERFIELD AND
LIEUT.-GENERAL IRWINE, 1769

CHESTERFIELD And those, Mr. Irwine, are my cantelupe melons ; but we will look at 'em another time , for even my third leg, this wooden fellow, is getting tired- indeed it has to bear most of the weight of my crazy old carcass- Half an hour is the most I can hobble at a time- If you will help me upstairs, we will sit in the gallery, look at the view- and talk

IRWINE (showing) I hope that I shall be so robust when I reach your age

CHESTERFIELD Eh? (gazing) I am beyond flattery, being no longer a statesman- But I must be the talkative one, since you would soon grow hoarse with making me hear- deafness is my hereditary right- the only one I believe in- That's well, your left shoulder- my weight won't fatigue you- we Stanhopes were always ridiculously small

(They sit in the gallery.)

IRWINE Wasn't that a portrait of the Duke of Newcastle on the stairway?

CHESTERFIELD Taken years ago, as you could see.

IRWINE He must have been very old when he died, if he was at all as old as he looked

CHESTERFIELD Let me see- he was some fourteen months older than I was- he must have been born in the summer of '93, and he died last November- That makes him seventy-six. I think I wrote you the news

IRWINE You did indeed- you told me that he was at last dead, and he the first time quere

CHESTERFIELD I don't know what post they will find for him in heaven to make it a heaven to him- if he were not allowed to plague himself with affairs, he would think he was in hell. His ruling passion was the agitation, the bustle, and hurry of business, and to think of him as quiet is to conceive him miserable. He was always in a hurry, as though he could never be in time.

IRWINE I have even seen him running.

CHESTERFIELD. He always ran—on tip-toe. Ha! I remember once telling him that by his footness one would think him the courier, not the author of the letters he was carrying. He was like quicksilver—only he didn't shine so bright.

IRWINE. I was astonished that he was always in so visible a state of fluster.

CHESTERFIELD. He was such a bundle of weaknesses that he could never make up his mind, and when it was made up for him, he dreaded the consequences. Everything alarmed him: he could have been still only in a frozen world. Even when I brought in my Bill for the reform of the calendar—and what could be more harmless than that?—he begged me 'not to stir matters that had long been quiet,' called my Bill, a little question of office reform, 'a bold undertaking,' and added that he didn't love new-fangled things.

IRWINE. Like a man afraid to move a chair in a room for fear the whole house should tumble down! But he must sometimes have had to decide.

CHESTERFIELD. Never willingly, I believe. He didn't even choose his own wife!

IRWINE. That is not unusual, my lord, in great families.

CHESTERFIELD. Oh, when there is family pressure, but he was his own master. What he did was to choose an intermediary to choose for him, what do we think of that? I had the story from old Sir John Vanbrugh when he employed as go-between. You wouldn't remember him, I suppose?

IRWINE. He must have died before I was born.

CHESTERFIELD. Dear, dear! so he must! Sir John was building Clarendon for him, and at the same time Blenheim for the Duchess of Marlborough, and as the Duchess had a granddaughter, Sir John thought he could easily combine one business with 'tother if he proposed Lady Harriet Spencer. He did so, and the Duke was taken with the idea, more than with the lady, but he shilly-shallied, as he would, put it off for a year, wondered this and that, asked too big a dowry—while the Duchess, as Sir John said, wanted a grandson-in-law, like all other things, both good and cheap—so—

IRWINE. She cannot have been easy to manage: I have read Mr. Pope's character of Atossa.

CHESTERFIELD. She was a friend of mine, Mr. Irwine. I will allow nobody but myself to say anything against her. The long and short of it is that, after months of haggling, he was brought to it by thinking it would be pleasant to have children descended from the great Duke of Marlborough.

IRWINE. Which he never had.

CHESTERFIELD. Which, as you say, he never had. Just as

well, perhaps: he would never have found time to look after them.

IRWINE. When I became a Parliament-man I used sometimes to go to his levées, if I could spare the unconscionable time he kept us people waiting.

CHESTERFIELD. And then when he came, the illiberal, degrading familiarity of his address! How he accosted, hugged, embraced everybody, and made them fulsome promises he would not have wished to keep even if he had had the power!

IRWINE. The odd fact is that he had any power at all.

CHESTERFIELD. He loved it; he was as jealous of it as an impotent lover is of his mistress, without activity of mind enough to enjoy or exert it: yet, as I said, he dreaded power, and could not bear a share even in the appearances of it:—it was Sir Robert who wished it, or Carteret who insisted, or Lord Hardwicke who pressed it urgently, whenever it couldn't be had at the King's door. I have known him throw himself weeping on Lord Hardwicke's neck, imploring him to support him in a situation which wouldn't have irked a junior clerk for a moment. You know the story of the freedom of Bristol.

IRWINE. When it was conferred on him and Mr. Pitt? I heard no details.

CHESTERFIELD. One would have thought that a man who already had more than forty years' experience of business and Court matters would have given five minutes to composing an answer to the offer. But not so his Grace. He drew out a draft, as long as the most tedious despatch from the most long-winded Foreign Minister, and—sent it to Lord Hardwicke, with marginal queries, including one as to whether he should consult Mr. Pitt. Why the Lord Chancellor should concern himself doesn't appear. I don't know whether Lord Hardwicke gave much thought to the matter: he answered that he was sure his Grace could want no advice, but that in his humble opinion the draft was much too long. The Duke industriously blackened ten more large sides of paper, and finally the mountain of stationery, after great labour, gave birth to a monster-reply of four lines. It was Stone who told me.

IRWINE. Stone, that was a mysterious figure! The gossip went that it was Stone who was really Minister, while the Duke traded the boroughs.

CHESTERFIELD. Well, no. It is true that to write to his Grace or to write to Stone was much the same thing, and that Stone knew all that was in the Duke's mind; and he would often have been at a loss without his Under-Secretary to tell him what his mind really was, but it was the Duke who led the dance. Did you know that at one time, when the Duke was not on speaking

turns with his brother, who was then first Minister, they used to converse through Stone, even when they were together in the same room? It was, 'Mr. Stone, would you be so kind as to tell Mr. Pelham? . . .'; and, 'Mr. Stone, would you be so good as to inform his Grace? . . .'; and the worthy man would trot from one to the other and back again with an admirable gravity it was hard to imitate.

IRWINE. I never knew Mr. Pelham. I understand he was not at all like his brother.

CHESTERFIELD. He had great good sense, but no shining parts; and I have now come to think that in politics good sense is more valuable than brilliance. Mr. Pelham had a steady resolution, unlike his brother, and showed great candour in his behaviour. He never took refuge in cunning, that dark sanctuary of incapacity. An honourable man, a well-wishing Minister! But indeed the Duke also was the last two. When he retired from business in 1762 he was above four hundred thousand pounds poorer than when he went into it.

IRWINE. Money well spent in corruption, but at least it came from his own pocket.

CHESTERFIELD. He was disinterested unlike Sir Robert Walpole. He twice refused a pension. He did, it is true, submit himself to that abominable system of bribery which, if it is not stopped,—and God knows how it is to be stopped now—will bring the country to ruin.

IRWINE. It was, I suppose, the source of his power. How else could he have been in office some forty-five years, and for some of the time first Minister?

CHESTERFIELD. Without his wealth he would, of course, have been a mere feather, but it is not wealth alone, even in these days, that can give power. It is true that he had no superior parts, no eminent talents, but he was not such a fool as the public supposed, as indeed he liked them to suppose. The whiffing activity of his body was partly a disguise; and behind it he had indefatigable industry, perseverance, which gave him a lever, added to a singular knowledge of Court craft, and a servile compliance with the will of the sovereign for the time being—whether George the First, second, or Third—though with his present Majesty it did not avail him much. It never ceases to amaze me how men of standing and even of common sense, men of affairs, with a knowledge of mankind and of worldly traffic, still feel awe in the presence of kings, who are usually far worse brought up than themselves, and infinitely more ignorant.

IRWINE. His Majesty, after all, is the head of the State, the fount of the Constitution.

CHESTERFIELD. Oh, by all means; but no man stands in

swe of a keystone. No, it is more than that. They are like boys in the presence of their schoolmaster: if the King frowns, they feel whipped; if he smiles, they feel entitled to a half-holiday. I was never more struck by this than in the great revolution of '46—you will remember the heaven-sent forty-eight-hour Ministry?

IRWINE. I was not much more than a boy at the time, and my interests were less in politics than in my military duties.

CHESTERFIELD. Come, General, so serious already! No tributes to Venus? For shame!

IRWINE. By my 'interests' I meant rather what I thought of in my spare time, the time I could spare from the more serious pursuits that you mention, but I nevertheless remember the occasion you refer to, when Lords Granville and Bath laughed up to London to take the Seals, and then were laughed away again after fingering them. I was in Ireland at the time.

CHESTERFIELD. Ah, to be sure, and so was I. It was then and there, indeed, that I first met you.

IRWINE. And when I met the best Viceroy Ireland ever had.

CHESTERFIELD. Say, the most Irish Viceroy. When I was there I panted to get away, but I have often wished that time back again. But about this Ministry? The plot, if you like to call it so, was thrashed out at the beginning of '45. The case was this: the Pelhams were nominally in power, and stronger than ever before, since they had at last gathered in the remnant of the old Opposition.

IRWINE. Meaning yourself?

CHESTERFIELD. Oh, and the Colclham faction, and half-patriots, half-malcontent Whigs: these are old stories now. Parliament was behind them and their policy. Carteret, who at about that time became Granville, had gone from public view, but he was still in the closet, and he and Lord Bath had the key to the back door; they were virtually the Cabinet, and the King forced their policy on his ostensible Ministers. The issue was, as I urged in letter after letter to the Duke—for I was then at The Hague—were the King's servants his Ministers, or, really, the servants of other Ministers? Again and again I implored him to resign with his colleagues in a body, and before Parliament rose, for once it was gone they were powerless. What! the Duke said, resign all together? Why, that is conspiracy; it is indeed high treason. If one or two of you resign, I answered, the King can replace you. But who in heaven or earth is to fill the posts if we all go? This is unheard of, the Duke would protest: what would his Majesty do without us? Exactly! I used to reply, show now that you're indispensable. Oh, but, he havered, that wouldn't be respectful. I told him that it was not the respectfulness of measures I considered, but

their expedience, their prudence, their necessity. But Parliament rose, and his Majesty went to Hanover without anything being done. And in the autumn the rebellion in Scotland made such a step inopportune.

IRWINE. I forget what it was brought the Duke's courage up to the sticking point, if I ever knew.

CHESTERFIELD. It was over the question of admitting Mr. Pitt to office, or rather to the post of Secretary at War. The King had a mortal dislike to Mr. Pitt, and refused ever to see him. Matters might have been arranged, but that Lord Bath, with Lord Granville behind the scenes, but pretending not to be there, whispered the King's ear as the toad did that of Eve in Milton's poem, insinuating that his Ministers were affronting him. After a great to-do, the details of which I forget, the members of the Ministry heroically decided to resign, and for two or three days there was a rare procession of White Stiffs and Seals going up the steps of St. James's. Funds fell while the new cabal hawked places about, and could find no takers. You know the rest. The King grumbled as usual that the Ministers were the king in this country, and everybody came back. The matters for amused consideration is their abhorrence of the idea of opposition—never, never, they declared, would they band themselves into so horrid a thing—and the sense of guilt they carried about with them after their action.

IRWINE. You yourself, my lord, declared when you resigned the Seals that you would never go into opposition.

CHESTERFIELD. I had earned my rest. Were not eleven years of opposition enough for my share? I had had my fill of patriots.

IRWINE. I presume that when Dr. Johnson described patriotism as the last refuge of the scoundrel he was referring to political faction which aims at disturbing the Government?

CHESTERFIELD. All parties claim the monopoly of patriotism; those who have the places—that is, the money—are exceedingly desirous to keep them, and those who have them not are as desirous to get them—that is, the money. I had nothing to ask.

IRWINE. But had the Duke anything to ask?

CHESTERFIELD. Nothing—but the being in business. He liked to be at it. It may have been habit, since from the time he was made Lord Chamberlain in 1716, until 1768, except for a few months in '56-'57, he was always in office. His aim was always one dignity, just as his business was. He was Secretary of State for some thirty years together, from 1734 to 1754, when, his brother dying, he became first Minister. And then, rather than be nothing, he allowed himself in '63 to be made Lord Privy Seal. It was a disease.

IRWINE. I always wondered how, with his notorious ignorance, he could even maintain an appearance as Secretary of State.

CHESTERFIELD. Oh, I know the stories. 'Cape Breton an island? Really? Show it me on the map! So it is! I must go and tell the King. He'll be delighted'; and 'Minneapolis must be defended. Send troops to Minneapolis. Where is Minneapolis?' But he was far from ignorant of foreign affairs; he had acquired an enormous amount of information, which he stored away in the wallet of his memory.

IRWINE. Aims for oblivion?

CHESTERFIELD. By no means, but he was inclined to remember only what was agreeable. When I was Secretary of State, at the time of the Austrian Succession War, he wouldn't listen to what I told him, that the Dutch were bankrupt; but he easily accepted the absurd lies Lord Sandwich regaled him with to the contrary effect. I was the better informed, as events proved.

IRWINE. He must have been an uncomfortable colleague.

CHESTERFIELD. One never knew where one stood. You remember when Lord Harrington finally resigned in '46 (when I took his place) it was because his Grace corresponded behind his back with Lord Sandwich, who was in Lord Harrington's department. When Lord Harrington complained to the King, his Majesty, who had never forgiven him his part in the forty-eight-hour Ministry, bluntly told him he supposed he might correspond with his Ministers abroad by what canal he chose. But his Grace preferred to be indirect: he was terrified he might miss something, and he behaved in exactly the same way with me. At the beginning he told Lord Sandwich that as the two Secretaries were of one mind on policy, it was enough for him to write to me. But soon it was, 'How is it I never hear from Lord Sandwich?' Why does Lord Sandwich write only to you? Why does he never write to me? I had to tell Lord Sandwich to hearten his Grace occasionally with a private letter, mixing some business in it. I would not be jealous, I said. Little things please some people. I told him. But soon Lord Sandwich ceased to write me anything but office letters, and I was always finding the ground cut from under my feet. Finally, when Bentinck came over to discuss Dutch affairs, affairs for which I was responsible, I was the only man in the kingdom he was on no account allowed to see. I felt no pique, but it was useless for me to remain. So I quitted.

IRWINE. His views differed from yours?

CHESTERFIELD. He was incurably optimistic. He would go into the Closet and tell the King there was good news; and what

he came out I would ask him what the good news was, for I could see none in what he had said. Then he would run away. He would never believe what he didn't want to think true. He thought, for instance, that if the Austrians said they would put 60,000 men into the field, 60,000 men would appear. Subsidies was his only notion of foreign politics—he thought he could buy States as he could buy placemen—that and Chloe.

IRWINE. Chloe?

CHESTERFIELD. How! did you never experience Chloe?—more properly M. Clouet, his French *chef*? You missed a good thing, one which you especially would have appreciated. When representatives came from abroad, he would instruct Chloe to stuff them well. You may sometimes induce the right frame of mind in a man if you flatter his stomach.

IRWINE. Did Chloe ever feed Lord Chatham? There was an odd pair to go minuetting together! The Duke cannot have much enjoyed the dance, and I often wondered how you managed to bring them close enough.

CHESTERFIELD. It was the most curious tale I ever found myself in. I warned the Duke he would have trouble with his gouty wife, as I used to call Mr. Pitt—*or* as you rightly say, Lord Chatham, to him—but I deserved no credit for marrying 'em. It had to be, neither could hold office without the other. Indeed, Mr. Pitt bullied the Duke, but the Duke enjoyed that also. After all, he managed the party—the secret service funds, the patronage, those were his delight. Mr. Pitt managed the war and the House.

IRWINE. Which, being in the other House, the Duke could not do.

CHESTERFIELD. And could not have done as a commoner. To lead men one must be able to move men. The House of Commons is largely *peuple*; and, as the Cardinal de Retz used to say, '*quiconque rassemble le peuple, l'aime*'. You will not mind my lapsing into French, seeing you are yourself so good a Frenchman, as Madame de Monconseil assures me.

IRWINE. She flatters me. The Duke was no speaker, like Mr. Pitt.

CHESTERFIELD. I confess I never altogether liked Mr. Pitt—he was too flamboyant, too theatrical for me—but he could indeed move the people. He carried with him the strength of thunder, and the splendour of lightning. The marriage worked admirably for a time, though the gouty wife would often enough remove herself in the sulks. But the Duke as a popular leader? No! Did you not think, privately, Mr. Irwine, that his face resembled that of a sheep?

IRWINE. Sometimes, certainly, it looked as crystalline. I

was sorry for him at the end, when Lord Bute took the reins out of his hands. That was a terrible story about the Archbishop of York.

CHESTERFIELD. I do not know it: I know nothing these days. The coffee-houses are better informed than I am: they know everything.

IRWINE. I believe he recommended a Whig to the prelate, and Lord Bute answered, 'If your Grace thinks so highly of him, I wonder that you did not promote him when you had the power.' This to the first Minister!

CHESTERFIELD. Meekness and humility are Christian virtues: I didn't know my poor old cousin had so great a share of 'em. What a strange thing this fever of power is! My grandfather Halifax used to doubt whether business was fit for a man of sense. And it was the underside of power the Duke of Newcastle loved. I wonder what posterity will think of him?—for history will not be able to neglect him. Historians are necessarily ignorant; and perhaps what seems to matter so much to us will seem of little weight to them. The past, which seems to teach us so much, often teaches us wrong. But I grow prosy: deaf men converse with themselves so much, they may forget that others may be listening to their droning.

IRWINE. Your lordship has been too kind, too patient of my ignorance.

CHESTERFIELD. Stuff! the kindness has been yours, I feel; certainly the patience. When we grow old and ready to go, with nothing before us, it is only by thinking of the past that we can manage to avoid the present.

HONAMY DORRIS

'THE MILNER PAPERS'

SOUTH AFRICA, 1897-1899

RARELY has anything failed like the failure of the British Army to seize Majuba Hill on February 26, 1881. A people trained to think in military values would have dismissed the skirmish from their minds with a passing thought for the ninety-two British dead and fifty-two prisoners. But a people who for centuries had fought their battles and made widespread conquests through selected champions, and shared in the excitements of war vicariously, took the defeat of their champions to heart in a way that foreign nations among whom military service was universal were incapable of appreciating. My own generation was reared in the national shame of one of our little Army's smallest disasters. I remember, among the most vivid recollections of my boyhood, on the morning when the news reached England, standing waiting, puzzled, in a line of small boys facing a drill sergeant who had fought at Inkermann. He was unable to commence our customary drill, but was walking up and down in front of us, striking his cane against his tight pepper-and-salt trousers, the tears running down his cheeks and muttering to himself, 'Nothing but a European war will wipe it out.' Then came the news that England had accepted this check as final defeat and made peace with the Boers, and we were told that Gladstone had said that the British public would never consent to go on to victory in a war which meant shooting down a lot of old gentlemen in top hats. And so we gave the Boers back their country. Bryce in his *Impressions of South Africa* says, in 1897, that the British Government 'had expected that the Transvaal people would appreciate the generosity of the retrocession, as well as the humanity which was willing to forego vengeance for the tarnished lustre of British arms. The Boers, however, saw neither generosity nor humanity in their conduct, but only fear. Jubilant over their victories, and . . . not realising the overwhelming force which could have been brought against them, they fancied themselves entitled to add some measure of contempt to the dislike they already cherished for the English, and they have ever since shown themselves unpleasant neighbours.'

* Published by Cassell & Co., Ltd.

Of this contempt and dislike my generation was constantly reminded by that master of fiction for the young, Rider Haggard. *Majuba* became for us another Bunkers Hill, but with this difference, that it was not irretrievable. And if *revenge* was an underlying motive in the minds of many young Englishmen, 7000 miles away, what must have been its strength in the hearts of British Colonists in South Africa in close and daily contact with that dislike and contempt? On the Boer side the memories of British defeats fired the blood of young men, as recollections of Crécy and Agincourt filled the hearts of our ancestors. Against soldiers trained in conventional military tactics their mounted burghers armed with rifles had played a part similar to that of our archers in the fourteenth century, and they were convinced that they could again, as in 1881, face the same odds and at any time drive the 'redcoats' into the sea—let them only, as our yeomen on the village-green, keep their eye in on the boundless veld where the buck offered daily practice.

By 1895 this dislike and contempt, which might have been kept inoffensive behind set boundaries, with occasional outbursts from fortuitous contact, became actively aggressive, concentrated on the influx of outlanders, the majority of whom were British, across these boundaries into the Transvaal itself. As a result of the development of the mines around Johannesburg the Boers found the hated English in their midst, and not only the English before whom they had retreated inland for years, but English bringing in a new civilisation abhorrent to a pastoral people, whose ideals were those of the Old Testament interpreted by a primitive Protestantism.

To appreciate the Boers' attitude at its best, one should try and imagine the feelings at the present time of some still arcadian people who at all costs were determined to resist the encroachments on their traditions of mechanisation, mass production, standardisation and the other resultants of the new civilisation. The clash would be one of ideals which would excite profound sympathy among a considerable number of thinking people. One can imagine such sympathisers saying now when we have seen the bankruptcy of many a progressive speculation, when we are trying to save from the floods of materialism the wreckage of the spiritual achievements of our forefathers, when chaos overwhelms us and science is unable to illumine for ordinary sight the darkness which it has created, how brave a sight it is to see some, with greater courage than ourselves, make a bold and desperate stand in defence of narrow-minded adherence to tradition. But no such disillusionment had begun to make itself felt among the British public at the end of the nineteenth century, and to them progress along the new tracks blazed by

science was the cause of humanity and the ultimate happiness of mankind.

I have emphasized at the outset the military setting in which the South African problem had become fixed, for there is an inclination in these days when our instincts are turning towards other solvents to discuss events in the immediate past without remembering that force was the only means recognised as, in the last resort, effective to unravel political complications. And in 1897, after the fiasco of the Jameson Raid when Milner was sent to South Africa, everything pointed to a military solution as inevitable.

It is at this point in Milner's career that the curtain is lifted in the first volume of *The Milner Papers*, and the public are admitted to knowledge a good deal of which was hitherto the property of only a few. The book is history rather than biography, for Milner himself desired no official biography. This is in a way disappointing to those who served under him and have survived him. To them he was not only a leader but an example, on which they tried to model their own lives and actions, and so stimulating and inspiring was that example that they have always regarded it as a national asset from which posterity had a claim to benefit. And a biography might have shown the play of that master mind in the early stages of his career, when his character was developing to its full strength, his actions and reactions in the face of trials and difficulties common to all men which formed and tempered it, and how his singleness of purpose—a bright light to all who knew him, never wavered but dominated all minor interests. Possibly there is no one living who could have written such a biography, for, even to those who knew him best, there was a selfishness about Milner that almost amounted to aloofness. Of all men of his time and his size he was the least introspective, and the man behind the thoughts, the words, the actions was not easily accessible and was certainly never displayed by Milner himself. And yet the personality was a lovable one which commanded the affection as well as the devotion of his followers, and they would have wished that they themselves, and, I repeat, posterity, should have been put in possession of some of the elements comprising the whole, knowledge of which only his selfishness deprived them during his lifetime.

In the brief biographical sketch introducing this volume this wish is indeed to some extent satisfied. A very pleasant light is thrown on his invariable sympathy with every brave man in difficulties (bravery and straightness alone would always elicit his help and support) by the story of his own isolation and hardships in his youth. The German influence, to which he owed

perhaps his exceptional organising sense, is now disclosed in the published genealogy; directly he inherited it from the German wife of a Lancashire grandfather. Again, the story of how at Oxford he lost the 'Ireland' merely because, on the last day of the examination, he tore up his papers and walked out of the room, being dissatisfied with what he was doing, discloses the secret of the lasting quality of his work in later life: nothing but work as perfect as he could make it would he give to the world, neither reward nor pressure of circumstance nor any external claim could persuade him to hasty decision or to throwing into the balance of a cause any achievement or opinion which had not survived the severest of all tests, submission to his own judgment, a judgment which had in it the quality of objectivity in a very rare degree. Something, too, we should have liked indicating the source of that sense of boyish humour which to his heavier-witted companions seemed at times to verge on the wanton, but which was an impenetrable armour against arrows which would have pierced and rankled in many a breast. In the letters themselves it is occasionally evident. Writing of Sir William Butler, he says: 'With me amusement at Butler's idiotic proceedings overcomes annoyance. No doubt if I was Fiddes or poor Fraser, I should feel differently. But I am still in a more or less holiday humour and the Gilbertian flavour of a 2½ months High Commissioner's out-Krugging Kruger appeals to me. To all who knew him it is needless to say that this amusement was not affected, it alone could have made possible this further kindly reference to that thorn in his flesh.' Don't think that Butler is a bad fellow. He is hasty and rhetorical, fearfully deficient in judgment. But he is well-meaning enough and a most agreeable companion.' An unrecorded example of this humour may be given here. One London newspaper in particular during the Boer War attacked Milner bitterly and personally. After his retirement the attack was repeated periodically on his birthday. No child ever looked forward with more pleasurable excitement on his birthday eve to a present than Milner did to these attacks, and if the article had not duly appeared on his breakfast table it would certainly have spoilt his day. It was the kind of humour which underlies Olympian laughter; but it must have been largely acquired by severe intellectual discipline, for Milner was by nature very humanly sensitive.

But for what the biographical introduction does give us there is every reason to be grateful. In outline at any rate it provides one more record of England's power to avail herself of the service of her irregulars in spite of the prohibitions of aristocratic tradition and the impassable barrier of democratic bureaucracy. Speaking of Rosebery, Chamberlain once said: 'Birth, wealth, genius—

and what will he do with them ? ' Milner was without the first, in the sense implied, or the second—both advantages which he estimated at their full value in a career. Referring to such men he once remarked to some of us : ' They have sixteen years' start of people like us.' And his genius had not followed the ordained path to employment in public administration ; he was not a civil servant. One conventional course to public office he did attempt and failed when he stood as Liberal candidate for Harrow in the General Election of 1885. But on leaving Oxford, where of course the man had been taken at his true value, he entered upon a career in London which might well have begun and finished as that of many an eminent journalist. Called to the Bar, he began, like many another, writing for newspapers ; he attracted the attention of John Morley, and on his invitation joined the staff of the *Pall Mall*, of which W. F. Stead was then assistant editor. Of Stead he often spoke in later life with a broadminded affection. After several years of writing and hard study he was given by Goschen ' the good political opening ' for which he had decided always to ' keep my eyes open.' As Goschen's private secretary he had the freedom of inside political knowledge, and when Goschen, urged and counselled by Milner, became Chancellor of the Exchequer Milner became his official private secretary. Through Goschen he was appointed in 1889 Under-Secretary in the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, and three years later the same master selected him for one of the most coveted administrative posts in England, the chairmanship of the Board of Inland Revenue. Here the regular civil servant would have rested on the summit of his own particular range of hills, but Milner, with his wider experience behind him, was looking out on to other ranges and studying the wide world at his feet. In 1897 Chamberlain sent for him to the Colonial Office and offered him first the Under-Secretaryship of the Colonies, which he declined, and then the High Commissionership of South Africa.

The policy which, before sailing for South Africa, he decided with Chamberlain to pursue is recapitulated by Chamberlain in a private letter of the very first importance which he wrote to him on March 16, 1898. It is so important that it is dangerous to give extracts from it without their context. But the key to that policy is contained in the third consideration given : ' We were of opinion that the waiting game was the best for this country as time must be on our side. The misgovernment in the Transvaal will in the long run produce opposition within its borders, and when the present rule of President Kruger comes to an end, as it must do before many years are over, we might confidently look for an improvement in the position.' The occasion of this letter from Chamberlain was a characteristic outburst of Milner's.

For fifteen months he had been following this policy of patience. In a letter to Chamberlain of August 2, 1897, he had explained the means by which, experience had taught him, that policy might be made successful. The first condition was that the British Government should maintain such a force 'as would impress the Boers with the danger of defying us' if catastrophe was to be averted. 'The internal state of the Transvaal,' he says, 'is the danger to South Africa. That country is in a terrible mess, social, political and financial. I think great allowance must be made for the men who have to govern a country in that state, even if their methods often seem to us very unwise. We should be very patient with them, very conciliatory, remembering how much excuse they have for regarding us with suspicion. But we cannot afford to appear, or to be, weak. It is no use being conciliatory if people think you are only conciliatory because you are afraid. There are men among the Boers themselves who know perfectly well that, if their country is to be preserved, reforms must come. We cannot give them direct assistance. But a firm attitude on our part gives them indirect assistance: as some at least among them are well aware, for, where appeals to the reason of *dopperdom* fail, they can appeal to its fears, by pointing out that there is a degree of harshness, whether to Uitlanders or Natives, which means war with England. And from war with England I believe even the most violent of the reactionaries will shrink: as they have shrunk already, if such a contingency stares them fairly in the face.' And now his patience had broken down, and the Milner with whom Chamberlain had to deal and restrain was a Milner outraged in his fundamental ideals—indignant, wrathful. To appreciate Milner's attitude, in the crisis which had arisen, one has to be biographical rather than historical. What were the fundamental ideals which he brought to bear on the task of practical statesmanship with which his country had entrusted him?

In pure politics, as he reminded an audience in Rhodesia in 1897, 'the strongest idea that had influenced him in life was that, if the different parts of the British Empire could hold together as a great nation or confederacy of nations, it would be a great achievement in political history.' To save South Africa from drifting out of that future common structure, whatever it might be, to add her potentialities, great if rapidly developed as he aimed at developing them, to that mighty influence in human destiny, was always one of his objects. This Imperial ideal strengthened so in the course of his life that, with the exception of Chamberlain, no Englishman has been so closely associated in the minds of younger men with its promotion. Indeed there is a danger, which future volumes of these Papers may dispel,

that the greatness of Milner may be handed down to posterity refracted through a political medium on which indeed he had (such was the domination of party on the political thought of his time) to depend largely while in South Africa, and even more later on, for his support, but which has no rightful claim to be the interpreter of his memory. For, his instincts and his character had led him to concentrate in all his early studies and training on an even wider objective than the maintenance and strengthening of the British Empire, on one which may be described as the betterment of humanity and the conditions in which it lives through right government. He cared deeply for the welfare of his fellows, and Arnold Toynbee had done much to inspire him while he was young to consecrate his life to the improvement of social and economic conditions. Toynbee's influence was a spiritual one which lasted throughout his whole career. He wrote to Mrs. Toynbee on Toynbee's death: "It is from within ourselves that we men restore those 'noble ends' for the outside world is always seeking to undermine them, and one has no such help in the work as the ever-living presence of a noble spirit like his, which interprets to me the old phrase of the 'communion of Saints'." I speak of my own experience. I am a man of the world and of affairs, not pretending or seeking to be otherwise, but holding on, not with a relaxing grasp, to my own great link with the higher life to which he belonged and belongs altogether. . . . Those who did not understand this side of Milner did not know the whole man and were sometimes puzzled and surprised by his actions, which belied the reputation which, between them, his enemies and some of his supporters had created for him. I remember when, before the Great War, he accepted the chairmanship of Toynbee Hall, how this side of Milner was really a revelation to many with whom he there worked. But all who were brought into contact with his inner thoughts in political action became aware of it. It was once expressed to me, in the somewhat crude terms of current party politics, by Sir Richard Solomon. (Solomon was the ablest of his first Transvaal Ministers. Milner had already spotted him in the period covered by this volume; speaking highly of him to Chamberlain he says: "He is a good speaker, a Radical and a negro-philist.") He had just come away from a discussion with Milner in Johannesburg on one of the questions on which they did not see eye to eye. He was obviously exhausted by only partial success in making his point of view prevail, but ended his account of the struggle with the exclamation: "Anyhow, thank Heaven the man was born a Liberal!"

It is the Milner of these convictions who is disclosed in these Papers, to some for the first time. His main object is to promote good government wherever England has any responsi-

bility or a right to exercise her influence in South Africa. It is impossible for any unbiased reader not to be impressed by the way in which this object dominates even the Imperial ideal. Just as he was 'for a better understanding with the Transvaal even if the devil makes it,' so—again and again there is evidence—he was prepared, up to the last minute before the war, to be satisfied with no more than the establishment of good government in the Transvaal, by whatever means achieved, regarding 'sovereignty,' 'independence,' and all the other debated questions as of little else than academic interest. At times it is almost startling to realise how far he was ready to leave the political relations between the South African Republic and the British Empire to work themselves out freely under natural forces, if only good government could be assured within the Republic. And it is only necessary to read his confidential letter of December 1, 1897, to Mr. Chamberlain to see that he was applying the same stern test to the government of Rhodes and the Chartered Company as he was to that of Kruger. 'On the administrative side the case for the Company is much weaker. I am dead against any attempt to rip up the past, but between ourselves, it is a bad story.' The letter is masterly: here there is not space to consider its proposals further than to note that he was determined to remove in Rhodesia abuses (inseparable from an oligarchy or despotism) similar in kind, if less in degree, to those under which British and natives were suffering in the Transvaal.

Now, good government, as Milner understood it, was based on democratic principles, and English history had shown that these principles could only thrive and develop freely in the safety assured by a free, independent and incorruptible judiciary. This safety Kruger had ruthlessly suppressed. In February 1898 he had been re-elected President of the Transvaal by an overwhelming majority, though only 10 per cent. of the population had voted. One of his first acts was abruptly to dismiss Kotze, the Chief Justice, whose offence was that he had refused to acknowledge the validity of all laws or resolutions passed by the Volksraad, whether contrary to the *Grondart* (the Constitution) or not. This dismissal was a step which, says Milner, in a despatch to Chamberlain, 'will be condemned in every civilized community as striking a fatal blow at the independence and authority of the judicial body, indicates a complete indifference to public opinion and is especially of evil augury for the peaceful and satisfactory settlement of the numerous questions outstanding, or likely to arise in the near future between H.M.'s Government and the Government of the South African Republic.'

So the end of fifteen months of patience had resulted in this justice, free and independent of political influence, Englishmen,

indeed all civilised races, had fought for, and willingly given their lives for, throughout history. It was, to a people brought up on such legends as that of the Chief Justice of England and Prince Hal, the sheet-anchor of liberty. If Uitlanders and natives were to be deprived of this in the Transvaal, their lot would be an intolerable one, for which England could not accept even such responsibility as the loosest interpretation of the Transvaal Convention of 1884 imposed upon her. But what concerned Milner immediately was the passivity of the citizens of the Transvaal themselves in face of this outrage on liberty; it convinced him that the hopes, which until then he had sincerely cherished, of reform from within were illusory, and, what always gave tenacity and finality to his conclusions, he was persuaded that the grounds upon which these hopes had been built were disproved by the patent facts. The indignation which blazed up in him, lifting him as on very rare occasions into a white heat of resentment, was not only fired by the knowledge that the foot of tyranny had been stamped vindictively on the neck of British and natives in the Transvaal, whose common rights of citizenship, in what was, at least nominally, a friendly foreign State, he had come out to South Africa to secure. It was intensified by his deep human sympathy for a brave man fighting disinterestedly against the overwhelming forces of despotism. Of Kotze he writes, after having seen him and heard and weighed his story, his 'attitude seems to me manly and deserving of respect', and again, 'if more men had his pluck, the cabal would be smashed'. And underneath these feelings was the dread expressed in a letter to Lord Selborne: 'I hope that Kotze will not be personally snubbed in England. We generally snub our unsuccessful allies, our inconvenient friends.'

It is clear to an impartial reader of his letters that the dismissal of Kotze shook and very nearly destroyed Milner's faith in a policy of patience. He submitted to the restraint imposed on him by Chamberlain in his letter of March 16, but he wrote to Lord Selborne that while he still by personal temperament sympathised with, and fully appreciated the arguments for, a policy of patience, and 'while, such being my orders, I shall loyally carry it out, I am less hopeful than I was of an ultimate solution on those lines. Two wholly antagonistic systems—a mediæval race oligarchy, and a modern industrial state, recognising no difference of status between various white races—cannot permanently live side by side in what after all is one country. The race-oligarchy has got to go, and I see no signs of its removing itself.'

The remainder of the Papers deal with eighteen months of superhuman statesmanship still governed by this policy, terminating for all practical purposes in the Bloemfontein Conference

of June 1899 with Kruger, after which he wrote to an American friend, Mrs. R. W. Chapin,² and so it was a failure—as I anticipated . . . I am fearfully tired and disappointed, but not beaten.

The controversy, which has raged round Milner's responsibility for the Boer War which ensued, has not yet died down; and there are many alive to-day who are ready to bring out from the backs of drawers treasured old party colours and hoist them the moment the subject is mentioned. But those who served Milner are rather concerned with the effect these Papers will have on younger men and women, here and in South Africa, who are more or less free from these inevitable prejudices. That is a consideration which must have weighed heavily with his executors when they decided to publish the Papers now, rather than wait a little longer until the old rosettes had faded. But as there are signs that the controversy has been revived it may be of possible benefit to those who did not live in late nineteenth-century conditions to be reminded of some of these conditions by those who knew them and have lived to see them modified, and in some respects shattered, by the Great War. By his opponents Milner was held personally responsible for the war. The most extreme among them publicly decried him as a 'man of blood' thirsting for war; the more moderate blamed his 'Imperialistic' temperament and his fatalism which they held all along regarded war as inevitable. They are united in condemning Milner for having broken off the Bloemfontein Conference when it is maintained further discussion might have effected a satisfactory compromise between Kruger and himself.

Now if there is one thing which all the evidence produced in these Papers places beyond a shadow of doubt it is that Milner believed that if England maintained sufficient forces in South Africa Kruger would not fight. Even in May 1899 he writes to Lord Selborne: 'My view is that absolute downright determination plus a large temporary increase of force will ensure a climb down.' Rhodes shared this view to the end, and as late as September 1899, when many thought that the Boers were only 'waiting for the grass' to start an offensive, he wrote to Milner: 'I am so absolutely sure that Kruger will concede everything H.M.G. demand that . . . It must be remembered again that in Milner's day the ultimate appeal to arms was the legitimate and the only means by which the vast majority of Englishmen believed that irreconcilable national or racial convictions could settle their differences. Future generations may draw conclusions and point a moral, if they have evolved other means, but to apply what is

² In a book recently published, *Their Troubles Way* (Constable & Co.), Mrs. Chapin has given one of the most penetrating and sympathetic studies of Milner which have hitherto appeared.

now known as the League of Nations spirit as a test of Milner's action is anachronistic and destructive of such benefits as may be learnt from the lessons of history. To those who knew Milner's methods one piece of evidence that he believed that his policy would succeed in averting war is overwhelming. It is to be found in his neglect to concentrate personally on a study of the military problems involved in a war with the Transvaal until the eleventh hour. Up till then he had been satisfied to leave the military provisions required to support his policy to the War Office, expressing at times annoyance, tinged with amusement, at General Butler's secrecy as to his arrangements (which he thought nevertheless must be 'all right'). But he never takes the matter really seriously until June 1899, when he asks for Butler to be replaced.

Why, then, did this policy fail? The two outstanding reasons seem to be these. As explained in the beginning of this article, the Boers had established a warlike tradition which gave them every confidence that they were more than a match for the British Army, a confidence no doubt increased by the knowledge, not disclosed to the English until realised on the battlefield, that they had added to their rifles quick-firing guns and other modern arms with which the English Army was not equipped. The Boers were convinced that they had little to fear from the British Army at its known strength, a conviction actually justified by events; for it was only by additions to that strength, unforeseen by the Boers and foreign European Powers on whose advice they depended, by additions of troops from the self-governing Colonies and of newly raised volunteer forces in the United Kingdom, that the British Empire in the result was able to achieve victory. The Boers had not miscalculated when they decided that they could defy England, though they forgot the strength of a United Empire; and England herself had not calculated on this when she entered into the war.

But perhaps what will interest the military student of the future more than anything else in these letters is the evidence of the entire want of co-ordination in England between military and political action. Even Chamberlain, who had obtained an historical independence of the Treasury, seems to have feared or been ignored by the War Office. At the best he took it for granted that our soldiers were quite competent to direct their mysteries without lay interference. There is something pathetic in his almost desperate cry in October 1899: 'It is unfortunate that our troops, unlike the Boers, cannot mobilise with a piece of blitting and a belt of ammunition, but require such enormous quantities of transport and impediments.' From what is disclosed in these Papers it seems certain that nothing whatever had

been done by the Cabinet or Chamberlain to see that that essential part of Milner's policy, a show of sufficient force in the Transvaal, was understood and properly carried out by the War Office. To blame General Buller alone for this is to relieve the Cabinet of an elementary responsibility. War Office opinion they had before them, of the type of General Buller's observation in July 1899, that 'as long as clever men like Buller and Symons on the spot did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our position against any possible attack by the Boers on our frontier.'

An excuse for the failure of the Cabinet to support Milner in this may be found by a lenient historian in, what seems to-day, the incredible confusion of thought as to the relation of military to political action then generally prevailing in England. Some of us can remember the almost sensational effect on intelligent men about this time of the writings of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, who was one of the first to convince the British public of the necessity for clear thinking in the uses of the Navy and the Army as instruments of national policy. But while in his own books, and through the medium of the *Morning Post*, he had attained such a position that he was regarded as the most authoritative of military critics when the Boer War started, his teachings bore little practical fruit until after it was over and Haldane carried out that reorganisation which culminated in the creation of an Expeditionary Force of calculated strength and made possible its despatch in 1914. One may search in vain in these Papers for any appreciation of such a use of military force as a means of preventing war as Milner had laid down as necessary to the success of his policy. Whether if, as he held, war could have been averted had he been given throughout the military support for which he asked can only be matter for conjecture, but at times the balance seems to have hung so evenly that it is possible to believe that this additional pressure would have turned the scale. At any rate, the full responsibility for the final result must rest on the Cabinet at home who failed him and drifted into war, under the worst possible conditions for its speedy termination.

As to those who still pass judgment to-day on Milner for having broken off the Bloemfontein Conference too soon, they may find support in his characteristic admission to Chamberlain: 'I think I was wrong in breaking off the Conference quite as quickly as I did. Perhaps extreme fatigue had something to do with it. . . . Of course I should not have broken off as I did had I had your telegram, urging delay, in time. That came the next morning.' It is argued that Milner did not 'know' the Boer and had the townsman rather than the farmer mind; some English critics have suggested that he might have smoothed over diffi-

cutties by 'passing the tobacco jar,' or, as South African critics put it, by 'smoking a pipe with the old man on the stoep.' Some of us who had considerable experience, after the war, of negotiating minor questions with the Boers have been asked if we did not think we could have done better if we had been given the chance! Perhaps I may venture to give here my own reply to such an inquiry. I enjoyed many 'pipes on the stoep' with Boers in order to remove misunderstandings. On some occasions I was successful, on others I was not. Of the latter category of negotiations I will give one typical example. A 'better-ender' (a Boer who had fought to the end—a class that strongly appealed to our English sympathies) was doing his best in the Eastern Transvaal to upset the work for which I was responsible. I went to see him, was very hospitably received and spent the night at his house. In the most friendly spirit we discussed the point at issue, round and round, over and over again, but I made no progress. In the early morning he asked me to go for a ride with him. We made our way in silence for about a mile and then stopped above a 'salt-pan.' At last breaking the silence he said to me: 'Early one misty morning I found twelve Tasmanians asleep in that salt-pan. I got some other Boers and surrounded them and shouted "Hands up!" One big fellow jumped up and said "Hands up be damned!" So we shot them all.' We turned our horses and rode back again in silence and the negotiations were finished. That was the Kruger type of Boer, even after defeat, in its simplest form, without the training in diplomacy which Kruger had undergone. The type was just simply irreconcilable.

What one does want to know, if history is to concern itself with the causes of the failure of the Conference, is the part played during those eventful days by the men behind Kruger, some of them of an intelligence only inferior to Milner's with a European education similar in many respects to his. Their evidence is required, and will no doubt some day be frankly and ably given, before the historian can pronounce judgment.

It is to be hoped that the lure of the Transvaal War will not distract the reader's attention from Milner's work in other parts of South Africa. His relations with Rhodes, a somewhat shadowy figure in this selection of Papers, are not the least interesting of the chapters of this history. The masterly dispatch to Chamberlain on Rhodesia has been referred to above. Rhodes was still one of the three great men on the South African stage. 'Rhodes,' says Milner, 'is a great developer, but he is not a good administrator, and it is most necessary that in his administrative arrangements and in his choice of men, he should listen to good advice. . . . And again: 'He is too self-willed, too violent, too sanguine, and in too great a hurry. He is just the same man as he always

was, undaunted and unbroken by his former failure, but also untaught by it. He is much too strong a man to be merely used.' 'Men are ruled by their foibles, and Rhodes's foible is size . . . he looks at that big map.'


Those who loved Milner personally will find very great enjoyment in the account of his tour in Basutoland in March 1898. For there, as only those who have visited that protectorate can fully realise, he found under Sir Godfrey Lagden a few Englishmen doing that kind of work (as they are still doing it unnoticed and unadvertised in many a part of the world) which is the foundation of the real British Imperialism. It may to-day save the Empire in the difficulties through which it is passing; if not, it is that which will be remembered in history as characteristic and differentiating it from all other Imperialisms when the Empire has passed away. Rightly Milner's diary is quoted more extensively in this chapter than in other parts of the volume. 'For once I am happy,' he says.


For the knowledge of that happiness they are grateful. And to Lord Selborne, 'excellent friend and staunch supporter,' whose letters run through this volume like a bright thread, they must ever remain bound and indebted. To those of Lord Milner's young men who left South Africa before Lord Selborne succeeded him these letters explain why those who remained served him with confidence and devotion.

FABIAN WARE

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12, Orange Street, Leicester Square W.C. 2

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.





THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



NO. DCLX—FEBRUARY 1932

DIS-ARM OR RE-ARM?

AFTER twelve years of talk about disarmament the nations are now coming together in order to act. For, in one way or another, action there will certainly be. The Conference may arrive at an agreement which will result in an immediate diminution of all armies and navies, or it may fail to agree, in which case we shall inevitably witness the race for armed supremacy begin again.

We have not been without experience of this process. The Peace Conference at Versailles was not the first occasion when the nations met to dis-arm and parted to re-arm. We can well remember the Peace Conference at the Hague in 1899, when Tsar Nicholas II., being vastly impressed at the piling up of armaments by every State in Europe, sent out his invitation to the Powers. With it there went the note by Count Mouraviev, wherein he explained that the object of his Imperial master was 'to arrive at an understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present armed military and naval forces . . . and to examine the means whereby even a reduction might be effected.' There is an odd resemblance in these words to the 'holiday' talked about in

Geneva last year. The Conference of 1899 failed, the chief obstructionist being the German Emperor, who understood the value of a 'mailed fist,' and was then firmly persuaded that his army was going to become the great organ for keeping the peace of the world. At the close of the proceedings the Chinese plenipotentiary presented an illuminating report to the old Empress in which he gave his impressions of the Conference. He said that he noticed that very many people talked, but very few were listened to; and, on inquiry, he had discovered that those who were listened to were the delegates of Powers which possessed either a great army or a great navy. He therefore advised his sovereign that if she desired that China should have a chance of being heard in the next Conference she should at once set about building up either a great army or a great navy.

There was, no doubt, a vein of satire in that remark; but it represented a view which was widely held at that time, and one which, if we may judge from certain recent episodes in the United States of America, civilised nations have not yet altogether cast aside. There are still many people who honestly believe that great armies and navies are the best security for peace. Would to God it were true! If it were, we could happily tolerate the immense financial burdens that are their necessary accompaniment. But the Great War proved the contrary to be true. When the test came, the German army was not used for keeping the peace. Nor was any one of the immense military establishments which the nations had been building up ever since the Hague Conference blew the Tsar's treaty into thin air.

It is only fair to add that the two Conferences at the Hague achieved something, and it is worth noting this, as it may contribute still another lesson to those who put their faith in conferences. The delegates at the Hague—since they had little chance of doing anything for peace—spent their time doing what they could for war. They made laws prohibiting bombs being thrown from balloons. They prohibited poison gas. They prohibited explosive bullets. It was an excellent pastime, but it had little result, as those who lived through the winters of 1915 and 1916 in London or in the trenches around Ypres know to their cost. But the serious aspect of the case is that in these Disarmament Conferences delegates are apt to turn their attention away from methods of keeping the peace to methods of fighting, and this may happen now unless the present delegates recognise that their chief duty is to put into operation the measures for ridding the world of war, devised by those who, in 1919, brought the treaties of peace out of the welter and misery of the Great War.

At the risk of repeating what most educated people know, it may be well to set out the facts which place this Conference on a

totally different plane to that on which any of the earlier Conferences have rested. The Hague Conferences, and others, were only meetings of the various Powers, summoned on the initiative of one or other monarch or State in order to consider proposals having a more or less personal origin. The representatives of the nations came together to listen and to learn and, if possible, to help the originator of the Conference to attain his end. They had, however, no responsibilities of their own to fulfil. If nothing came of the Conference they could retire with no feeling of failure on their part. No harm was done except to show that the nations were still far from being sufficiently united to be able to co-operate effectively for the benefit of all mankind. On the present occasion the situation is entirely changed. The nations are assembling to carry out an undertaking to which they are pledged by the declarations of their own statesmen, by obligations enshrined in treaties by the acts of their delegates in the meetings of the League of Nations, and even by the terms on which the Great War was brought to an end. If the present Conference fails, it will be the failure, not of one or two enlightened nations striving to take a step forward in the march of human progress, but of civilised States which will have shown themselves ready to promise but unwilling to perform. Let us see how far this assertion is correct.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the war was no walk-over. It was a bitter and fierce struggle during which the chances of victory swung from side to side. There were moments when each party experienced the terror of imminent defeat. Even in the last year, when the position of the Central Powers was becoming almost hopeless, the Allies were in no state to regard their victory as certain. In any event, within that period negotiations were being actively carried on between the belligerent Governments for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Germans assert that the Armistice was asked for and granted on the understanding that the Fourteen Points were to form part of the Peace Treaty, and they complain, with some degree of justification, that this understanding was never fully acted upon. Be this as it may, there is no doubt that the principles of Wilson's pronouncement were accepted by both sides and victory was conceded on this understanding.

The fourth of President Wilson's points ran as follows: 'Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.' The Allied Governments endorsed this as a condition of peace and Germany accepted it. Later on these same words found a place in the treaties. Article VIII. of the Covenant of

the League of Nations states that 'The members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement of national obligations,' and proceeds to enact that 'the Council of the League shall formulate plans for such reduction; and, after the plans have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.'

Thus, up to that point, there can be no doubt that the Powers considered it to be a necessary sequence of the treaties of peace that the process of reduction of armaments by all the nations forming part of the League should be undertaken forthwith. The subsequent proceedings at Versailles prove this still more clearly, for in the month of May 1919 the clauses in the draft treaty whereby Germany was invited to disarm were presented to her representatives. These clauses are preceded by a recital that Germany undertook the obligations contained in them 'in order to render possible the initiation of a general reduction of the armaments of all nations.' Moreover, when the Germans asked for some assurance that this was to be the beginning of a general reduction of armaments, M. Clemenceau wrote a letter on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers in which he said:

The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first step toward the reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

In view of these assurances it clearly became the duty of the European Governments to push on with the reduction of armaments as rapidly as possible after peace was concluded. The Assembly of the League recognised its responsibility immediately and set up one committee after another to investigate the problem and to prepare suitable plans. They were, however, met by one great obstacle, namely, the objection of France to take any step in the direction of disarmament so long as there remained any doubt as to the power of the League of Nations to protect a disarmed country against attack.

This contention on the part of France has commanded a great deal of sympathy, and no one can fail to realise that her people have good reason for apprehension. Her experiences with regard to promises of aid by other countries have not been happy. She reminds us that when the Peace Treaty was being drafted, and when M. Clemenceau made his pronouncement about general disarmament, the United States of America was to be a member

of the League of Nations. Moreover, that powerful nation, in conjunction with Great Britain, had, through the mouth of its President, guaranteed France against attack by Germany. The security from aggression thereby accorded to France, and indirectly to the other States of Europe so long as they should conduct their affairs peacefully, was of great value. When this guarantee was withdrawn by the vote of the American Senate the situation was changed.

The League recognised this to be the case and proceeded to deal with the new problem as best it could. It began by formulating a new treaty which took its final shape in 1924 as the 'Geneva Protocol.' This instrument was directed towards making the forces of the League more mobile in the event of a threat of war; but, in doing so, it made the duty of armed intervention resting upon the members of the League more onerous than some of them had considered it to be under the terms of the Covenant. This was the view taken by the British Government in 1925, with the result that the Protocol was rejected. However, the matter could not be left where it was, and in the same year, on the initiative of Great Britain, the meeting at Locarno took place. This meeting was attended by representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the agreements which were concluded there gave both to France and Germany a guarantee of support by England and Italy in the event of any aggression across the Franco-German frontier, and recorded a declaration by all the seven signatories that they would give their unswerving co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and seek realisation of it in a general agreement.

There is one more event which must not be left out of sight. In 1926 Germany was admitted as a member of the League of Nations. Since then she has stood upon an equal footing with all other members of the League. She shares responsibility for the proper execution of Article VIII. She has the same rights as others have under that article. How far she could demand to have the limits of her own armaments revised with a view to 'the enforcement by common action of international obligations' one cannot attempt to decide. The question need not be decided yet; but some day it is certain to be raised. For the moment, it suffices to realise that Germany has an undeniable right to insist that the Powers which lead in the League of Nations shall get on with the work of general reduction to which they have pledged themselves over and over again.

But it is easy to bring a horse to the water, and yet difficult to make him drink. This is the case now. There was recently

held in Paris a conference of the advocates of disarmament coming from all countries. The meeting included, of course, many Frenchmen whose sympathies were with the promoters. But no one present in Paris at the time could fail to notice that public sentiment, at any rate as it was displayed by the Press, was almost unanimously hostile. If the gathering had taken place in the provinces the sentiment might have been different ; but it must be admitted by anyone who knows France that the majority of her people do not enter the Geneva Conference with any strong desire to make it succeed.

And yet it is of supreme importance that the Conference shall succeed, and of equal importance that it shall do so with the goodwill and, if possible, on the initiative of France. If the Conference comes to nothing the effect will not be negative. It will be dangerously positive—dangerous especially to France. True, there are many people who would prefer to leave things alone ; people who argue that it were better to devote ourselves to devising means to prevent war. ‘Get your courts of arbitration into action,’ they say ‘and their decisions respected. Remove the inequalities, injustices and hardships that men suffer under and which are an ever-fruitle cause of war.’ There is a good deal in this argument, but the answer to it is that it is now too late. Had there been no pledges, no disarmament of defeated foes, no attempt to keep certain proud peoples in a permanent state of inferiority, the suggested remedies might be efficacious. But Germany and Hungary, and even Austria and Bulgaria, demand equality of treatment. How, indeed, can we refuse this demand ? It is impossible to hold that these nations are to remain perpetually in a state of subjection to their neighbours. What justification would there be for such a contention ? Even if it be true that the men who eighteen years ago led these countries into war were international criminals and should be treated as outlaws, what responsibility have the young men and women of to-day for their crimes ? They will certainly not recognise any such responsibility, and it is childish on our part to expect them to express contrition for the sins of a generation that is rapidly passing off the stage. On the other hand, they are keenly alive to the circumstances of the present day, and the future lies in their hands, and not in ours. The fault that the leaders in French politics have made is that they have not tried to make friends with the youth of Germany. Old enemies have been dying off, and there was no reason why new enemies should spring up. But they are appearing in millions, and one of the main causes of this growth lies in the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty and the hesitation shown by France to carry out the promises made at Versailles.

The revival of militarism is one of the tragedies of the post-war period. At the close of the war militarism was dead; as dead as were the millions of soldiers who had been sacrificed in its name on the flats of Flanders. At any rate, this was true of the old militarism, which consisted in the desire to appropriate another nation's territory. The world had had enough of this sort of thing, and when the war ended hardly a man in Germany or France would have been found willing to stir a finger to gain, or to regain, an inch of foreign ground. The soil was open for the seeds of peace, but, unfortunately, no one tried to sow them. Men's minds were more occupied in gathering prematurely the crop of reparations than in preparing for the normal harvests of succeeding years. In the end the exploitation of the Saar Valley, the invasion of the Ruhr and the long-drawn-out occupation of the Rhine Provinces had their inevitable result—namely, the conversion of the younger elements of the German people from an attitude of peace at any price to one of sullen resentment growing rapidly into exasperation, revenge, and a determination to be equal with France some day, in some manner or other. Militarism is once again rampant in Germany and in a more democratic, and therefore more dangerous, form. It is rooted in hatred, and its fibres spread into all classes of the nation.

And this militarism exists also in France. The French are not a militaristic nation at all, although this accusation is frequently brought against them. Reputations die hard, and it may be that Napoleonic legends still cling around France in the eyes of her neighbours. But the French have seen too much of war to wish for it again in any shape, and they more than any other people, would have liked to go straight back to their provinces to beat their swords into ploughshares, and to set their sons once more to labour peacefully upon their fertile farms. The French would undoubtedly wish to disarm, but they are afraid to. This is the secret of the French attitude towards the Disarmament Conference. Those who wish that the Conference succeed must do what they can to remove this fear. So long as it persists the French will keep their army ready for all eventualities. No pressure, moral or financial, will induce them to lessen their own powers of action without receiving a real assurance that advantage will not be taken of them in consequence.

There is some reason for the reluctance shown by France to reduce her military equipment. Apart from the strained relations between her and Germany, there are other dangers to which she is exposed. Italy is not friendly towards her, and there are points of contact between the two nations in Northern Africa on which public sentiment easily becomes irritated. Then there are the French colonies in Asia and West Africa. And, besides this,

France has certain special responsibilities towards Poland and other East European States which may embroil her in a conflict with Germany, or perhaps Russia, that may prove to be difficult and costly. Moreover, even if these fears are ill-grounded, there is still the question of policing Europe, and many Frenchmen consider that their army is the only mobile force which is at present available for this purpose. It may be that they are falling into the same error as that which led the Kaiser astray; but there can be no doubt that there are millions of true lovers of peace in France—and, indeed, in most other countries—who would regret to see the French army become impotent. It is these people whose minds we have to set at rest, if we are to bring out of the Conference any real reduction and limitation of armaments.

Thus we find in France a set purpose that the army shall be retained at any cost, and this frame of mind foreigners speak of as French militarism. It is not so bad as the old militarism, but it has much the same faults. It is that 'trust in the sword' which the highest ethical teacher has told us only brings disaster to those who hold to it. Few believe in this great truth and no one acts upon it. It is too high above us to be considered as practical politics, even in the so-called Christian countries. So, if we are to exorcise militarism to-day, we must use a talisman of a more commonplace type. French mentality is, of course, chiefly influenced by what goes on in Germany, and French militarism has been just as truly called into being by Germany as German militarism has sprung from the deeds of France. It may be said that during the last twelve years these two nations have been mutually manufacturing militarism within each other's territories. If, immediately after the war, the Germans had admitted what they were constantly saying amongst themselves—namely, that the Kaiser had led them into a war which they did not want—and if they had willingly and honestly set about the task of making good what he had destroyed, the whole trend of opinion in France would have been diverted into other channels. Unfortunately, the then German Administration was not of that way of thinking, and obstacles of all kinds were put in the way of the punctual fulfilment of obligations. It is unnecessary to hark back to all the troubles of the years succeeding the war and the ceaseless attempts by France to obtain what she considered she was entitled to have and what Germany in some cases would not, and in others really could not, give. All these events created in the minds of the French people a conviction that Germany was only waiting her opportunity to tear into pieces the Treaty of Versailles and to regain by force all that she had been compelled to abandon in the war. This conviction has rooted itself more

and more deeply as the Hitler movement has gained ground in Germany. German politics have much to answer for in the reluctance of France to reduce her forces at the present moment.

Such being the situation as between the two principal Powers concerned in the coming Conference, what reasonable hope is there of any agreement coming out of it? If the Conference becomes a stage upon which the conflicting opinions of Frenchmen and Germans form the chief attraction, it will only degenerate into a useless display of forensic skill and leave the world nearer than ever to the verge of war. But this is by no means inevitable, and it will be for the other nations to discover the way to avoid it.

It is fortunate that on this occasion the Conference is not confined to members of the League of Nations. There will be two very notable additions in the delegations sent by Soviet Russia and the United States of America. Each of these great Powers can render special service to the cause of peace, provided that its representatives come to Geneva resolved to make the Conference succeed. Russia has declared her desire for peace; but up to now she has given no earnest of her intentions. She is regarded with suspicion by her neighbours, and she is busily equipping herself with munitions of war. The United States has been still more emphatic in her declarations, but she is also actively engaged in forging new weapons. Both of these States would create an immense impression on the world by definitely offering to join in a general scheme for the reduction and limitation of armaments. Nothing would tend more certainly to make the members of the Conference bend themselves resolutely to their task than the knowledge that in the new organisation they would have the co-operation of these two States whose attitude upon the question of armaments has hitherto been one of non-committal. There is no doubt that if Russia were to subject herself voluntarily to the international supervision which is indispensable in any scheme for the limitation of armed forces, several of the European nations would be relieved of anxiety, which, whether it be well-founded or ill-founded, is one of their chief reasons for maintaining their present means of defence. On the other hand, the assistance that America could offer in carrying into effect such a scheme would be of supreme value to the other members and to the cause of general peace throughout the world. The question of disarmament, like many other international questions, has now become a world question and can only be solved by universal action. The League of Nations is, in fact, too small for it. It has admirably prepared the ground. Its plans for reduction have been skilfully elaborated, but they must be brought into operation over a wider field. Let us hope that, in the interests of humanity as a whole, the American people will

recognise this. After all, the United States is responsible, to some extent, for the obligations to Germany set out in an earlier part of this article. Not only did M. Clemenceau speak in the name of the *Allied and Associated Powers* when he declared that the disarmament of Germany was the first step towards a reduction and limitation of armaments, but in the separate treaty which the United States concluded with Germany the former reserved to herself specifically the rights and advantages of the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Versailles, and recognised the rights accorded to Germany thereby, which, as already pointed out, included a limitation of the armaments 'of all nations.'

With America and Russia participating in the Conference it will be practically a gathering 'of all nations,' and it will be able to bring to bear upon the problem before it broader considerations than those which have hitherto been possible. In particular it will be in a position to discuss the question of general security from a new point of view. As already explained the last occasions when attempts were made to solve this question were in Geneva in 1924 and at Locarno in 1925. Germany was not then at Geneva and Russia was not at Locarno. If we could bring about a new Locarno on a wider basis, with Russia co-operating cordially in the deliberations and with the United States casting a friendly eye towards her setting sun, where perhaps she is less averse from intervening than she is when she looks across the Atlantic, we could go forward with some hope into the Conference. And it would not be necessary to tackle again (at any rate for the moment) the thorny question of 'sanctions.' With Russia and the United States co-operating with the other nations for the purpose of rendering the Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League effective, we could afford to keep sanctions in the background and to try for a little longer the effect of moral forces on the policy of nations.

If this Conference makes a definite commencement in the process of general disarmament and strengthens the sense of general security amongst the European nations, a way may be found to reconcile even the conflicting views of Germany and France. Possibly the financial disaster which menaces both countries may help to bring this about, for the monetary relief that must inevitably be accorded by France to Germany might be accompanied by conditions that Germany should take definite measures which would make the risk of attack upon France almost negligible. At the same time arrangements might be reached whereby questions such as those of the eastern frontiers of Germany would be reviewed in a manner acceptable to her and to her neighbours. If there is a real desire to arrive at a settle-

ment, as there appears now to be, a settlement is not impossible, even in those regions.

The main thing in this Conference will be to avoid failure, for failure at this moment will be fatal: fatal to the over-burdened taxpayers who look to reduction of armaments to bring them relief; fatal to any chance of reconciliation between France and Germany; fatal to the League of Nations, which will be represented by its opponents as being incapable of performing 'one of the first tasks' laid upon it by the Covenant, fatal to the hopes of millions of men and women who are groping for a way to peace but can find none

DICKINSON

THE DRINK QUESTION AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION

THIRTY-TWO years have passed since a Royal Commission on the liquor trade issued their Report, or rather their Reports, for there were two, and much has happened since then. Drink is no longer such an urgent question as it was, and Lord Amulree's Commission has not excited the public interest that attended the inquiry presided over by Lord Peel. The reasons for this are various, but so far as drink is concerned they are distinctly satisfactory. It excites less interest in this country because of a change in public habits which may be called almost dramatic. Consumption has diminished, and with it police drunkenness and mortality from alcoholic poisoning, to a really remarkable extent. Taking the consumption of beer, spirits and wine we get the following figures for the years 1900 and 1930 from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise:

CONSUMPTION PER HEAD IN GALLONS

Year		Beer	Spirits	Wine
1900	..	32.2	1.16	.42
1930	..	16.3	.27	.34

The aggregate quantity of alcohol consumed per head is estimated in 1900 at 4.54 gallons and in 1930 at 1.95. The police figures for drunkenness in England and Wales are as follows:

DRUNKENNESS

Year		Cases	Convictions
1904	.	227,403	207,730
1930	..	61,455	53,080

The number of drunkenness offences per head fell from 623 in 1904-8 to 156 in 1928. The number of deaths certified to be due to alcohol fell from 113 per million in 1900 to 16 per million in 1930.

When all allowance has been made for possible errors the case is convincingly clear. The increased sobriety of the nation is "spectacular," as the Royal Commission call it in their Report; from being one of the hard-drinking peoples we have in a wonder-

fully short time become comparatively sober. And there is other evidence of the change besides the statistical. Many observers have attested the fact, but I would refer more particularly to the testimony of a large number of employers and managers in different industries and in different parts of the country. Their evidence has been collected by the highly experienced committee appointed by a group of persons, one of whom is a member of Lord Amulree's Commission, to investigate the social and economic effects of drink in this country. Their conclusion is stated in the recently published volume on *The Social and Economic Aspects of the Drink Problem* :

The evidence as a whole large in volume and representative in character, certainly appears to indicate that at the present time and under prevailing conditions—regulative, fiscal, economic and industrial—drink is not, directly and prominently seriously impairing industrial efficiency. Excessive drinking which obviously impairs efficiency has been greatly reduced, and the majority of the workers who drink at all are now moderate drinkers.

It used not to be so. I well remember the bitter complaints of lost time and inefficiency due to drink made to me in my own investigations during the war and the enormous improvement effected by the regulations of the Control Board. I came to the conclusion that the complaints were exaggerated, owing to the intense pressure under which everyone was working, and that the lost time in particular, which was always attributed to drink, was really due in a considerable measure to other causes. But there was no doubt about the improvement effected by the restrictions on drinking and especially the shortened hours. One man who had charge of 7000 men in the roughest shop of a huge factory told me that they had made all the difference and turned his shop from hell into heaven.

The marked increase in sobriety, attested by statistics which confirm each other and by personal observation, has become a commonplace and is quite sufficient to explain the lack of interest in the Report of the Royal Commission. People feel that any proposed increase of restrictions or any large change in the system may safely be left to a vague future. And they are justified not only by the present state of national affairs, but also by the fact that the movement towards greater sobriety is progressive. But to estimate this fact correctly it is necessary to examine the evidence more closely.

What are the causes of the diminished consumption and the increased sobriety? There is a tendency on the one hand to regard them as justifying a general reduction, and even the total abolition, of the existing restrictions, and on the other hand to demand their extension and try some new experiment such as

State ownership or local option or a new licensing authority or a combination of these. How far do the facts support either of these views?

The consumption of drink and the consequent drunkenness are subject to two different sets of influences: (1) permanent and progressive; (2) temporary and fluctuating. The first works slowly because it depends mainly on the rising generation. It includes many conditions which tend to wean the younger people from excessive drinking, and some of these have multiplied very rapidly in recent years. Prominent among them are the counter-attractions to the publichouse, most of which appeal particularly to the young. The 'passion for games and athletics' mentioned by the Peel Commission has found many new means of gratification; you cannot excel in any physical exercise if you drink much, and most youths have an ambition to excel. This has spread to the girls also; gymnastics, swimming, rowing, dancing and physical exercises have become common. Then the means of locomotion have been multiplied indefinitely by the bicycle, the motor cycle and the motor coach, and if these—especially the last—offer additional opportunities of visiting strange public-houses they also provide abundant counter-excitement. Travel is an occupation in itself. The cinema is another universal attraction which takes people in, warms and amuses them for a few pence during the very hours they would have otherwise spent in the publichouse. For those with literary tastes there are free libraries and a singular abundance of cheap periodicals and stories; for the studious-minded and those with serious ambitions there is an ample assortment of technical and scientific hand-books.

In short, there is to-day something for all sorts and conditions of men to occupy their minds when at leisure in place of drink, so that they can escape the danger of excess or have a far better chance of escaping it than they had when the publichouse was almost the only means of occupying their leisure agreeably. For the mind will be occupied, and, since it cannot be always at work, it finds its leisured occupation where it can, the more opportunities it has the better.

To the multiplication of alternative occupations is added another influence which is noted by the Royal Commission and is distinctly more marked than when I first drew attention to it many years ago. They speak of the social standards and the public attitude towards drunkenness, and observe that 'drunkenness has gone out of fashion and a drunken person is not tolerated as he used to be.' It is a very long time since I visited a music-hall, and I do not know how that remarkable mirror of social standards presents the drunkard of to-day. I confess that I should be surprised to find that he had altogether vanished from

the boards or was not even now regarded with a rather contemptuous sympathy. But, broadly speaking, the remark is true. The social standard has changed in this matter and is changing all the time. Disapproval of drunkenness began a long time ago in the higher ranks of society. I believe the process began at Court in the reign of William IV, and it was greatly stimulated there when Queen Victoria came to the throne. At that time the gentlemen still regularly appeared in the drawing-room after dinner more or less fuddled, but the influence of the Court example gradually made it unfashionable for a gentleman. The saying 'as drunk as a lord' lost its meaning, and the standard of conduct filtered down by degrees through the social strata. It has gone on filtering down ever since, and the process has been accelerated by the democratisation of society. Class distinctions are now greatly modified and aspiring persons are much encouraged to imitate the conduct of those who are above them according to the accepted view of social standing. Evidence to this effect is contained in *The Social and Economic Aspects of the Drink Problem*, which records the belief that labourers in the main drink more heavily than skilled workmen. The habit of moderation has filtered down nearly to the bottom.

Popular education has had a pervasive influence in fostering most of these inducements to moderation. Indeed, when one realises the immense change that has been accomplished in the improvement of education during the last fifty years one is inclined rather to wonder that anyone is left to indulge in excessive drinking. But the habits of the people die very slowly. For instance, the belief that port wine is a temperance drink is still widely held. One cannot understand how such a delusion ever arose, but I have recently had evidence of its persistence. The continued popularity of the public-house may be attributed in part to habit, but there is more in it than that. Some people go there for nothing but drink, which they take quietly without any intercourse, but far more go there for the sake of the company. It is the social side that attracts them. The only real competitor is the club, which accounts for their rapid multiplication in recent years while public-houses have been reduced. But everyone cannot join a club. The social lure, which accounts for the continued popularity of the public-house more than any other feature, is no bad thing. It is of great antiquity; according to Piers Plowman, all classes used to meet and talk at the village inn in the fourteenth century, and no doubt they did so before then. Enough has not been made of this important reason for the hold of the public-house on the populace. It is more compatible with moderate than with excessive drinking, which generally leads to trouble.

Other causes of increased sobriety which have been mentioned

are improved housing and public health. They are parts of the rising standard of life and have to do with the growth of intelligence among the young ; but their precise influence is uncertain, and it is impossible to say how far they are causes and how far effects of moderation. What is certain, however, is that the process of permanent and progressive improvement works through the succession of generations and is necessarily slow. The young grow up free, for various reasons, from excessive drinking and do not contract the habit. Some of them no doubt always did so, but the number has been constantly increasing through the influences that have been enumerated. This is the 'real element of permanence' noted by the Royal Commission. And it is more real, I would observe, than the sobriety caused by the most perfect system of prohibition - assuming the possibility of such a system in a drinking country - because it depends on a free choice. People deliberately prefer moderation and are therefore in no danger of backsliding, whereas compulsory abstinence would leave them always open to a temptation, to which some at least would succumb whenever the system was relaxed or they found themselves in another country. Recent experience is fatal to prohibition. It has shown the world that legal compulsion in a matter of personal habit itself begets a desire to break the law and leads to excessive drinking on the part of those who would otherwise abstain.

Yet it is easy to overrate the permanent element, and those who demand a wholesale removal of existing restrictions certainly overrate it. The 'spectacular' fall in consumption and the increased sobriety set in only with the war. Up till then both drink and drunkenness had been increasing since 1910. No one suggested that we had become a sober people. In 1913 the cases of drunkenness in England and Wales numbered 204,038 and the convictions were 183,514. In 1910 they had been 175,449 and 156,874. (The figures are somewhat differently stated in the Licensing statistics.) When the war came in 1914 the figures were still rising, and before long great alarm was raised at the amount of drunkenness and its interference with the production of war material. Early in 1915 Mr Lloyd George made the characteristic remark that we had three enemies to fight - Germany, Austria and drink, and the greatest of these was the third. So the Control Board was appointed and armed with full powers to deal with drink, and it did so by various measures of restriction, which were received with general approval, though some complaints were raised.

That was the beginning of the spectacular fall. It was the result of a dictatorship in a time of emergency. There is no need to go into what happened during the war. It passed, and

presently the Act of 1921, under which we have lived ever since, put an end to the dictatorship, but not to the restrictions, which were only modified. It is since then that the fall, to which we owe the reputation for national sobriety, has been fully confirmed. To what is it due? Primarily and principally to the restrictions and the depressed state of trade; in other words, to the temporary and fluctuating causes or to the second set of influences pointed out above. They may also be called the compulsory causes as opposed to the voluntary or permanent causes already discussed.

The interaction of these two sets of influences may be read plainly enough in the records of the drink trade; one sees the figures both of consumption and of drunkenness rising and falling, but through these fluctuations a progressive movement is visible over the years. It is marked at each successive fluctuation or swing of the pendulum, the high water mark of drunkenness is not so high as it was and the low-water mark is lower. Thirty years ago I pointed this out and explained it by the fact that

The practice of getting intoxicated is becoming confined to a smaller and smaller section of the community, and the standard of conduct which stops short of it is accepted more and more widely and lower down in the social scale.

The combined process has continued during the last thirty years, the one set of causes acting permanently, the other temporarily. The latter is due to the fluctuating capacity of the drinking public to pay for their liquor, which depends on the current rates of wages and the state of employment in relation to the price. Now throughout the whole period since 1921 the price of liquor has been exceptionally high through heavy taxation, which has been about thirteen times what it was in 1914 for beer and nearly six times the previous level for spirits. At the same time trade has been depressed and unemployment rife, with a marked tendency to increase. It is true that rates of wages have been comparatively high and the effects of unemployment have been partly met by insurance or the dole. But for these alleviating influences I believe the high cost of drink would have caused trouble either through disorder or illicit sale or both.

These factors are sufficient of themselves to account for a large fall in consumption since the war. But they have been accompanied by another form of compulsory restriction in the shape of reduced hours of sale. How powerful this may be can be seen from the effects of the Metropolitan Police Act of 1899, which reduced the apprehensions for drunkenness in London from a yearly average of 12.7 to 7.9 per 1000 in 1890 by closing the publichouses on Saturday at midnight until noon on Sunday. When I first drew attention to this Act in 1896 an old gentleman

who well remembered it wrote and described its remarkable effects in curing the 'dreadful state of things' that previously existed. It was so successful that in 1848 the same regulation was applied to the whole country.

It does not seem much of a restriction to-day, and perhaps those who demand freedom for the trade would like to abolish it. The experiment would be interesting. It would not revive the old state of things because of the general improvement in the standard of conduct, but some publicans would certainly take advantage of the permission to remain open, they would attract a certain number of customers and other publicans would feel constrained to follow their example. Thus the practice would grow and would become a very considerable evil. In our country, where the climate conduces to drinking, unlike the sober coasts of the Mediterranean, there are — and probably always will be — too many people given to excess to make freedom from restrictions a practicable policy. For excess inflicts so much injury on other people in the way of annoyance, inefficiency, poverty, and cruelty that the State is compelled to check the evil by means of restrictions. There are many of them under the system of licensing; but I dwell upon the hours of sale and the price of drink because these are the most effective instruments in producing the great improvement that has taken place in the short time since the war.

Before the appointment of the Control Board in 1915 the hours of sale were still as fixed by the Act of 1874. They ranged from sixteen in the country to nineteen and a half in London. The Act of 1901 fixed them at nine in London and eight elsewhere, and further reduced the hours on Sunday from six or seven to five. The reduction is very great. No one would have ventured seriously to propose it but for the still greater reduction that was submitted to in the war. Compared with that it came as a relief and was accepted on the whole with a good grace, though there has been some grumbling, which has a tendency to increase, and the trade has agitated for relaxation. Against this must be set the continued agitation of societies which wish to establish some more drastic restrictions. Now comes the Royal Commission, but before entering on its proposals there are certain other elements in the situation which must be mentioned.

There is the reduction of licensed houses on a systematic plan under the Act of 1904, the multiplication of clubs, the tentative area of State control, of which Carlisle is the centre, and there is the movement for the improvement of publichouses which has been stimulated by the proceedings at Carlisle. These are all less important items in regard to the future of the trade than the price of drink and the hours of sale, which are decisive elements under

any system ; but they are the subject of certain proposals by the Royal Commission and therefore come into consideration.

The Report of the Royal Commission approximates more nearly to complete agreement than was to be expected from its composition, which included diverse and antagonistic views among the twenty-one members. The majority Report was signed by sixteen members with six reservations, and there were three separate minority Reports. This result may be attributed to its judicial and generally moderate character, the separate Reports and the reservations reveal the more determined differences. The principal and the newest proposal is to set up a National Licensing Commission, or, rather two, which would have under their care most of the other substantial modifications contemplated. This relegation of authority to a body not yet in existence is in keeping with the tentative character of the whole Report, to which several of the signatures may be attributed. But it rather precludes any action. It is admitted that the present situation is more satisfactory than it has ever been, and that, given the continuation of the restrictions, the general change in habits is not in danger of being substantially upset by a general rise in prosperity, which would have the same effect as a reduction in the price of drink.

In these circumstances what chance is there of public and parliamentary agreement to a proposal for increasing public expenditure by setting up a new body with a new staff, to make certain changes and try certain experiments, which cannot be expected at the best to exercise much effect on the consumption of drink? It would mean a *wanton increase of expenditure* for a very small gain or for no gain at all, and that is no time for increased expenditure. The need for economy, which ought to have been realised when the war came to an end, is becoming more urgent now with every day. It is highly probable that if it had reached its present pitch of urgency two years ago a Royal Commission costing £20,000 would not have been appointed at all.

Its first proposal has to do with the reduction of licences under the Act of 1904, which provides compensation for refusal. The total net decrease in 1930 was 22,141 from 99,478 to 77,335, but this was not due to the Act alone for 6774 lapsed and 373 were refused renewal without compensation. The largest number refused under the Act was 1735 in 1907, since then they have declined to 416 in 1930. These licences are held to be 'superfluous,' but what constitutes superfluity neither the Commission nor anyone else can determine. The Commissioners say that if there are in any area more licences than are 'reasonably needed for the service of the public,' then some of them are superfluous. That may be ; but who is the judge of what is reasonably needed?

At present it is the licensing benches, to whose efficiency they pay a general tribute. But in spite of this they propose to supersede their authority by appointing a National Commission, which would have various duties, and among them would be that of reviewing schemes of reduction prepared by the local authorities. The main object is to accelerate the pace of reduction, which is not fast enough in some areas and has failed to achieve all that supporters of the scheme expected. They also propose to increase the compensation levy up to three times the present scale. Two of the reservations to the Report refer to this last proposal as excessive.

In my opinion the supporters of the 1904 scheme expected too much. The influence of superfluity, however determined, has been altogether overrated. The object is—or ought to be—the prevention of excessive drinking, not the limitation of licences to any particular number in proportion to population. It is impossible to establish any relation between the number of licences and the prevalence of drunkenness. It was immediately after the three years 1907-09, in which the Act of 1904 reached its maximum operation, that drunkenness began to rise and went on rising up to the war. In Carlisle the reduction of superfluous licences has proceeded without let or hindrance and has been more drastic than it could possibly be under the proposed National Commission, but in spite of this no exceptional diminution of drunkenness has taken place there. It is not that I want to preserve any licences—it makes no difference to me whether they are many or few—but I know that this factor is greatly overrated and the importance attached to it is a delusion. Where licences are really superfluous and excessive competition leads to malpractices—which I fully admit—then the offending licences should be suppressed and the licence taken away without any compensation. This is the duty of the local authority, and the Commission does not recommend any interference. In any case, I am sure the public will not, and ought not to, sanction any expenditure, such as the proposed National Commission would involve, for a purely problematical gain.

The next proposal, apart from minor points, also involves the National Commission. It is for the encouragement and acceleration of the movement towards the improvement of public-houses on definite lines. The 'improved public-house' is becoming a feature in social life, but it has not got very far yet where improvement is most needed. The movement was started by the Trust companies a good many years ago, and taken up vigorously by the Control Board in the Carlisle area during the war. The example has been followed with much energy by the trade, who had spent by June 1930 some £20,000,000 in building

or altering 20,000 houses and putting them into an improved condition. The Commission approves of the movement and wants to accelerate it, particularly in those areas where small, old-fashioned houses still abound. To facilitate the process reliance is placed on the National Commission, which would couple schemes of reduction with plans for the improvement of the remaining houses, but would be armed only with powers of advice to the local justices. This might do something to effect more uniform action; but what of security to the trade, on whom the expense would fall? The owners of houses improve them where customers are likely to appreciate the change, and there is a fair prospect of a return on the outlay; it is a business proposition. They are not likely to spend money on improvements in purely industrial areas where there would be no call for them and at the same time undergo a heavy reduction of the houses which do supply what the people want. The proposal seems calculated to check rather than to promote the movement. To couple with it other duties of the National Commission involving the tentative application of local option and the extension of State ownership is to increase the insecurity of the trade, which is recognised by the Commission as an obstacle, to a point at which it threatens to stop the movement altogether.

The desire to expedite the improvement of publichouses, in which lies the best hope for the immediate future of the trade, is natural and right, and there is something in the argument that 'custom must be attracted before it will come'. But the process, which depends on a change of taste, must be gradual, and to stimulate it artificially would not be wise. When I think of the publichouses and their customers in such districts as Elswick or Attlebridge it seems to me that the spread of the improved house must be a slow process.

Following the list of principal proposals given in the Report of the Commission we come to the creation of special hotel and restaurant licences, which would permit ordinary premises to be closed uniformly at 11 p.m. The suggestion of hotel and restaurant licences was made to the Peel Commission, and I think it is sound, though whether the democratic tendencies of to-day would allow it is a question. It seems absurd that a first-class hotel or restaurant should have exactly the same licence as an East End pubhouse, and the absurdity is greater to-day than it was thirty years ago; they serve totally different purposes. Perhaps the special licence would do something to stimulate the improved publichouse, which might aspire to a restaurant licence. It is only in London that any licensing authority has fixed the closing hour so late as 11 p.m., and only in two central districts, mainly for the benefit of theatre-goers, I suppose. All the other

districts stick resolutely to 10 p.m., except the City, which has 10.30. In my opinion 10 o'clock is quite late enough, and if the special licences were issued the disturbance caused by different hours in contiguous districts would be avoided. But my experience has made me rather a fanatic on the subject of early closing: I think of the many children whose bed-time coincides with the closing hour.

The proposal for the extension of State ownership comes next and is bound up with the National Commission. They may be taken together and with them the question of local option. State ownership has obviously been the subject of acute differences in the Commission. Five of the reservations object to it; two of the minority Reports condemn it emphatically, and one thinks the Commission does not go far enough in its favour. Opinion depends largely on the view taken of Carlisle, which notoriously excites the most extreme differences. The nine or ten Commissioners who sign the Report unconditionally take a very favourable view of Carlisle but they do not propose to extend State ownership to the whole country or to copy the Carlisle example exactly. They suggest that the National Commission should formulate schemes and that control should be entrusted to an independent Board. It seems to me that this proposal, which leaves the door open to general State control, is incompatible with the improved publichouse. How can any private person be expected to spend money on improving a house of which he may be deprived at any moment? The case of local option, which is also included among the duties of the National Commission in a tentative way, is somewhat different. It is proposed to apply it to new areas, to be selected by the National Commission, and to give power to the Welsh Commission to apply it fully in Wales in ten years' time. How anybody can approve of local option after the American and the Scottish experience passes my comprehension. The guarded manner in which its introduction is recommended suggests grave doubts on the subject, but its mere appearance on the horizon would probably kill the policy of improvement.

Lastly, there is the extremely knotty question of clubs. I recognise the care and the knowledge with which it is discussed—these qualities mark the whole Report—but I cannot think that they have solved the difficulties, which are fully realised and described. The cardinal proposal is that the police should have the power of entry. This would undoubtedly be effective in the case of many bogus clubs, but is there any chance of its passing through Parliament? The question⁸ is peculiarly and directly political, because of the large number of political clubs which would resent the proposal and would put pressure on their M.P.'s to resist it. The power of entry need disturb high-class clubs no

more than it does hotels, but it is otherwise with working-men's clubs, many of whose members have no love of the police. Even under the present law the competition of clubs has become serious; the proposed reduction of licences and the other suggested ways of curtailing the licensed trade could not fail to stimulate their formation. Here is a real menace to any and every system.

A. SHADWELL.

THE DOMESTIC TASK BEFORE THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

ANYONE who ventures to write on politics before Parliament reassembles in February obviously must confine himself to what in his opinion ought to be done, for the legislation and policy of the National Government during the recent session is no more an indication of the long-term policy which is to follow than the curtain-raiser is a forecast of a play.

One characteristic of the new Parliament has already made itself plain—the sincere devotion of the vast majority of Unionist members to the idea of a national government. Many observers were afraid that new and inexperienced members would be easily stampeded by appeals to them based on ancient Conservative principles. No time was lost by experienced old parliamentary hands in making the attempt in regard to India, the Statute of Westminster, and protection for iron and steel—but as it turned out, these attempts to force a purely party policy received support from few except the promoters. The explanation is that members cannot forget how very definitely they pledged themselves at the election to support the National Government and asked for a 'free hand' for the Prime Minister rather than for themselves. They gladly admit, therefore, that they were elected by Liberal and Labour votes, and are perfectly willing to put their own party opinions into cold storage. Moreover, Mr. Baldwin has a personal hold over a majority of the new members which is probably all the stronger because he is not Prime Minister.

The National Government was called into being to deal with a crisis, and it was originally contemplated that it would only last a few weeks. It was given a greatly extended term of life at the General Election, because it was then apparent that the departure from the gold standard meant the indefinite prolongation of the crisis. It is, moreover, surely fair to interpret the astonishing majority accorded to the Government as an invitation to overhaul and replan the whole of our economic and national life. We can now see that there has been no wholesale readaptation of our economic structure, such as has taken place in other countries, to the altered conditions of the world which were only hastened, not

caused, by the war. There is fairly general acceptance of the thesis of Mr. G. D. H. Cole, the *Week-End Review*, Sir Oswald Mosley, and Lord Eustace Percy that we must now enter on a period of deliberate 'planning,' and that the plan will include principles of individualism and of Socialism quite impartially and with no object other than efficiency. We have not so much adopted this attitude as had it forced upon us, the unfavourable balance of trade, which has made so many Free Traders accept the need for tariffs without accepting the Protectionist thesis, compels us to think out a scientific tariff and consequently a planned industrial policy, while the departure from the gold standard compels us to re-examine currency questions in the light of past events and future theory.

It is particularly valuable at the present time to look back at the history of a century ago. The close parallel between the economic aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and of the Great War has been too frequently cited to need repetition. After the 1820's, when the depression in England was far worse than in the 1920's, the 1830's saw a trade revival which led on to the decades of rarely interrupted increasing prosperity. The turning-point was probably the year 1834, when the Poor Law Commission reported and Parliament, acting on its recommendations, ended the subsidising of wages out of rates and the grant of out-relief to the able-bodied. How far the 'dole' idea had been carried is shown by the case of Cholesbury, in Buckinghamshire. In 1801 the parish poor rate stood at £10 11s., by 1832 it had risen to £367. The burden was so intolerable that the property owners offered all the land to the assembled poor, but the offer was declined on the ground that it was preferable to be generously supported out of the rates. In 1817 the poor rate for the whole kingdom amounted to nearly £8,000,000 for a population of 11,000,000, a burden not less than that of unemployment at the present day, if the higher value of money and the low national productivity at that time be taken into account.

What the Poor Law Commission did in 1834 the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance must do in 1932. The reduction in standard benefit and the application of the means test to transitional benefit has already had a beneficial effect in reducing the appalling cost of unemployment and in increasing the incentive to find work. It has long been apparent that a drastic remedy of that kind was an immediate and urgent necessity, but the whole system needs complete reorganisation. The insurance scheme as it has been worked has had the effect of making wage rates rigid, of increasing the immobility of labour, and consequently of discouraging the rationalisation of industry. In the docks daily wage rates have been maintained at such

uneconomic levels that much of our old entrepôt trade has gone elsewhere. Very probably the immediate effect of a reduction in dockers' daily wage rates would be to lower costs sufficiently to attract more shipping, so that the increased work would result in higher weekly earnings. But so long as he can earn high wages three days a week and draw unemployment benefit for the other three days he has no inducement to accept any reduction, although it is satisfactory to note that a small reduction has just been accepted after negotiation. At the same time unemployment insurance deprives the dock employers of any inducement to improve their organisation: so long as the law allows them to maintain a labour force greatly in excess of their requirements and to employ most of it only part-time while leaving public funds to supplement earnings, they are hardly likely to decasualise their labour or to make economical use of it. In the same way the coal mines are still retaining nearly 200,000 superfluous men in that industry. Most pits are now working short time, and managers endeavour to work five or three days a week, but never four. Five days' work gives the miner decent weekly earnings, while the wages of three days can be supplemented by three days' dole, but four days' work gives inadequate earnings and disqualifies for the dole on the remaining two days. Public funds are therefore used to subsidise the industry on condition that it does not rationalise itself and that it gives part-time employment to 200,000 superfluous men.

It has always been recognised that fluidity of labour is desirable, and never more than at a time when the relative importance of industries and their location are both changing rapidly. The security for subsistence afforded by the dole keeps numbers of men and their families in distressed areas where there is no likelihood of their ever again obtaining employment. This has not so far been a serious evil, because there has not been a real demand for additional labour anywhere else recently, but it is essential that labour should be made more fluid before any trade revival appears.

A reorganisation of unemployment insurance on economic lines, then, is the first essential in preparing the country to take advantage of a trade revival, and in carrying out this policy the twentieth century will be doing what the nineteenth century did in 1834. But the prosperity of the last six decades of the nineteenth century was not less due to the full application of machinery to manufacturing and transport in this country before the Industrial Revolution had spread to other parts of the world. Have we reason to anticipate that any discovery in the twentieth century will bring us a similar, almost effortless, prosperity? There is no harm in hoping for it, but it would be rash to expect it. Such

prosperity as we shall enjoy is likely to come only from careful organisation to make the most of what natural advantages we possess, and that planning, if it is carried out at all, is likely to be the work of the National Government. It will involve so much cutting out of old wood, so much interference with vested interests, that only a national Government could carry it through successfully.

Finance, of course, lies at the root of the problem. To justify wholesale retrenchment it is not necessary to prove that ever since the war national expenditure has been too high, the fall in the national income would alone be sufficient to necessitate a reduction all round in the standard of living. The economies that have been made are good so far as they go, but they were not sufficient to prevent an increase in the already crushing burden of taxation, far less to reduce it. The beneficial effect of tariffs in encouraging foreign concerns to establish factories in this country is largely cancelled by the income tax on all profits made, while the crazy finance of budgeting for receipts from death duties exceeding the sinking fund by £30,000,000 at once is already reducing the yield of income tax and surtax and is depressing the market price of Government securities. Every effort must be made to reduce expenditure, and it is to be hoped that the Disarmament Conference will enable further economies to be made on the fighting forces. But no substantial lightening of the burden can be effected without a reduction of the debt charge. When the Road and Unemployment Insurance Funds are beginning to redeem debt, and when local authorities have been brought back to the path of virtue and have begun to provide a reasonable portion of their capital expenditure out of revenue, the prospects of a conversion scheme will rapidly improve. If at the same time the death duties could be reduced so that their receipts did not exceed the sinking fund on debt, it might be possible to raise the market price of Government securities by providing that they would be accepted in payment of death duties at a minimum valuation rather in excess of the market price now ruling or, at the option of the payer, at the market price at the time of payment. Nor would it seem unreasonable to expect a national Government to take the view that the purpose of death duties is to bring funds to the Exchequer, not to destroy estates, and that to insure against death duties is an act of good citizenship deserving to be encouraged. At present, if a man takes out an insurance against his own death, duties are payable, not only on the estate he has enjoyed in his lifetime, but also on the sum to which his estate becomes entitled at his death. The law on this point can be evaded, but that is no reason why it should not be amended in accordance with reason and justice.

How far income tax is a handicap to industry is a disputed question, but it will be agreed that, in so far as it falls on profits retained in an industry, it is undoubtedly burdensome. In 1930 the Liberal Party moved an amendment to the Finance Act to relieve industry of this burden, and received an answer from Mr. Snowden which, though negative, must, coming from him, be considered sympathetic. Now that the reconditioning of so many of our plants is another two years overdue, the case for such relief is surely stronger than ever. That an unduly large proportion of profits would go to reserve is become in present circumstances less a fear than a pious hope, and shareholders may surely be trusted to see that their dividends, if any such there be, are not diminished unduly. If it were feared that this concession would enable companies to evade fair taxation by issuing bonus shares or by the capital appreciation of the existing shares, a tax on the appreciation of shares on American lines might be imposed. In any case, the vital need for increasing our capital resources and for directing them to re-equipment of our industries is so pressing that some sacrifice of revenue from income tax might well be made, while the application of the full yield of death duties would stop the frittering away of our capital resources.

Amongst all the so-called social services housing is almost alone in not having yet been retrenched, and yet it is the service where there is most doubt as to whether the money is being wisely expended. The scandal of housing shortage and slum conditions, and the cost in ill-health and crime, is all universally admitted; but does it follow that the millions of pounds spent on subsidising building have been effective? The facts show that the effect of the subsidy has been largely to prevent that fall in the price of building materials which has been almost universal in the case of other commodities, there is much unemployment in the industry, and most of the subsidised houses let at rents which are beyond the means of those whose housing conditions are most unsatisfactory. Subsidies then do not appear to have been an unqualified success, and even if they had been, the emptiness of the Exchequer would compel a reconsideration of the policy.

Experts inside and outside seem to agree that the industry is badly organised, and, as the cost of a house depends chiefly on the length of time taken in building and then on the price of money, a reorganisation of the industry, made possible by continuous work, would have a startling effect. It might be made possible by a joint programme—local authorities and private individuals—for a specified number of houses. The order would be guaranteed by the Government, which, however, would make no financial contribution. This might well so reduce the cost of building as to enable the houses to be let economically at approximately

existing rents in spite of the withdrawal of the subsidy. Certainly the capital cost per house could be immensely reduced, and equally certainly an effort must be made to break the vicious circle of high subsidy and high costs of production.

The tariffs which, we can assume, are coming will do away with all justification for the industrialist's demand to be left free from Government interference. So long as he asked for no assistance from the Government he was entitled to demand no interference. Now that he is asking for protection, he must accept the conditions upon which alone it will be given to him. There has been a great agitation in favour of protection for the iron and steel industry. It is no disparagement of that industry which has kept going for the last ten depressed years in circumstances of great difficulty to say that it needs reorganisation and re-equipment. Many small units need to be eliminated and the effect of a tariff rashly and unconditionally imposed might well be to protect them against more efficient foreign competition and keep in sickly existence those better dead. At the same time the larger units might be spared the painful need to reduce their costs. It is encouraging to see how firmly Mr. Runciman has stood out against the demand to give immediate and unconditional protection. A tariff is only economically justified as an instrument for reducing British costs; it is not justified if it merely obscures the fact that British costs are higher than foreign.

Nowhere is concentration and reorganisation more needed than in the mining industry and the expiry on July 8 this year of the Socialist Act extending the period of the suspension of the seven hours' day together with the expiry next December of the Socialist Coal Mines Act, will compel attention to the problem, probably in the form of the periodical crisis which makes the mining industry resemble an epileptic man. Mr. Runciman and Mr. Fort have a great responsibility and a great opportunity.

After twelve months of working, the quota and price-fixing arrangements of the Coal Mines Act of 1920 are seen to have falsified to some extent the hopes and fears of supporters and opponents alike. The price-fixing schemes have not raised prices appreciably, though they may have prevented them from falling. The allocation to pits of quotas (if such untechnical language may be excused) has prevented the chaos and cut-throat competition in the industry which the world-wide depression might otherwise have caused. For this reason few coal-owners would like to see the Act allowed to expire if nothing were put in its place. On the other hand, the objection of the critics of the Act has been so abundantly justified that it has resulted in preserving the *status quo ante*, that it has on the whole hindered rationalisation, and that it has made the good pits carry the bad ones on their

backs. An Act which spreads the demand for coal over all pits and discourages, except by the sale of quotas, the full-time working of the best pits is obviously wrong in principle: it has created the 'dole' in retaining 200,000 superfluous miners in the industry at the expense of short time for all the rest.

Given the need for reducing the potential output of the industry to the actual consumption of coal, the proper policy is obviously to close down the least efficient pits and to work the remaining ones full time, with a resulting reduction of costs. One way to do this has been indicated by the ship building industry, which has voluntarily subscribed the capital to a company formed to buy up redundant yards and so eliminate cut-throat competition. Similar schemes are under consideration in the cotton and tin-plate industries. If the coal mining industry really wants to restrict output, it should have done with the present uneconomic system, by which antiquated and high cost pits sell their right to produce coal at the highest price they can wring from their more efficient competitors; such pits should be bought out at a fair valuation. A company could be floated which might well be called by the attractive name of Moribund Coal Mines, Ltd. If it were financed by a levy of 1d. per ton on coal raised in Great Britain it would dispose of an income of nearly £1,000,000 per annum. This should be sufficient to enable it to buy out pits of a capacity of about 60,000,000 tons per annum thereby reducing the potential coal production of the country from 330,000,000 to the 260,000,000 which can generally be disposed of. Moribund Coal Mines, Ltd., would divide its pits into two categories—those on a 'care-and-maintenance' basis which could be brought into production at any time when war or some other cause had suddenly stimulated the demand for coal, and those which it would dismantle entirely and abandon. Nor should it be forgotten that Moribund Coal Mines, Ltd., might, and probably would, deem it wise to acquire some newly sunk pits, which are not likely to work cheaply, but are designed to produce a large output which will completely disintegrate the market.

The power of compulsory purchase on a fair valuation would be an essential part of any such scheme, for otherwise any individual pit could stand out for its nuisance price rather than for its intrinsic value. Royalty owners would not be treated differently and minimum royalties would be brought out at a valuation, which would take into account the uneconomic state of the coal industry which would result if competition were unregulated. Such a scheme could only be put into effect by the politicians if it obtained substantial support in the industry, and it would require a national Government confident in its mandate to propose legislation involving so deep an incursion on the accepted rights of private

property, and resulting in the first instance in the loss of livelihood to so many thousands of miners. But the injury to sectional interests would be more apparent than real, and the benefit to the country would be lasting.

No need is more pressing than to secure the establishment of new industries in the distressed areas. The tendency of industry to drift south is shown by the fact that new concerns are selecting sites for new factories chiefly in London, Hertfordshire, and Buckinghamshire. Fresh enterprise is indeed to be welcomed anywhere, but its value is multiplied when it goes into the distressed areas, to South Wales, the Tyne, or Lancashire. In such places there is abundant labour only asking for work, houses, schools, and all other necessities are already there, factories, roads, and railway sidings are in use. It is obviously far more economical to turn existing facilities to a new use than to industrialise fresh agricultural areas, a process costly to the *entrepreneur* and still more so to the local authority. But more important even than economy is the material and moral relief that new industries would bring to inhabitants of distressed areas, for some of whom migration is impossible, for many of whom it would mean breaking family ties or abandoning property painfully acquired as the fruit of thrift.

A distinct inducement might be given to industrialists to assist the distressed areas if they were relieved entirely for, say, a period of seven years from all liability for rates. Obviously this concession would have to be extended to existing concerns. It would only be carrying the principle of derating a stage further and would meet the one valid Socialist objection that the original measure spread the benefit universally and did not alter the relative disadvantage of the distressed areas where rates are highest. It would admittedly be in the nature of a subsidy, but the benefit to public funds by providing work for the unemployed would certainly result in a net gain. If the comparatively small relief of abolishing temporarily rates on industries in the distressed areas were judged insufficient, an additional step might be taken in reducing the employers' contributions to unemployment insurance, which is a wholly uneconomic tax on employment.

It has always been an accepted principle in the Unionist Party that agriculture must be encouraged, but a welcome change has taken place in its view of the ideal to aim at, and for this much credit is due to Lord Wolmer. The old idea that Britain must continue, regardless of cost, to produce a certain quantity of wheat has been abandoned. This is partly because the Treasury has not the funds necessary to subsidise that uneconomic production, partly because it is now seen that the uncertain and rainy climate of Britain is as unsuited to cereal growing as it is appro-

private for dairying. Britain could in any case never produce a large proportion of its grain requirements, but it could be made almost self-supporting in bacon, milk, butter and eggs by the adoption of Danish methods and organisation. Farming of this kind would, moreover, employ far more men on the land than cereal-raising, which is everywhere tending to become increasingly mechanised. There is also virtual agreement amongst all but farmers of the old school that organised marketing for any kind of farming is essential. The Unionist Party opposed the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931, not because it went too far, but because it did not go far enough. That Act may be of great value when to its control of home produce is added control of foreign imports; and by making this extension of the old policy, the National Government can show itself more progressive, more truly radical, than its Socialist predecessor. When British agriculture concentrates on those products for which the soil and climate of the islands are suitable it will regain its prosperity, but the guiding hand of the Government will be necessary.

It has been the purpose of this article to draw attention to some of the most urgent domestic problems which the National Government should tackle. It may well be, however, that Government, Parliament, and people alike will be too much preoccupied with international problems to give great attention to domestic matters. Nor will this necessarily be wrong. Certainly the settlement of the question of Reparations on a basis which will prevent the collapse of Germany, and the resettlement of inter-Allied debts in a way which will not bankrupt Britain is a necessary preliminary to any recovery in world trade. The formulation of an economic policy of international co-operation may well prove necessary, and the development of Empire trade will influence every branch of policy. If these subjects have not been dealt with in this article, it is not because their supreme importance is ignored.

The present Government appears to have grown in stature since it came into existence. It is of course still on trial, but it will not be judged harshly. The House of Commons, young and inexperienced as it is, has faithfully expressed the real feeling of the country in giving it a freer rein, while itself using freely the spur. As Liberals have sacrificed their adulation of Free Trade, and the National Socialists their devotion to expanding social services, so the Unionists will accept loyally whatever the composite Cabinet may decide upon. Parliament will be very tolerant of mistakes, but not of timidity.

HUGH MOSSON.

THE IRISH FREE STATE TO-DAY

IT is a curious commentary upon the fact that for many years the English people spared neither blood nor treasure in their efforts to preserve the Union with Ireland intact, that no sooner had the Irish Free State come into being than they proceeded to forget about it altogether. Relatively few Englishmen have ever crossed the Irish Sea, and the youngest Dominion receives but scant attention in the English Press, though England is still her best customer. It may, of course, be argued that this indifference is better than the continual friction which marked the relations of the two countries of old, and there is something to be said for such a point of view; but unfortunately it also tends to make the English public an easy prey for those who, for reasons of their own, wish to disturb the harmony which should exist between the two islands. Indifference results in ignorance, and in that fertile soil all sorts of harmful prejudices have their root.

The Irish Free State is, above all else, an agricultural community, and it has eight men on the land for every one who is in the towns, while many of the latter, far from being industrial centres, depend for their prosperity wholly upon the surrounding countryside. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that Irish politics should have developed in a very different way from those of England, and this difference is one of the principal difficulties that the Englishman experiences when he endeavours to understand the political situation in the Free State. The Irish Labour Party, for example, is very weak, and Dáil Éireann does not contain a single Labour representative from Dublin, which is the most highly urbanised one might almost say the only urbanised, area in the whole country. The two main parties are Cumann na n-Gaedheal, led by Mr. Cosgrave, and Fianna Fáil, which follows Mr. de Valera, and the struggle between them for power constitutes the political life of the country.

Feeling between these two parties is as bitter as that which exists in England between the Labour followers of Mr. MacDonald and those of Mr. Henderson, and for much the same reason. Mr. Cosgrave and Mr. de Valera worked together to secure the establishment of Irish autonomy, and their present differences

are, as always in such cases, rendered the more bitter by the memory of their earlier co-operation. The debates in Dáil Éireann some months ago on the Safety Bill were remarkably acrimonious, and they revealed very clearly indeed the fundamental divergence of view that exists between the supporters of the Government on the one hand and the Republicans on the other. The former believe that effective independence was achieved by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, while the latter maintain that such is not the case, and in particular they single out for attack the oath of allegiance to the Crown. Between them there also lies the bloodshed in the civil war which followed the ratification of the Treaty, and the memory of the brutal murders which, for several years, were so distressing a feature of Irish political life. In consequence co-operation between the two parties, even at a time of national crisis, has so far proved impossible, though with the passage of time and the appearance of a fresh generation in the field, there is every reason to hope that much of the existing bitterness will die away.

In the opinion of all, save his most inveterate opponents, Mr. Cosgrave has done very well indeed during his ten years of office, and, incidentally, he has stolen a great deal of Republican thunder in the process. On such questions as the flag, the National Anthem, the teaching of Irish, and appeals to the Privy Council, he has adopted an attitude which Fianna Fáil has not found it by any means easy to criticise while, as far as possible, he has avoided going to such lengths as would outrage the feelings of the old Unionist minority. Indeed, there is a great deal in the complaint of Fianna Fáil that no sooner does it get hold of a good idea than the Government adopts it. At the same time, Mr. Cosgrave is far more than a subtle politician of the school of which the late Sir John Gubbins was so distinguished an example, for when occasion demands it he can show real courage, as was proved by his attitude towards the terrorists in the autumn of last year. For the first time for many a century the world has seen strong measures taken in Ireland by an Irishman. As head of an Administration which itself has a revolutionary bias, Mr. Cosgrave had no easy task before him in repressing revolution, but he has not flinched from it, and there can be little doubt but that he has the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen, as well as the Church, solidly behind him.

Moreover, save perhaps in the case of the teaching of Irish, Mr. Cosgrave has made no attempt to win support by bribing the electorate with public money. Gone are the days when every tour of a Chief Secretary in the West was followed by the construction of bridges that few people ever crossed, and of piers at which no ship ever called. The whole of Connacht is covered

with 'follies' of this nature, but the policy which brought them into being is never likely to be put into force again. Even ex-Unionists now admit that English administration is liable to be wasteful and inefficient, and the party that might be tempted to repeat its mistakes may, with justice, be urged 'a monumentum requirit, circumspice'. Fortunately for the taxpayer, the Republicans are also wedded to the principles of economy, for one of the main planks in their platform is the contention that the scale of official remuneration in the Free State is too high, and that it is ridiculous to expect Ireland to conform to the English standard in such matters. Whether they would make any change if they came into office is another matter, but the prospects of a country in these latter days are none too bad when the official Opposition is to be found advocating economy in any particular.

Mr. de Valera is generally regarded in England as a revolutionary of the most dangerous description, whose accession to power would be the signal for the outbreak of anarchy in Ireland, and would be fraught with the gravest danger to the whole British Empire. It is of course true that in the past, the Republicans have expressed themselves very bitterly with regard to the British connexion, but the years which they have spent in the wilderness have taught them a great deal. Indeed, the criticism that one hears levelled at Mr. de Valera in the Free State is not that his programme is too extreme, but that he has no constructive policy at all. In one of his recent speeches the Republican leader soundly condemned unconstitutional methods of agitation, and set as his goal a Free State so perfectly administered that ere long the Six Counties would crave incorporation in it. There are undoubtedly undesirable elements in the Republican ranks, and Irish oratory rarely appeals to the higher instincts, but the dangers of a Republican victory at the polls have been greatly exaggerated on both sides of the Irish Sea. It is true that Mr. de Valera opposed the passage of the Safety Act in October, but it is the duty of an Opposition to oppose, and it is a common error to take parliamentary debates too seriously.

A great deal too much has also been made in the English Press of the activities of the terrorists. Admittedly, had these been allowed to continue unchecked, they would have constituted a serious menace, but the Safety Act has provided the authorities with ample powers to deal with them, and these powers will assuredly be exercised. Herds of violence have for so long been confined in the popular mind with acts of patriotism that it will take some little time for the ground-swell occasioned by centuries of strife to die away, but the spirit of civic consciousness is developing in a way and to an extent that would surprise those

who only knew Ireland in the old bad days. Indeed, a lady of the writer's acquaintance remarked only the other day that she never read the English newspapers now because they contained nothing but accounts of murders which kept her awake at night, and she therefore only read the *Irish Press*, which was relatively free from reports of such horrors. There are, it is true, counties such as Clare, and to a lesser extent Tipperary, where crime appears to be endemic, and in these districts it will take as long to eradicate it as it is taking to suppress the Mafia in Sicily, where conditions are not dissimilar. In any event, the gunman has ceased to be a hero, and for him that means the beginning of the end.

In the forefront of the battle against the terrorists are the Civic Guards, who discharge the duties of the old Royal Irish Constabulary, and are a very fine body of men indeed. Hitherto they have been unarmed, but one of the provisions of the Safety Act gives the authorities power to arm them—a step which experience has shown to be necessary. The same measure has transferred the trial of political prisoners to special tribunals, and this is bound to enhance the prestige of the ordinary courts, where justice was by no means always done in political cases, with a resulting loss of prestige all round. The assize system was abolished, but there is now talk of its revival, for the appeals from the district justices and the circuit judges are heard in Dublin without the presence of witnesses, and many lawyers consider this method unsatisfactory. In any event, the administration of the law in civil and non-political criminal cases works well, and there seems no call for any extensive alteration.

During the ten years that have elapsed since the passing of the Treaty the task of reconstruction at home has, not unnaturally, absorbed Irish attention to the exclusion of all else, and the Free State has not played the part in the British Commonwealth of Nations that is its due. There is still, it must be confessed, a good deal of suspicion of England, though it is quite unaccompanied by any hostility towards individuals of English race, and for some years to come any Administration that may happen to be in power in Dublin will have to walk warily where its relations with London are concerned. It will be well to let the economic interdependence of Ireland and England be more fully realised before any steps are taken to strengthen the links that bind them together as parts of the same Empire. When the time comes to emphasise the Imperial connexion, it may well be that, as elsewhere, the strongest link of Empire will be found to be the monarchy. The Royal Family has never been unpopular in Ireland, not even in the days of Queen Victoria, whom the Irish had little cause to love, and it is not unpopular to-day, even

among those who call themselves Republicans. We are still a long way from the day when a British monarch will make a state entry into Dublin, but it must be the wish of all who have the best interests of the Empire at heart that this may again happen, perhaps on the morrow of that monarch's coronation at Tara as King of Ireland.

The separation between the Free State and the Six Counties seems complete, and no one, save Mr. de Valera, ever refers to the possibility of a union of the whole country under one Government, yet the continuance of the present situation cannot be to the advantage either of Dublin or of Belfast in the long run. Quite apart from the nuisance of a frontier that is little more than a purely arbitrary line, the Six Counties are too small an administrative unit. Their chief industries, linen and ship-building, are depressed—the overhead expenses of so tiny a State are considerable—and they are subject to taxation on the English scale. At the same time the evils which were expected to follow the establishment of the Irish Free State have not made their appearance. The new Dominion has prospered exceedingly, and no man has been persecuted in it for his religion. Many a bitter hatred of old will have to die down before Orange and Green can fuse, but true statesmanship, both in the Six Counties and in the Free State, will never lose sight of the ultimate goal of united Ireland, and those who criticise Mr. de Valera most severely would do well to bear in mind his attitude upon this subject. Perhaps electricity, derived from water power, may be the force that will ultimately bring Dublin and Belfast together, and thus the Shannon will efface the memory of the Boyne.

When one turns from the consideration of the political to that of the economic condition of the Free State it is necessary to continue to bear in mind the fact that the country is primarily agricultural—a fact which was too often forgotten in the past when the Union still stood. For its products England is by far its best customer, and so the decreased purchasing power of the English people during the past two or three years has affected Ireland adversely. In particular, cattle have been selling at prices below the pre-war level, and the markets for other live-stock have been little better. Bacon, butter, and eggs cannot be sold so as to compete successfully with Danish products, though in this case the blame must rest with the English middleman. Fisheries have done better, and it is satisfactory to hear that fish caught off the coast of Mayo are now beginning to find their way to Le Havre. Still, when all is said and done, there can be no doubt but that the slump in England and Scotland has hit the Free State hard. Nevertheless, there are two sides to every picture, and the consequent depression has done a good deal to

impress upon the Irish people the economic interdependence of the British Isles.

In the past all this would have been of relatively less importance, for those who could not find employment at home used to migrate to the United States. First the quota system and now the widespread unemployment on the other side of the Atlantic have put a stop to emigration, and some of those who left to seek their fortune in America have already returned home. In present circumstances there is nothing for them to do, and to some extent the existence of a number of idle young men on the farms is responsible for the illegal drilling which the Safety Act is designed to prevent. It is quite useless to create employment by the stimulation of production, for there is no one to buy what is produced. This situation is, of course, unprecedented in recent Irish history, for the flight of 'the wild geese' dates back to the sixteenth century, and emigration has become a national tradition. During the past year even the demand for Irish labourers to help with the English harvest has fallen away, and that has proved a sore trial for a good many families, to whom the money received for such work made all the difference. The Free State cannot afford the expensive and elaborate social services in which England indulges, and were there no prospect of an early improvement the economic situation would indeed be desperate. There are, however, two factors beginning to operate which will soon, it is hoped, bring about a change for the better.

The first of these is the famous Shannon scheme, which bids fair to revolutionise conditions of life even in the most remote districts of Connacht. Already the overhead cables are to be seen crossing mountain and bog in the most unexpected places, and, as in rural Spain and Italy, countryfolk are passing direct from candles to electricity. So far only light is available in the majority of cases, but there will be power to be had before long, and dairy farming in particular is expected to benefit very considerably. It is true that the cost of the hydro-electric works has been greater than was originally estimated, and Dáil Éireann has already been compelled to vote a supplementary estimate, but the prospects for the future are bright. When one reflects upon the changes that have been effected in Italy by similar means it is not difficult to foreshadow the advantages that must accrue to the Free State. Furthermore, the supply of cheap electricity is bound to aid such local industries as are in existence, and to encourage the foundation of new ones, for the cost of transport is a very serious matter in Ireland, and the imported article will not, in these new circumstances, be able to compete with that which has been manufactured in the neighbourhood. In short, the Shannon scheme should, in due

course, bring a very considerable measure of prosperity to the Free State.

The second factor—namely, a great increase of exports—is generally expected to make itself felt as the result of recent events in Great Britain. The fall in the exchange value of the pound, in consequence of the abandonment of the gold standard, has already given the Irish exporter an advantage in the English market over his Continental rivals, and the adoption of Protection by the British Government would increase it still further. Not unnaturally, the policy of Empire Free Trade is very popular in the Free State, and Lord Beaverbrook is acclaimed as a new Brian Boru who shall overcome the Danes. It is widely believed that the verdict of the British electorate must result in a general tariff, combined with Imperial Preference, and that then, taking into account the exchange value of the pound, will come Ireland's opportunity. Should these expectations be realised, as it would seem inevitable that they must be, at any rate in part, then the cessation of emigration will become a definite advantage. That Ireland should become Britain's home farm is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility, and the creation of such a tie between the two countries would be to the advantage of both from every point of view. The Empire Marketing Board is co-operating to this end with the High Commissioner in London, who, in his turn, is proving one of the best salesmen that ever advertised Irish products, and has deserved well of his fellow-countrymen during the short time that he has held his present office.

Socially, the Irish Free State has not yet recovered from the revolutionary period, and from the long years of agitation which preceded it. The old order has passed away, and no new one has taken its place, though signs are not wanting that society will be on a stable basis again in the near future.

Until the third quarter of the nineteenth century Ireland was dominated by the landed gentry, who, it must be confessed, were inclined on the whole to abuse their position. It is true that there were few landlords as harsh as the Marquess of Clancarde; but insecurity of tenure was made a definite principle of policy, and all over the country stories are told which, even allowing for exaggeration on the part of those who relate them, go to show that the landowning class was arbitrary in its relations with its tenants. This might have been tolerated had the landlords made any efforts to develop their property, as they had done in the eighteenth century, but a great many of them were absentee, and nearly all were poor: in these circumstances, they regarded their tenants merely as so many payers of rent, and gradually the old Irish reverence for the gentry began to disappear. The Land

League and the various Land Acts eventually confined the landlords to their demesnes, while the growth of nationalism, in which very few of them played any part, and the creation of county councils, deprived them of the last vestige of their old political power. Nevertheless, up to the war their social influence was considerable, and society revolved round them and their houses.

Between 1916 and 1922 a social revolution, as well as a political, took place. Country houses in all parts of Ireland were burnt to the ground, and their owners for the most part settled in England or on the Continent with such sums as they had been able to extract from the British or Irish Government by way of compensation. Such buildings as were not destroyed were converted into convents or schools, and it appeared as if the Free State would become a purely peasant community like Switzerland. This, however, was not to be, and before long the tide of migration began to turn. The ever-increasing taxation in England, where the standard rate of income tax is now 1s. 6d. in the pound higher than in the Free State, caused the exiles to look at their own country with regret, and when they saw that Mr. Congrave and his colleagues meant business, they began to go back. To-day it is as difficult to obtain a country house in some parts of Ireland as it is easy in England, and those who have returned to what was left of their property are now farming their demesnes and working their fisheries. The gentry of Lever's novels have disappeared for ever, and their descendants have a much greater realisation of their duty as citizens.

Meanwhile, the sons of those who had bought their holdings were beginning to play a more prominent part in local affairs, and it is upon the union between the more prosperous of them and the old landowning class that the stability of the Free State will, in the future, be based. Such co-operation will naturally take time to develop, but signs of its growth are to be noted already. As a whole the Irish aristocracy and gentry would have preferred the continuance of the Union, but they are adapting themselves to the new order, and they are, fortunately, not holding aloof as the same class in France has done ever since the establishment of the Third Republic. Some of them sit in the Senate, and one or two in *Dáil Éireann*. In this connexion tribute must be paid to the memory of the late Major Bryan Cooper, who, after sitting at Westminster as the Unionist representative of Dublin County South, threw in his lot with Mr. Congrave, and at the time of his death was a *Cumann na n-Gaedheal* deputy in *Dáil Éireann*. He set an example of patriotism that is invaluable, and was the living embodiment of that new conservatism, born of the union between the landlord and tenant

of yesterday, the propertied classes of to-day, which has it in its power to do so much for the Ireland of to-morrow.

Hitherto the weakness of the Irish social structure has been the lack of solidarity, and this has been the cause of that complete absence of civic consciousness which has made the country the prey of the extremists in the past. The agitation against the Safety Act last October proved that this unhappy state of affairs is at an end, for all over the country men were found to condemn terroristic methods on the platform and in the Press, in a way that would have been incomprehensible ten years ago, and it is worthy of note that not a single supporter of the measure in question was kept away from his place in Dail Eireann by the threats of the gunmen. It is unfortunately true that to some extent the old Unionist element is alienated by what it deems the Anglophobia of the Government, and such aspects of the latter's policy as the teaching of Irish seem to it to be calculated to perpetuate the ancient racial divisions. Those who hold such a view would do well to reflect upon the difficulties that Mr. Cosgrave has had to face—difficulties that he could never have overcome had he allowed the sentimental appeal to be utilised by his opponents. It is an encouraging fact that the younger generation, while possessed of more historical sense than in England, shows little sign of sharing these suspicions, and in their place there is a growing pride in the Free State and in its achievements that bodes well for the future.

The general standard of living is decidedly lower in Ireland than in England, and both wireless sets and gramophones are still regarded in the light of luxuries rather than as necessities. On the other hand, the farmer's wife and daughters are not trying so hard to be ladies that they have no time to take their share in the work of the farm. Moreover, there has been a great change for the better since the Free State came into being, even where the poorest class of the population is concerned. The crumbling cottages of a generation ago have either been repaired or replaced by more modern dwellings, and in their new surroundings the inhabitants have acquired a new self-respect. Beggars are as rare in the Free State as in Fascist Italy, and the Londoner who visits Dublin will find it a decided relief not to be pestered for money every few yards along the street. Only in the more remote parts of Galway is the down-at-heel peasant of yore still to be seen, for elsewhere he has been replaced by the type of countrymen of whom any country might well be proud. Inebriety, too, is on the decline, possibly for economic reasons, and a small town on a Saturday night no longer presents the spectacle of human depravity that once it did. To the unsophisticated Englishman, life in rural Ireland may still appear primitive, but

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it has improved out of all recognition within living memory, and a certain amount of austerity is by no means an evil.

One of the problems of Irish life that has yet to be solved is that of communications. At the time that the railways were constructed the population was twice as large as it is to-day, and there was no competition, whereas of recent years the motor-coach has become a very formidable rival indeed to the train. Such being the case, it is in no way surprising that the railways, in spite of amalgamation, have been run at a loss, and during the past year drastic steps have been taken to improve the situation. For a long time now, all save the principal lines have been single tracks, but within the last few months many of the branch lines have been closed, some to all traffic, and some only to passenger traffic. In this way a considerable sum of money will be saved, for these lines, with their one or two trains a day, were an enormous expense, as may be gauged by the fact that the eight miles of rail between Ballina and Killala, in Mayo, cost £1000 a year to maintain. Whether these economies will make the difference between profit and loss remains to be seen, and if the population begins to increase, as it may well do now that emigration is at an end, the railways may be saved. As for the roads, of which the surface is now generally very good, chaos reigns supreme there, and the cut-throat competition of the various motor-coach companies has taken a great many passengers away from the railways. However, live-stock cannot be carried satisfactorily by road, and if trade prospers the railways must surely benefit, while, when the novelty of the motor-coach wears off, the public may return to the train, at any rate for the longer journeys. In the meantime, the situation is admittedly unsatisfactory, and an Act has been passed to deal with it.

Another question that has, so far, proved incapable of solution is the abolition of the Dublin slums, which are very little changed from what they were in the days of the English occupation. In other respects the capital has been improved very considerably, and its cleanliness, thanks to a French company to which sanitation has been entrusted, is in marked contrast to the condition of the city some years ago when its inhabitants spoke affectionately of 'dear old dirty Dublin,' and others referred to it in more opprobrious terms. The buildings which were damaged in the time of the troubles have been repaired, and Dublin presents an appearance in every way worthy of the capital of a Dominion. Only the slums remain to remind the visitor of the past, and it is to be hoped that before long they will have disappeared. In this connexion, however, it must be remembered that the Free State is not a rich country, and that there is no money to spare for elaborate housing schemes. The first care of an Irish

Administration must be to keep taxation low if competition with Continental rivals is to be successful, and a few slums are preferable to a declining trade. Furthermore, the experience of other countries has shown that the slum problem is not solved merely by moving the slum-dweller into new houses, for he only creates another slum in his fresh surroundings. The Free State authorities have taken this lesson to heart, and so it may be that in the end the delay will prove to be a blessing in disguise, in view of the moral improvement which has been effected in even the lowest classes of the population.

No account of existing conditions in the Irish Free State could pretend to completeness which did not contain some reference, however brief, to the position of the Church. That it lost ground during the troubles is as indisputable as is the fact that to-day it appears to be as strong as ever. Some critics profess to see a weakening of its influence, and are of the opinion that recent events in Italy and Spain are undermining it, but it is difficult to share this view. Furthermore, none save the most bigoted of Orangemen or the most frenzied of Bolsheviks would wish it otherwise, for there can be no shadow of doubt but that the collapse of the authority of the Catholic Church in Ireland would be followed by an outbreak of anarchy upon an extended scale. The anti-clerical does not become a Protestant but a revolutionary, and there is always quite enough inflammable material lying about in the Free State without the quantity being increased by the growth of indiscipline in religious matters. In short, although she is not without her share of narrow-minded clerics (what religious body ever is?), the Church is using her power wisely in Ireland, and more than once she has come down on the side of law and order in a manner that has proved decisive.

In fine, there is more ground for optimism than for pessimism with regard to the Irish Free State on the tenth anniversary of the Treaty. Progress, it is true, has not been uniform, but considering all things, Mr. Cosgrave and his colleagues have done more than the most enthusiastic of their supporters could have expected of them ten years ago and if it should happily so be that a period of renewed prosperity is about to begin for the British Commonwealth of Nations, then the youngest Dominion is certainly in a position to avail itself of every opportunity that may come its way.

CHARLES FRYER.

WEALTH, RICHES AND DEBT

WEALTH and riches are often used as synonymous terms. But it may be permissible to make a distinction between them. For the purpose of this article let us take wealth as meaning things consumable or usable by men. Wealth may consist either of things which are immediately consumable or usable—e.g., food, clothing, and so on; or of things which are consumable or usable over a long period of time—e.g., houses, ships, roads; or of things which are usable for the production of other goods—e.g., machinery, water power, and so on. Other categories and sub-categories of goods might be mentioned, but the above will serve as an illustration. The material prosperity of the world depends on the amount of wealth in the above sense which it can command and distribute. If everyone could command all the usable or consumable goods which they desired, there would be nothing more to wish for as far as material prosperity was concerned.

Now let us take the term 'riches' and give it a wider meaning. It includes everything which is included under the term 'wealth' as defined above. It also includes claims to wealth, which are different things from wealth itself. A man may be rich and yet own little in the way of usable things beyond his own clothes, if he has a million pounds in Government bonds and lives in a hotel and hires his motor cars. Riches, then, as we define them, may be divided into two parts—the first part consisting of usable or consumable goods, and being synonymous with wealth; the second part consisting of claims on wealth in the form of bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and evidences of debt generally. Let us call the first part X and the second part Y.

The riches of an individual are measured by his possession of X plus his possession of Y. But when it comes to a community it is only the possession of X that counts, since Y is merely a claim upon X, except in so far as Y consists of a claim upon the X of some outside community. If we take the world as a whole, it is only X that counts, since every Y must be a claim on some X elsewhere and has no usable value in itself.

As material civilisation advances and society becomes more

highly developed in a productive and economical sense, the element Y tends to grow larger and larger in proportion to the element X. In a primitive society riches consist almost entirely of material possessions, such as land, houses, cattle, stores of clothing, and so forth. These are all part of X. Even in the most primitive societies there is no doubt a certain amount of Y, but it is comparatively small. But as economic progress is made and production is increased and comes to be organised by the help of credit the element Y increases in volume. In societies which are highly organised for production—as a great deal of the world is at present—the volume of Y will come to have large proportions as compared with the volume of X. It consists of the following elements among others: all national, local and municipal public debts; all borrowings of industrial and trading companies, represented by bond or debenture issues; all mortgages on land, houses and other fixed property; all advances made by banks. There is one important element of modern riches which may seem to stand midway between X and Y—that is, certificates of stock and share ownership. These are not usable goods. On the other hand they do not represent a debt, and therefore, strictly speaking, are not a claim on wealth, but rather are evidence of part ownership of some aggregation of wealth. In spite of this shareholders, and especially preferred shareholders, often tend to think of themselves as creditors rather than as owners. But for the purpose of the present argument we will treat all such possessions as a part of X.

Leaving them out of consideration, the volume of Y in the world at present is already huge and is growing fast. Every war adds to it. Practically every road or railway or schoolhouse built adds to it. Every new public utility adds to it. And most, if not all, new industrial enterprises add to it. All this volume of Y constitutes a claim on the available X of the world, not only for repayment of the principal some time or other, but also for the payment of interest in the meantime at rates fixed beforehand.

It is conceivable that the continued growth of Y in proportion to X may reach a point where it becomes dangerous to the economic and social structure. It may be said that there is no reason why this should be so, because, as has been pointed out above, material prosperity must be measured by the amount of X available, and so long as this increases or does not diminish, then the growth of the volume of Y merely affects its distribution. The answer is that it is just this change of distribution which may cause trouble. If Y grows disproportionately to X, the producing classes may become discouraged, because their reward for exertion—whether it takes the form of wages, salaries, profits,

or dividends on share capital—must all come out of what is left after the claims of Y have been satisfied. As the claims of Y grow greater there is less left for the producers of X to divide. It will be understood that the term 'producing classes' is used in a wide sense, and includes not only the working class in the ordinary sense of the term, but everyone engaged in production, whether as workman, manager, capitalist, promoter, or anything else.

In other words, the whole world may become debt-logged, as individual societies have been before now. Even if it has not yet arrived at that condition there certainly seems a danger that it may do so in a not very distant future. The danger has been brought appreciably nearer by the general fall in prices which has taken place in the last two years.

According to the figures given by the *Economist* (July 1931), the fall in average prices between 1929 and 1931 amounted to a little over 30 per cent. This means an increase in the burden of the world's debts of 50 per cent, as may be seen from the following example. Suppose the volume of the world's annual production to be represented by 100 units selling at £10 a unit, giving a total value of £1000. Suppose the annual claim of Y, i.e. the debt charge, to be one-fifth of this, i.e. £200. This is satisfied by the appropriation of 20 units out of the 100 produced. If prices drop over 30 per cent, as they have, a unit will bring less than £7, instead of £10 as formerly, and to provide the £200 required to meet the debt charge will absorb 30 units instead of 20. This is for the annual charge. The same proportion will, of course, hold good when it comes to the repayment of principal.

Thus it appears that the fall in prices since 1929 has added 50 per cent to the burden of world indebtedness as it existed at that date—a greater addition than was caused by the Great War. And it must be remembered that prices in 1929 had already fallen a long way from their highest post war level. If, for example, even 1924 be taken for purposes of comparison with 1931, it will be found that the debt burden of the world was increased between the two periods by over 80 per cent through the operation of falling prices alone, without taking any account of additional borrowings during the seven years.

Much has been written of the intolerable burden of international war debts, and this is often represented as being the chief cause of the economic crisis from which the world is suffering. But the whole volume of international war debts, great as it is, is only a fraction of the amount which has been added to the world's debt burden by the fall in prices during the last two years alone. Even if we disregard internal debt burden and signed international debts alone, it is safe to say that the fall in

prices since 1924 has imposed an additional burden on Australia, Canada, and the Argentine—to take only three debtor countries out of many—at least equivalent to the whole burden of the reparation payments laid on Germany.

While the growth of debt may come to be a danger to the economic structure, it is none the less a necessary factor in economic progress. At any rate, this is the case so long as our present individualist system is maintained, and we must hope that it will be maintained, since reason and experience alike lead to the belief that it is better suited to the temperament of Europeans and North Americans, and likely to give better moral and material results, than any system of Communism. For under the individualist system economic progress must depend on the maintenance and improvement of the machinery of production through the agency of private capital, and this agency must work to a great extent through the method of loaning. It may be said that this is not necessary, and that private capital should do its work by the method of direct ownership. Direct ownership was all very well when industry was on a small scale. But it is out of the question, generally speaking, when a large amount of capital is required, as it usually is for modern industries. The purchase of shares in a limited liability company, which is a method of dividing ownership into many small parts, thus enabling a number of capitalists, large and small, to share in the ownership of the undertaking, gets over this difficulty, and is in fact the method whereby a good deal of the capital required for maintaining and improving the machinery of production is obtained. But it does not cover the whole field. There is a demand on the part of many classes of capitalists both large and small, for the greater security which is supposed to be given by the method of loaning money rather than by that of investing it in the purchase of shares. This method also suits promoters, who are a necessary element in collecting the capital required. Consequently a good deal of industrial capital is raised by means of bonds and debentures. This is so even when capital is being raised for internal purposes. It is even more so when the capital is required for a foreign country, where the conditions are unknown and the management cannot be controlled by the shareholders in any practical sense of the word. In such a case, when capital is required it must be obtained largely by the method of loaning.

Again, all public works carried out by States, provinces, and municipalities must be financed solely by the method of loaning, since there is no possibility in this field of giving an ownership interest to the private capitalist. This field covers a large and increasing proportion of the work incident to economic develop-

ment. It includes not only works the return on which is indirect rather than direct, and which therefore are likely to be neglected by private capital (such as roads, harbours, and bridges), or, again, schools and museums, which are intended to show intellectual rather than material profits, but also many works in what is called the utility field - e.g., tramways, electric lighting, water supply, telegraphs and telephones, works which can be, and sometimes are, undertaken by private capital on its own account, but which still more often are undertaken by public bodies.

The economic progress, therefore, even of a fully developed country depends on a constant flow of borrowing for its industries, and still more for its public works. The building up of undeveloped countries to a higher standard of production is still more dependent on borrowing, and in their case the borrowing must be mainly from other countries which have a surplus to lend. The transaction is beneficial to both. For when a country has built up a high productive capacity in excess of its own powers of consumption it can only make use of this by lending or investing its surplus abroad. Great Britain for the greater part of the nineteenth century was in this position - that is to say, she had built up a productive capacity, especially in manufactures, far in excess of her own consumption. She disposed of her surplus by investing and lending freely, first in the United States, then in South America, then in the various British Dominions and elsewhere. These countries were at the time comparatively speaking, undeveloped in their production and could not give goods in immediate exchange for the full value of the goods and services they took from Great Britain. Or if they could, Great Britain was not prepared to take them. Therefore while a part of her exported manufactures and services was paid for by the import of food and raw materials a large balance remained in her favour, which was paid for in paper, in the form of bond or share certificates. These represented either loans to the other countries concerned or the purchase of ownership or part ownership of enterprises there.

The United States to-day has reached a somewhat similar position. It has developed a capacity for production far in excess of its own consumption. It can only use the resulting surplus by lending to other countries or by investing in their industries. At the present time, after a comparatively short period of rather reckless lending, it appears to have come to the conclusion that foreign loans are too risky a business altogether. Yet this is the only means by which it can use its surplus productive capacity. It has the choice between letting that capacity run to waste and disposing of it by foreign investment.

From a national point of view it would appear to be more advantageous for the United States to use its surplus productive capacity for the purpose of making foreign loans than to let it be idle, even if in the end it only gets its capital repaid with a small interest, or even without any interest at all; or, indeed, even if it only gets part of the capital back. For the alternative is that the surplus productive capacity lies idle and brings in no return at all.

An illustration of this argument lies ready to hand in the war loans made by the United States to the Allied Powers. These loans were made out of the surplus productive capacity developed by the United States during the war. They did not represent the transfer by the United States of anything it could have used itself, but of something which would never have been produced at all had it not been for the foreign demand. The United States has written off large sums from all these loans, with the exception of that made to Great Britain. Even if it makes no further remission, the most it will do is to get its capital back without interest. Again excepting the British portion of the loans, yet it is richer by the amount it actually has received, and will receive, than it would be if the loans had never been made at all. For in that case the goods which the loans represent would never have been produced.

When British capital made its foreign credits in the nineteenth century it took constant risks. Some of its investments and loans were lost altogether. Others failed to pay a return equivalent to the current rates of interest. But the net result was that at the end of the nineteenth century British investors owned a great volume of foreign securities which brought in a large income. This was obtained in exchange for the surplus production of Great Britain during the preceding fifty or sixty years, which if it had not been used in this way probably would not have come into existence at all. At the same time the productive capacity of other countries has been developed by the aid of the British loans, and the world as a whole is materially much better off.

Suppose that United States capital were to undertake to build a network of railways over China, as British capital built railways in South America last century. This could well be done out of the surplus productive capacity of the United States which otherwise would not be used at all. Even if the whole investment were lost the United States would be no worse off than if it had never used this capacity. In fact, it would be better off in so far as the condition of China would be improved; and therefore its capacity to buy American goods. But, of course, there is no likelihood that the whole investment would

be lost. Parts of it might prove unremunerative—as part of the British investments in South America did—if judged by the current return on other capital. But the point is that this potential capital—i.e., that arising from surplus production—must be used in this way or cannot be used at all, and any return is better than none. This argument, of course, deals with the matter from the point of view of the interest of the community. It does not get over the difficulty of inducing capitalists to take individual risks for the sake of keeping productive capacity employed. That is a matter which depends on national psychology. Possibly the investors of the United States will in the course of time develop the same readiness to take long-term risks as was shown by British investors last century. If not, the surplus productive capacity which that country has developed will be of little use either to itself or to the rest of the world.

We have now arrived at two conclusions. First, that a continual flow of borrowing is necessary for economic progress. Second, that there is a danger of the economic organism being crippled, or even of collapsing, if debt charges become too high. This danger is increased by the fact that borrowing, both internal and external, is done most freely when trade is active—that is to say, when there is a general demand for money and interest rates run high. Thus the interest on long-term investments is often fixed at a higher rate than the capital lent can actually earn over a long term in the hands of the borrowers, even if it is employed to the best advantage, which it is not always.

These two factors, the steady growth in the volume of debt and the tendency to fix interest rates higher than the conditions justify over a long term, require some corrective if the danger spoken of above is to be avoided. A natural corrective is supplied by a period of rising prices, when that occurs, for this lessens the burden on the borrower who is a producer in terms of produce. Thus in the twenty years preceding the war the burden of world debt was being lightened all the time by the gradual rise in prices. The subsequent rapid rise of prices owing to inflation during the war still further lightened the burden as far as pre-war debts were concerned.

Falling prices, on the other hand, increase the burden, and may make it intolerable. In such a case the only other corrective that can be applied is a reduction in the interest or principal of debts, or in both. This can be applied by the bankruptcy of the debtor or by legalised repudiation or reduction of debt. The latter course was taken by Germany and France and other European countries, as far as their internal debts were concerned, through the method of first inflating and then devaluing their

currency. It has been adopted by Russia, both for internal and external debt, by the method of simple repudiation.

The relief given by bankruptcy is an individual one, spasmodic and often unfair in its operation, and destructive of credit. If any general measure of relief has to be given to debtors as a matter of necessity, it is probably better for the community that it should be given by concerted action. Such a necessity may not be far off, should the recent fall in prices prove to be permanent. Still more if prices go yet lower. It is possible, even then, that debts, both internal and external, could be paid in full, if the producing countries and producing classes were willing to cut down by a great deal the scale of living to which they have been accustomed. But it is at least doubtful whether they would be willing to do this to the extent required. It may be said that the matter should adjust itself by interest rates falling to correspond with the fall in prices, and that this will actually happen. But this theory does not work out in practice - and in any case it does not touch the question of capital repayment - for, if a debtor is unable to pay the interest he has promised to pay, the tendency of capital is not to reduce the rate, but to raise it in any new loan or prolongation of the old.

In conclusion it may be said that the growth of the burden of debt is a matter which concerns creditor as well as debtor countries. First, because the chief creditor countries in the course of their economic development have built up a great volume of internal debt, partly through the construction of public works and the provision of social services, partly through other State expenditure. A change in the incidence of debt burden must therefore affect their internal economy. Whether their internal debt takes the form of borrowing by individual industries or of borrowing by the State and other public bodies, a disproportionate increase in its burden will in the end disturb the balance of business.

Secondly, the matter concerns them on the external side also, because creditors are concerned with the solvency of their debtors, and if the burden of the latter grows too heavy for them to carry it is apt to be thrown off altogether. An increase in the burden of debt, such as has taken place recently through the fall of prices, may seem at first sight advantageous to creditor countries though disadvantageous to their debtors. For it means that if the stipulated terms of the loan are carried out the creditors will receive much more in the way of goods than they expected. But this view may prove fallacious if the burden is so much increased that debtors become unable or unwilling to carry out their bargains.

F. PEARCE.

THE PROBLEM OF CHURCH PATRONAGE

THE Church Assembly has now completed its first decade, and it is instructive to note that here—as in most things English, the bread-and-butter fly is right—it is the unexpected which always happens. In matters administrative, which were regarded as a kind of side-line, the Assembly has done sterling work. In legislation it has so far proved a failure.

The reason for this is simple and instructive. From the very beginning there was a determined and influentially supported attempt to reduce the Convocations to a merely ornamental position. A new outlook was not only possible but essential (men said), and fusty old ecclesiastical traditions must not be allowed to bar the way to reform. Church courts were to be remodelled in accordance with the judicial aspirations of chancellors, the Prayer-Book in accordance with the will of the bishops, patronage in accordance with the wishes of the laity, and so on. Committees and commissions were appointed. Lengthy debates took place. Resolutions were passed. Occasionally Measures were drafted. But up to date the results have been almost negligible from a legislative point of view. Only Measures of secondary importance (other than those dealing with administration, such as the Pensions and Cathedral Measures) have reached Parliament at all, and of these not a few were subsequently withdrawn or have been proved bad in practice. This result might—indeed should—have been foreseen. For, with all its shortcomings and antiquated procedure, Convocation is a learned body. The Lower House especially has always taken the greatest pains never to express its judgment on any matter without the most careful examination both of the underlying principles and the history of their application. During the past eighty years nearly 600 reports on various subjects have been carefully compiled. By this means a mass of information has been collected which should have been of inestimable value to the legislators of the Church Assembly. It has been almost completely ignored. Instead of that meticulous all-round examination of a problem (which alone can give satisfactory results in the reconstruction of an ancient institution) some 'pill

for the earthquake' has been compounded. It has been praised by bishops, chancellors, etc., and rammed down the throat of the patient. Fortunately, in most cases it has been thrown up!

The patronage problem is a case in point. It was one of the very first matters to which the Assembly turned its attention. A Committee was appointed which presented a long string of resolutions in 1925, the purpose of which was to give the 'parish' a voice in the appointment of its incumbent. Into the origin and purpose of the traditional patronage system this Committee (unlike a committee of Convocation) did not think it necessary to inquire. They were practical men. In the Established Church of Scotland the congregation elected its minister. In England they did not, and as a consequence the incumbent was able to disregard the wishes of his parishioners. Obviously this was bad, and there was no other remedy than to introduce a 'democratic' element into the English system by associating the newly-formed Parochial Church Councils with the patrons in presenting candidates to the bishop for institution. In 1926 a Measure to secure this reform was introduced and nearly became law. Although the proposal to submit themselves to their future parishioners for examination was most distasteful to the clergy generally, their opposition was voiced in the Assembly only by one or two of the elected patrons. The bishops favoured the Measure in the hope that it would ultimately lead to the vesting of all patronage in their hands. The lay representatives were dominated by what can only be described as an anti-clerical group, the power of which was broken at the election in 1930. The representatives of the clergy for the most part played up either to the bishops or the laity when in the Assembly. In these circumstances opposition seemed hopeless, and its ultimate success is important from a constitutional point of view. For those who undertook the broken hope knew what they wanted and how to achieve it. They blocked the Measure in the Assembly by a long series of amendments designed to recast its provisions on right lines, and simultaneously moved for a Committee in the Canterbury Lower House to 'examine and report'. This Committee was appointed in February 1926, and was the first example of the intervention of the Convocations in the legislative activities of the Assembly which they had created as a link with Parliament. In the Lower Houses the atmosphere was totally different, no bishops or laymen being present for the clergy to instruct or conciliate. Moreover, as a journalist whose work lies both in the Commons temporal and in the Commons spiritual remarked to me, there is a dignity and tradition, a feeling of responsibility, about the latter which even the Mother of Parliaments has failed to maintain.

The whole question of patronage was carefully re-examined by the Lower House Committee, historically with the assistance of the Professors of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford and Cambridge, and practically with the varied experience of the clergy themselves. Their Report (No 570), the immediate effect of which was to kill the Assembly Measure, is a striking illustration of the necessity for careful and accurate study of tradition as a preliminary to the attempted reconstruction of any ancient institution which has lived and grown and yet remained unchanged in principle throughout many centuries. In its historical survey the Committee began by defining Patronage.

The ministry of the Church is divided both in theory and in practice, into two distinct categories—Order and Jurisdiction. The more important spiritual functions have always been reserved (at least as far as historical evidence goes back) to men called to special orders claiming authority in succession from the apostles or presbyters of the New Testament record. This gift of 'order' is freely entrusted to its recipients independently of their personal relations to their fellow Christians, but the use of it is regulated by the law and custom of the Church. Such regulations belong to the category of 'Jurisdiction'. Patronage, i.e. the selection of a minister for a particular office is clearly a matter of jurisdiction, whether the office be that of bishop or of church-thane (to use the old Anglo-Saxon synonym for the incumbent of a parish).

The original organisation of the Church as an 'establishment' was modelled on the institutions of Constantine's time.

A network of city-churches, each under its own city bishop, covered the greater part of the Roman Empire. Each city-bishop had jurisdiction over the *parochia* (parish) round his house, more or less delimited by the territory of the city of which he was spiritual head. All Church property was vested in him on behalf of the community, and the city clergy formed his household under an obedience conditioned only by synodical practice. The areas under the jurisdiction of the city bishops gradually extended during the fourth and fifth centuries, until by the fourth Canon of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) the territorial system of ecclesiastical organisation was made universal.

This system, that of the Constantinian establishment, is simple and, to a certain type of mind, admirable. There are not wanting among the English bishops those whose ideal concerning 'patronage reform' is the Byzantine type. Many laymen, especially those experienced in the public services, still firmly believe that the fifth-century arrangements are the constitution of the Church of England. The Report proceeds to shatter this superstition:

In Western Europe the Chalcedon order was profoundly modified by the northern conquerors, who confined the jurisdiction of the city-bishops once more to the territories immediately connected with the old cities. In the country districts northern law and custom prevailed, each noble claiming to have a *parochia* similar to that of the city for the

spiritual service of which the priest (or priests) were in his service and not in that of the city-bishop. Towards such 'servants' the lord was regarded as standing in a relation similar to that of a Roman patrician towards the freedmen of his household, and the word *patronus* was borrowed to define his legal position. . . . The English system differs from the continental in one important respect, namely that there are no city-bishops with *parochia* of their own (in the restricted sense of the word). Our bishoprics are all new foundations dating from the mission of St. Augustine, and a uniform system of 'patronage' prevails both in town and country.

Moreover, in England the northern tradition of the independence of localities, each under its own chieftain, never gave way to the centralised institutional forms of the Continental Church and State. The 'establishment of religion' was in the parish, and not in the province: so much so that the setting up of the Ecclesiastical Commission in 1840 was strongly opposed by constitutional lawyers like Cripps on the ground that the Act 'created' a Church of England (as a legal entity) for the first time in history. Parson and squire wielded the Two Swords in a parish just as Pope and Emperor did at Rome. In this way the old Roman institutions (the heritage of the Church) were harmonised with the thane rights of Rome's conquerors, whether on the world-wide in the Eternal City or in the village round a chieftain's house.

One of the puzzling features of English parochial organisation is the multitude of small churches, each with its own parish and its own independent church-thane, or rector. The origin of these is to be found in the old law which made the possession of a church one of the qualifications for the recognition of a freeman as a thane at all. If the ceorl throve, so that he had fully five hides of his own land, Church and kitchen, bellhouse and burh-gate-seat, and special duty in the King's hall, then was he henceforth of thegn-right worthy. (Stubbs, *Select Charters*, p. 65.) There was little need of a 'Twenty-five Churches Fund' to deal with settlements in new districts. The chief landowner had a direct incentive to build a church. For without one, whatever his religious views or his birth might be, he could not be a gentleman. The patron of a benefice was, thus, automatically the headman of the district round his house (*parochia*) and ruled the inhabitants in alliance with his spiritual colleague. By the transference of estates to collegiate bodies, to bishops, to monasteries, etc., the right of appointment to a few benefices passed into the hands of what may be called 'alien' patrons. These, however, whether individual officials or bodies corporate, exercised their rights at law in the capacity of secular persons - as landowners, and not as ecclesiastics. But, in spite of anomalies of this kind, and even in spite of the vast changes arising out of

the industrial revolution since 1750, the old linked jurisdiction of squires and parsons still continued to be the norm. In parishes where there is no squire to this day there seems to be something lacking, and the Parochial Church Councils will never fill the gap.

Those responsible for the Patronage Measure of 1926 seem to have been either totally ignorant of the constitutional principle underlying the system or unwilling to face the problem of readjusting it. At any rate, they confined themselves, as has been said, to amending the patron's right of presentation so as to give the Parochial Church Council a share in its exercise. The Lower House Committee, unwilling to go beyond criticism of the actual legislation proposed, followed their example, but on the lines of restoring tradition rather than introducing a new principle. The alternative they suggested was to make the right of protest against institution—a right which every parishioner in theory possesses—a reality instead of a farce, by setting up a Diocesan Board of Examiners to receive and consider every such protest. On the unanimous request of that Board the bishop should be given the right to refuse to institute not merely on the very restricted canonical grounds (as at present), but for any reason reported to him by the Examiners.

On the publication of the Lower House Report the Assembly Measure was at once dropped and a new Measure drafted which purported to carry out the Convocation proposal. This became law in 1930, but only in a form that may make the remedy worse than the disease. For the dominant faction in the Assembly varied in two significant details the simple and general check on patronage set out in the proposals of the Lower House Committee. The 'Examiners' have become 'Advisers', a merely advisory body, consultation of which by the bishop is formal and, indeed, not obligatory unless the parish asks for it. Only those parishes, also, whose councils explicitly so desire come under the Measure. If, therefore, the patron's 'party' dominates the council (as generally happens), things will go on as before, with no check on the presentation except on canonical grounds.

There is, however, one class of benefices which is directly affected by the new law—namely those which are purchased by a party trust for the purpose of controlling the 'colour' of Churchmanship in them. More gross distortion of the ancient patronage rights could hardly be conceived than such purchase, legalised as it is under common law decisions originally given by the King's courts to protect local liberties. Where the advowson of a parish of one 'colour' is bought by a party trust of another, it may be confidently expected that for a time, at any rate, the Council will vote the benefice under the operation of the Measure

and so empower the bishop to decline to receive the presentation of an 'extreme' candidate. But, as things are in the Church, this check is unlikely to be operative anywhere for long. It is not difficult for the parson to pack his Parochial Church Council. Opposition in Church matters is always distasteful, and the natural taste of most people is to drop out rather than to continue to oppose. As parochial church councillors, those not of the parson's party are impossible. As parishioners, the Convocation proposal having been varied, they continue to have no rights.

Fresh tinkering at the patronage system, therefore, has become necessary immediately—a thing which happens too often after the passing of Assembly Measures. At this February session a Measure is to be introduced empowering parishes to repurchase advowsons which are sold and to vest them in the bishop or in a diocesan trust. Like the original Measure, this new piece of legislation deals only with the temporary difficulty of conflicting parties fighting to control the Church by property rights rather than by persuasion. It may be necessary, but it is certainly regrettable that the Assembly seems to lack the vision to tackle this problem (as it does so many others) on broad principles rather than to secure niggling little details of policy.

For the patron to-day as in the past, should be a very real person in the parochial organisation of the Church—the framework of the body corporate which is the Church of England. In the olden time he was the head of the temporality as the 'churchthane' was of the spirituality. He held his position by inheritance under a social system which regarded the chief landowner as the headman of the parish. He was at once the best person to select his spiritual colleague in the local jurisdiction, the latter's protector and defender against non-Christian influences, and the champion of the rights of the laity against undue 'clericalism'. Under modern conditions it is no longer proper or even possible to couple the office of patron with landholding, especially in towns. But is that any reason for abolishing it? Or for substituting the bishop as sole selector of the parish clergy? Or still worse, for setting up a board without a soul to be saved or a body to be kicked? Surely the right way unless the whole traditional system is to be abandoned in favour of a kind of 'Government service' of clergy, is to accept the modern substitution of election for property-claim as conferring authority—to fill the office of patron by vote of the parishioners.

No immediate legislation is necessary in the majority of cases, for the experiment could be tried by any bishop who is uneasy as to the responsibility (and incidentally the unpopularity) of selecting incumbents for one-third of the parishes in his diocese. He would draw up a list of trustworthy men and women who

were willing to act as patrons, and any of these (or other person approved by him) would be eligible for election by a Parochial Church Council as patron. If a vacancy occurred, the patron so elected would suggest to the bishop a clergyman for collation, and it may be taken for granted that his choice would at least be made with intimate personal and local knowledge.

An elected patron, whether resident in the parish or not, would at once function in a number of ways quite apart from 'patronage.' For example, take a working-class parish in any of the great industrial centres. It is as isolated from general Church life as the most remote village. It has no link, except the parson, with anything except the mild activities of the Ruridecanal Conference. It has little or no money, and no means of interesting (except again through the parson) those in the 'better-class' neighbourhoods who would be glad to help if they knew the need. Devout laymen and keen Churchmen may even have a factory or office in the parish without any more interest in it than can be expressed by occasional subscriptions. But elect such a man as patron of the parish in which his daily bread is earned. Quite apart from monetary assistance, he is someone to look to for advice and support. He will be interested in recommending, from personal knowledge, those in search of jobs. He will encourage the depressed faithful to realise that the Body is One and that their struggles are not in vain. Social intercourse with himself and his friends will break down the bitterness of imagined class barriers. Conversely, the lay members of the Diocesan Conference and Church Assembly would have some first-hand knowledge of, and interest in, the general problems and difficulties of the diocese as a whole. They would no longer have to function solely in support of the clergy. They would feel once more that it was their Church as well as ours.

In a country diocese the effect of such revivification of the office of patron would be even more effective. For there are few country parishes in which something corresponding to the better aspect of 'what squire says' is not being more urgently needed every day. In too many villages the disappearance of the squire has afforded some aggressive local boss the opportunity to grasp the reins of power to the hindrance of the parson's work and to the ruin of brotherliness in the whole parish. A recognised lay social head is, indeed, vitally necessary in English rural life, and the elected patron would supply the place.

The same system could (and should) be carried out by the various patronage trusts which 'own' one-twelfth of the parish churches of England, by the universities, and by the Crown—each in its own way and with its own list of patrons. An

Impersonal patron is altogether a monstrosity in the English theory of patronage rights, which is meaningless without personal responsibility and personal interest in the people concerned. If by any chance (as does sometimes happen, though rarely) one member of a board has such personal interest, he has still no personal responsibility. The board appoints, and his individual acquaintance with the parish is but one factor in many, some at least of which are always unworthy. And when the appointment has been made, the new parson is left alone to carry on without the sympathy or the support or the counsel of those who entrusted him with the work. If 'clericalism' be on the increase (as some people assert) and a danger (as the same critics complain), the reason is that the incumbents are clucked into their parishes to sink or swim. Some fail, and that is a proof that the clergy are no good. Others succeed and are accused of priestcraft. But the real source of weakness in both cases lies in the fact that the spiritual thane cannot function properly without the temporal thane to support and to check him. There is no alternative but that beloved by bureaucrats to abolish the parson's freehold altogether and substitute a clerical service graduated on the lines of Whitehall, in which independence of thought and action is regulated by the bishop as head of a diocesan 'department'.

C. E. DOUGLAS

JUDICIAL SALARIES

AFTER the recent announcement that the Judges of the High Court and all major judicial dignitaries were to be docked of 20 per cent. of their statutory salaries, it was stated in the House of Lords by an ex-Lord Chancellor, during the course of a sympathetic speech, that the salary of a Judge of the High Court had at one time been as much as £7000. This figure cannot be verified if the relevant records are consulted. It is true that the Judges once received more than the modern remuneration of £5000, but the high-water mark appears to have been £5500 in the reign of George IV, the low-water mark being £6 13s 4d when Henry III was on the throne.

The chief source of information as to the remote past is Sir William Dugdale's *Originales Juridicales*, which was published in 1666. The records, says that learned quarter King of Arms, begin in the 'Xlth year of King Henry the Third's reign,' at which time Will de Insula and R. Duket, King's Justices, received ten marks (a mark being 13s 4d) each out of the Exchequer. Twenty years later the amount was more than doubled for 'Will de Calworth, one of the Justices of the Common Pleas, had XXI per annum fee.' In 27 Henry III Alexander de Swerford, Chief Baron of the Exchequer, was paid 'XL marks per annum,' and a little later the Barons of that Court had an annual 'XX marks.' At the end of the same reign the Justices of the Common Pleas, with 'C marks,' were doing better than their brothers of the King's Bench, who had '40s per annum.' The Chief Justice of the King's Bench (Gilbert de Preston) was paid 'C marks per annum' in 35 Henry III, and a little later the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas was receiving 'but XI pounds.' Between the seventh year of the reign of Edward I and the twenty-fifth year of that of Edward III the Chief Justices of the King's Bench and the Common Pleas received the same amount, 'XL pounds per annum,' the payment of their purses being 'XL marks.' 'I hear,' says Dugdale, 'the salary of the Chief Justice of the King's Bench shrank more, viz. to fifty marks per annum (which is no more than XXXIII. VI. VIII^d), the yearly fee of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas being augmented to

C. marka per annum.' At the same time it was arranged that the Chief Baron should have '40l. per annum' and the various puisne Judges 'XXI. per annum.'

In the eighteenth year of Henry VI. 'there was more of certainty, both in their yearly salaries, and allowances for their robes.' This was the result of a petition to Parliament by the Judges of all the Courts of Westminster, the King's Attorney and the King's Serjeants. Apparently the Judges had not been paid the customary sums for their judicial services or for their robes, and they were moved to present a prayer for immediate settlement of all arrears and punctual payment thereafter. The King, by the advice of his Lords and Commons, 'ad grante tout ceo qu'est contenuz en ceste Petition,' and accordingly John Markham, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, had a yearly pension of CLXX marks payable by the Clerk of the Hanaper together with CVI. XI^d. for a Christmas robe and LXVI. VI^d. for a 'Robe at Whitsuntide'. After this 'says the same author, 'viz. in 37 H. 6, there was a further increase of their fees; viz. to the Chief Justice of the King's Bench and his successors for the time being of XXXI. per annum, to every other Justice of the Court and their successors, XXI. per annum and to every Justice of the Common Pleas and their successors, XXI. per annum'. It was some twelve years earlier that the Judges had first been required to pay taxes and subsidies, the charge being at the rate of 5 per cent. on their respective incomes. The figures on which they were assessed indicate that they must have been receiving perquisites which increased their nominal salaries, for Fineux, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, paid on 1000 marks, Brudenell Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, on 650 marks, and Fitzlames, C. B. on £400. Two of the Justices of the King's Bench were charged on £400 and one on £200; two of the Judges of the Common Pleas paid on 500 marks, and one on £200. This novel and disagreeable demand was probably the explanation of the subsequent raising of the judicial salaries.

During the reign of Elizabeth the 'Lord Chief Justice of England' was paid as follows

- 'Fee, reward and robes £208 6s. 8d.
- Wyne, 2 tunnes at £5 per tunne £10 0 0
- Allowance for being justice of assise £20 0 0'

The Chief Justice of the Common Pleas had £141 13s. 4d., £8. and £20 under the same headings, and in addition £12 10s. 8d. as 'fee for keeping the assise in the Augmentation Court.' The Judges in the two Courts had £128 6s. 8d. for 'fee, reward, and robes' and £20 'allowance as justice of assise,' but nothing for 'wyne.' The Court of Exchequer fared worse, the 'Lord Chief

Baron' receiving in all £151 17s. 8d. and his three Barons £79 10s. 8d. apiece.

It is clear, however, from the assessments of the Judges for purposes of taxation in the reign of Henry VIII., that they had sources of income apart from their official pay. At what date the system of presents, fees and perquisites began is uncertain; but, whatever its origin, it was in full swing during the sixteenth century. And from the terms of the 6 Edw. VI. c. 16, it would seem that one of the privileges of the Judges was the right to dispose of certain offices by sale. The statute forbids the sale of offices connected with the administration of the law, but excepts from its provisions 'any office or offices to be given or granted by the Chief Justices and Judges of Assize,' who are to give or grant them 'as they or any of them might have done before the making of this Act.' The alternative privilege was the right to bestow the office upon some needy member of the Judge's family. How rich was the patronage of the Chief Justices was disclosed in the parliamentary debates preceding the passing of the 6 Geo. IV. cc. 82, 83, 84—but theirs was as nothing to that of the Lord Chancellor. The occupant of the woolsack till the passing of the 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 111, had the following sinecures to bestow: Keeper or Clerk of His Majesty's Manager, Patentee of the Subpoena Office, Registrar of Affidavits, Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, Clerk of the Patents, Clerk of the Custodies of Lunatics and Idiots, Prothonotary of the Court of Chancery, Chaffwax, Sealer, Clerk of the Presentations, Clerk of Insolvents in Bankruptcy, Clerk of Dispensations and Faculties, and Patentee for the Execution of the Laws and Statutes concerning Bankrupts. These posts were all alike in two respects: the emoluments were large and the duties could be performed by deputy. Together they produced about £24,000 a year. It was the business of Chaffwax (or his deputy) to bring the wax to the proper state of liquefaction when the Great Seal was in use.

Lord Eldon, who was the last Lord Chancellor under the old dispensation, was thus enabled to provide handsomely for one of his sons. Mr. William Henry Scott had 'in possession' the Clerkship of Patents, the Registrarship of Affidavits, the Receivership of Fines and the Curatorship, and 'in reversion' the Clerkship of the Crown in Chancery, and the office for the execution of the Statutes of Bankruptcy. 'The ample income,' says the biographer of Lord Eldon, 'which he derived from several offices conferred upon him by his father, exempted him from the necessity of application.' It was the practice of the Lord Chancellor to retain for himself the Clerkship of the Manager; and when bankruptcies were abundant he reaped a golden harvest from the patenteeship 'for the Execution of the Laws and

Statutes concerning Bankrupts.' Lord Eldon's annual receipts from this source are said to have never fallen lower than £12,000; and Lord Thurlow was able to bestow the office upon two of his relatives in succession.

The best of the offices in the gift of the Lord Chief Justice was the Chief Clerkship of the Court of King's Bench. If it happened to become vacant, the Lord Chief Justice was able to make a 'noble provision' (to quote Lord Campbell) for his family. Lord Ellenborough, who died in 1818 leaving £240,000, was fortunate in this respect. He was riding in Hyde Park when he heard of the death of Mr. Way, who had been appointed Chief Clerk by Lord Mansfield. With commendable caution the Chief Justice dismounted and at a house in Knightsbridge forthwith executed the necessary deed of gift, lest any mischance should occur to him before he reached home. The name he filled in was his own, and he retained the Chief Clerkship till the time came to hand it on to his son. In the days of Chief Justice Coke the Chief Clerkship was worth £4000 a year, and that good patriot covered himself with glory in 1679 by declining to appoint a nominee of Bacon and disposing of the office for the benefit of the Judges, whose salaries the Chief Justice deemed to be inadequate. To Lord Ellenborough, it was worth £16,000 a year. The Chief Justice could also appoint the Clerk of the Treasury and Custos Breviarum and Filazer, Exigentes and Clerk of the Outlawries, and these positions were also deemed to be saleable by him. What gave the Chief Clerkship an additional value was the fact that the Chief Clerk himself could appoint to, or sell, the Clerkship of the Rules on the Plea Side, the Clerkship of the Papers on the Plea Side, the Clerkship of the Declarations, the Clerkship of Common Bails, Estreats and Postons, and the Clerkship of the Dockets, and the Custos Breviarum had a further group of sinecures to fill up or sell to the highest bidder, which included the Bag Peatership on the Plea Side and the Clerkships of the Inner and Outer Treasury. Thus, when either office became vacant, the Chief Justice was doubly enriched.

The Chief Justice of the Common Pleas had at his disposal the offices of Chief and Third Prothonotaries, the Clerkship of the King's Silver, and many more, and when the Custos Breviarum nominated (as he might) the Second Prothonotary and the Clerkship of the Jures, the Chief Justice was 'entitled to certain fees.'

There was therefore something to justify the rumour that Sir Thomas Richardson, who became Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in 1626, had paid £17,000 for his appointment. The fame of Chief Justice Richardson survives, for he belonged to the race of witty Judges. When the prisoner threw a brickbat at him, as

he was stooping over his desk, 'que narrowly mist'—to quote from Dyer's Reports—the Chief Justice remarked: 'If I had been an upright Judge, I had been slain.' That the Judges supplemented their official pay in many ways is shown by the diary of Mr. Justice Rokeby, who was a Judge of the Common Pleas in the reign of William III. He kept a careful note of his receipts from 'dedimus money, fees from Clerk of the Warrants, etc.,' which in one year came to £694 4s 6d., and his total takings, including salary, were £1378 19s in 1684 and £1631 10s 11d in 1698. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Judges were apparently receiving little but their regular stipends. There is a MS. note written in 1744 by Sir James Harrow, Master of the Crown Office, in his copy of the *Origines Juridicales* (now in the Middle Temple Library) which throws light on this point.

L.Ch. J. B.R. 'runs the note' was worth I know to Lord Raymond £3500. Lord Hardwicke had the salary increased from £2000 to £4000, and, consequently, the place was worth to him about £5000 per annum. I don't know what salary L.Ch. J. Lee receives, nor I believe does anyone else. L.Ch. J. C.B. is not much under £5000 per annum. Ld Ch. Baron is £2500.

As to puisnes and perquisites he adds

Each poune has a salary of £1500 per annum. The perquisites in C.B. are greater than in B.R. But they all say that they give them to their clerks. N.B. The second Judge of B.R. receives £40 per annum out of the fines for his trouble in giving the charge every Term, to the Grand Jury of Middlesex. And all the puisnes I believe receive some other monies from the Chief Clerk, the Master of the King's Bench Office. The Judges of the B.R. do also receive some little Presents (of Sugar loaves &c.) from some of the Officers. And there used to be larger Compliments paid to the Chief Justices by some of the Superior Officers at Christmas (even in hard money). But the Clerk of the Crown and the Custos Breviarum were ashamed to offer such a thing to Lord Hardwicke, and he never hinted anything about it to them, all three happening to come into their respective offices much about the same time, and consequently unpractised in the thing. So that since the time (which is now about 12 years) it has never been either asked or offered. But I have heard a Judge put an Officer in mind of the Sugar loaves, intimating that such Customs ought not to be neglected. Note. It was always customary for the Ld Ch. Justice to entertain all the Officers at Christmas. But this Gentleman (Chief Justice Lee) has never done it, nor taken the least notice about it.

But, if the Judges were reduced to their sugar loaves, the Chiefs continued to enjoy the emoluments, or the purchase price, of the above-mentioned unecures. Their right to sell the offices in their gift was never questioned, and (as mentioned already) was definitely protected by the 6 Edw VI c. 16. Why the Lord Chancellor should not have enjoyed the same right it is

not easy to understand; but when it was rumoured that the Earl of Macclesfield (Lord Chancellor from 1718 to 1725), assisted by his Countess, had sold Masterships for ready money, his impeachment followed. Perhaps it was the crudeness of his methods that roused the indignation of the public. The evidence of Masters Bennet, Elde and Neaston, which is set out in the State Trials, makes good reading. Master Bennet, it seemed, had asked Mr. Cottingham (the Chancellor's Secretary) what present was expected of him, and had been referred to Master Godfrey. Having consulted that official, Master Bennet returned to Mr. Cottingham with an offer of £1000. Mr. Cottingham countered with a suggestion of 1500 guineas, rejected Master Bennet's improved offer of £1500, and intimated that the money might be paid in any way Master Bennet pleased. 'So it be guineas.' So the 1500 guineas were duly paid and the appointment arrived in due course. Master Elde told a similar tale. He had informed Mr. Cottingham that he was prepared to give £5000 for the vacant Mastership. 'Guineas are handsomer,' was Mr. Cottingham's succinct reply. Master Elde accordingly carried the 5000 guineas in a basket to his lordship's house, and a few days later the basket, empty of its contents, was returned. Master Neaston had dealt directly with the Countess of Macclesfield, with satisfactory results. Two days after he had tactfully left £5250 on her table he was admitted to the Mastership. Lord Macclesfield and his learned counsel went down with their colours flying. They insisted that there were precedents for the sale of Masterships in the days of Lord Harcourt and Lord Cowper, and relied strongly on the statutory sanction of similar sales by the Chief Justices. But their arguments were rejected.

Both the chiefs and the puisnes were favourably considered when George I. came to the throne in 1714. It is recorded in Lord Raymond's Reports (vol. II. p. 1319) that 'the salaries of the two Chief Justices and Chief Baron, were increased from £1000 to £2000 per annum, and the salaries of the rest of the Judges were increased from £1000 to £1500 per annum, for which they had distinct patents from those by which they were appointed Judges.' In 1738 there was a further advance. The 32 Geo. II. c. 35, after reciting that the salaries of the Judges were 'inadequate to the Dignity and Importance of their Offices,' enacted that they should be augmented by £500 (Judges), £1000 (Chief Baron), and £500 (Barons of the Court), and in 1779 the 19 Geo. III. c. 65, there being a surplus from the stamp duties appropriated to the payment of the Judges' salaries, added £500 to the Chief Baron and £400 to the puisne Judges and Barons. Twenty years later the salaries were raised by the 39 Geo. III. c. 110 as follows: Master of the Rolls, £4000; Chief Baron,

£4000: puisne Judges and Barons, £3000. The same statute enabled the Crown to grant pensions, after fifteen years' service or retirement by reason of physical infirmity, to the Chief Justice of the King's Bench of £3000, to the Master of the Rolls, to the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron of £2500, and to the Judges and Barons of £2000 a year. It also empowered the grant of an annuity of £4000 to a retiring Lord Chancellor. In 1813 these pensions were increased by £800 (the two Chiefs and the Master of the Rolls) and by £600 (puisne Judges and Barons).

'An Act for further augmenting the Salaries of certain of the Judges' (49 Geo. III. c. 127) raised the Chief Baron's salary to £5000 and that of the puisnes, both Judges and Barons, to £4000, the 'second Judge' receiving a further £40 for charging the grand jury each term and pronouncing judgment on malefactors. The high cost of living brought about by the war was the ground put forward for the passing of this statute: and the fact that the Judges were now subject to a heavy income tax (10 per cent) as well as a land tax was an additional reason for improving their financial position.

A portion of the duties of the 'second Judge' (though not the payment) still survives. When there is a trial 'at Bar' the senior Judge, as representing the 'second Judge' of other days, in the ordinary course passes sentence. It was as senior Judge that Mr. Justice Mellor sent the claimant to penal servitude when the case of *Rex v. Castro* at last came to an end, and Mr. Justice Wills, in the same capacity, sentenced 'Colonel' Lynch to death when that mildly-mannered politician was found guilty of treason in the Court of the Lord Chief Justice in 1903.

The better opinion, however, was that Mr. Justice Wills should not have been the spokesman of the Court on this occasion, and at the trial of Sir Roger Casement, the Chief Justice, Lord Reading, pronounced sentence of death. An examination into the precedents had shown that in cases of treason the senior Judge gives way to the 'Chief.' Mr. Baron Pollock, who ought to have sentenced the 'Jameson raiders,' is said to have taken the point that as the £40 payment had been abolished the senior Judge by implication was relieved of his ancient duty, and the then Chief Justice, Lord Russell of Killowen, accordingly passed the sentence of the Court.

By the 6 Geo. IV. cc. 82, 83 and 84, the two Chiefs lost the whole of their patronage, and fixed salaries were substituted for the old method of remuneration. The Chief Justice of the King's Bench was given £10,000, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas £8000, the Master of the Rolls £7000, the Vice-Chancellor of England £6000, the Chief Baron £7000, and the Judges and Barons £3500. This was the zenith of judicial comfort. But

for the opposition of Brougham the Judges would have received £6000, which was the figure first suggested by those in charge of the Bill. The same Acts fixed the pensions at £4000 (Chief Justice of the King's Bench), £3750 (Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Master of the Rolls, Vice-Chancellor of England and Chief Baron), and £3500 (Judges and Barons).

Naturally enough, when the House of Commons was asked in 1826 to substitute for the attractive windfalls, which might fall into the laps of the Chiefs, a flat rate payment of £10,000 a year for the Chief Justice of the King's Bench and £8000 a year for the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, there was opposition in interested quarters. Mr. Scarlett (not yet Attorney-General, but with 'the pallow of the Common Pleas' in mind) stoutly defended the old order of things. He regarded the offices in question as incidental to the situation of the Chief Justice (one of great elevation and dignity), as the proper source of the greater part of his recompense and as survivals in which he had a vested interest. If the vulgar course of fixing a salary had to be taken, then let the salary be £12,000 for the head of the King's Bench. For the pusses, too, he said a word, and not without effect. As originally drafted, the Bill providing for the pensions gave the Judges and Barons £2800. This sum seemed to Scarlett quite inadequate, and he drew for the House a pathetic picture of Mr. Baron Wood, who, notwithstanding the loss of the sight of one eye and the use of both ears, had clung to the Bench rather than retire into poverty-stricken obscurity. The learned Baron had died not long before Scarlett made this disclosure to the House of Commons. He was sixty-seven years of age when appointed and eighty-three when he resigned, so some measure of physical decay was to be expected. A lawyer of erudition he is now forgotten. His *Observations on Tithes and Tithe Law* is no longer read, and pilgrims do not visit his grave in the Temple Church. Yet he was the subject of a legal witticism which greatly entertained the special pleaders of the day. Wood appeared before Lord Mansfield for a client who had bought a horse. The animal, warranted a good roadster and free from vice, entirely refused to leave its stable. Hence the action against the vendor. 'Who would have thought,' observed the Chief Justice, 'that Mr. Wood's horse would have *demurred* when he ought to have gone to the country?' The author who records this incident adds the mournful comment that 'this excellent joke, in the changes of the art of pleading, may possibly become unintelligible.' His fears have been realised: the special pleaders are no more, and the jest has lost its savour.

Brougham, who throughout the debates was the enemy of the Bench, informed the House of Commons that the Chief

Justice had, ere now, sold two of the above-mentioned offices for £20,000, and that the reason for the raising of the Judges' salaries from £3000 to £4000—the increased prices of all commodities—had long since ceased to operate. Other relevant and irrelevant facts referred to in the debates by legal members were that Buller, J., who had become a Judge at the age of thirty-two, accumulated a considerable fortune on the Bench; that Lord Ellenborough, C.J., on one occasion disposed of 588 causes at the Guildhall; that though three 'Chiefships' fell in while Garrow was Attorney-General he did not secure one of them; that the Judges were paid partly from the civil list and partly from fees, and that each Judge had, therefore, to make a return on oath of the fees he received, which was undignified; that the Judges recently appointed had been on an average sixty years of age; that during one term in 1826 the Court of King's Bench had 250 cases to try and the Common Pleas only twenty-five; and that Mr. Dampier refused to be a Judge till after his health had given way, because he could not support the dignity of the position. The latter learned gentleman, being a stuff-gowanusman of fifty-eight, was promoted to the Bench in 1823, and died some two years afterwards.

Then came a drop. The 11 Geo IV & 1 Will IV c 70 had given the three Common Law Courts an additional Judge each, with a salary of £5000. The 2 & 3 Will IV c 110 reduced the Chief Justice of the King's Bench to £5000 and the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas to £7000, leaving the Master of the Rolls untouched at £7000. It also deprived the puisne Judges and the Barons of the Exchequer (other than those already appointed at the salary of £5500) of £500 a year, and the 'second Judge' of his additional £400.

Lord Eldon, the stoutest of Tories, did his best to uphold the old order of things so far as the Chancellorship was concerned. The services of the Lord Chancellor, he thought, could not be adequately compensated by 'mere wages,' and it was not right that he should be 'left in a state of destitution on quitting the woolsack.' But Lord Brougham was ruthless, and Lord Eldon's protests were in vain.

The 2 & 3 Will IV c 111 made a sad difference to the position of the Lord Chancellor. The whole of the sinecures which had enriched the office were to 'utterly cease and determine' from and after August 20, 1833. But, to compensate him, he was to receive an annuity of £5000 (the 39 Geo III c. 20 had limited it to £4000) on resignation of his office. When Lord Birkenhead, being an ex-Lord Chancellor, elected to turn his attention to finance, the opinion was expressed in some quarters that he ought not to continue to receive a 'pension' if he ceased to sit.

as a Lord of Appeal in the House of Lords. It is, however, arguable that an ex-Lord Chancellor is under no obligation to discharge any legal duties, and that the larger 'annuity' was given to him because he could no longer provide for his descendants by conferring valuable offices upon them.

Section 3 of the above-mentioned Act said

Whereas by the abolition of the said Offices the Lord High Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal for the time being will be deprived of the Patronage and Gift of the said Offices which does of Right belong to and has been exercised by him and it is therefore just and equitable that more ample Provision should be made for the Lord High Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal on his Retirement from Office, be it therefore enacted that it shall be lawful for His Majesty . . . to give and grant, unto any person executing the Office . . . an Annuity or yearly Sum of Money not exceeding Five Thousand Pounds . . . to commence and take effect immediately from and after the Person whenever the person to whom such Annuity or yearly Sum of Money shall be granted shall resign the said office

It is in recognition of his unqualified statutory right to the annuity that it is granted immediately on his appointment, to take effect on his retirement. An Act of the same year—the 2 & 3 Will IV c. 122—gave the Lord Chancellor during his tenure of office a fixed salary of £10,000, to be paid quarterly out of the Sutors Fund in Chancery—free and clear from all Taxes, Deductions or Abatements whatsoever. And the Lord Chancellor's salary has since remained at the above figure, though the last relevant statute (15 & 16 Geo. V c. 49) describes the amount as 'such yearly sum as with the amount payable to him as Speaker of the House of Lords is sufficient to make up the sum of ten thousand pounds a year.

In 1851 the Mastership of the Rolls was shorn of some of its glory by the Court of Chancery Act, which fixed the salary of the holder at £6000 a year, the same statute benefiting the profession by creating two 'Judges of the Court of Appeal in Chancery' (who were to relieve the Lord Chancellor of some of his labours) with salaries payable out of the interest and dividends arising from the Sutors Fund, of £6000 a year. These were the first of the Lords Justices and the forerunners of the present Court of Appeal. The Judicature Acts, which established that tribunal and increased the number of the Lords Justices from two to five in order that it should be adequately staffed, lowered their salary to the figure of £5000. There is a tradition that while the Acts were going through Parliament the Judges, on being consulted as to whether the Lords Justices should be distinguished from their humbler brethren by a further £500 a year or a Privy Councillorship, voted for the latter.

The only Judges who receive more than £5000 (less 20 per cent.) to-day are the Lord Chief Justice (£8000), the Master of the Rolls (£6000), and the six Lords of Appeal (£6000); and the patronage of the Lord Chief Justice is limited to the appointment of a secretary, and the right to nominate (in rotation with the Lord Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls) to Masterships and to the office of Master in the Crown Office. The offices remaining in the gift of the Judges, now that Revising Barristers have disappeared, are the Clerkships of Assize. When a Clerk of Assize dies or retires the Judge of Assize is entitled to nominate his successor.

It is melancholy to realise that the Judges, with a salary of £5000 diminished by 20 per cent. and the deduction of tax and sur-tax, are worse off than they were in 1790, when they had £3000 a year 'free and clear from all taxes and deductions whatever'.

THEOBALD MATHEW

THE AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN

IN view of the impending International Conference on Disarmament, it may be of some interest to review the position and requirements of Great Britain in terms of air power for home and overseas defence, and to consider their bearings upon the problems of Disarmament. Undoubtedly the main way to disarmament lies primarily in the removal of the fears by reason of which so many countries, even in their impoverishment, submit to the financial and economic burdens which large armaments involve; and partly also in securing that those armed forces which represent a minimum of provision for self-defence, for the preservation of order and the maintenance of communications by land and sea, should be so organised and distributed as to afford the fullest guarantees of their non-aggressive character, and to provide the maximum return in practical utility for the expenditure which they involve.

The principal defence requirements of Great Britain are security from invasion and the assurance of the delivery of her imports of food stuffs and of raw materials for her manufactures. Captain Darling in *The Nineteenth Century*¹ points out that 'invasion and starvation it has ever been the duty of the Navy to prevent', but in upholding the importance of the Navy he gets carried away into minimising the possibilities of air power, until finally, inflamed by some remarks of an American general, he virtually denies that air power has any importance whatsoever. It is therefore desirable to recall the standard of requirements of Great Britain in home defence against air attack, to describe the forces kept for the purpose, and to correct some misstatements about their employment.

These requirements were authoritatively defined by Mr. Baldwin (then Prime Minister), speaking in the House of Commons on June 26, 1923, in the following terms:

In addition to meeting the essential air power requirements of the Navy, Army, Indian and overseas commitments British air power must

¹ 'The Navy and the Air,' November 1892.

include a Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of this country.

It would seem superfluous to assert the necessity of protecting our capital, manufacturing towns, and ports against air attack, if Captain Dorling did not imply, first, that intense air bombardment will not affect the essential activities in any town attacked, and, secondly, that only action at sea will prevent our imports of food-stuffs and raw materials from reaching the consumers. As regards the first implication, it is perhaps sufficient to say that the French and the Italians show in their air manoeuvres that they attach vital importance to the protection of towns from air attack. There are two important pronouncements on this point—the well-known dictum of Marshal Foch, that the action of air power on civilian populations may prove decisive in future wars, and (more in terms of our own problem) Captain Liddell Hart's statement that 'Provided that the blow be sufficiently swift and powerful there is no reason why in a few hours, or at most days, from the commencement of hostilities the nerve centre of one of the contending countries should not be paralysed'.

Captain Dorling draws an analogy from the fact that, in spite of repeated air bombardments, the civil population of the little French town of Dunkirk stuck to their posts throughout the war; but the make-up and importance of London is vastly different from that of Dunkirk, and the striking power of aircraft has very greatly increased since 1918. Even as regards food supplies it is not true to say that no country can be brought to terms by aerial attacks alone. Although food and a thousand and one staple commodities can be stopped on the high seas, they can also be effectively denied to the consumer if their unloading at the docks and distribution by the railways are stopped by air attacks, to which, not the Navy, but only the air defences, can provide a counter-move. An adequate air defence is, in brief, an essential part of Great Britain's protection against both invasion and starvation.

The scale of attack, security against which successive British Governments have affirmed the necessity of providing, is that of attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of this country. It is, broadly speaking, a one-Power standard of air strength, comparable to the 'one-Power standard' now accepted for naval strength. It may be, as Captain Dorling points out, 'the most improbable war that is likely to take place,' but it is a contingency which (taking into account the very definite commitments involved by the Locarno Treaty) is higher in the scale of

* B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Remaking of Modern Armies*.

possibility than a war between Great Britain and the United States, which is no doubt why we have not, in fact, built to that standard.

Although it is necessary for us to preserve the right to build to a one-Power standard—a standard we should like to see fixed at a modest scale—yet in fact we are only fifth in order of strength among the air Powers of the world. We have not yet even completed the first stage of the policy laid down in 1923. It was then announced that a force of fifty-two squadrons for home defence should be formed with as little delay as possible, and it was expected that that force would be completed by 1929-30. Actually only forty-two squadrons have been formed, of which thirteen are fighter squadrons, and sixteen are regular bomber squadrons, the remainder being auxiliary or special reserve squadrons, manned mainly by personnel whose training and liabilities of service approximate to those of the Territorial Army. Under existing political and financial conditions this lag in the execution of our approved air policy may be regarded as inevitable, and it is much to be hoped that the scale of the one-Power standard to which we might have to build if circumstances altered may be reduced by international agreements at the Disarmament Conference.

The justification and method of employment of a Home Defence Force is a subject on which Captain Doring (and other critics) are very much at sea. He admits that the initiative is retained if a tactical offensive compels a combatant to employ in defence those forces with which he would otherwise himself take the offensive, but appears to think that the bombing squadrons of the Home Defence Force could have no prospect of forcing a tactical defensive upon their antagonists. The claim, in Captain Doring's own words, 'that by attacking the enemy you force him back to the defensive' has no substance whatever in air warfare. To make this assertion is to forget that the bombing attacks on London in the Great War led to the retention in England for the defence of London alone of ten times the number of aircraft actually employed in the attacks; and, similarly, that the British attacks on the Rhine towns caused the Germans to lock up in passive defence very much larger forces whose personnel would otherwise have been employed in offensives over our lines.

We learned how to apply to air operations the doctrine that 'offensive is the best defence' in 1916 on the Somme, as the French learned it in the same year at Verdun. It has nothing to do with 'retaliation'. It is difficult of application, and will be more so as long as unconstructed opinion calls for passive defence, as it does even now, and will certainly do with vehemence

in wartime. Major Sherman,¹ of the United States Army, writes :

There will be many and insistent demands for the defensive. Nevertheless, ultimate success will be achieved with greater degree of certainty by a vigorous offensive against the enemy's aircraft and his vital centres than by attempting to provide a close and positive defence against similar attacks on his part, a plan which will never produce decisive results and will often end in stark failure.

Further, it is sometimes forgotten that air defence is not 'parochial.' It forms part of the general operations of the war in which defence is called for. The operations of the Air Force are concerted with those of the Navy and Army, each service aims at breaking the enemy's attacks in the way best suited to it, but each does so as far as it can in such ways as may best combine to make the total pressure exerted most effective. The operations of the bombing squadrons allotted to the air defence forces of Great Britain will be framed to contribute to this end by attacks on objectives calculated to achieve this combined pressure. They will be as positive efforts towards winning the war as were the attacks on the chemical and munition industries of the Rhine towns. Retaliation for retaliation's sake would be no part of the scheme of their employment. Such attacks on the enemy's concentrations, communications, munition supplies, naval bases and ports, coupled with the power, which the mobility of the air arm provides, of switching at very short notice from one form of attack to another, besides contributing to the collective aim of all three services, will force the enemy to employ in defence forces far larger than those employed by the attacker. They thus deny to the enemy freedom to use in attack part of the forces which he would wish to use. The bombing attacks could be carried out in accordance with the rules now governing naval bombardment, and without any element of that 'indiscriminate use against the enemy civilian population' which Captain Darling wrongly regards as inseparable from an air offensive.

It is sometimes objected that the theory of the tactical offensive leaves out of account two factors of importance—first, the difficulty of making successful attacks before local air superiority is gained, and, secondly, the fact that the enemy forces which are locked up by attack are fighter squadrons, and that therefore nothing is contributed towards 'home defence,' since the enemy's bomber squadrons are not locked up as well. As to the first objection, the most intense air fighting in point of fact took place in the war near and over active objectives that the enemy were bound to defend. Fewer enemy aircraft were destroyed when local air superiority was sought by making

¹ *An Warfare* (Routledge: New York, 1904).

attacks on the enemy on the ground or by increasing line patrols. On the ground it is very difficult to destroy aircraft, since they may be stationed on improvised landing grounds and be hard to find, or be in the air when the aerodrome is attacked. In the air it is also very difficult to bring attacking aircraft to battle, except when the locality which is the object of attack can only be reached by the attackers after penetration to a great depth through a highly organised defence system. Even then the wide choice of points of attack probably enables the attacker to be in superior numbers at the point he selects. He can fulfil his mission, drop his bombs, and, in fighting, have superiority in numbers. In some other respects, such as superior performance and ability to call for reinforcements, it may be conceded that the tactical advantage is on the side of the defending fighters, but those considerations never affected the unhesitating preference in the Great War of all air commanders to force the struggle to the enemy's side of the lines. When that offensive is successfully maintained, the enemy finds himself obliged to devote more and more of his energies to defence and can spare correspondingly fewer for attack. When this course is forced upon him, the second objection referred to above is answered. He begins to employ in defence aircraft designed for bombing.

In that predominant numerous instances occurred of bombing, reconnaissance and even artillery co-operation aircraft being used for defensive patrols in emergencies, both on account of military necessity and because of popular clamour. As Major Sherman observes, every airplane possesses in some degree the qualities which another may have superlatively. It may accordingly be called upon to perform any duty which normally belongs to another type when a grave emergency arises. That the result may be slight success or even failure will not prevent an enemy being driven to the defensive from this misuse of aircraft in the future any more than it did in the past. Apart from this detraction from bombing strength, the enemy will come to employ his best pilots in the fighter squadrons, fill up casualties in their ranks more quickly than those in the bomber squadrons, and make his replacement programme give fighter aircraft priority over bombing aircraft. The air force, therefore, which perseveres in the maintenance of its object of attacking the vital centres of the enemy will not only contribute most effectively to the attainment of the national war aim, but will also act most effectively for the attainment of air superiority and for the defence of its own land. Mahan says that

Every proposal to use a Navy as an instrument of pure passive defence is bound finally upon particular examination, and those various results all proceed from the one fundamental fact that the distinguishing feature of Naval force is mobility while that of a passive defence is immobility.

The same is even more true of air forces. We must also remember that in many respects the country we have to travel is radically different from that in which the Navy operates. We must examine these differences as Corbett did those between the Navy and Army, when he pointed out in his *Principles of Maritime Strategy* that the Navy could not accept without great modifications the theory of war which has been almost entirely the work of soldiers.

So much for the main principles of the organisation and strategy of the air defence of this country. We may now turn to the other commitments of the Air Force as laid down by the Government in the statement quoted above—namely, the requirements of overseas possessions and of co-operation with the Navy and Army. The Royal Air Force meets the requirements of the Navy by the Fleet air arm, which is organised in twenty-six flights of torpedo bombers, spotters and reconnaissance aircraft, and fighters. These flights are embarked on carriers, battleships and cruisers. Their work is essential to the Fleet, and the two other great naval Powers (the United States and Japan) propose making large additions to their fleet air arms. These increases are governed to some extent by the limitations imposed by the London Naval Treaty on the building of aircraft carriers, and on the fitting of landing decks on cruisers. But it appears possible here to effect some more direct limitation, and as classes of ships and guns have already been limited in numbers, so we may hope that numbers of fleet aircraft may, too, be limited at the Disarmament Conference. It has been suggested that the Great Powers might agree to abolish fleet aircraft, but the fate of our proposal at the Washington Conference to abolish submarines shows that there is little prospect of agreement on such a question. The difficulties of technical as opposed to numerical limitation of armament are very great, while as regards the degree of reliance which may be placed on rules of warfare, it is difficult to gainsay the conclusion reached by Royce,¹ that rules of warfare appear to operate against means and methods of warfare only when a weapon or method has either grown obsolete or is not vital to the military establishment of any State.

As regards the overseas commitments of the Royal Air Force, eight squadrons are maintained in India and five in Egypt and the Sudan. These consist partly of 'general purpose' squadrons, and partly of squadrons more specially trained and allotted for 'close co-operation' with infantry and artillery. Their number is so small as to give anxiety whether they are sufficient to deal with disturbances as they arise, and to co-operate adequately with the large number of troops in these countries. From Egypt,

¹ *Aerial Bombardment* (Vind & Co. New York, 1907).

for example, one squadron travels thousands of miles every year and carries out training programmes with troops in East Africa, in West Africa, or in the Union of South Africa. To these thirteen squadrons must be added five 'army co-operation' squadrons maintained at home for training and exercise with the Army. The squadrons of the Home Defence Force, moreover, in addition to their primary function, form a reserve to supply any additional requirements that may be needed in any emergency in which the safety of Great Britain itself is not in question. In peace these squadrons supply pilots to the squadrons overseas much as a battalion at home supplies drafts to its linked battalion abroad. We may say, therefore, that, while the needs of the Army at home, in India, and in Egypt are adequately met, there are no forces to spare, if grave disturbances occur simultaneously in widely separated parts of the Empire. Other overseas responsibilities are: Iraq (four land squadrons and one squadron of flying-boats) and Aden (one squadron) (in both of these areas the Air Force is employed as the primary arm of defence), Palestine and Transjordan (one squadron), Malta (one squadron of flying-boats), and Singapore (one squadron of flying-boats and one of torpedo-bomber landplanes). Total, ten squadrons.

In the mandated territories the squadrons assist in the peaceful development of the country and are the primary resources behind the civil power in cases of serious unrest. In these countries it will be possible in the future, as it has been in the past, to reduce the forces required to back the civil power in accordance with the progress of civilisation. Both in Iraq and Transjordan the incursions of frontier tribes have decreased, and, though both countries have still very serious problems to face, it is to be expected that further progress will be made in the course of the next few years. At Malta and Singapore the duties of the squadrons are to assist in the protection of our naval bases and in the maintenance of our sea communications, for which in home waters we also keep four squadrons of flying-boats. Though the radius of aircraft can at present be taken at only 250 to 300 miles, it is surprising how many of our lines of sea communications pass within that distance of potentially hostile air bases. So far very little provision has been made for these duties, and important naval bases and lines of sea communications are left entirely without air defence—a fact which would have to be taken into consideration in connexion with any proposals at the Disarmament Conference for the limitation of numbers of aircraft. In respect of these and of other liabilities it must be, in fact, recognised that the policy of economy in air expenditure which has been pursued by Great Britain since the war entirely precludes this country (having regard to its widespread Imperial commit-

ments) from continuing to lead the way in the reduction of armaments unless and until other countries are prepared to co-operate in full measure.

Two methods for reduction may be put forward :

First, a reduction by international agreement of the sizes of metropolitan air forces. This would have the effect of reducing to a lower scale in terms of aircraft and expenditure the liabilities of a 'one-Power' standard, the right to the maintenance of which was implied in the Government's declaration of air policy in 1923.

The second is the limitation by agreement of numbers of ship-borne aircraft in the same way as the sizes of fleets have already been limited by the Washington Treaty and the Treaty of London. This latter method of reduction is one which it is desirable, and should be feasible, to achieve, given the will to co-operate on the part of the United States and of Japan.

In considering the possibility of an agreement for the reduction of metropolitan air forces it is necessary to examine the numbers of first-line military aircraft at present possessed by the principal air Powers. These numbers were stated as follows by the then Under-Secretary for Air (Mr. F. C. Montague) in the House of Commons on March 11, 1931:

France	1320
Italy	1100
United States	1050
Russia	1000
Great Britain	770

Since that date some alterations have no doubt been made, and the figures quoted by Mr. Montague differ in some respects from those contained in the returns recently published by the League of Nations in preparation for the Disarmament Conference. The later figures suggest that the figures of strength given by Mr. Montague considerably under-estimated the size of the French air forces, but rather over-estimated the size of the air forces of the United States. But, when these allowances are made, it remains clear that a reduction of air forces by the crude method of an over-all percentage cut, whether in expenditure or in first-line aircraft applied equally to all countries or even to the major air Powers, would produce entirely unsatisfactory results. To employ such a method would be to reproduce and perpetuate (if on a somewhat lower scale) the predominance of air power at present possessed by certain countries. Applied to our own position, it would ignore the fact that we are still far from posses-

ing forces 'of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of this country.'

In short, while a reduction in the size of the air forces maintained by the principal air Powers is an object eminently to be desired and striven for, the method of reduction should be one which must equitably take into account reductions already made and intrinsic defence requirements.

C. LONGCROFT.

CHARING CROSS—A TIME FOR REFLECTION

IN the last days of July it was announced that the Government was unable to renew its offer of financial assistance towards the cost of a new Charing Cross Bridge, and immediately the laboriously prepared official plans, the vigorous protests and the eager counter schemes, all were shelved and became but memories of a sterile past. Many must have been the sighs of relief as the news was read, for Charing Cross Bridge had become one of the most hardy of newspaper perennials. Hasty executive decisions, violent oppositions, Royal Commissions and committees of experts, technical opinions and complete disagreements, had succeeded each other in such a maze of contradiction that perspective and a sense of true direction had been lost, and all hope of any ultimate solution which would transcend petty disagreements seemed finally to have vanished. This feeling of relief has not been confined to the unwilling thousands who have had the Charing Cross problem forced upon them. Overriding considerations of supreme importance have supervened, and all the nation must now feel that this is no time for heavy expenditure, however desirable the objective. Yet, even from the narrower standpoint of that objective itself, delay is welcome, for the more we realize the far-reaching possibilities and effects of a worthy Charing Cross improvement, the more vital does it become that our lost sense of a wider vision should be regained. And for this the passage of time is necessary.

In all the varied discussions and investigations that have succeeded each other there is only one point on which unanimity has been achieved, and that is on the importance of the problem itself, the necessity of building a new road bridge at Charing Cross. One particular factor, the needs of traffic, has been responsible again and again for forcing this question back into the realm of practical politics, despite the disappointment of hard work rendered fruitless by endless disagreement. This traffic problem in Greater London is one of the most urgent with which we are faced, and drastic steps for its solution in the near future are an absolute necessity. Some temporary alleviation has been secured by the introduction of roundabouts and automatic

signals, and the rate of increase in the volume of traffic has been checked by the results of the present world-wide slump. But experts are all agreed that these factors are of but limited application, that some ultimate solution will have to be found, and that the longer it is postponed the more drastic and costly is it likely to be. For the population of Greater London is growing steadily; the average distance between the offices and homes of the daily workers is increasing still more quickly as new dormitory areas spring up on the outskirts, the percentage of motor cars per head of population seems likely to continue growing, and the average use made of each individual vehicle becomes ever greater as mechanical efficiency is perfected. The conclusion of urgency that must be drawn from the effect of these combined factors upon the tangled streets of London's haphazard growth seems obvious, and we have the experience of the United States and of our own traffic experts to assure us that this urgency is not likely to prove fanciful in practice. The key to any satisfactory solution to this vital problem in Central London lies in a Charing Cross Road Bridge.

It is the traffic experts, therefore, whom we have to thank for bringing the improvement of Charing Cross out of the minds of visionary reformers into the practical discussions of present politics, and all who have the future of London at heart owe a debt of gratitude for the drive and incentive supplied by them. Yet immediate urgency gives no title to ultimate importance, and the issues which in the future will prove most permanently vital to London's well being are not those of traffic but rather of town-planning. No glaring have our traffic necessities become that many have been blinded to the wider and deeper requirements of town-planning, and it is the object of this article to show that it has been the inversion in the minds of overworked authorities of the relative importance of traffic and town-planning which has rendered fruitless so many laborious and conscientious efforts.

The words 'town planning' have become a useful cliché in newspaper correspondence, but from the very wideness of their implication and the comparatively recent growth of the science which lies behind them, they too often fail to conjure up any definite picture in the minds of readers, and tend, therefore, to lack the compelling power which is their due. Town-planning is not merely one factor which has to be weighed against others, such as the needs of road and railway traffic. Town-planning is itself the science of how best to create and improve cities, and there are therefore no considerations, great or small, which are not included within its scope. The needs of town-planning are paramount over all others, because only when this is admitted can each factor receive what is its due—neither more nor less. When

improvements in an existing city are brought up for debate a very large number of vested and often conflicting interests are involved; and especially is this the case when an operation of first magnitude on a vast living organism such as London is proposed. The issues at stake spread far and wide, and the possibilities of well-grounded opposition are endless if any one sectional interest is first allowed to obtain possession of the judge's ear. In questions such as these no interest, however powerful or important, can be allowed the right of unquestioned dictation. The community as a whole is paramount, and it is the duty and privilege of town-planning to show how best the community may be served. In proportion as the realisation of the true position and function of town-planning grows, so does the understanding that it sets no merely ideal standard but is of practical advantage on each facet of everyday life. Business men have come to realise that in building individual houses the accessibility, proportion, and attractiveness of good architecture pays, even at the sacrifice of some part of the maximum floor area. On a far larger scale the same is true of town-planning but this truth has not yet been so generally recognised. The ideal town-plan will give the most suitable placing, proportioning and relative distribution for each component part of the town and of its life, and all will benefit thereby. It will give a lay-out suitable in its utility, homeliness or dignity, it will give the opportunities necessary for obtaining the greatest available business efficiency, domestic comfort, social and political convenience, traffic distribution and direct accessibility. In short, town-planning pays.

Town-planning in a great city is therefore of supreme importance, but there is no part of London where it is more vitally needed than in the districts on the Surrey side of the great bend of the river which sweeps past Charing Cross and Waterloo Bridges. The development of modern London has been greatly hindered by the fact that the traditions and associations attached to the north bank of the Thames stretch back a thousand years behind those of the south bank. Large parts of Lambeth and Southwark were smiling hebls in the eighteenth century, now they are in the centre of London, but have never acquired the dignity and reputation of the older portions. So strong is the prejudice against the districts 'across the river' that people often fail to realise how central they are. The shortest route between Westminster and the City lies through them, and large portions of them are within half a mile of Charing Cross, now normally considered the centre of modern London. The rate at which the business community and commercial interests have been spreading out into and rebuilding new districts in recent years is well known. How far more desirable it would be if these admirable develop-

ments could take place in the mean and partly derelict areas south of the Thames, which are or could be more central and accessible than Grosvenor Road, Mayfair or Baker Street, and would mean displacing few elements that are desirable in the heart of a great capital city. The present deplorable condition of large parts of Lambeth and Southwark is obscured by the very prejudice caused thereby, in that so many persons visit those districts never at all. Dirty and partly derelict slums are separated by long streets of narrow frontages which are monotonous and mean where they are not dingy and the whole is cramped and stifled by a network of railway viaducts upon their dismal arches. Hidden away in this hopeless tangle, without frontage or other than deplorable approach, lies London's greatest station, Waterloo, from the gates of which most Americans get their first lamentable impression of our Empire capital.

No very prolonged thought is required to convince an interested observer of the desirability of making the southern districts worthy members of London's greatness but as soon as any practical solution of the ideal is attempted difficulties are encountered on every side. An afternoon's walk through the areas in question will impress upon the greatest optimist the impossibility of any large improvement being brought about by vision or by chance through the enterprise of private owners or building speculators. These can do no more than anticipate an already existing demand. No piecemeal demands for civic development in such an area can possibly exist—a complete break from the past and present is essential before individual firms could trust their fortunes to such surroundings. It is clear that only a sweeping Act of Parliament can achieve this break. But such an Act must meet and reasonably satisfy the vested interests which exist, and these vested interests are amongst the most powerful in the country and also involve considerations which stretch not only throughout London itself, but even into the realms of national and international trade. All such problems should be weighed before a true solution can be found. Here we must content ourselves with lightly indicating the nature and extent of the three factors which seem most fundamental.

First and foremost there is no hope for the development of Lambeth and Southwark so long as they remain honeycombed with high-level railway viaducts. This statement has been violently contradicted, but is made advisedly. It is perfectly true that in newly laid-out towns (consisting mostly of rectangles) a high-level railway may in *ideal conditions* be made almost unobjectionable. It is equally true that large underground spaces, such as Piccadilly Circus Station, can be made most attractive by modern methods of illumination. But neither of

improvements in an existing city are brought up for debate a very large number of vested and often conflicting interests are involved ; and especially is this the case when an operation of first magnitude on a vast living organism such as London is proposed. The issues at stake spread far and wide, and the possibilities of well-grounded opposition are endless if any one sectional interest is first allowed to obtain possession of the judge's ear. In questions such as these no interest, however powerful or important, can be allowed the right of unquestioned dictation. The community as a whole is paramount, and it is the duty and privilege of town-planning to show how best the community may be served. In proportion as the realisation of the true position and function of town-planning grows, so does the understanding that it sets no merely ideal standard, but is of practical advantage on each facet of everyday life. Business men have come to realise that in building individual houses the accessibility, proportion, and attractiveness of good architecture pays, even at the sacrifice of some part of the maximum floor area. On a far larger scale the same is true of town-planning but this truth has not yet been so generally recognised. The ideal town-plan will give the most suitable placing, proportioning and relative distribution for each component part of the town and of its life, and all will benefit thereby. It will give a lay-out suitable in its utility, homeliness or dignity, it will give the opportunities necessary for obtaining the greatest available business efficiency, domestic comfort, social and political convenience, traffic distribution and direct accessibility. In short, town-planning pays.

Town-planning in a great city is therefore of supreme importance, but there is no part of London where it is more vitally needed than in the districts on the Surrey side of the great bend of the river which sweeps past Charing Cross and Waterloo Bridges. The development of modern London has been greatly hindered by the fact that the traditions and associations attached to the north bank of the Thames stretch back a thousand years behind those of the south bank. Large parts of Lambeth and Southwark were smiling fields in the eighteenth century ; now they are in the centre of London, but have never acquired the dignity and reputation of the older portions. So strong is the prejudice against the districts ' across the river ' that people often fail to realise how central they are. The shortest route between Westminster and the City lies through them, and large portions of them are within half a mile of Charing Cross, now normally considered the centre of modern London. The rate at which the business community and commercial interests have been spreading out into and rebuilding new districts in recent years is well known. How far more desirable it would be if these admirable develop-

ments could take place in the mean and partly derelict areas south of the Thames, which are or could be more central and accessible than Grosvenor Road, Mayfair or Baker Street, and would mean displacing few elements that are desirable in the heart of a great capital city. The present deplorable condition of large parts of Lambeth and Southwark is obscured by the very prejudice caused thereby, in that so many persons visit those districts never at all. Dirty and partly derelict slums are separated by long streets of narrow frontages which are monotonous and mean where they are not dingy, and the whole is cramped and stifled by a network of railway viaducts upon their dismal arches. Hidden away in this hopeless tangle, without frontage or other than deplorable approach, lies London's greatest station, Waterloo, from the gates of which most Americans get their first lamentable impression of our Empire capital.

No very prolonged thought is required to convince an interested observer of the desirability of making the southern districts worthy members of London's greatness, but as soon as any practical solution of the ideal is attempted difficulties are encountered on every side. An afternoon's walk through the areas in question will impress upon the greatest optimist the impossibility of any large improvement being brought about by vision or by chance through the enterprise of private owners or building speculators. These can do no more than anticipate an already existing demand. No piecemeal demands for civic development in such an area can possibly exist; a complete break from the past and present is essential before individual firms could trust their fortunes to such surroundings. It is clear that only a sweeping Act of Parliament can achieve this break. But such an Act must meet and reasonably satisfy the vested interests which exist, and these vested interests are amongst the most powerful in the country and also involve considerations which stretch not only throughout London itself but even into the realms of national and international trade. All such problems should be weighed before a true solution can be found. Here we must content ourselves with lightly indicating the nature and extent of the three factors which seem most fundamental.

First and foremost there is no hope for the development of Lambeth and Southwark so long as they remain honeycombed with high-level railway viaducts. This statement has been violently contradicted, but is made advisedly. It is perfectly true that in newly laid-out towns (consisting mostly of rectangles) a high-level railway may in ideal conditions be made almost unobjectionable. It is equally true that large underground spaces, such as Piccadilly Circus Station, can be made most attractive by modern methods of illumination. But neither of

these arguments apply to the Lambeth problem. Lambeth is not a newly laid-out town, and certainly the conditions there are far from ideal. The main lines of both streets and railways are fixed; they cross each other at awkward places and at awkward angles. The railway serving the present Charing Cross Station completely blocks the possibility of a seemly approach to Waterloo Station, and the viaducts as they wind diagonally across the streets prevent the formation of direct and open thoroughfares so vital in civic developments of this kind. Can anyone imagine that Kingsway and Aldwych would have developed as they have to-day if they had been crossed by a broad and low railway viaduct at a slanting angle? The impossibility of forming a new first-class civic area when cramped by such a condition can well be visualised during a visit to the roads that tunnel under Vauxhall Station. Here is no question of a Piccadilly Circus Station, planned as an isolated centre and visited only by pedestrians. The tunnel is a link between the streets on either side, and (however well lighted) must by its lowness break the spacious dignity and continuity necessary to attract business to a new civic thoroughfare. Yet, however blighting may be the effects of railway viaducts on Lambeth or Southwark, many problems have to be envisaged before their demolition can be seriously proposed. Since a busy city cannot be riddled with level crossings, only two alternatives remain to the present system, either those particular sections of railway must be abolished altogether or they must be transferred underground. Whichever of these solutions is preferred, there remains the third problem of how far back the railways in question can be so treated and where and of what nature the terminal stations are to be. The magnitude of the issues raised is at once apparent. The fundamental desiderata of suburban passenger and of goods traffic are involved, with repercussions that stretch far out into the surrounding countryside.

The second basic consideration that has to be faced is the ever-growing requirements of vehicular traffic. These may be divided into two categories, since the needs of both long-distance through traffic and of local traffic have to be met. The latter category is in this instance particularly large owing to the position of Waterloo Station, coupled with a possible new terminus adjoining. We have already stressed the urgency of traffic needs. The peculiar position which Charing Cross Bridge holds in this connexion is that it would supply a direct link, now missing, between the heavily charged traffic centres in the north-western and south-eastern districts. At present such traffic has to find its way round by either Westminster or Waterloo Bridges, both of which, in view of their positions and the limitations of their approaches, are already loaded to full capacity. The need for a road bridge

at Charing Cross can be accepted as proved; though it may be mentioned that, in spite of the careful statistics of the Ministry of Transport, no complete traffic census has ever been taken in London, such as the one in New York, which gave not only the volume of traffic at different points, but also the origin and destination of each particular vehicle. The information supplied by such a census would be invaluable in determining the fundamental traffic necessities that the new bridge must meet. For the problems involved in establishing a new artery between two such highly charged centres as Trafalgar Square and the 'Elephant and Castle' are complex in the extreme, and the conclusions of even the most expert authorities to-day must in part be only opinions based on data admittedly incomplete. We shall have occasion later to touch on the merits or demerits of high-level roads for through traffic - a question of principle which must be decided before it is possible to make even a scheme for a new Thames bridge.

The third factor which cannot be omitted when discussing Charing Cross Bridge is the interests of the river users, for the volume of water borne trade affected is not always realised. There is first the important but comparatively subsidiary point that the new bridge must not unreasonably interfere with navigation, and, owing to the bend in the river and the currents caused thereby, this imposes severe limitations upon the position and type of structure which can be erected. Of wider implication, however, is the question of what is to be the ultimate treatment of the Surrey shore. Lambeth and Southwark cannot come into their own until a complete break has been made with the stigmas of the past. Once the movement southwards has begun it is bound to be cumulative, so many-sided are the advantages. But an attractive bait will be necessary to overcome the first wariness and aversion due to past memories. It seems likely that a southern embankment between the County Hall and Blackfriars Bridge will provide just the stimulus required. The sites fronting such an embankment, with views over the great sweep of the river towards Whitehall and the Strand, would be amongst the finest in the world, and in times of normal prosperity the demand for them would be enormous. But this would mean displacing the existing warehouses, involving interests which extend not only throughout the Thames basin, but even to international trade. Various compromise proposals have been made, such as a high-level embankment with warehouses under, but, whatever may be decided, the nature of the embankment and the use to which it is to be put must clearly have a profound influence both upon any new bridge and upon the future development of Lambeth.

Even such a cursory examination as has been possible makes plain how far-reaching are the problems involved, and the nearer the approach to practical consideration the more numerous do the difficulties become. The question is of such magnitude that the ideal solution is beyond the scope or vision of any one or two interests involved; it is beyond the technical knowledge not only of any individual but of any one profession. In such conditions the method whereby the problem is approached is the crucial question, the *sine qua non* of success, and the only point on which the man-in-the-street has any right to insist. It is essential that the approach should be from the top downwards, that the broad considerations of all the interests involved should first be weighed in the light of the needs of the community before they are obscured and prejudiced by the myriads of contradictory difficulties that lie in wait on every side. A broad view and a generous spirit of compromise for London's good are necessary, and sectional rivalry and jealousies must be discouraged before the many factors that promote them become too strong. Seen in this light, the actual sequence of events that have led up to the present situation makes lamentable reading indeed, and the moral is so plain that a short review¹ will well repay the effort of casting back our minds into the past, for we are now given time to assimilate the lesson and to determine that when the opportunity for action recurs it shall not be in vain.

Waterloo Bridge has been the focus of interest both at the beginning and at the end of that stage of the long controversy which has now just closed. For some fifty years its piers had been settling very slowly owing to the greatly increased scour since old London Bridge was removed, the gravel being slowly washed away from round the wooden piles on which the bridge rests. In March 1924 the London County Council, who have charge of the bridge, injected cement under high pressure into the ground beneath one pier, in an attempt to arrest the slow movement. Instead, however, of consolidating the gravel the pressure appears to have blown it out into the river away from the piles, and the pier in question settled suddenly, alarmingly and at a rapidly increasing rate. The temporary bridge was built, the arches on each side of the disabled pier were shored up on wooden centering and the roadway over lightened. The subsidence thereupon ceased, and the condition of Waterloo Bridge remains substantially unaltered to this day. Meanwhile, the London County Council, influenced by the rapid subsidence and by the repeated advice of their experts against underpinning, decided in

¹ For a somewhat longer review of the subject readers are referred to Mr. Arthur Ross's admirable book, to which my acknowledgments are due. (*Charing Cross Bridge*: Ernest Benn, October 1929.)

April 1924 to demolish the bridge and rebuild it to the same design but widened to take more traffic. At once protests arose on all sides—from the lovers of the amenities who resented the destruction of a national monument, from engineers who denied the impossibility of underpinning, and from the Labour Party in the Council itself, who advocated an entirely new bridge which would be capable of bringing trams across the river. The feasibility or otherwise of underpinning was crucial, since the necessity of demolishing the bridge depended upon the answer to this question. Competent expert opinion was sharply divided; the eminent engineers consulted by the County Council advised against underpinning, equally eminent engineers consulted by the protesting societies advised in favour, and the Institute of Civil Engineers refused to give a conclusive verdict between the two schools. When the navigation interests added vigorous objection to the compromise proposal of rebuilding the bridge to the same design but wider, the County Council rescinded their former resolution and determined in February 1925 to demolish Waterloo Bridge and to replace it by an entirely new bridge with only five arches. This was, however, to be 'subject to the provision of a vehicular subway under the Strand'. Demolition could not be begun until the temporary bridge was completed, and a conference of protesting societies utilised the respite to organise opposition and to obtain a number of additional engineering opinions on the feasibility of underpinning. The question was referred back to a special Bridges Sub-committee, who finally recommended asking the Government to set up a technical commission as a way out of the impasse. Feeling was now running high; this recommendation was rejected, and in December 1925 the County Council voted to proceed with the demolition. No mention was made this time of the subway under the Strand. As a direct result of the storm of public protest which arose the Royal Commission on Cross-River Traffic was set up in July 1926 under the chairmanship of Lord Lee of Fareham.


The proceedings of Lord Lee's Commission were dominated by two main considerations—the future of Waterloo Bridge and the urgent need of a rapid decision which was emphasised in the Royal instructions. As regards Waterloo Bridge, the Commission investigated every detail with the utmost thoroughness and produced a Report which has every right to be regarded as authoritative. They recommend a combination of rebuilding and of underpinning which would leave the bridge unaltered with the exception of its parapets, which were to be portolled out so as to admit of four lines of traffic instead of only three. They responded so admirably to the call of urgency that their Report was produced in the remarkably short period of four months (November 1926).

but their more general conclusions were profoundly affected by the lack of time available for surveying the vast problem. True to the title of their Commission, traffic was the consideration to which they gave paramount importance, and other equally vital aspects were either entirely overlooked or passed over as subsidiary. Their main recommendations were all based on the assumption that, since crossings are the main cause of traffic congestion, therefore long high-level thoroughfares which bridge the streets below are desirable. The wider town-planning effects that are likely to result from superimposing such road viaducts upon the tangle of existing roads and frontages were ignored. Except in rare and carefully chosen instances, such roads can be almost as injurious as railway viaducts. The constant need of city development is to open out and give more space for easy circulation, rather than to fence off one district from its neighbour by a viaduct. Where a new high-level road is driven between existing streets, site values tend to deteriorate owing to the unremunerative narrow strips and triangles of property which so often form a large part of the area left available for resale, and even where a district is entirely replanned the changes in level are normally found to restrict severely the number of attractive frontages. In the case of Charing Cross Bridge the high-level approach roads suggested by the Royal Commission were after further investigations abandoned by general consent. It is probable that in the future special provision will have to be made for through long-distance traffic. Such traffic forms no part of the life of the districts through which it passes, but rather is an intrusion into them, and it is more likely that its passage can be made innocuous in open cuttings than in overhead viaducts. Whichever level is chosen, the dangers of congestion at the ends of such a thoroughfare or 'speed-way' are profound.

The Report of the Royal Commission in so far as it concerned Charing Cross Bridge was referred to a Committee of Engineers, who first met in the spring of 1927 and continued their discussions for a year. They had the benefit of the advice of the Director-General of Roads on traffic problems (on behalf of the Government), and were also permitted to confer with the engineers of the Southern Railway. They examined numerous possibilities with the greatest diligence, and achieved great merit by inducing the Southern Railway to agree to transfer its terminus to the other side of the river. But no representative of the wider town-planning interests was allowed to share their labours, and repeated protests could only elicit the reply from the Minister of Transport that 'he did not consider that any useful purpose would be served by an examination of the architectural and aesthetic aspects of the scheme until its general features, which must depend on engineer-

ing and financial considerations, had been investigated.' This is the only stage of the long controversy at which blame can properly be attached to individuals. The deplorable lack of foresight that must have prompted such an answer needs no stressing; town-planning was ignored and architecture conceived merely as an addition of mouldings and cornices to pre-determined structures. Once such an attitude had been taken up, no deliberations, however earnest, on the part of experts in some only of the vital factors in the problem could be fruitful, and these experts were inevitably pushed by the sheer weight of circumstances from one untenable position to the next. They should rather be honoured than blamed for their thankless labours under most difficult conditions.

PLAN BY COMMITTEE OF ENGINEERS ADOPTED BY L.C.C. JULY 1908



New terminus on Lamb Brewery site cutting the area on Lambeth bank into two. New (having Level) Bridge continued at higher level over Waterloo Bridge Road. Long tunnels on York Road and Waterloo Bridge Road. Railroad viaducts and road junctions east of Waterloo Station. No new plan was considered. Ramped high level tracks to St Martin's Place, Westminster Bridge Road and Whitefriars Road, abandoned later.

This Committee of Engineers reported in April 1908 and suggested a plan which placed the new terminus on the site of Waterloo Junction Station. This was opposed by the Southern Railway, and in July 1908 the London County Council adopted

a third plan, with the terminus brought forward to the river's edge on the Lion Brewery site. This scheme carried with it the provisional concurrence of the railway company. In January 1929 the County Council, bowing to overwhelming arguments, announced the abandonment of some of the elevated road approaches, which were the sole remaining features originating from the Royal Commission. Finally, in March 1929, when all the fundamentals of the scheme had been settled beyond recall, Sir Edwin Lutyens was asked to advise on its town-planning and architectural aspects, and the 'Official Scheme,' touched up by him in what was, in the circumstances, an almost miraculous way, was adopted by the London County Council and the Southern Railway in July 1929. This scheme passed its second reading in the House of Commons in February 1930, and was then courageously rejected by a strong Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Cantley, which, after a most scrupulous

'OFFICIAL PLAN, ADOPTED BY L.C.C. JULY 1929. REJECTED BY PARLIAMENT'



— TUNNEL —


— BRIDGE —

This should be compared with A. Once the high-level junction had been abandoned the two proposals of both are the same and 'B' shows how much town-planning considerations can impose a scheme even when introduced long after all main principles have been fixed. The Lambeth area is still completely cut into two, with long tunnels under the railway to the new terminus on Lion Brewery site. All bridge traffic is thrown into the Strand.

examination of the proposals themselves, did not even require to hear the arguments of the various opponents.

The clamorous and variegated nature of this opposition will be well remembered. Many alternative suggestions had been put forward and were now examined by the Advisory Committee on Charing Cross Bridge which was set up by the County Council in June 1930, under the chairmanship of Sir Leslie Scott. The appointment of this Committee was a real step in the right direction, since all the varied interests were adequately represented. The terms of reference were, however, unfortunately worded, binding the Committee to a strict limit of initial expenditure and thereby preventing due weight being given to the chances of ultimate recoupment and to the long view. A reference to the necessity of strict economy would have met the need. Moreover, the Committee met in an atmosphere rigidly defined by preconceived opinions, and instead of breaking through these limitations it fixed them still more firmly by what appeared to many on-


PLAN BY LAMBETH BOROUGH COUNCIL ADVISED BY MR W R DAVING AND MR T ADAMS



Now terminals set back to Waterloo Junction etc thus leaving the whole riverside area open to development. The Southern Railway refuses to accept this position for the terminus. The approach to Waterloo Station greatly improved. (The treatment of the Southern Railway station is similar to that of Sir W D. Carr's plan of 1917.)

lookers to be two important errors of procedure. In the first place, members of the Committee were allowed to bring forward schemes of their own without themselves retiring from the Committee, thus not only securing a fuller hearing for these schemes than for those emanating from without, but also prejudicing impartial judgments. And, more important still, the engineer authors of the 'Official Scheme,' which had been rejected as fundamentally unsound by Parliament, were retained, not as witnesses, but as expert advisers. We have tried to show that these eminent engineers had been the victims of circumstances imposed upon them from above. Forced to lend the full weight of their professional experience to final decisions based on inadequate data, they would not have been human had they not wished to maintain their reputation for consistency before the public. Their evidence as witnesses was amongst the most important that could be heard, but it was not fair even to them to give them

PLAN BY SIR M. MACDONALD MR. W. MEIRHEAD MR. D. B. NIVEN, MR. W. D. CAROL, MR. E. M. EBY AND MR. J. ADAMS



THE STATION AREA

An attempt to meet the requirements of the Southern Railway while yet leaving the area open to development as a whole. New terraces on Lion Brewery site, but at low level, the roads being raised over the railway instead of the converse. Minor alterations in street layout than official plan. The Westminster bank, bridge carried over Embankment and then traffic distributed in four directions, but the official scheme on this bank can equally well be substituted. Approach to Waterloo Station greatly improved.

the ubiquitous influence on every detail possessed by the expert adviser on questions of such intricacy. The atmosphere became such that no outside evidence at variance with these preconceived opinions could get a friendly hearing, and when the Committee reported in March 1931 it was found to be hopelessly divided, the majority recommending a plan which was a mere relaunch of the 'Official Scheme' which had been justly killed in Parliament. All question of a new Charing Cross Bridge was shortly after suspended by the Government's decision not to contribute to the cost.

We are left to-day faced by one problem of immediate importance. The London County Council had accepted the recommendations of the Royal Commission with regard to Waterloo Bridge on condition that a new road bridge was built at Charing Cross. Immediately the Government's decision against the latter was announced, the chairman of the Improvements Committee of the County Council wrote a letter to *The Times* announcing that he would proceed at once 'to issue such instructions as may be necessary with a view to minimising the delay in the commencement of the demolition of Waterloo Bridge so that an entirely new bridge may be built to take six lanes of traffic. We find ourselves, therefore, back in the same position as in December 1925. But the holidays have since supervened, and with them time for reflection. There is no possible logical justification for the proposed demolition except the wish to bring trams up to a terminus south of the Strand. For the factor which limits the amount of traffic which Waterloo Bridge will carry is not the width of the bridge itself but the blocks which occur at its crossing with the Strand. The vehicular subway under the Strand (considered a necessary adjunct to a widened Waterloo Bridge by the County Council in February 1925) is not only no longer proposed for the immediate future but even the ultimate construction of such a subway is rendered infinitely harder by the deepening of the Kingsway subway to take double-decked trams. Supported by the unchallengeable authority of the Royal Commission, the æsthetic and antiquarian value of Waterloo Bridge remains supreme, and it is therefore greatly to be hoped that the London County Council will take no action in furtherance of a letter written no doubt at a moment of extreme personal disappointment.

The result of these prolonged and manifold discussions is to leave us in this lamentable position—every expert of note in each of the professions has been consulted, but in such a way and at such a time that each has been forced to commit himself to an opinion founded on incomplete data. Nor is the argument valid which would insist that the 'Official Scheme' (though imperfect) is the best attainable under practical conditions. Each of the

alternative plans proposed may equally be open to objections; but this could not be otherwise with plans prepared by private individuals denied access to official information. A fresh start is needed with new methods and a wider vision, and the present world-wide depression—for all its deplorable consequences—at least gives a heaven-sent opportunity to put the question of cross-river development into cold storage, where old animosities and reputations may be quietly forgotten. And when the cloud shall lift again the prospect is not without hope. We are likely then for the first time to have a Traffic Board controlling all the roads and railways in Greater London, and a Town and Country Planning Act giving powers of development in built-up areas. The primary stimulus necessary to hasten the development of the southern districts will be at hand in the new Lambeth Bridge, the improvements now authorised at the 'Elephant and Castle,' and the new park on the site of Bethlem Hospital, and a fourth factor can be added by the formation of a civic centre in front of Waterloo Station. In fact, if only the methods of approach are right, the hopes of ultimate success are strong and we may take comfort and courage to persevere from the example of Kingsway and Aldwych. First seriously discussed as a practical proposition in 1855, they were not opened till 1905 and are not completely built up now. Yet, in spite of the war and subsequent depression, they have paid their way. And so may Charing Cross, if the long view be allowed to prevail.

A. D. R. CAROE

CLAUDE: A REVALUATION

By way of preparing myself for enjoying the French pictures at Burlington House I have been looking at those in the various permanent collections of London. It is altogether fantastic to imagine these as ever gathered under one roof, because such things do not happen: but only in this event would their composite strength as a revelation of the character of French art be fully apparent. As it is, impressions have to be formed piecemeal and then built together. In doing so I have found myself up against the problem of Claude. He is well represented everywhere, as is to be expected, since Waagen nearly 100 years ago referred to him as the favourite painter of the English. The Dulwich Gallery may be said to have been cradled in Claude, since it was by the purchase of a small picture by him, afterwards sold advantageously to George III. that Descentans was led to undertake the business of picture buying, which had as its sequel the foundation of the gallery. Two landscapes typical of his serenity and delicate aerial sense—two seaports in which the magnificence of Venice lives transported to the quays of Ostia, four other works of his school, keep the visitor aware of his presence: and the impression there formed of the subtlety of his power to render the infinite gradations of the atmosphere is renewed in the Italian landscape with its sun-steeped *vista* in the Wallace.

'An enlightened public needs not my aid to discover the sublimity of Raphael, the brilliancy of Titian, or the tenderness of Claude.' I take these words from the introduction to a catalogue of 1823 of the Angerstein Collection, which by purchase a year later formed the nucleus of the National Gallery. Of the thirty-eight pictures contained in it no less than five were by Claude. In a note on one of these the author remarks that the best pictures of Claude are to be found in this country, and a *postea* of another he observes that Claude's landscapes do not always exhibit the portraiture of a prescribed portion of country, but are frequently collected from materials united with consummate art and cultivated taste. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to frame a description of the painter's method of composition more fair and unobscure.

These two pictures representing the embarkation of the Queen of Sheba and the marriage of Isaac and Rebecca, known as *The Seaport* and *The Mill*, are not now hung with the other Claudes in the room in the National Gallery devoted to the earlier French pictures, but are set in companionate exile in the lobby, side by side with two Turners at the head of the steps leading to it. A visitor might imagine them to be merely crowded out if it were not for the presence of an inscription on the Turners stating them to be placed there in conformity with the terms of Turner's will, which apparently has been potent enough to cause the removal of *The Seaport* and *The Mill* from among the other French pictures. *The Seaport* and Turner's *Building of Carthage*, which hangs by its side, have elements of composition in common which may render them a convenient basis for a comparison of the work of the two painters, were such comparison for all time desirable in the interests of art; but *The Mill*, with its essentially Italian landscape, clear light of noon and stately trees, is altogether dissimilar in composition, tonality and range of colour to Turner's picture of *The Sun Rising in Mist*, with its men-of-war and fishermen; and the enforced juxtaposition of the two consequent upon the terms of Turner's will might well cause a present-day observer to find a solution of the enigma on the same lines as according to Hamerton, M. Vairiot found it—namely by doubting the sanity of the testator at the time the will was made.

Even then he might ask, Why this particular provision? And the answer to the question necessitates the attempt to review Claude's position in art. He might also wonder whether Turner's spirit would be at all disquieted if what Ruskin has described as 'the noble passage of arms to which he challenged his rival from the grave' were now, after eighty years, pronounced ended and the Claudes were put back in their own place.

We are a law-abiding people, but we are also on occasions a chivalrous people, and I would suggest that neither the reputation of Turner nor of anyone else would suffer if in this matter the instinct of chivalry were allowed to preponderate. As the account of the origin of the Dulwich Gallery and the National Gallery has served to suggest, for about a century and a half after Claude's death, which occurred in 1682, there was no painter, with the exception of two or three Italians whose work ranked more highly in general European repute. This was due primarily to the rise of landscape painting, and to the fact that he had come to be regarded as having a better title than anyone else to be looked upon as its founder. With Titian and Tintoretto the painting of landscape not merely as a background, but for what it conveyed in itself, was a casual and infrequent experiment. With Claude the background became the picture. To represent Nature

was the settled practice of his art, and not only his paintings, but the *Liber Veritatis* and his other drawings, of which the British Museum possesses over 200, reveal how completely his life was devoted to this service. The biographical notice by a German painter, Sandrart, is of primary value, because he was Claude's frequent companion in Rome during the period immediately following his return there after his two years' absence, from 1625 to 1627, during which time he had made some stay at Venice, to the no small enrichment of his artistic powers.

During the dozen years of his earlier life in Rome, whether he had gone in boyhood, he had worked first as servant, then as pupil, and finally as assistant to Agostino Tassi, a landscape painter of scenery and in fresco, but after his return there he had won freedom to follow his own course. It was one of tireless and unending effort. As a means, says Sandrart, of penetrating into the hidden ways of Nature he would remain in the Campagna from before dawn until nightfall in order to learn the different conditions of Nature at sunrise and sunset and in the evening hours, and then, returning to his house, he would try to set them down in colours. It was while on one of these expeditions that Sandrart first met him near the falls of Tivoli, and, united by the bond of a common interest, they afterwards spent many days together, making studies of the various natural objects round about Tivoli and also drawing trees and plants in the garden of Sandrart's patron (Justiniani). On certainly one of these occasions Poussin was of the party. During this period, when neither thus occupied nor assisting in frescoes for a living, Claude was busy in drawing from the life or from statues in the Academy. Nature, for others a background, was for him a mistress, whom he served with such devotion as left him but scant measure of power for figure subjects. So entirely did his effort leave behind all other achievement in this particular form of art that already, before Sandrart left Rome in 1635, success had come in the form of patrons—cardinals, popes, ambassadors among them. Either the patron—steeped in tradition—would stipulate, or the painter himself, as a compliment to the presumed classical or biblical learning of his patron, would suggest that in order that the solitude of Nature should not overpower, there should be introduced some small groups of mythological or pastoral figures pursuing their avocations, and it was perhaps because these interested him less than the shadows or shapes of trees, or the changing light of the sun on mountain or lake, that he made the deprecating remark attributed to him that he sold his landscapes but gave his figures. The *Liber Veritatis*, which he compiled to serve as a record of his works, serves to show how widely they were distributed among patrons, France, Spain and England.

figuring in the list—e.g., *Echo and Narcissus*, now in the National Gallery, 'painted for England in 1644.'

The custom of making the Grand Tour contributed, no doubt, to extend the knowledge of his work and to cause an increasing number of his pictures to pass into British ownership. It was responsible, one would imagine, for what is probably the earliest reference to Claude occurring in English literature. It is recorded of James Thomson, the poet, that he was selected by the Lord Chancellor to accompany his eldest son on the Grand Tour of Europe, and that he visited with him most of its courts and capital cities. Thus, presumably, he acquired the knowledge which led him to refer to Claude and two other painters in a stanza in *The Castle of Indolence* published in 1748, the year of his death:

Sometimes the pencil in cool arts halls
Hade the gay bloom of vernal landscapes rise
Or autumn's varied shades imbrown the walls
Now the black tempest strikes the astonished eyes,
Now down the steep the flashing current flies
The trembling sun now plays o'er ocean blue
And now rude mountains frown around the skies
Whate'er Lorrain light touch'd with softening haze,
Or savage Ronsard dash'd our learned Phœbus down

The characteristics of the three painters as thus defined may now seem somewhat trite, but the definitions have survived admirably the test of time.

The references to Claude in Sir Joshua Reynolds's *Discourses* have that touch of condescension natural in view of the lower estimation in which the art of landscape painting was held then, and for long afterwards. So when Constable, at the age of fifty-three, was tardily admitted to the honour of becoming an Academician, Sir Thomas Lawrence bluntly told him that he considered him fortunate in being chosen at a time when there were historical painters of great merit on the list of Associates. Reynolds cites a landscape by Claude Lorraine as an example of how perfection in an inferior style may reasonably be preferred to mediocrity in the highest walks of art. But he also says that Claude would have shown more discretion if he had never meddled with such subjects as affect to introduce mythological learning.

His appreciation of the characteristic features of Claude's landscapes is revealed in such a sentence as 'Claude Lorraine conducts us to the tranquillity of Arcadian scenes and fairy land,' or when he speaks of his mountains as gilded with the setting sun. He approved of his practice of 'composing' his scenes from the various drafts which he had previously made from various beautiful scenes and prospects, and commends its adoption to land-

scape painters, in opposition to the practice of the Dutch and Flemish schools, for the rather curious reason of its truth being founded upon the same principle as that by which the historical painter acquires perfect form. Claude's practice tended, no doubt, to make his landscapes become set and conventionalised, but sometimes, as is the case in the picture now at Burlington House from Houghton Hall, he represents a scene in the Campagna the effect of which is as natural as Nature herself, and I find it impossible not to believe that he sometimes represented particular scenes in his pictures. The question whether landscape painting should aspire to reject what he calls the Accidents of Nature Reynolds will not attempt to determine. He confines himself to saying that Claude seldom if ever availed himself of such Accidents.

How Claude's achievement appeared to the art historian at the close of the eighteenth century may be surmised from a sentence in Lanzi's *History of Painting*: 'Le varie mutazioni del giorno meglio non si veggono in altro paesista che in Claudio.'

The French Revolution probably was the cause of a good many of Claude's pictures finding homes in England, among them being *The Seaport* and *The Mill*, painted in 1745 for the Duc de Bouillon, and sold at the time of the Revolution by the Bouillon family.

In Waagen's account of his visits to Great Britain in 1835 and 1850 there are descriptions of pictures by Claude in more than forty private collections. One of these now at Burlington House, is the beautiful and romantically conceived landscape with an equally beautiful name *The Enchanted Castle*, which Mr. Roger Fry has characterised as 'perhaps Claude's finest work.' Comparatively late work, painted according to the *Liber Primatus*, in 1674, it shows during what a long period Claude's powers remained at their zenith. Perhaps the title conspires to take thought prisoner, but it is an extraordinarily beautiful example of his art. Here surely, his method of composing his landscape is justified by the result. The castle is architecturally ornate, yet as it drops to the lake it seems a thing ethereal and remote. The presence in the foreground of a woman sitting looking out over the water, a boat with towers in the middle distance, white sails far out, suggests what you will. The shimmer of light on the water leads away to the sun-filled distance. The enveloping trees, the motionless seated figure, the haze over the water have a dream-like quality that serves to suggest some degree of kinship between the art of Claude and that of Corot. How the picture has moved a poet to utterance may be seen in Keats' *Epistle to J. H. Reynolds*, written from Triguemouth in 1818, in the lines beginning:

You know the enchanted Castle—it doth stand
Upon a rock on the border of a Lake,
Nested in trees, which all do seem to shake
From some old magic-like Uriganda's sword . . .

You know it well enough, where it doth seem
A mossy place, a Merlin's Hall, a dream.

We pass to the witness of Hazlitt, one of those writers, comparatively few in number, possessing not only an interest, but a technical training in art. For some years he endeavoured to earn a living as a portrait painter, and according to James Northcote, he would have been a great artist had he not preferred the pen to the brush. There is undoubtedly a personal reminiscence in such a sentence as this: 'Painting for a whole morning gives one as excellent an appetite for one's dinner as old Abraham Tucker acquired for his by riding over Banstead Downs.' In the essay in which this sentence occurs he speaks of one of his first attempts—a picture of his father then in a green old age.

I drew it, he says, with a broad light, leaving the face looking brown with spectacles on reading. . . . He was willing to sit as long as I pleased, for there is a natural desire in the mind of man to let his own picture to be the object of continual attention, to have his likeness multiplied, and besides his satisfaction in the picture he had some pride in the artist, though he would rather I should have written a sermon than have painted like Rembrandt or Raphael.

The love he had for pictures is shown by his account of the sensations that overcame him on first entering the Louvre.

Reader if thou hast not seen the Louvre thou art ignorant.

'Here for four months together I stalked and stalked, and I saw heard the warning sounds:

Quatre heures passées, à l'est l'ombre d'un rayon.

That the spectacle of all the Louvre had to offer of great art had not in any way lessened Hazlitt's admiration for the works of Claude, formed probably first at the Dulwich Gallery, is very evident. He calls him 'the great master of Italian landscape' who 'drank in the clear sparkling lines and lovely forms of Nature.' He speaks of 'the exquisite gradations in a sky of Claude's,' of his forms 'always exquisite, sometimes beyond compare.' Speaking of the pleasure that awaits a painter in viewing country seats, he indulges in a rhetorical flourish: 'there is an air round Lord Radnor's park, for there hang the two Claudes, the morning and evening of the Roman Empire.'

The second of these two examples of the painter's art, now on loan at Burlington House, has, if one may use Hazlitt's figure of speech, 'an air round it.' It represents a scene of sunset with the ruins of Rome in the background, while in the foreground a

shepherd is seated watching two girls who are dragging a goat to a river. The composition offers admirable contrasts in the grandiose outlines of the sun-steeped ruins and the peasants preoccupied with their simple pursuits. The masterly treatment of the water with the sunlight dancing along its ripples, the reflection of the Arch of Septimius Severus and its reliefs within it, the flowers, grasses and cattle of the foreground, are all in the artist's best manner.

The references to Claude scattered throughout Constable's letters are of such a nature that Meyer Graefe has said that he was Constable's purest affection, 'the figure he approached with the purest feelings as the youth approaches his first love'. Great as the influence undoubtedly was, Constable only rose to his full stature when he forgot the work of others. He would seem to have himself become convinced of the necessity of this when he wrote at twenty-six, 'For the last two years I have been running after pictures and seeking the truth at second hand. There is room enough for a natural painter'. And on another occasion, 'Painting is with me but another word for feeling'. And his biographer Leslie once heard him say, 'When I sit down to make a sketch from Nature the first thing I try to do is to forget that I have ever seen a picture'. It is by virtue of the innate sympathy with Nature's moods which these words suggest, and of which his paintings form a record, that Constable is to be regarded as the creator of impressionism in art.

Admiration for the art of Claude had early taken deep root in his being. At the age of sixteen he had seen the small landscape representing either Hagar or an Annunciation in the possession of Sir George Beaumont, and, according to Leslie, he looked back on the sight of it as an important epoch in his life. Seven years later he copied it, and a dozen years later still the zest for copying Claude was unabated. For then, apparently, there was a chance of the Academy getting the loan of a Claude from Mr. Angerstein's collection for that purpose. 'It must have been *The Seaport*, from what Constable wrote. The large and magnificent marine picture, one of the most perfect in the world'. 'Though I can ill afford it,' he added, 'I will make a copy of the same now . . . The very doing it will almost bring me into communion with Claude himself'. In a later letter he says, 'The great Claude does not come to the Academy this year (a young lady is copying it)'. He found compensation two years later when staying with Sir George Beaumont at Colchester. The following excerpts from his letters to Leslie's life afford a delightful glimpse of a conduct of devotion during this visit.

Only think, I am now writing in a room full of Claudes, (not Clavens but real Claudes) Wilsons and Pusses, but I think of you and am sad in the midst of all.

I have copied one of the small Claudes; a breezy sunrise, a most pathetic picture. Perhaps a sketch would have served my present purpose, but I wished for a more lasting remembrance of it; and a sketch of a picture is only like seeing it in one view. It will not serve to drink at again and again. I have likewise begun the little grove by Claude, a noon-day scene 'which warms and cheers, but which does not inflame or irritate.' Through the depths of the trees are seen a waterfall and a ruined temple, and a solitary shepherd is piping to some goats and sheep.

In closing shades, and where the current strays
Pipes the lone shepherd to his feeding flocks. . . .

In the breakfast room hang four Claudes, a Cosmo, and a Swaneveldt; the sun glows on them as it sets.

I am now going to breakfast before *The Narcissus* of Claude. How enchanting and lovely it is, far, very far surpassing any other landscape I ever beheld.

[A week later.] I do not wonder at your being jealous of Claude. If anything could come between our love it is him. I am fast advancing a beautiful little copy of his study from nature of a little grove scene. If you, my dearest love, will be so good as to make yourself happy without me for this week it will, I hope, be long before we part again. But, believe me, I shall be the better for this visit as long as I live. To-morrow Southey is coming with his wife and daughter. I know you would be sorry if I did not stay and meet him. But the Claudes, the Claudes are all, all, I can think of here.

Of the said four Claudes presented by Sir George Beaumont to the National Gallery in 1826 only two (Nos. 43 and 52) *The Death of Procris* and *The Little Grove*, are now in a position accessible to the public.

Constable's final considered judgments upon Claude are to be found in his Lectures on Landscape delivered in 1833 and 1836. In the first he said of him, 'He has been deemed the most perfect landscape painter the world ever saw, and he fully merits the distinction. The characteristics of his pictures are always those of serene beauty.' In the second, 'A painter whose works have given unalloyed pleasure for two centuries. Deep admiration and reverence would seem to inspire each and all of these utterances, and Constable's dicta about a painter of landscape have some title to our respect.

And then came Ruskin, and the concert of approbation was marred by a shrill note of dissonance. There appeared in May 1843 vol. 1. of *Modern Painters. their Superiority in the Art of Landscape Painting to all the Ancient Masters proved by Examples of the True the Beautiful and the Intellectual, from the Works of Modern Artists, especially from those of J. M. W. Turner, Esq. R.A. by a Graduate of Oxford*. The anonymity was not long permitted in. It was a device suggested by the author's father,

because he felt that some of the views expressed in the book might be looked upon as presumptuous if known to have emanated from an author whose age was twenty-four at the time of publication. His doubts were well founded, but the book was an instant success. 'Our Noble Selves' will always be a popular toast if only it has a good speaker, and there can be no doubt that Ruskin was a very great literary artist. Turner's work had been slow in gaining the attention of the public, and Ruskin's advocacy helped enormously to bring this about. But Turner had been elected an Academician seventeen years before Ruskin was born, and he was not really by any means so obscure as his eulogist chose to suppose him to have been previous to the fact of his own discovery. The work must be considered somewhat lacking in the historic sense as endeavouring an abrupt line of division, ignoring the debt which each painter owed to certain of his predecessors. As Constable remarks, 'A self-taught artist is one taught by a very ignorant person.'

The trumpet call to artists to reject tradition and go direct to Nature has heralded every rebirth. Leonardo da Vinci in a passage in his *Treatise on Painting* says that it had been the ruling motive of Giotto and Masaccio. It was that of Turner, as Ruskin showed in many passages of lofty and imperishable eloquence. And of Claude also, and others of the earlier masters, each in their degree, whose work Ruskin contrasts with that of Turner. Of Claude—out in the Campagna at daybreak, remaining there until nightfall, sketch-book in hand, intent to study the transitional effects of light throughout the long hours of the day.

What, then, is the motive of Ruskin's undeniable antagonism to Claude in particular? To some extent it is an unconscious tribute. Having set himself with all a master's armoury of rhetoric to champion the cause of the living against the dead, he must needs bring from the shades a leader upon whom to do battle. He chooses the most prominent in repute because he is the most prominent. If he can show that Claude is not worthy of admiration, then Turner has no rival in landscape worth the name. If, however, before he wrote the first volume of *Modern Painters* he had set himself to undertake the serious study of the art of Florence and Venice which followed it, would not his perspective have entirely changed? Would he then have denounced Claude for showing an interest in treatment of detail while eulogising Carpaccio for doing the same thing? From the plan projected in the sub-title partisanshipe was inevitable, but at times it passes all bounds, and then at other times, especially in the later volumes, the brilliant perspicacity of the writer breaks away from his rôle of carping critic. There are such peculiarities as 'the fixed white insipidity of Claude,' 'shiny futile Claude,' or the statement that the stem of the chief tree in one of the pictures which won Con-

stable's admiration at Coleorton is 'a very faithful portrait of a large boa constrictor with a handsome tail.' And then in amazing contrast he will define with dispassionate sobriety and insight the position which Claude occupies in the development of the art of landscape; e.g.:

He set the sun in the heaven and was I suppose the first who attempted anything like the realisation of actual sunlight in misty air

[He] made the sun his subject and painted the effects of misty shadows cast by his rays over the landscape and other delicate aerial transitions as no one had ever done before, and in some respects as no one has ever done in oil colour since

This, surely, were enough title to fame! But Ruskin follows up the latter sentence by the remarkable *dictum* that if Claude had been a great man he would not have been so steadfastly set on painting effects of sun

In the same chapter he defines with lucidity the relation in which Claude stood to Turner in respect to technique

When Turner arose with an earnest desire to paint the whole of nature, he found that the existence of the sun was an important fact and by no means an easily manageable one — the burning orb and the golden haze could not somehow be got out of the oil-paint. Naturally he went to Claude, who really had got them out of oil-paint — approached him with great reverence, as having done that which seemed to Turner most difficult of all technical matters and he became his faithful disciple

Turner was a supremely great colourist who probably put more colour into his sunlight than did any other artist either before or since. But who fished the murex up? It is strange how Ruskin, while rendering homage to the greatness of Turner, constantly belittles the painter from whom, as he acknowledges, Turner learnt more than from any other

The heady wine of adulation, poured out at first in even more abundant manner than we now read it, was almost too much for the object of his admiration. It was embarrassing, no doubt, but at the same time it was difficult for even an Academician nearing the age of seventy to remain unmoved when an admirer in a book which sold by the thousand likened him to the Angel of the Sun in *The Apocalypse*. Turner, therefore, when he read the luminous demonstration of the falsity, feebleness, and foolish elegance (to quote from the headings in the index to *Modern Painters*) of almost everything that Claude either accomplished or attempted, with particular and detailed reference to the great outstanding examples of his work which had passed with the Angerstein collection into the National Gallery, felt convinced of the truth of these observations, and consequently of the errors of Claude.

to whose works he had formerly put himself to school as a pupil to copy and to learn, and from whom, as Ruskin admits, he had learnt far more than from any other painter. Poor is that pupil, says Leonardo da Vinci, who does not surpass his master. And so he evolved the brilliant notion of challenging his rival from the grave to a contest, by leaving an instruction in his will that two of his pictures should be left to the nation on condition that they were hung by the side of *The Seaport* and *The Mill*. And he died eighty years ago, and the contest still goes on.

But the spirit of antagonism of which it was the symbol is ended. Thanks to the efforts of Turner's doughty champion, the issue was never really in doubt. The proverbial straw shows the way the wind of public favour blows, and the official statistics show that no sooner were Turner's pictures exhibited in the National Gallery than Claude lost the attention of the copyists. The general public, led captive for a time by Ruskin's burning enthusiasm, was slow to perceive that he was a far safer guide when he bid them admire than when he was engaged in casting down false idols. He did far less than justice to Claude and also to Constable.

Waagen, in the record of his visitation of British art treasures, referred to Claude as the favourite painter of the English. At no subsequent time could such a statement be made. Claude's reputation, however, probably never stood higher than it does to-day among those who study the problems of the artist. In his interest in the distribution of light and transparency of atmosphere, in his intimate sympathy with the life and movement of Nature as seen primarily in his drawings, he is nearer to the more recent developments of landscape art than is Turner in his more impassioned and dramatic renderings. Each painted sunlight marvellously, but Claude was more interested in what the sunlight fell upon.

In the opinion of Sir George Clausen, of whose claim to speak as an authority on the art of landscape his own work is more than sufficient warrant, Claude's weak points 'the 'staging,' the too obvious 'composition' of many of his pictures, the conventional groups of personages' are overpowered and redeemed by the greatness of his vision, by 'his wonderful skill in expressing light, perception of delicate gradations extending through a wide range, and the clearness and freshness of his tints.' He finds him even greater as an artist in his drawings 'made direct from Nature with a simple enjoyment in what was before him.' But he is also kinder far than Ruskin to *The Seaport* and *The Mill*. In the former he pierces to the core of the artist's intention: 'What he wanted to impress on us was the beauty of the evening sun shining in the clear sky over the sea, and so well did he do it that

the sun still shines in his picture, after over two hundred years.' In the latter it was to show the stretch of sunlit open country through the trees. 'We notice the trees but our eye goes through to the distance.'

'I am now going to breakfast before *The Narcissus* of Claude,' wrote Constable from Coleorton. 'How enchanting and lovely it is; far, very far surpassing any landscape I ever beheld.' This is one of the Beaumont Claudes that are no longer shown, but for a few weeks nine examples of his art, gathered from far and wide, hang on the walls of Burlington House. They serve admirably to reinforce the examples of his work in the permanent collections, in revealing the full extent of his power to interpret the gradations of the atmosphere and the beauty and serenity of Nature. We may not see in them all that Constable saw in *The Narcissus*, but we can no more see with his eyes than we can paint with his brush.

EDWARD McCURDY

EARLY THEATRICALS AT OXFORD

WITH PROLOGUES BY LEWIS CARROLL

As we shall this year celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Lewis Carroll, it is possible that some interest may attach to a hitherto unpublished prologue written by him for some private theatricals sixty years ago, and to a brief retrospective sketch of the circumstances in the social life of the University under which it was composed.

Anyone familiar with the crowded streets and the busy life of Oxford at the present day—the endless stream of traffic, and the constant succession of bicycles conveying male and female students to their respective lectures—would find it difficult to imagine or recall the serene and sequestered life of the University during the later sixties of the last century. There were at that time no married Fellows. Only the heads of houses and University professors were permitted to enjoy the amenities of family life, and, apart from the college dons, Oxford society was confined to them and to the few residents more or less connected with the University. Formal dinners were exchanged amongst members of this select circle throughout the year, excepting during Lent, when they gave place to musical—at homes—irreverently styled ‘stand ups’ and ‘perpendiculars’ by the undergraduates occasionally honoured with an invitation. Hospitality was dispensed by college dons at luncheons or dinners in their rooms, or in the college common rooms. During Commemoration Week there were the annual fixtures of the Masonic, University, and Christ Church balls, with one smaller one occasionally given by some other college or by Vincent’s Club, the flower show, and a concert for which some of the leading artists from Drury Lane or Covent Garden were engaged. At other times there was little variation in the daily life of the University. Undergraduates from time to time ‘snatched a fearful joy’ by dining at the Mitre, or spending an evening at the billiard rooms, but convivial gatherings usually took the form of ‘wines’ in college. Only three colleges—New College, Magdalen, and Pembroke—possessed junior common-rooms at which dessert was laid, though not necessarily partaken

of, every evening, and, as the usual dinner hour was six o'clock, these symposia generally terminated before 'Tom' sounded, and did not seriously interfere with the evening's work. In addition to these, wine clubs existed at most of the colleges—the 'King Charles' at St John's, the 'Phoenix' at Brasenose, the 'Adelphi' at Exeter, and others; but one form of entertainment was conspicuously absent, and that was the drama. Classical burlesques, indeed, were written, and produced during Commemoration Week by the Nolan brothers of St John's, Vincent Amcotts, and others. I have the libretto of *Iphigenia*, acted at the Holywell Music Room in 1866, but by the close of that decade the drama had fallen into disfavour with the University authorities and many of the college tutors, partly as being a hindrance to the work of the schools, and partly in consequence of a recent scandal connected with the 'Shooting Stars' the precursors of the O.U.D.S. A proposed performance of *The School for Scandal* in 1869 never materialised, and was, I believe, vetoed by the Vice-Chancellor. Private theatricals continued to be given from time to time. I remember hearing of a party at St Edmund Hall in 1870 at which a play entitled *The Woman who was a Cat* was performed, and soon afterwards I myself took part in some theatricals at Myddleton Hall, the residence of Professor Bartholomew Price, afterwards Master of Pembroke College: the plays acted being *The Happy Pair* and *The Area Belle*. But it required some courage to brave the disapproval of a certain section of the University, and it was in these circumstances that Mrs Hatch, the wife of the Vice-Principal of St Mary Hall, approached the Rev C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) with the request that he would write a prologue for some private theatricals which she proposed giving at Clevedon House on November 1 and 2, 1871. With this request he complied. The plays were *The Loan of a Lover* and *Whitebait at Greenwich*, and the prologue was spoken by Mr Maxwell-Lyte, of Magdalen.

PROLOGUE (by C. L. Dodgson, spoken at Oxford November 1 and 2, 1871)

(*Certain rises and discovers the SPEAKER, who comes forward thinking aloud*)

'Ladies and gentlemen seems stiff and cold
There's something personal in 'Young and old'
I'll try 'Dear friends' (to audience) (Oh! let me call you so!—
Dear friends, look kindly on our little show,
Contract us not with giants in the art
Nor say 'You should see better in that part'
Nor yet, unkindest cut of all in fact
Condemn the actors while you praise the act,
Having by coming proved you find a charm in it.
Don't go away and hint there may be harm in it

MISS CRABB. My dear Miss Verjuice—can it really be?—

You're just in time, love, for a cup of tea.

And so, you want to see those people play!

MISS VERJUICE. Well! Yes, Miss Crabb, and I may truly say

You showed your wisdom when you stayed away

MISS CRABB. Doubtless! Theatricals in our quiet town!

I've always said 'The law should put them down'

They mean no harm—though I begin to doubt it,

But now, sit down, and tell me all about it

MISS VERJUICE. Well then, Miss Crabb, I won't deceive you, dear

I heard some things I'm m—didn't like to hear

MISS CRABB. But don't omit them now

MISS VERJUICE. Well, m— I'll try

To tell you all the painful history

(She whispers alternately behind a small fan.)

And then, my dear Miss Astorian and he

Preterred they were lovers!

MISS CRABB. *(Starts up)*

(Miss Verjuice whispers behind the fan)

SPEAKERS. What? Acting like?—Ah, has that not been worn

Save with a row of feelings?—a pointed between?

My gentle cousins, let me scrupulously ask

Is there not actors ever wear a rascal?

Oh have we reached at last that golden age

That finds deception only on the stage?

Come, let's confess all round before we judge

Where all are guilty none should pass the judge.

We're actors all a trifle—except

Some on the stage and others on the sill

And guiltiest he who paints so well his plot

Has brother actors scarce known what he is

A truce to moralizing—we invite

The genial company we are to-night

To share the little banquet we have got.

Well dressed, we hope, and served up hot and hot

Even of a few in the boiling tank

Concluding with a hearty course of fish

It should be at Greenwich in the best condition

(The Mr. Gluckstone's very kind performance)

Before the course will be handed round

An entire made of children, nicely browned

(All sing)

But hark! The bell is summoning me away.

They're anxious to begin their little play

One word before I go—we'll do our best,

And crave your kind indulgence for the rest.

Own that at least we've striven to succeed

And take the good intention for the deed

In the following year there were again theatricals at Clevedon House, the plays acted being *Charlemagne* and *Dame on Both Sides*.

* He was at that time M.P. for Greenwich.

Mr. Dodgson again wrote the prologue, which, with the former one, will appear in Mr. Falconer Madan's forthcoming *Handbook to the Literature of Lewis Carroll*, and was spoken by the two small children of our hostess.

PROLOGUE

BEATRICE. Wife, I'm sure that something is the matter,
All day there's been - Oh! such a noise and clatter,
Mamma's been trying on a funny dress;
I never saw the house in such a mess.
Is it a secret, Wife?

WILFRED. Yes, of course.

BEATRICE. And you won't tell me? Then you're very cross.
I'm sure of this, it's something quite uncommon

WILFRED. Curiously thy name is Woman!

Well then, I'll tell you, Birdie. What should you say
If they were going to act a little Play?

BEATRICE. I'd say 'How nice!' but (*pointing to audience*) will it please
the rest?

WILFRED. Oh yes! Because you know they'll do their best
(*To audience*) You'll praise them won't you when they've done
their Play?

Just say (*clapping his hands*) How nice! before you go away

The next performance in which I took part was that of *The Rivals*, given by the 'Oxford Private Dramatic Society' at the Clarendon Hotel, at which H R H the Duke of Albany was present, and in 1883 I again acted at Myddleton Hall in Robertson's comedy *Ours*. On this occasion W. I. Courtney, for many years editor of *The Fortnightly Review*, whose reputation as an actor had been established by his impersonation of the Watchman in the production of *The Agamemnon* a short time previously, played the part of the hero, Hugh Chalced. But by this time the University authorities had yielded to the increasing demand in Oxford for stage performances, and the O.U.D.S. had come into existence.

FRED. B. DE SAUSMAKES

LITERATURE IN UTOPIA¹

For literature such as we now enjoy if Utopia would be a lethal chamber. Our art needs inequalities, contrasts, catastrophes, reactionary yearnings, millennial hopes, abysmal despairs, the subtly pungent odour of decay, and mystic premonitions of a far-off spring—a gloriously imperfect, capricious, almost chaotic world. With peace, with order, with justice, there would spread over the earth the pall of uniformity, mother of *l'adieu* and herald of spiritual death.

Needless to say that such a contingency is infinitely remote, like the cooling off of our sun. At any rate, it lies farther beyond the range of practical consideration than the exhaustion of our coal supply. Be not dismayed: for untold generations there will be enough misery and madness among men to keep poetical fires burning. When the more obvious ills are cured, more refined ones will come to light: there is ever a new peak of discontent to be climbed. So long as there is maladjustment, dissatisfaction, desire, we have not fully entered upon our Utopian heritage, and poets will have their say.

Still, we should not entertain too blind a faith in the perpetuity of human wrongs: they might fail us at any moment. The acceleration of human progress is such that the millennium might burst upon us with catastrophic suddenness. The extinction of desire might come in lieu of satisfaction, and produce the same benumbing effect. In our happy Republic 'lickers' and 'knockers' are sternly discouraged: in a world further advanced towards Utopia, discontent of any kind might be considered as the most heinous social sin. The apostles thereof would be eliminated as undesirable. Euthanasia would weed them out; eugenics would see to it that the breed remain extinct. In Utopia only those loyal and law-abiding citizens will be allowed to live whose social instincts are in perfect harmony with the organisation of the State. Life will then become purely automatic, hope disappearing along with fear.

It may be objected that literature is not merely the mirror of

¹ See 'Gomphopolis: A Utopia for Literatures' by the same author, *New South Country and After*, August 1933.

contemporary life. True : a Utopian world might enjoy vicariously, through art, the wickedness and distress of our age, just as the epic grandeur of the Napoleonic era was enjoyed by the peace-loving subjects of Louis Philippe, the aristocratic calm of the Augustans by a busy plebeian public, the naive faith of the Middle Ages by the sophisticates of the Post-Voltairian era. But if literature thus became purely retrospective, it would inevitably lose its vitality. Great art cannot subsist on ghosts and make-believe. A hundred years ago our ancestors enjoyed, romantically, knights, bandits and pirates to-day these charming characters chiefly belong to very juvenile fiction ; grown-ups greet them with a smile which is wistful, but also half-contemptuous.

Literature in historical setting has not completely lost its appeal, because the problems of the past are still essentially our problems. On a different scale, with different weapons, with different battle cries, the world of ten centuries ago was a world of struggle, very much like our own. In less picturesque garb, bandits, pirates and knights are still with us. But Utopian society will be vexed by none of our cares and therefore will be thrilled by none of our interests.

Maria-Antonette, told that the people had no bread, ingeniously replied : ' Why don't they eat *bricées* ? ' She was living in an artificial Utopia, had no experience of actual suffering, and her imagination could not stretch across the chasm. Our descendants will all evince the unwitting callousness of Maria-Antonette. We cannot actually recreate a vanished world : we can only deck ourselves in the trappings of the past, as for a masquerade, or project our living sentiments on a picturesque antiquarian background. A literature based on the problems of a bygone age will first become superficially romantic, then purely conventional, and ultimately meaningless. This process is taking place under our eyes. The theme of the long-lost child, which delighted antiquity, the Middle Ages, and even classical Europe, has sunk to the level of cheapest melodrama. Military prowess, exploration, even the conquest of wealth and power, will go the same way : all such subjects will seem absurd when men are assigned their function in the commonwealth as the result of blood tests and skull measurements. Many of my students to-day cannot understand why the Victorians made such a fuss over the loss of their orthodoxy, and a book like Froude's *Normans of Fustik* now belongs to history, not to living literature. The problems of to-day will cast their shadows for centuries to come, just as we are still vexing our souls in this twentieth century over issues which properly belong to the Middle Ages, but the shadow will ultimately melt away altogether. The literature of Utopia will

have to be founded on the problems of Utopia. If there be no problems, there will be no literature.

Utopian conditions, however, do not spell the death of literature, but only of a literature based upon physical adventure, contrasts, surprise. In other words, they might imply simply the downfall of a superficially dramatic, or melodramatic, conception of art. In a world thoroughly conscious, organized and stabilised, the romance of accident, sudden rise, violent collapse, will cease to be significant and therefore will cease to be interesting. Even *Œdipus Rex* might be discarded on that score. But the result might be refinement rather than barrenness—the trim garden would take the place of the wilderness. A great loss? I do not know—there is beauty in Versailles. The fear of sudden death, no doubt, gives great zest to life—at every moment you rejoice that you have been spared yet a little while; perfect security would destroy that thrill which makes the mere fact of existence a boom. But the man who has no pestilence and no murderer to dread need not perish of boredom. He will have time to live, instead of merely begging for life. His ordered life will confess the beauty of the world's peace.

We might anticipate that in this quieter and more spacious existence, our Utopian would have less use for art as an exquisite luxury. Even though art should lose all deeper significance, it might retain its pure as gratuitous activity, as play pure and simple. Only in Utopia is it possible for art to exist solely for art's sake. Under the present dispensation some purpose will almost inevitably be injected—even George Moore was proud that a home for unwed mothers was named after his *Encher Waters*. There is no artist who does not denounce or extol, no artist who does not preach—the most disinterested cannot refrain from denouncing the Plainities and preaching the cult of Beauty. The art that will disappear with the world or tragic chaos of our society is only an art of propaganda—and surely George Moore, H. L. Mencken, or J. H. Cabell should be the last to plead for its retention. 'O blues!' In Utopia there will be no cause to serve.

No doubt literature would tend to be static in a static world. Will the thought be quite so appalling if we substitute 'permanent' for 'static'? What do the Classicists, and the Neo-Classicists, and most of all our Neo-Neo-Classicists, stand for except enduring values and unchangeable laws? Writers in Utopia will not be worse off than La Bruyère, who opened his book with the words: 'All has been said, and there remains nothing to be said, after six thousand years of human thought.' Originality of theme has absolutely nothing to do with literary merit. As Pascal remarked, although two players use the same tennis ball, one of them places it better. Merely as a game, the

combinations of words are infinitely more inexhaustible than those of chessmen.

Such a formal conception of art would lead to the worship of technique and total indifference to subject-matter. In Utopia a poet might be a prince among his peers for having brought together two unexpected epithets applied to a saucepan. In the past such conditions have invariably denoted decadence. The last poets of the Middle Ages rejoiced in metrical acrobatics, just as the last schoolmen were noted for tight-rope walking over a logical abyss. The dim ultimate classicists of the eighteenth century could describe the most commonplace object or happening in smoothest verse, and managed to be perfectly definite without ever calling a thing by its rude proper name. Banville, beloved and revered by Swinburne, was the star juggler and tumbler of late Romanticism, and Jean Giraudoux among the living can give the tritest thought such unexpected piquancy that he almost deserves to live in Utopia. If all 'purpose' could be banished, and form alone be sovereign, then the kingdom of Pure Poetry desired by George Moore and Henri Bremond would be at hand.

As nothing ever happens in Utopia, literature, after a transition period, will cease to deal with deeds, and will become entirely introspective. Long after the physical universe has been reduced to order the heart will remain unruly and the mind mysterious. So 'landscapes of the soul' and 'climates of feeling' will take the place of our coarse and obvious material descriptions. Violent passions, being anti-social, will long have been trained out of human nature. shades of likes and dislikes, the ghost of jealousy, the gleam of a scruple, a flicker of remorse, will be examined under a high-power microscope. Not a murder case, but the faint wiffleity toward the use of an expletive, may be a fair subject for a novelist of the year 3000. The psychological fiction of the French may give us an adumbration of what we have a right to expect in Utopia. Racine's tragedy *Berence* is a sigh in 1600 lines; Marivaux 'weighed airy trifles in scales made of gossamer'; Proust rediscovered his whole sensitive childhood in a bite of *madeleine* dipped in a cup of tea, and the analyst of to-morrow will out-Proust Marcel Proust as deceptively as Proust himself went beyond Marie Corelli.

To our untutored taste Utopian literature would probably seem morbidly sentimental and absurdly finicky. Every feeling will be isolated, magnified, placed under various lights, submitted to endless reagents, so as to be studied and enjoyed with absolute safety. Similarly, a Texas rancher, used to guessing at a glance the weight of living steers, would scorn the meticulous methods of the physicist, who measures a fraction of a milligramme under truly scientific conditions. The cowboy may have more native

genius; but modern civilisation pins its faith to the methods of the laboratory.

The possibilities of psychological romance in Utopia are unfathomable. We may take it for granted that the more obvious sentiments will have ceased to exist as fit subjects for literature; perhaps they will have ceased to exist altogether. But then we shall reach from the conscious, too clearly mapped out, into the subconscious and the unconscious. A psychological drama will take place on many planes, each new depth explored will reveal another depth still unplumbed. We could conceive of a stirring piece dealing with the obscure struggle between two embryonic thoughts, in the inmost recesses of a man's soul. The climax would be reached when the victorious idea rises to the threshold of consciousness. It might be that in the process the rivals should get inextricably entangled. The emergent thought, bearing the name of the one, would borrow most of its substance from the other, for Fate will not cease to be ironical in Utopia. The subconscious preparation of a Fundamentalist sermon implies a whole epic of spiritual warfare, more fascinating than Napoleon's Russian campaign. Our descendants will not starve for lack of fun.

If psychological training should progress in such a way as to make mind-reading a common achievement and telepathy a possibility, then new problems and new techniques will open before the fictionist. Man evolved speech so as to conceal his thought: what is going to happen when that coarse mask is torn aside? The difficulty will be to think in such a way as to preserve inviolate the privacy of one's ultimate self. Certain thoughts will be used as smoke screens or camouflage for other thoughts. O'Neill and Pirandello are already attempting such dramas of the dark within, but their method of symbolical presentation is still crudely primitive. In order fully to fathom a novel or play of the thirtieth century the reader will have to combine the acumen of Bergson, Einstein and Paul Valéry. We may imagine the smile of the Utopians if they were to unearth the sophomoric subtleties of Henry James or Marcel Proust.

As Utopia reaches its perfection, even psychology may come to offer entrancing mysteries. Not that there will ever be a lack of inner worlds to conquer, but the urge to discovery might become atrophied through premature self-satisfaction. When psychology has thus attained the definiteness and rigidity of a mechanism, it will be dead: that is to say, it will have become a full-fledged science, and the artists of the thirty-first or thirty-second centuries will feel anxious again about the future of their craft.

Idle fears once more! Long before we are seriously concerned about the exhaustion of certain sources of power, such as coal,

other sources are discovered or rediscovered, such as waterfalls, the winds, the waves, the tides, the sun's rays ; to-morrow we may release and harness atomic energy. Literature may face the future with like confidence. If the human mind should ever become scientifically known in its inner workings, in its relations with other minds and with the physical universe, there would still remain the boundless field of Metaphysics. Metaphysics are to be found, evanescent or in solid nuclei, through many poetical masterpieces of the past, but they were blended with melodrama and psychology, with mere adventure and with human personalities. Now such a mixture denotes a primitive state of culture. A chemist to-day would laugh at the idea of translating the formula H^2O into a poetical masque, the courtship of the nymph Hydrogen by the swain Oxygen. Science is direct and stark. Philosophy may also be stripped of ornaments which are little better than puerile. The *Divine Comedy* and *Faust* are grand metaphysical epics : in an adult world the puppet show element in Goethe's masterpiece, the lurid popular imagery in Dante's, would disappear altogether, like dress under an acid. The metaphysical would survive unalloyed. Could it be enjoyed in such a form ? Yes, by readers with proper gifts and training. It is hard for a layman to realise that certain musicians can read a symphony silently, and derive profound enjoyment from it ; that a great mathematician can read pages of formulæ with perfect understanding and intense delight. In the Utopian world Spinoza and Hegel will be considered, as they ought to have been from the first, as poets, 'cloud-weavers of phantasmal hopes and fears'. The destiny of the 'thing-in-itself' will thrill our great-grand-children as keenly as the matrimonial tangles of Arthur and Evelyn thrill us to-day.

The Utopian mind, after reaching the ultimate confines of its domain, might, however, refuse to venture into metaphysics at all. What if metaphysics were, not the Unknown but simply the impalpable Inane ? To plunge into its void would be sheer suicide. 'The Science of the Unknowable' is little better than an absurdity, and Herbert Spencer knew it well. This condemnation of metaphysics, if it were accepted, would leave mysticism unscathed. For, at all stages in human development, there will be a feeling that cosmic life is greater than organised science, and intuition, in the thirtieth century, will take its flight no less boldly than in the twentieth. Its expression will not be so crudely anthropomorphic ; but it can never be fully scientific either. A surmise, even a revelation, can only be indicated in symbolical terms. There always will be a touch of wildness in the affirmations of the mystic ; for any venture beyond the norm of experience is by definition *unlike and unnameable*. The marginal ground, the debatable borderland between accepted reality and reality still in the

making, will ever be the realm of dreams and fancies, intuitions and visions, and will never cease bearing poetical fruit. This as long as we see only as through a glass darkly, as long as we do not know even as we are known.

This leads us to the Supreme Utopia, when all veils are removed and we contemplate the splendour of truth face to face—what are the possibilities of literature in heaven? According to the most approved authorities on the subject, the sole poetical genre to survive will be an eternal hymn of praise. We shall not challenge the word of witnesses who cannot claim a prolonged acquaintance with the conditions they describe, but we have a right to wonder whether their lyrical paradise be the very last stage. For the separation between Creator and creatures, implied in such a ritual, means limitation, incompleteness, and therefore longing, and therefore sorrow. Perfect bliss is inconceivable until the lost are all redeemed and all individuals are absorbed again into the One. Then the song of praise itself will be stilled, and the absolute silence of Nirvana will prevail throughout eternity. At this extreme limit Utopia does, indeed, necessitate the complete extinction of all literature. But not until then.

Let us wake up. What is the sense of all this nonsense? Believe it or not, O practical Anglo-Saxon reader, there is some sense in it—and since you challenge me to draw explicitly the moral lessons of my apologue, here they are, duly tabulated:

I. The hostility of the alleged artistic soul to industrial and social progress is based on a fallacy. Chaos, injustice, suffering, are not essential to poetry. The opposition of aesthetes to such causes as pacifism, simplified spelling, a reformed calendar, an international language, world organisation, Socialism, is founded on a crude conception of art. Art under Utopia will simply be more disinterested and more refined than it is at present. Material standardisation need not hurt the soul. What if we should all wear the same brand of clothes and drive the same kind of automobiles? Our remote ancestors had standardised on nakedness and pedestrian transportation.

II. It is not impossible that Utopia might see the vanishing of the artist as a being apart. In the same way, the hero and the saint would disappear; they will not be needed. As we are moving towards Utopia, this waning of outstanding personalities becomes clearly noticeable. The affairs of the biggest nation in history were admirably directed for seven years by a man who was almost ideally average. This is not a sign of decadence; it indicates a clear gain. In an artistocracy all would be statesmen, like Calvin Coolidge: a Napoleon would be out of

place. All would be poets, so that none would need to wear unclipped locks and print lines of unequal length in order to advertise the fact. All would have the painter's eyes, and discern beauty in sea or fields, sky or human faces: so none would need to daub meanly a canvas with childish symbols of their vision. Men will live without king, priest or poet, because each will be his own king, priest and poet. To a mind formed in the ancient hierarchised world such a state might present a dead level of uniformity; to the *anarchist* of to-morrow it means the fullest release of the individual. There will be no *élite*, because the *élite* will embrace the whole of mankind. One element in art will vanish altogether—art as a shibboleth to set aside the small company of the Elect—thus art will be purged from the last admixture of snobbishness, from which it is by no means free to-day.

III. It is not so idle as it may seem to follow as we have done, in free yet logical fancy, certain tendencies of the present. Some aspects of psychological literature, for instance, might easily be considered as sheer eccentricities. O'Neill, Pirandello, Proust, Joyce, 'got away with it', but for their own good and ours, should they not remain unique? Is their art a picturesque blind alley? Or is it destined to broaden into a main avenue? It has been our purpose to show that, as the gates of physical adventure were closing, our best chance lay in the direction of an ever more searching psychology. There are poeers and morons among the cryptic writers of to-day, but there are men also who are pathfinders, blazers of trails, and not mere oddities.

IV. The great danger which menaces all Utopias is not achievement, but stagnation. This danger is with us to-day; for stagnation is the price we have to pay for complacency. If we persuade ourselves that our Constitution, our economic régime, our religious creed, our morals, are fundamentally and unchangeably right, when we shall have reached at a single bound Utopia in all its horror—a Utopia of conformity and dullness, worse than any cycle of Cathay. Tennyson's mid-Victorian wisdom remains wise in our Hooverian era.

And God fulfils Himself in many ways
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world

It is for poets to discover new ways in which God may fulfil Himself. The Utopia just ahead—the dream born of Protest—will save us from the slough of self-satisfaction. So long as we are made to realise that this is not God's own country, there will be some hope of salvation.

ALBERT GUERARD.

TWO JOURNALISTS

C. P. SCOTT AND NORTHCLIFFE—A CONTRAST

No personal event since the death of Gladstone has touched the Liberal thought of the world more profoundly than the passing of Charles Priestwich Scott of the *Manchester Guardian*. It is no exaggeration to say that it is felt as a bereavement, not of this country alone, not even of Europe alone, but of civilisation itself. The fact is the more remarkable because Scott played little or no personal part on the political stage and was little known to the general public, even of his own country. He did not enter the House of Commons as a member until well advanced in years, and though he sat in two Parliaments, he occupied no official position, rarely spoke, and retired just when the cause he had supported through the dark days of the Boer War triumphed in the great Liberal revival of 1906. He spoke little in public, wrote nothing under his own name, declined all honours, spent the whole of his long working life in a provincial city, and, so far as I can recall, never had a London residence. Society, in the narrow sense, he did not frequent, and his way of life was unchanged throughout. He cycled to his office from his home at Fallowfield when he was a young man and he cycled to it from the same home when he was far on in his eighties, when his sight had grown dim and when the country lanes he had once traversed had become busy streets accosted with tram lines. In all his personal habits there was a vein of obstinate conservatism which added a pleasant flavour of the past to the spiritual adventure he was always breathlessly pursuing.

His aloofness from the public stage was not due to the fact that he was a recluse or that he cultivated the rôle of the veiled prophet. No one was more free from that affectation, or more accessible, and his manner at all times and in all society was marked by an equable and urbane courtesy. He was without the modern 'complexes,' either of the superior or the inferior variety, and, though he did not suffer fools gladly, he was entirely unconscious of racial discriminations. The negro preacher Douglass who visited President Lincoln said, 'He spoke to me as though he was

unaware of the difference of colour.' He would have found Scott on the same noble plane of human fellowship. It was the real values of men that alone interested him. For these he had a swift and penetrating insight. It was expressed in his glance. Before semi-blindness fell upon him, his eyes, dark and intense, had a searching and formidable power. They were the most remarkable feature of a striking countenance, and glowed with an all-embracing intelligence and with inner fires that seemed visibly restrained by a masterful will.

There is, nevertheless, no real mystery in the fact that the passing of a man so little known personally to the public should have evoked so world-wide an emotion. Spiritually he had been one of the most powerful influences of civilisation for more than half a century, and the fact that that influence was exercised, not by direct personal contact with the public, but through the vehicle of a newspaper, only enlarged and emphasised it. Scott made the *Manchester Guardian*, but it is also true in a sense that the *Guardian* made Scott. The two names were interchangeable, and it was impossible to think of the one without being aware of the other. Every newspaper that achieves success of any sort must have some personal inspiration, even if it is only a passion for power at all costs or for prosperity at any price. But the *Manchester Guardian* under Scott bore the signature of a personality more definite, sustained and forceful than anything in the records of the world's daily journalism. The concurrence of the man and the vehicle had in it something not wholly fortuitous. Circumstances might almost be said to have dedicated Scott to his life's task before he was born. When John Edward Taylor founded the *Manchester Guardian* in 1824 he was engaged to the sister of Scott's grandfather, and the two families, though widely separated, became linked by the subsequent marriage. Both belonged to the Unitarian connexion, which, never large in numbers was always marked by an intense intellectual life, an austere morality, and a grave attitude to public affairs. The prescription under which Nonconformity still laboured had bred in it a stern and unbending self-reliance and a spirit of detachment from the general current.

Born at Bath in 1846, Scott was indoctrinated from the cradle with the 'dissonance of Dissent' and the mawk of Cobdenite Liberalism, and though his residence at Oxford, to which he gained admission with difficulty owing to the still existing theological tests, modified his outlook, he remained throughout his life essentially the product of the Nonconformity of the days of tests and proscriptions. It was while he was at Oxford that the second John Edward Taylor invited him to join his staff, and, having taken his degree and served a brief apprenticeship to journalism in the office of the *Scotsman*, he became editor of

the *Manchester Guardian* in 1872 when he was twenty-six. For nearly sixty years, almost to the day of his death, he remained in control, adding a generation ago the position of chief proprietor to that of editor. He found the *Manchester Guardian* an undistinguished provincial morning paper: he left it, if not the greatest newspaper in the world, at least the most universally esteemed and influential organ of opinion and the most authoritative voice of the Liberal idea in the world.

It was a personal achievement on a scale that has had only one parallel in the history of modern journalism, and it is the contrast of the influence of C. P. Scott upon the English Press with that of the late Lord Northcliffe that seems most deserving of attention now that both these remarkable men have passed away. Scott's career overlapped that of Northcliffe at both ends. He had begun his editorship of the *Manchester Guardian* when Alfred Harmsworth was barely out of the cradle, and he lived to direct his famous newspaper with undiminished vigour for years after Northcliffe's tumultuous and meteoric career had closed. It is in his attitude to the revolution which Northcliffe wrought in the world of journalism that Scott may be said to have made his most important contribution to the public life of the country.

That revolution was in a sense inevitable. English journalism had, at the end of the nineteenth century, reached a stage in which some sweeping change was imminent. It had remained essentially what it had been for more than a century -- the vehicle of the thought, the interests and temper of the leisured and educated middle class, relatively small in numbers but great in influence. Its appeal was sober and restrained, its methods grave and unadventurous, its spirit dignified even to dullness. The great change which had come over the face of English society in the preceding quarter of a century found little reflection in its character or appeal. That change began with the Education Act of 1870, and developed with the consolidation of the trade union movement and the extension of the franchise which transferred political power from the few to the many. The centre of gravity in the nation had shifted from the middle class to the democracy which had become possessed, not only of the rudiments of education, but also of a powerful industrial organisation and almost complete political enfranchisement. But the Press took little account of the transition. The penny standard still prevailed, and the Press still addressed itself in the old way to the old limited public. The democracy had taken possession of the seats of the mighty, but the journalists seemed unaware of the fact.

It was an unrivalled moment for an adventurer. A new

kingdom of immense potentialities was calling for a king. In 1895 the claimant appeared in the person of Alfred Harmsworth. He was a young man, still on the right side of thirty, who had already discovered the vast possibilities opened up by a generation of universal education. He was not the first in the field. Cassells had tried to exploit those possibilities, but their standard was too high and too educational for complete triumph. The true path had been struck by Mr George Newnes, with *Tit-Bits*; and young Master Harmsworth, a youth of eighteen or so, with his quick eye for what the public wanted and his adventurous intrepidity, plunged into the same path with *Answers*, the prolific parent of a host of weekly journals of the *Comic Cuts*, the *Funny Wonder*, and the *Sunday Companion* type.

His success was unprecedented. He had imitators, but no one approached his sure instinct for the hunger of the rudimentary mind for information about the unimportant, for entertainment, and for cheap sentiment. He had taken the measure of the man in the street, for he himself was the man in the street, with his eager interest in the moment, his passion for sensation, his indifference to ideas, his waywardness, and his dislike of abstract thought. His energy of mind was astonishing, his ambition limitless, his vision for the material possibilities of things swift and amazingly sure. No grass grew under his feet and no scruples or principles impeded his path. The one touchstone he applied to men and things was the touchstone of success, and moral purpose in any shape was divorced from his extraordinary genius for business. That genius rapidly passed to a new plane of activity with his purchase of the *Evening News*. At his Midas touch that moribund journal leaped into life, and out of it sprang the greatest achievement of his dazzling career.

There has been nothing in the story of English journalism comparable with the apparition of the *Daily Mail*. It found vacant a vast territory which it proceeded to occupy with an efficiency and completeness that left little room for competition. It applied to the sphere of daily journalism the discovery that Alfred Harmsworth had made in the weekly Press—namely, that what the democracy wanted was not instruction, but amusement and thrills. The Press had been serious and responsible, respectful to the past and its traditions, cautious about consequences, suspicious about anything that savoured of sensation. And in consequence it had left the democracy cold and aloof. Alfred Harmsworth repudiated all these conventions. He adopted sensationalism as his gospel. Every day must have its thrill, every paragraph must be an electric shock, every issue must be as full of 'turns' as a music-hall programme. 'What's wrong with the shop-window?' was his formula when the paper

displeased him; and the formula contained the whole of his newspaper philosophy. His shop-window must be the talk of the town; woe to the window-dresser who put in the quiet grays and left out the brilliant trifles! Policies were nothing, parties were nothing, principles were nothing. All that mattered was that the great public should be kept humming with excitement. There was always war in the air and some enemy against whom to arouse passion. Sometimes it was the Boers, sometimes it was the French, whom we would 'roll in mud and blood' and whose colonies we would give to Germany. Sometimes it was the Irish, later it was the Germans. It did not matter whom, for Harnsworth had no rooted antipathies. He merely seized the handiest instrument for his purpose. If there came a lull in affairs and the public mind wanted rest and an idyllic interlude, then who so ready with his anodynes? He would set all the nation growing sweet peas, he would make it scethe with mild interest over the discovery that it was dying from eating white bread, and that if it would save itself it must start eating brown bread. But these were only the *entr'actes* of the great drama. War was the permanent theme, and out of the Boer War the *Daily Mail* emerged with an influence that was unrivalled. People laughed and scuffed, but they read it and insensibly were governed by it.

The unprecedented success of the paper naturally reacted on the Press generally. Before this tornado the old tradition withered away. The circulation which had satisfied the newspapers of the past seemed trivial beside the unparalleled sale of the new-comer, and in the competition of newspapers, as in the competition of the battlefield, it is numbers that count. It was mere obscurantism to assume that the appeal to the few and select was the important thing. Power and political influence had passed to the multitude, and it was the paper which had the ear of the multitude that was able to control the tides of national thought. Moreover the advertiser was with the bag battalions, and the resources with which he endowed the new venture enabled it to devote to its news service an expenditure with which its rivals could not compete. Add to this a genius untrammelled by any respect for the past, for parties, or for scruples, and the nature of the convulsion which had overtaken the Press world will be understood.

In the struggle to survive, some of the newspapers adopted the form and spirit of the *Daily Mail* without reserve; others adopted the form and attempted to adapt their tradition to the new conditions. All felt the revolution in some measure. Even *The Times* fell under the sway of the young Alexander, and for a season accommodated its traditional decorum to the levities

of the new journalism. Max Beerbohm in one of his cartoons represented Lord Northcliffe standing, with agonised face and outstretched arms, in the midst of a group of grave and bearded old gentlemen of *The Times*, who were rushing eagerly forward as if to save him from falling, while from his lips came the cry, 'Hold me! I feel the demon of sensationalism descending upon me.' The effects of the revolution upon the standards of the Press were devastating. There had been no tradition of journalism more sacred than that of the impartiality of the news columns. Editorial opinion was confined to the leader columns and news had to be unbiassed and uncoloured. The new journalism ignored this wholesome tradition. The leader ceased to be a serious argument addressed to the reason of the public, and opinion and propaganda permeated the news. Northcliffe had a favourite saying that 'The power of the Press is to suppress,' and he exercised that power ruthlessly. News became the medium for moulding opinion, and it was given prominence or suppressed according to whether it served or did not serve the purpose in view. His test of the success of a newspaper was a purely material one. When a friend of mine, one of the most distinguished of living journalists, visited him in a time of crisis in order to persuade him that his newspapers were taking the wrong line, his answer was to call for his circulation ledgers and to show the favourable effect that his policy had had upon the sale of his journals.

It was not only the methods of journalism that were transformed by the irruption of Alfred Harmsworth into Fleet Street. The whole structure of the journalistic system of the country was transformed also, not merely in the metropolis, but in the provinces. The main feature of that structure had been the independent daily newspaper owned by a single proprietor or group of proprietors and exercising influence over a certain well-defined area. It had its roots deep in the past and was in a very real sense an indigenous growth, expressing the life, interests and spirit of the community it served. By comparison with the modern popular newspaper, its circulation was small, even contemptible. Only two London newspapers had a sale much exceeding 100,000 a day, and in the provinces, even in great cities like Birmingham or Glasgow a circulation of 50,000 was rare, while in the smaller towns possessing morning newspapers the figure was often nearer 10,000 and 20,000. Advertising on the modern scale was unknown, and the newspapers relied mainly on their local revenue. Their income was small, but they lived—often two or even three of them in one city—discreetly and economically. They were an important institution of the local life, and their standard of service, if somewhat dull

according to present taste, was serious and responsible. Their main business was the accurate presentation of news, and their political point of view was confined to their leading columns. They indulged in no levities, and were ignorant of the circulation-raising expedients of insurance, prizes and competitions, so common in these days.

Upon this structure the impact of the journalism initiated by Northcliffe fell with devastating consequences. The local paper withered before the competition of a journal which was at once cheaper and more entertaining, had command of vast financial resources, and was able, through the development of newspaper trains and duplicate printing in remote centres, to reach the breakfast table in any part of the country as soon as the locally printed paper. The power of the new invader was increased by the enormous growth of general advertising and the extent to which his command of great national circulations enabled him to canalise that advertising into his own channels at prices which left the modest local newspaper gasping. It was, of course, this monopoly of advertising which was the goal in view. Great circulations in themselves do not pay. If sales were the only source of revenue, no newspaper could exist, for the income from sales does not much more than cover the cost of raw materials. It is the advertiser who makes the newspaper profitable, and the object of great circulations is to command from the advertiser the highest possible price for the space he buys. The newspaper with a vast circulation loses heavily on the swings, but it gains more on the roundabouts. It was this conception of the commercial possibilities of journalism and his translation of the conception into realities that is the outstanding achievement of Northcliffe. From it sprang the mass production of journalism and the decadence of the independent Press. There is only a certain amount of advertising available, and the more it is absorbed by the great circulations, the less there is for the small. The result is the aggregation of the popular Press in few and fewer hands, until to-day it approaches the character of a monopoly. It would not be an exaggeration to say that half a dozen men, representing two or three great syndicates, have access to most of the homes in the country. Where Lord Rothermere is not, there is Lord Camrose; and where neither is, there is Lord Beaverbrook. In London *The Times*, the *Morning Post*, and the *News Chronicle* still preserve their independence of the all-powerful groups, and the *Daily Herald* as the organ of Labour is also independent. In the provinces it is only here and there that there is a survivor of the independently owned and independently edited type of morning newspapers which a generation ago was the commonplace of British journalism.

By the universal acclaim, not merely of the public, but of the journalistic profession, the *Manchester Guardian* is the most famous of these, and it is because it owes its distinction to C. P. Scott that the death of that remarkable man has been the subject of such world-wide attention. He was the representative man of the old journalistic tradition as Northcliffe was the representative man of the new. By representative I do not mean that he was not unusual, any more than that Northcliffe was not unusual. Both were extraordinary. But both were representative in the sense that they embodied an ideal of their calling at its maximum. It would be no extravagance to say of Scott, as Wordsworth, with perfect propriety, said of himself, that he was 'a Dedicated spirit'. He brought to the task of journalism a high gravity that gave to his paper a severe even slightly ecclesiastical air. One was tempted to say at times that no institution could be quite so morally impeccable as the *Manchester Guardian* seemed; but one said it under one's breath and was ashamed of having said it even so. It was not that Scott was indifferent to the business aspect of journalism. The remarkable and sustained commercial success his paper achieved under his administration was evidence of that. But business success was only a means to an end. He saw that journalism was not merely a business, in the sense that brewing or tailoring or soap-making is a business. As the by-product of its business activities it had a profound influence upon the public mind. It was the chief instrument in the formation of public opinion, and it was this fact that distinguished it from all other forms of business and imposed on the journalist a very special responsibility. He dwelt upon this dual basis of journalism in his speech on the occasion of the presentation of his bust to the city of Manchester in celebration of his eightieth birthday.

A newspaper has two sides to it. On the one hand it is a business like any other business carried on for profit and depending on profit for prosperity or existence. On the other hand, it may be described as a public-utility service, a service which may be performed well or ill, but which, on the whole, is essential to the interests of the public. These two elements in the life and purpose of a newspaper are not always in accord, they may even violently conflict. Yet in their harmony the character and usefulness of a newspaper must depend.

There was no question in his mind which consideration had to yield to the other to secure that harmony. When large issues were at stake, and what he held to be the cause of truth and justice was in one scale and business advantage was in the other, he never hesitated. He was so frequently on the unpopular side that it might have been supposed he preferred it so, and that he had a perverse love of opposing the general current. That was not the

case. It is true that he distrusted the general current, had little sympathy with emotional impulses and adopted a detached and sceptical attitude to affairs. His feelings were always under the governance of the intellect. But he had no passion for conflict for the sake of conflict, and was never happier than when the victory of reason over prejudice was won. He took great business risks, not under the spur of emotion, but with calculating firmness and with full appreciation of the possibly unpleasant consequences. The result at the time was often what he had feared. That was especially the case in regard to the Boer War, when he threw the whole weight of his journal into antagonism to the popular current, and when the war passion ran so violently against him that both his house and his office needed at times the protection of the police. In that, as in most cases in which he took the unpopular side, he lived to see the wisdom of his policy affirmed, and the authority of his paper by that fact strengthened. Indeed, the most decisive stride in its influence sprang from his courageous decision to support Gladstone in the Home Rule split of 1886, when most of the Liberals had left their leader and when public opinion was overwhelmingly against him. Up to that time the *Manchester Guardian* had been true to its Whig tradition, but thenceforward it was always in the vanguard of the battle. It might be said of Scott, as was said of Ripon, that he was always in favour of the most advanced thing of the moment, and this was never more true of him than in his later years. His eyes grew dim, but his spirit never lost its eager quest for new kingdoms of the human mind and wider horizons for human liberty. His influence was not measured by circulation figures, but by his appeal to all the best minds of his time all over the world, and especially by the weight of his authority with public men of all parties and with the best elements of journalism in every country. No man was read more studiously by those who disagreed with him than he was.

It was a tribute to the inflexible honesty of his opinions and the disinterested public spirit that inspired them. It was a tribute also to the technical excellence of the paper. No better written newspaper was published in the language, and it bore the signature of Scott in all its departments, for he had an extraordinary gift of impressing his own enlightened and rational processes of thought and expression upon others. He was careful to catch his journalists young--if they had the flavour of Oxford so much the better--and he would stalk a promising undergraduate for a year. In this way he created the most remarkable school of journalism this country has seen. To have worked for Scott was a certificate in journalism equivalent to a first in Greats in the scholastic world. Half the distinguished writers in English

journalism during the last half-century were licked into shape under the stern and discriminating eye of this martinet of the newspaper world. He would have nothing slipshod or garish. Rhetoric he disliked and emotion he discounted. High thinking must be expressed in plain, unadorned language, and the appeal must always be to the reason rather than to the feelings. The air was a little cold, but it was always dry, pure and stimulating. Occasionally, of course, a mettlesome steed like C. E. Montague would prance and curvet, and Scott would observe it with an aloof tolerance; but his ideal was men of the type of Leonard Hobhouse who drove straight to the mark in clean, direct, unimpeded English.


Finally, it was a tribute to Scott's incorruptible standard in regard to the presentation of news. On this subject, the most crucial of all affecting the prestige of the Press, he said the wisest words that have been uttered—words which Mr. Baldwin quoted at the Newspaper Society's dinner.

Fundamentally it 'the conduct of a newspaper implies honesty, cleanness, courage, fairness, and a sense of duty to the reader and the community. The newspaper is of necessity something of a monopoly, and its first duty is to shun the temptations of a monopoly. Its primary office is the gathering of news. At the peril of its soul it must see that the supply is not tainted. Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does not give, nor in the mode of presentation, must the unveiled face of Truth suffer wrong. Comment is free but facts are sacred. Propaganda, so called, by this means is hateful. The voice of opponents, no less than that of friends, has a right to be heard. Comment is also justly subject to a self-imposed restraint. It is well to be frank, it is even better to be fair.

These are, indeed, as Mr. Baldwin said, 'noble words'. They ought to be inscribed in the minds and hearts of all journalists who respect their calling, and in the mind of the public as the acid test of whether that calling is being honoured or dishonoured. They embody better than anything else can do that high sense of the journalist's duty to the public of which Scott's long and splendid career is the witness. And they explain that fear which haunted him of the influence of the syndicate's monopoly in journalism, with its power of propaganda and suggestion through the manipulation of the news. I cannot close better than with his own moving words at Manchester on this great theme.

There are papers which will never be well which would rather suffer extinction. And it is well that it should be so. The public has its rights. The paper which has grown up in a great community, nourished by its patronage, reflecting in a thousand ways its spirit and its interests, in a real sense belongs to it. How else except in the permanence of that association can it fulfil its duty or repay the benefits and the confidence it has received?

A. G. GARDNER.



THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER



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TARIFFS AND AFTER

As this article is being written the Import Duties Bill runs its rapid course through Parliament. It will reach the Statute Book by March 1— in principle as introduced and in detail little altered. This legislation alters basically our fiscal alignment and marks a reversal of policy as radical as the adoption of Free Trade some three generations back. The final effect on our trade and industry it is impossible to foretell.

To some people this reversal of policy may seem sudden and inexplicable, but in reality the old order was breached by the restrictions of war-time. Subsequent safeguarding of certain industries accustomed the public mind to view the problem from the angle of detail and paved the way for a clearer understanding of our import and export position in relation to international trade as well as to our internal problems. Since the war, political preconceptions have played a minor part in fiscal controversy. Argument has been more definitely related to the practical workings of trade and industry, to the growing policy of excluding foreign goods on the part of European countries, and to the

heavily increased charges cast on our production by a very generous scale of social services. The new conclusions arrived at cut right across political faiths. Probably, too, while we are agreed on the excellence of Imperial Preference as a principle, there remains some difference of opinion as to the best way of making it effective, from our own point of view as well as that of the Dominions. Since the war, the attitude and demands of the Socialists have introduced new complications into our economic machine. They claim a larger share of the profits of industry and assert that the prevailing index of division is definitely unfair to Labour. The steady infiltration of trades union lodges by the Socialist machine has attracted the local leaders to political work with new careers of wider promise. With this development came the demand for a minimum wage coupled with the diminution of the hours of labour and the acceptance of trade union speed standards. Strikes became the order of the day, and production suffered a disorganisation which seriously perturbed our foreign customers and let in our competitors on lines of export hitherto virtually a monopoly.

The economic difficulties resulting from Socialist domination of the labour side of industry inevitably hastened political thought along the line of fiscal change. The export industries were obviously the first to react to the pressure. Since competition rigidly fixed their overseas prices, wages and other costs soon fell within strictly conditioned limits. Realisation of this position, always keenly appreciated by employers, came more slowly to workmen whose minds were still functioning mainly in a political mould, and who were still under the spell of Free Trade and the fear of dear food. But the hard economic facts had to be faced. How was it possible in an export industry to protect wages and leave exposed to the full blast of international competition the products of those wages? The Socialists, strong Free Traders, by political heredity, quickly saw their danger, and cleverly side-stepped. Civil servants, railwaymen and municipal workers were, so to speak, carried by the country, and their higher wages would not appear to be reflected in the cost of exported goods. Sheltered standards were fixed for these services. The Miners' Federation were treading the same path, and, while demanding a higher national minimum wage, were frankly willing to advocate a compulsory selling price for their product—a policy which meant that the nation would always be paying for the economic umbrella of the industry.

The economic results of the war are simple and devastating. Extended standards of life, possible only under the cover of industrial and currency inflation, were acquired during the reign of plenty springing from munitions manufacture, and have never

been forgotten. Like a gall over the future hangs our huge debt. Our foreign investments are sliding in value with every new repudiation, and in future the income from them must be heavily diminished. We have to face an industrial future with more urgent need than ever to export, and into a world of intensive competition and heavy commercial depression. From the commercial point of view one of the most disastrous results of the Versailles Treaty and its successors is the narrow nationalism engendered in Europe. This is shown in trade interference, exchange restrictions, and prohibitive tariffs, together with an intensive export founded on cheap labour. Great Britain, the only open dump left, was inevitably cast for the unwilling and rather stupid victim of the plots. With the increase of our internal difficulties, largely due to the easy post-war spending of public money demanded by appetites stimulated by war extravagance, the crash finally came in the summer of last year.

The steady rise in the unemployment figures strongly accelerated the speed of the Tariff Reform campaign, which, although pressed for some years by the majority of the Conservative Party, had made little national headway against subconscious Cobdenism and the fears of dear food. The Liberal Party, already in shreds before the Labour Cabinet broke up in July last year, carried little weight in the country. The chief concern of the Conservatives was what measure of protection they could persuade the country to sanction. Nor did they accept the temporary tonic of going off the gold standard as in any way a cure for disease which they considered needed radical treatment. The views of the Conservative Party to-day are, in essence, strongly protectionist, and will remain so as long as foreign nations maintain their barriers against us. The party would have welcomed much higher duties from the outset, but they loyally followed their leaders in the compromise which preserved the name and the impulse of a National Government. Liberal manoeuvres in the General Election reflected an obviously worried state of mind. Free Trade Liberals joined in the national chorus, but some of them were not quite sure of the words of the song, and, following their leader's hint, dropped a bar behind the rest of the band. As a natural result their parliamentary party split in twain. Both halves, historically, saved their consciences, as an excuse for touching economic patch, by pleading the need of the nation. The Budget, they agreed, had to be balanced, and imports limited. To-day, with the election straddle safely achieved, a re-sorting is again in train. It seems likely that a full half of the Liberal Party may, in the end, except the fiscal experiment; and the groupings in the House are perhaps an accurate reflection of old Liberal feeling in the country. What all three

parties frequently forget is the steadily growing mass of electoral opinion that has never held any political preconceptions, and which probably regards personal party reinforcements, if not with contempt, at least with indifference. Such voters, while caring nothing for party labels, are nevertheless vitally interested in their economic future. They have definitely plumped for the great tariff experiment.

The immediate concern of the nation after the election was that the Government should take all possible steps to restore our balance of trade, since the year's trade figures would clearly indicate that we were at last eating up capital to meet the balance of our external purchases, to the extent—now clearly computed—of more than a hundred millions. In aid of this position the Abnormal Importations Acts rapidly became law and were at once put into force by the necessary orders. The final scale of duties was drastic, and recent returns show that something near exclusion is now ruling. But this policy is not, and never was, intended to be the end, nor indeed any permanent part, in such shape of the tariff experiment. It was a temporary expedient, derived to meet quickly and forcibly a dangerous position, and to hold the fort until a more permanent barrier could be erected to safeguard the future. For this reason it attracted the support, as an emergency measure, of nearly all the Liberals in the House of Commons. Although some provisions of the expedient are incorporated in the import duties legislation, final shaping can only be settled in the light of experience.

Frequently, and without undue argument, people find themselves in agreement on a principle, but difficulties crop up directly any attempt is made to crystallise the principle into practice. So it seems with this tariff problem. Although the Conservative Party, together with their National associates, Liberal and Labour, have a definite end in view, it is the means which gives them trouble. As a nation we have no experience of the machine-work of a systematic tariff. Hasty controversialists, while talking glibly about a scientific basis, invariably jib when definition is demanded. The truth is, inconvenient as the process may be, we are compelled to feel our way somewhat empirically, to realise that we shall suffer unexpected repercussions, and frankly to be prepared to admit and to profit by our mistakes. What is the Experiment? In short, the preamble of the Bill answers the question: to restrict imports, to give powers of retaliation against unfair foreign treatment, and to provide extra revenue. The machinery of the Bill also provides for the extension of Colonial Preference, the details of which will be filled in by agreement and further legislation after the Ottawa Conference. Special tariffs on certain items levied under existing law are not at present

affected, but undoubtedly, for convenience of treatment in the future, all duties must in the end become part of a general scheme with such rates as may be agreed. The basis of this legislation is a flat 10 per cent *ad valorem* with a free list. It will be easier to consider the free list at once. Wheat and meat, British caught fish (about 80 per cent of the total landed), tea, rubber, and the raw materials of the leather and textile industries, certain ores, pit props, and newsprint substantially cover the ground. Clearly this list has been devised with a definite eye on export production, and substantially preserves the free entry of raw materials and essential foods. The effect on agriculture will be examined later.

Criticism is already free both as to inclusions and omissions. Partly finished products may easily be the raw materials of other processes. Claims for exemption as soon as the real incidence of the duties is appreciated are certain, and in equity, will need careful consideration. After six months, therefore, it is provided by appropriate machinery that the list may be varied. It has been suggested that power of revision to remove items should also be given, but this alteration will for rules of procedure reasons, be carried out by the Finance Act. Much discussion has been directed to drawbacks and free ports with the natural view of protecting our *entrepôt* trade. Free ports in this country, having in view the scattered areas of our docks, are, from a practical and customs point of view very difficult to contemplate, and, moreover, since the initial duty is to be only 10 per cent on the materials as landed, the reflection in the final price is bound to be small. Existing bonding arrangements for re-export are unaltered and therefore it is unlikely that our *entrepôt* trade will suffer. The fear that we shall lose *entrepôt* trade to foreign ports because of these small duties has little substance. We were already losing trade in free-entry days, but the reason was the lower labour and general charges of the foreign ports, and such factors will still remain effective. The full-blooded Protectionist, of course, seeks far higher duties, since to him 10 per cent. is simply a crumb. But in all fairness it must be realised that this legislation was never intended to introduce full Protection as an exclusive principle, but to make an initial experiment, capable, if need be, of expansion in many directions, as and when the need is proved and the machinery, through experience, can be properly operated.

Extension and alteration—and it is essential to remember this—remain in the hands of the Government of the day operating on the advice of an 'Import Duties Advisory Committee.' This Committee will report its findings to the Treasury, and the Treasury, no doubt after discussion with the appropriate Government departments, will finally report to the Cabinet, which will,

if it agrees, cause the necessary Orders to be issued. The altered duty will then be absorbed into a general list. To this procedure there is one important and very practical exception. The Board of Trade may, with the concurrence of the Treasury, where there is any foreign discrimination against the United Kingdom, our Colonies or Protectorates, at once impose supplementary and therefore retaliatory duties. Obviously the general machinery of the Act would, for such an emergency, be too dilatory. The big stick, if it is to be used at all, must come down quick and hard. Orders made by the Treasury or the Board of Trade under the new legislation, although taking effect as indicated, must be laid before the House of Commons, and need approval by Resolution within twenty-eight parliamentary sitting days. Publicity is therefore definitely assured. The development of the experiment obviously must radiate from the Advisory Committee. This authority is definitely intended to be an effective and impartial sieve of all that is cast into its meshes. At first sight the work indicated seems overwhelming. The queue of callers will certainly be long. May it also be patient! We can assume that the personnel of the Committee will be of the best, and that every Government department will place records and advice freely at its disposal. Clearly a new department is indicated to arrange and to sort material, to demand and to sift evidence, to interview and to inquire, and, out of all the hurly-burly, to develop the necessary technique for an impartial examination of every application. Our Civil Service, when properly aided by the requisite technical advice, is thoroughly efficient at such work, and, happily for us, its traditions and practice in touch with commercial and industrial problems have never morally been in question.

During the debates it was said on behalf of the Government that it was no part of their duty to give the Committee instructions. 'Here,' they say, 'is the Act. Get to work and advise us.' One can scarcely believe that this can be taken exactly as it reads. The Board of Trade have an immense mass of valuable trade material, much of which is available to prove or disprove concrete cases. The numerous industrial associations and groups have reached a high standard of organisation, latterly almost exclusively directed to tariff claims, and the experience gained under the applications for safeguarding must carry a technique which can be very quickly applied. Moreover, the work done by the Conservative Research Department, though never administratively official, has resulted in very valuable records; and, what is more to the point, in concrete conclusions not exclusively related to any particular interest. Since the Treasury, which really means the Cabinet, will be the final

whether after the Committee has made its recommendations, it does seem that some fairly definite indication should be given to the Committee by the Cabinet, or by a special committee of the Cabinet, as to the relative order in which their major problems should be attacked; and, in truth, what indeed are to be regarded as major problems. Such suggestions could no more be considered as dictation than the giving of priority in a judge's list to cases which for the public convenience needed speedy decision. Surely, too, the present position of the iron and steel trade, and what it claims, is among the first of these major problems. This principle, indeed, seems to have been admitted in regard to shipbuilding yards, which are to be registered, and all goods and material needed for both construction and repair will be free of duty. There is much of their heavy load which the Committee can, and undoubtedly will, delegate to their technical staff. The Act clearly contemplates that the factors to be taken into consideration on the granting or variation of any duties will be conditioned by the ability of the home producers to develop and extend a real industry in substitution for the foreign products they aim at supplanting, and also by the consideration whether the demand is likely to be substantial. There is full power to review, and if necessary to recall. The Board of Trade is given very wide powers of inquiry into the condition and progress of manufacturing industries, with a view, no doubt, to examining relative efficiency both in production and management, and in the margin of profits, but, rightly with strict rules against individual disclosure. The object is rather one of inquiry for massing information concerning the industry as a whole.

Some eager Protectionists claim that these inquiries are unnecessary inquisitions, and that the Government should at once have proceeded to pick out the basic industries and allot them priority of consideration. To them the general 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty smacks simply of revenue-getting, with petty repercussions affording protection as a side-line. In one sense this may be true, but it is at least doubtful whether this House of Commons would have voted high Protection as an initial change. Effective opposition to the general tariff scheme is negligible, and, in spite of some personal troubles the Cabinet, in the eyes of the electorate, still remains National. Nevertheless, as some of the dyed-in-the-wool Free Traders clearly see, Protection—whether low or high is immaterial—has at last been adopted as a permanent British policy. Nor for the purpose of the change are we concerned with its existing incidence. It has definitely replaced Free Trade. Machinery which can be made completely effective is now in being to run duties, if found advisable, as high up the scale as the House of Commons will allow. Moreover, we

have accepted the challenge of the tariff countries, and clearly intend that the fight shall be, not on the existing disparity, but on a new basis which takes definite note of our industrial position as a whole. Argument, persuasion, and example have all failed. Was there really any other remedy than the forthright one?

[What has stood in the way of many a Free Trader (and even of neutrals) considering Protection favourably was the fear of stabilising inefficiency and possibly of giving corruption a free hand. Probably they knew something of American tariff habits or had watched French methods. 'Be efficient first,' it was argued, 'and then, having done all you can, if Fate is still against you, ask for your tariff.' 'Give us the tariff first,' was the reply, 'and then, being fairly safeguarded, we can organise and justify ourselves.' The Government has chosen the mean by giving a measure of protection as a stimulus to efficiency. But should the tonic prove useless, and further treatment be called for, why--then the tariff doctor is handy. What ultimate principle may in future be established to justify increased protection for manufactured goods is not yet disclosed. Possibly, following the French example to some extent, it will be based on the measure of labour expended on the finished product. This view at least is logical and understandable. Dumping, in the modern accepted sense of the word, is not curable by Protection--it must be cut out by exclusion; and in any event it is usually due to some temporary productive inflation seeking a market at any price to minimise losses. There seems little danger that tariffs, as interpreted by our mentality, should lead in Great Britain to political or financial corruption. The checks provided by the Advisory Committee with the information extractable by the Board of Trade, and the ultimate debates in Parliament, together with the ready reaction of the consumer to high prices, seem sufficient to prevent any appreciable measure of lobbying. There is also the useful correction of internal competition. From the financial point of view, security of tenure behind a tariff wall will certainly assist in attracting capital, but at present, since the tariff is general, no industry in that respect will be at a disadvantage. Had the Protection been very high, warden amalgamations and so-called rationalisation might have enabled the promoting section of finance to snatch by flamboyant publicity more than a fair share of commission. As it is, proof of trade competence through the medium of tariff applications may well help to raise the general level of productive efficiency, and so attract the new capital needed. Tariffs may indirectly beget new production in little-known corners. Many British manufacturers could now make goods over which foreign patentees hold a tight hand. The foreigners prefer to face diminished export rather than sell a

trade rival overrode the right to manufacture on royalty. To many such patentees have to face a 10 per cent. tariff as well as the depreciation of sterling since its lapse from gold; and what little margin they had is gone. Second thoughts will surely point out that the only profit left is to sell a licence to manufacture in the territory they can no longer hope to cover. While it would scarcely pay them to risk a plant over here, royalties would still give a return, and the licence bring profit to a British producer and rebel generally to unemployment.

Agriculture is little affected by the new legislation. There has been some outcry as to the increased prices inevitable for maize and some oil seeds. As to the maize, the Dominions send us a fair proportion and may look for a quota. What more is needed comes from the Argentine, and will prove a useful counter in future tariff bargaining. The origin of oil seeds prevents much of their taxation. Farmers are very disappointed that wheat, meat, and pig products suffer no duties. For the first they are to have a quota in form not yet settled, and for meat there should be some satisfaction in the knowledge that all types of preserved meat, fruit and vegetables, eggs, poultry, and milk will pay the dues. It is difficult to believe that even this Parliament (which is keenly anxious that farming prosperity should return), or indeed any other, will consent to high Protection on essential food products. Opinion has hardened definitely that farmers ought to combine for marketing purposes. They can if they will; and if they do, Parliament is much more likely to listen to their claims. The ladder between farmer and consumer has too many rungs, and it is mainly the unnecessary commissions extracted by each rung that make the disparity between the prices of producer and consumer so great. Every other important industry is taking to co-operation and joint-selling of some type, but farming still remains obstinately individual in its marketing. The farmer is doing himself infinite harm in deliberately handing over to others profits which well might make all the difference between his solvency and bankruptcy.

The Imperial side of the Tariff Problem necessarily waits on the Ottawa Conference, and the legislation now passed leaves the door wide open for all necessary accommodation. The keenest enthusiast will be wise not to build on his hopes the expectation of immediate and complete realisation of the ideal. Our Dominions are trade units with a very keen appreciation of their own economic needs. The political tie to-day depends on sentiment, which, strong as it may be, cannot override long-settled economic lines of development. Every effort will be made on our side to reach an agreement that will seek to strengthen the net of trade between the centre and ends of the Empire and also mutually

between the units of the Empire. The growth of white population in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is very slow. South Africa and India have racial and other problems which keep them in a different economic category. Several generations will go by before unpeopled spaces fill up sufficiently to give Great Britain the increased export market she now needs so badly; and even then the growth of local manufactures and the sheltering these will claim—a process the Dominions keenly desire—cannot possibly be disregarded. The Crown Colonies and other Dependencies are on a different basis. Having due regard to their export needs, there is every reason why with them we should claim the strongest interdependent preferences. Politically they are under our control and economically they are dependent on capital from London.

It seems clear that the duties already imposed will bring in a considerable sum to the national Exchequer. Whether the price of the protected products will thereby be raised to the consumer is always a matter of acute controversy among tariff disputants. All economists are agreed that there must be a general rise in world price levels before long, particularly as restriction on production is now making an appreciable inroad on existing stocks. In this rise it is scarcely possible that an initial 10 per cent. duty can be more than a minute factor in determining the final price. What the nation looks for primarily is relief from unemployment; and if this be sensibly and steadily achieved by the incidence of tariffs, then the electorate will vote the beginnings of the experiment a success.

No tariff legislation can of itself cure our present economic situation. Our first need is to continue putting our own house in order. Much of the dead wood in industry has already been cleared away, but quite a lot still cumbers the ground. Mass combination into huge units, especially having in view our national character and individual qualities, offers no certainty of success. Indeed, in many instances it has definitely failed, either through financial inflation and mismanagement, or because the modern hustler will not appreciate that efficient control is really in the end conditioned by what one brain can personally manage. It is perhaps otherwise with services of a public utility nature such as transport, coal and electric power production. While electricity has been put under the control of a public board free from political interference, transport and coal, which alone may add such costs to our productive industries as to drive them out of international trade, are in complete chaos. Sniped and supplanted in every direction by road vehicles, railway management, so far as rates are concerned, has practically thrown up its hands. The demand of the managers to arrange future rates

on the basis of their existing costs will never be allowed. Searching inquiry into all the costs of transport and the ancillary trades it has invaded is long overdue. It must be, in the end, that a new basis of transport, both by road and rail, will be arranged; and that the costs of transport alone will be the deciding factor in fixing transport dues. The manufacture of rolling-stock ought to go back to industry. Such a change would appreciably reduce the costs of the railways and help industry both by widening its production and reducing its carriage charges. The coal problem is more difficult, but should not, under a National Government, be incapable of solution. Coal is far too basic an industry to throw to the dogs of unlimited and intensive competition. The men employed in it and those who use its products have a right to be considered. The general tariff does not help them. Even should Protection give us all the advantages claimed by its most ardent advocates, transport and coal, left in their present hopeless backwaters, would, like the Old Man of the Sea, grip the neck of industry and drag back every advance. Finally we must face the unpleasant fact that the depression of trade is world-wide. Why and how the commercial and industrial world got so completely out of gear we can leave to history. It is the task of the moderns to mend the machine. The Versailles statesmen well and truly laid the foundations of great trouble. Their successors have to find a way out of the mess. Perhaps the spate of words which has for so long deluged Geneva and wearied the whole world may at last have some tangible economic result.

To-day we are armed in a good cause. If necessary, we can use our weapons and use them effectively. Our neighbours know this and are at last awakening to realities. A new Europe, self-contained as to each nation in essentials, and for the rest producing what the people and the country are best adapted for by natural resources, climate and position, would do much to restore world prosperity. Great Britain's practical experiment may well result in such a basis for the future. We face the world of international competition in a position and with resources very different to those we possessed before the war. Our trade monopoly is gone. In the new struggle for trade the leading nations are without undue advantage over one another. The first commercial and industrial nation of the future will be the one which sets its house in order now, ready to jump off the mark the moment the race begins. We need not be beaten.

GEORGEY ELLIS.

WANTED—A FOREIGN POLICY

THE year 1932 seems likely to go down in history as a crucial year, in which all the conflicting post-war tendencies reached their climax and in which the nations were given a comprehensive opportunity to deal with the multifarious political, economic, and legal problems which had cumbered the international terrain ever since the Peace. Unhappily, owing to the culmination of these international problems into a world crisis, every Western State is far more narrowly preoccupied with its own economy, its defences, and its 'sovereignty,' so that the future historian will either chronicle a triumphant sectionalism or a momentous revolution in international relations, according as Western nations either abjure or embrace this final opportunity. The world issues which are now in the balance are not only of profound significance to Britain and the British Commonwealth; they are also susceptible of being decisively influenced by the British people and their representatives as a result of the force of post-war circumstances. Britain has a position of almost unique importance and responsibility at the present moment—not as a result of the conduct of some continuous, far-sighted foreign policy, but by reason of the trend towards a climax of many external factors. To appreciate this, we must return to the end of the war.

In the international jockeying for advantages at the Peace Conferences lie the clues to the present European impasse. They were obscured then by the nearness of emotions and events; but now they stare us in the face. There were five great Powers, each by its attitude to the others and to the future of Europe holding in its hands a potent contribution to our present troubles. First, the United States, nervous of idealism over a continent composed of warring elements and suspicious of future entanglements in such a congeries, renounced a League of Nations which seemed mere nationalism run riot on an international scale, and retired behind higher tariffs and stronger defences. Secondly, France, victoriously eager for future inviolability after being shattered for the second time in fifty years, strove for a League to enforce her new-found integrity, and for an Anglo-American guarantee of 'security' while the Peace going was good. The

Treaty of Versailles, and the League Covenant which was an integral part of it, were conceived by France, not only as the best substitute she could obtain for the Rhine frontier, but also as guaranteeing her the land domination of the Continent, and therewith the maintenance of a compulsorily disarmed, permanently shrunken, and economically distorted Central Europe. Italy, in the third place, the southern neighbour of France, saw herself as a pawn between French aspiration and German respiration, and, embittered by the French success at Versailles in circumscribing Italian ambitions, she turned once more toward Central Europe to 'redress the balance'. Fourthly, Germany and her associates, victims of internal dissolution as well as of external defeat, sought charitable guarantees that at least economic stability should be accorded them for the future welfare of their new republican citizens. Their armies and navies of imperial days were gone with the empires and emperors; so had their claims to 'places in the sun' and vast tracts of their own territories. They could only seek from the League (which, naturally enough, seemed to them like the Holy Alliance which followed Waterloo, 'a trade union of victors to repress the vanquished') some guarantee of continuous peace, in which they might slowly regain plenty for their peoples. Despite the enforced penance of Reparations and the compulsory 'confession' of war-guilt, they shouldered the burdens of both, relying on the Rathenau-Stresemann policy of 'fulfilment' and on the prospect of foreign loans, though they disputed the foundations of both in justice. Lastly, Britain, in unparalleled economic chaos and with her pre-war economic supremacy battered for a colossal debt to America, was heartily sick of the whole European *défile*, at which she had, it seemed against her better judgment, been forced to assist. Her European debts, as a set-off to her American obligations, turned out bad; her markets vanished; her money, devaluated in war, was revaluated at enormous cost in peace; and her future economic prospects were overshadowed by the swift American leap to commercial supremacy, as well as by the illogicality of reparations forcing the exports of her chief European competitor by means of American, French, and British loans.

At the outset, France was disappointed, for the Anglo-American guarantee fell through, so she bent her efforts to turning the League into an agency not only for securing her eastern frontiers, but also for furthering the foreign policy conceived and conducted with such admirable continuity of purpose by the Quai d'Orsay. Outside the League ambit France entered into a regular system of pre-war alliances, based on the darling of all foreign offices—the Balance of Power. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; these States, entirely

'created' or else greatly enlarged by the Peace treaties, owed either their existence or their accessions of territory to French influence during the war, and to the French 'lobbying' at Versailles. Thus, after 1919, they all came within the French political, and in time financial, purview. Their new-born nationalism ran parallel with their French orientation; and so their own aspirations for unimpaired existence coincided with the French aspirations for unimpaired Treaty conditions. Moreover, their economic and political security contributed to that of France vis-à-vis both the Communist octopus and the *revanche* menaces of Germany and her associates; and it was only to be expected that such identity of interests should weld France, Poland, and the Little Entente into a European *bloz* whose aim comprised both defence of French frontiers and the cementing of the other elements in the *bloz* upon Europe, until either the last trump, or—unhappy necessity!—the drums of a new war, to 'secure' the fruits of the last, should sound!

It is a truism to say that the extra-League *Realpolitik* pursued by France was, and is, the logical outcome of fear. The French people are, paradoxically, more insular than any other in Europe—far more so than the 'insular British.' They are a nation of peacefully minded provincials at heart, cherishing their 'little platoon' spirit, and extending this, on the national plane, to a patriotism which only seeks strength as a defence of Peace—that peace which alone guarantees them the possibilities of self-determination in which, as a nation and as individuals, they exult. No one who reflects upon the fact that France has twice been invaded in the lifetime of many of her citizens can fail to comprehend the degree of fear to which the French attained after the last war; none can, at the same time, fail to see therein the explanation of their show of force. France did not fear a restoration of the Habsburgs in Central Europe—for one thing, the Little Entente for its own reasons would see to that—so much as the recrudescence of the German *Drang nach Osten* in the guise of an Austro-German *Anschluss*, or of a *Zollverein* which would prove the prelude to another and larger German Confederation than that of last century. But chief among her fears was the perennial nightmare of a ruptured eastern frontier, and this might come by the repercussion of any European local dispute—the Polish corridor, the Balkans, Italian aims, anything. Disappointed of the kind of League which Clemenceau had first envisaged, France therefore pursued a twofold path: (a) internal direction of the existing League to secure French aims, and (b) external 'reinsurance policy' in case the League failed and France lost her premiums for 'security.' Thus, the economic collapse of Central Europe from 1920 to 1924 was exploited by

France, within the League and outside it, to restrict both the political and economic autonomy of the Central Powers still further than the Reparations system could achieve. The Ruhr episode showed that as long as Reparations lasted and as long as the League had a lien over the Central Powers France could feel secure in a Versailles Europe, and in French hegemony on the Continent.

But time alters things; and when the ex-Allies realised the inevitability of the ex-enemy Powers' adherence to the League as 'equal' members, something had to be done to give France a *quid pro quo* for the growing potentialities of these Powers. As early as 1923 France had sought a Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which failed; then came the 1924 Geneva Protocol, to which she 'passionately adhered,' but which also failed—largely because Great Britain and the Dominions unanimously took their stand on the sufficiency of the League Covenant as 'security'. But these failures, coupled with the failure of the (illegal) Ruhr 'sanctions,' had the unhappy effect of convincing France that she must look to her own strength to defend her interests against the certain rehabilitation of a Reparations-yielding Germany. This meant not only an indefinite postponement of that disarmament to which the Allied signatories of Versailles were directly pledged after the compulsory disarmament of the Central Powers, but also the beginnings of a new competition in armaments, if not for war, at any rate for the threat of war in order to 'safeguard' peace.

Britain, foreseeing this, entered 'wholeheartedly' into the engagements of Locarno in 1925, and thus gave France as complete a guarantee as she would have got from any Anglo-American Treaty. Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, together and individually, engaged themselves to defend the frontiers of Belgium and France on the one hand, and of Germany on the other, and demilitarised the Rhine hinterland on the German side. Any 'flagrant aggression' under these heads was to justify British defence of Continental interests, though it was made clear that any Power must be 'satisfied' that 'unprovoked aggression' had taken place. Moreover, the Continental signatories definitely undertook 'that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war on each other' apart from the reservation as to 'unprovoked aggression'. Yet still France was dissatisfied, not with her fellow-signatories' words, but with their capacities and will to implement those words. It was all very well to engage to defend her; but what if disarmament ensued, or if economic difficulties paralyzed her allies, or if all her paper guarantees proved unavailing against a secretly armed Germany? What powers of defence reside in words when there are no weapons, and when an implacable foe sits in the eastern gate?

It must be said that France adopted no inconsequent attitude. Ever since 1919, when the Bourgeois Plan for a League Military Force had been refused by Britain and the United States, she had maintained that Wilson's League could not work without 'sanctions' other than those dimly foreseen in the Covenant. But the American President's idealism, and the formidable negative of the people who imbibed the word 'Monroe' with their mother's milk, forced France to accept a 'second-best' League; and so she had to 'hedge' by 'dealing in futures' outside the League's ambit. And in 1926-1928, when Germany was being obviously rehabilitated as an economic force, when Britain seemed on the slippery slope to ruin, when the Rhineland evacuation question was coming nearer, and when Reparations would soon be due for another revision, where, apart from the paper of Locarno, were real guarantees of French security to be had? Moreover, in the distance loomed the forbidding shadows of the London Naval Conference, and beyond that the Disarmament Conference, which was to achieve in practice what all the Allies had morally bound themselves to achieve at Versailles, and upon preparation for which they had bickered so long. French experts continually raised the same cry: 'Give us security first by guaranteed sanctions, either in the League or outside it, and then we will consider real disarmament.' Why security first, if all disarm together, at the same rate? If weapons are literally not to hand, how can there be either insecurity or military sanctions? These were the British questions, to which France replied: 'We stand by Versailles Europe, and by its immutability as a guarantee of our frontiers; and we know that Germany, Italy, Russia (outside the League), and America (outside it, too), and probably even you British, do not stand by this immutability of Versailles. Guarantee us our integrity, and we will disarm, but leave it to the sport of any local outbreak with secret arms by bellicose neighbours, and we must defend it with all the arms we can afford to maintain.'

France 'passionately adhered' to the system of guarantees, the Central Powers also passionately adhered to the thesis of 'Disarmament first, then Security'; and Italy and Russia added their weight to these arguments, with Britain, to say the least, sympathetic. This put France's back to the wall. She claimed that there already existed a kind of *Einschränkungspolitik* against her, not for war, but for disarmament, yet in such a way that this specious disarmament would inevitably land her in commitments to start taking off the top stones in the very Treaty which she was most concerned to maintain intact; and once that process of demolition began, how should it be stopped at her own frontiers which the Treaty guaranteed? This argument accounted for the

French efforts to create a European Union based on the rigidity of Versailles; for the French refusal to consider the questions of 'trained reserves' and of anything but mere 'budgetary limitation' in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission; and for the French insistence on an Anglo-American 'consultative pact' as the price for her according Italy naval 'parity' at the London Naval Conference, which, as is well known, therefore failed to include Franco-Italian co-operation in its final Treaty.

It may therefore well be asked, in view of the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, Locarno, and the French extra-League alliances, what further guarantees France requires as the price of disarmament and French 'security.' But there is a very real French 'case,' which can be thus summarised. All negotiations for effective sanctions to enforce paper guarantees of peace have proved abortive: 1919 Anglo-American Treaty, 1922 Briand-Poincaré proposal for Anglo-French Alliance, 1923 Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1924 Protocol—all stillborn; against all of which they have the mere paper of Locarno, ringed with reservations, and of doubtful worth. Thus it is that, when one League member is at present the invader of the territory of another and is waging actual, if not 'legal,' war upon it, France has laid on the table at Geneva a set of new proposals to give the League armed forces with a lien on national armaments, to allow use of national armaments in 'emergencies,' to denude Germany, Italy, Russia, and Britain of large aeroplanes and submarines, and to put at the disposal of any member-State the defensive services of the rest, which, however, must still be nationally maintained in case of aggression.

What has been the foreign policy of Britain during this long succession of French *démarches*?

Incomparably the strongest feeling in Britain since the war—a feeling which has transcended all bounds of party politics—has been that on no account, League or no League, shall Britain be allowed to 'slide' into any Continental engagement which might conceivably be construed as binding her to defend the interests of any Continental Power. Britain has committed herself (strange paradox!) to wage war for the preservation of peace, but not for the preservation in *eternum* of all provisions in the Peace Treaties. She has committed herself to wage war again on the Continent if satisfied as to 'aggression' under Locarno; and also to wage war for the preservation of demilitarisation and free navigation in the Dardanelles under the 1923 Straits Convention. She has signed the Kellogg Pact 'renouncing war as an instrument of national policy,' and also the Optional Clause, though with strong reservations. But in the main Britain is already committed up to the hilt in any conceivable dispute which might ever

arise on the Continent, through any of the above engagements, or through the Covenant. And yet the British people are not only unprepared for war, but they oppose both preparation for war and any further engagements 'which might thrust war upon us willy-nilly.' 'We can't afford another war—least of all if it ends in such another peace!'

Britain certainly has interests to defend if aggressors are active—Crown Colonies, Mandated areas and Protectorates, India, lives and property of subjects, and the largest merchant marine in the world. The Dominions, since the recent Statute of Westminster, can be left to look after their own defences; they are too 'big' in many senses for Britain to defend, and to that extent we must wash our hands of them. They are unconcerned in Europe, where Britain's real dangers lie, and where the perpetual possibility of another *imbroglio* claims closer attention. The European continent, as a whole, is Britain's best customer; and from the European continent alone comes the direct threat to Britain—the threat of blockade. Conflagration or paralysis in Europe would affect Britain more adversely than almost anything else which is foreseeable in the near future. Moreover, only in a European war would Britain presumably insist on her rights to naval blockade, and this contains the hidden danger of antagonising the United States, to whom our insistence on this right has always appeared as an attack on their 'right' to 'the freedom of the seas'. This, therefore, is another inducement to the United States to preserve the 'Big Navy policy'. Finally, despite Britain's traditional and contradictory preoccupations—the European Balance of Power and the isolation policy—she is already heavily committed in the destinies of the Continent. She, most of all, needs to safeguard the *Pax Europæica*. But has she gone the right way about, in the short run and in the long, to secure it?

From 1919 to the present Britain's foreign policy has been a bundle of contradictions in majestic keeping with her traditional reputation for saying one thing and doing another—the origin alike of *la perfide Albion*, and of the present French distrust of British commitments. At the same time as she has made reservations on every conceivable topic she has signed away all vestiges of her neutrality in any European dispute which may arise; she has given up her rights to control the Empire as a unit of defence; and she has curtailed her expenditure on armaments far more drastically than any other great Power sending statistics to the Disarmament Conference. She claims to take her stand on the security offered by the League, but when one of her fellow-members wages *de facto* war upon another she refrains from suggesting or taking any initiative which might in a League crisis

consistently augment that League's authority, for fear of publishing to the world the radical cleavage of opinion on the League's functions which divides its present Council; yet all the world discounts the League as a result. The British attitudes are, in brief, inconsistent; British delegates are mostly diffident, and lack any conviction of the cause they are supposed to advocate; and Britain consequently suffers the reputation on the Continent of a distraught participant in unwelcome and unedifying bickerings. 'Let the tired lion sleep.'

The reasons for all this are evident. Britain half wishes she had consigned the League to the oblivion in which America wished it. Her talk of 'Imperial commitments' lacks substance, for the Dominions are separate members of the League: Britain is but a partner with them; they can abstain from co-operation with her. She has tried to support the League's own aims, but its constitution and the relatively unassailable position of France and her Allies have either put Britain in the Geneva shade or have ended each of her moves in a kind of stalemate. So she now push-pools all brands of initiative in the European tangle, at the very moment when her position might command unique attention. That her powers of intervention are in no way negligible will now appear, provided only that she pursues steadfastly a foreign policy, comprising three main tenets.

First, Britain should not subordinate her own views of the best ways and means of safeguarding peace to those of any other body, or even to the League Council itself. The reason is best given in examples of the alternative—for instance, rather than make patent the breach on the Council, the League has refused to take direct action under its own Covenant on three occasions—over the Rumanian Optants (killed by postponement), over the Austro-German Customs Union (Austria's renunciation was forced by France before the Hague Court's advisory opinion was announced), and over the Sino-Japanese dispute (the Council has temporised by appointing a Commission of Inquiry in the hope that the question may be forcibly 'settled' before an *ex post facto* report can easily be turned out). This stultification of League functions provides just that state of affairs which every critic of the League imagines for the sake of argument, and which the French need for strengthening their demand for a League with sanctions. Britain, in a case where the Council has failed to implement its own obligations, should not concur in a gentle laxity to preserve decorum, but should act quite independently of the League together with such League members and non-members as will co-operate to preserve peace against a flagrant aggressor who has used 'war as an instrument of national policy'; and preservation can be effected by military, economic, or moral

pressure. To some this may seem an alarming prospect ; but it was actually provided for in the Covenant, and if the League shrinks from it, or is paralysed, individual States, as many as can, should act independently.

Secondly, Britain should definitely outline her attitude to the question of Treaty revision. The French theses pivot on this point ; for the evident injustices of the Peace Treaties require unanimity on the Council before modification, and the French 'system' prevents this. That entails minority rule of the worst order over a whole continent. The question is not, What modifications can at present be made ? It is, How can we provide equal rights for the ex-enemy nations to invoke effective methods of legal modification by majority consent ? Without concession of those equal rights all the plague spots of Europe are decreed perpetual existence as long as France and her allies desire—an inconceivable legal system for any comity of nations. The European, or League, majority must somehow rule by discussion and consent, and not by minority menaces of repression. Reparations, as the French have always maintained, are not a question for the League Council, they are the price of war. But to evolve a League, and to propose giving it pooled sanctions in order to fasten upon a continent a territorial and economic settlement in perpetuity at the sole will of a minority of States, is no legal basis either for that League or for that display of coercive force. If France only needs guaranteed frontiers for herself, why not, therefore, propose a 'mutability agreement' which definitely guarantees her these frontiers, yet leaves open all other questions of the Peace Treaties ? For 'mutability' must come, either by disruption or by peaceful means, and Britain can at least propose that the inevitable should be peacefully ushered in by majority agreement. Any other way breeds disruption and dissatisfaction. Britain should now stand clearly for Treaty revision by majority agreement, but should offer France the *quid pro quo* of some substantial guarantees against any violent disturbance of the revised European order.

Third, and lastly, Britain should make this second tenet of her foreign policy dependent upon a dual programme for disarmament : No Continental commitments of any kind, past, present, or future, for Britain, without an immediate measure of disarmament coupled with a future progressive programme of disarmament. Treaty revision by majority agreement and British guarantees for French defence should be entirely conditioned by acceptance of this disarmament tenet. That means, if France refused the British offer, Britain should at once denounce her Continental commitments (notably Locarno) and claim complete liberty of action. Britain must not only secure Treaty revision

by just means, but she must also (a) admit the direct obligation of the ex-Allies to disarm; and (b) definitely oppose anything in the nature of the French 'sanctions' proposal, which has recently been made in such a dramatic (and cynical?) manner by the French Minister of War at Geneva, so long as treaties remain unrevised and armaments unreduced. The clear statement of alternative British offers to the Continent would provoke a crisis, but a crisis of certainty. Britain would, in this dual offer, be giving France a better thing than Locarno, would be definitely engaging herself to defend France, but at the same time would secure Treaty revision elsewhere than on the Rhine frontier, and a real measure of disarmament. That is, Britain would be committing herself, but only in a better state of Europe where those commitments were far less likely than ever before to eventuate. Germany and Italy would be appeased and far more amenable to counsels of moderation. And France would be faced with the dire alternatives: (a) a certain war probably sooner than later, if she refused the British offer; (b) the equally certain collapse, not only of her 'system', but also of her Versailles edifice if that war eventuates; and (c) acceptance of Treaty revision, disarmament, and sounder guarantees for herself and the embracing of a new conception of European security for herself and her allies. In exchange for justice in post-war Europe, France would gain a real security.

This threefold British foreign policy would stand to achieve striking results. It would enormously strengthen a disintegrating League. It would make the League safer on new foundations. And it would, through Disarmament, substitute economic and juridical sanctions (far more effective if organised!) for the crude 'pooled forces' which France envisages. These 'pacific sanctions,' moreover, are the very foundations which America, Russia, Britain, Italy, Germany, and the important 'neutral bloc' have always maintained should support the European comity of nations.

But, it may be objected, what if France and her allies decline to accept this British offer? What if they try to sabotage the League, or even retire from it? First refusal means a virtually hopeless prospect for the French Europe; from a dominant position the European minority would be in an inferior position. Secondly, if they retire from the League, the same result is brought about in the last analysis. Thirdly, if they sabotage the League, they continue to place the League in its present anomalous position, and eventually to breed a disaster of catastrophic dimensions. In any case, Britain cannot lose on balance by this policy, for the alternatives to Britain are either a dominant 'Rump' of the League, or a release from commitments which are soon likely to be enforced.

In fact, the ambiguous attitude of Britain has largely contributed to the present impasse. If one considers the European plague spots—the Polish corridor, Memel (again in the limelight), the Baltic powder magazines, the Ukraine, the Danubian *détente*, the Minorities friction, and the cancer of Reparations—then one is forced to lay the finger, not on the French demand for security, but upon the whole post-war European system, which, by existing British commitments and the hesitant British attitudes to Treaty revision and Disarmament, we have helped to perpetuate upon rotten foundations. How can any conscientious Englishman blame France? He can see as plain as a pikestaff the fears which prompt her demands. He must either subscribe to the system which nurses those fears or else he must put forward his own substitute for the crude French conception of the League and its functions—a substitute, moreover, which will eradicate French fears, and in which the Englishman believes sufficiently to 'commit himself' to defend it if the necessity arises.

Already at Geneva the issues have been made startlingly clear. The French, after a three-year 33½ per cent increase in expenditure on armaments, have stated that they cannot disarm in any way, unless (a) the sanctity of their own conceptions of European needs is definitely guaranteed by effective engagements from other members, and unless (b) the prevailing armaments, as well as the present defensive potentialities, of Germany, Britain, Italy, and Russia, are collectively placed at French disposal. This is, in effect, what 'the pooling of armaments for League uses' really comes to, since any European dispute involving repression by League action can only come from one of the outbreaks envisaged by the French theses. Now it is easy for France to propose to Britain the abolition of big submarines and bombers; to Italy, the abolition of the same; to Germany, the subordination of her big civilian aircraft to an International Commission (doubtless also 'staked out' by France and her associates when action is needed); and to all the navies of the world, the abolition of vessels over 10,000 tons, or carrying guns of over 8-inch calibre. For these are the most effective weapons of all countries which do not see eye to eye with France over the best methods of 'outguarding peace' or of enforcing League commitments. But Signor Grandi and M. Litvinoff have already, at Geneva, strikingly demonstrated the utter incompatibility of this 'plan' with the obligations incurred by the Powers at Versailles, and with the long-run security of the European continent; and Germany has taken her stand on that side of the fence, too, while Poland comes down, as ever, on the French side. So, doubtless, this European cleavage must always continue, to the aversion of America, as

long as Britain herself wreathes mists of equivocation about the fundamental issues. Just so long, therefore, must the League be rendered impotent, and the French 'system' dominant, but retrogressive.

Till now, Britain has definitely engaged herself on the European continent to defend Belgium and France on the one hand, or Germany on the other: and we have shown how contradictory, how ambiguous, and how 'reserved' those engagements have appeared to France, with the logical result that France has ever claimed more and more guarantees for 'security'—guarantees which are only to be added at present to an imposing array of armaments and alliances against Powers which are (a) economically bankrupt, (b) compulsorily disarmed, (c) equal members, on paper, of the League, and (d) therefore more and more chafing against such rabidly repressive treatment. Such a system contains all the seeds of its own violent dissolution within it—a dissolution which is at present postponed by the military strength of France and her associates, and by a hesitant British attitude, but a dissolution which, if the system is allowed to continue on the lines of French foreign policy and of French views of the League and its functions, becomes clearly inevitable. In such a dissolution Britain must, as things are now, willy-nilly be entangled, in direct opposition to whatever clear notions there have been in her post-war foreign policy, and in opposition to the expressed will of her people. Indeed, as is well appreciated on the Continent itself, such a dissolution will in any case mean the end of the European culture we have taken no small part in creating, defending, and supporting.

The world after the Great War is not the simple, narrow world of the Congress of Vienna—yet ten years after 1815, Britain, under Canning, turned her back on Europe, withdrew from a European League dominated by the dominators of the Continent at that date, and 'called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old'. But the world has shrunk; the New World is itself dominated by a greater Power across the Atlantic, and what is left of our Empire, as a functional unit, cannot remove us from a European ambit. So Britain cannot hope for a latter-day Canning: but she can, amid conflicting nationalisms and menaces of a return to pre-war dangers, boldly proclaim her will to defend the 'New World' promised in 1815. Some price must be paid for securing the 'New World,' as Lord Cecil said last year; and Britain must awake to the fact that it is better to be definitely committed to a controllable Continent and to its progress, than to be semi-committed to an uncontrollable one heading straight for the abyss. Britain must pay something; and the something proposed here is no more on paper, and much

less in probability, than the price we are at present becoming more and more liable to pay.

In any case, Britain has reached the crossroads in this century as she reached them under Canning last. If she persists in a foreign policy which is perpetually trimmed to the French wind, or likely to be blown away by 'pooled sanctions' at any moment, then she must resign herself to reaping a Continental whirlwind in the nearer future—that is, to living with neighbours who are perpetually involved in seething and brawling factions, in which she has contracted to join. She has an opportune moment for intervention now. But her declarations must be clear, unmistakable, and unhesitant.

D GRAHAM HUTTON.

CHINA, JAPAN, AND MANCHURIA

On the stage of Pacific affairs there are many actors, but none play parts so moving as China and Japan, and in the scene upon which the curtain rose when the Japanese army took the initiative last autumn in Manchuria the *roles* of the two actors can only be truly appreciated if their national traditions and the character of their Governments are well understood.

When Japan transformed herself into a modern Power last century, she sought the model of her new State in Europe and found it in Imperial Germany. To-day, even under the pressure of universal manhood suffrage and the growth of a new economic proletariat, the model retains much of its original character. As in Berlin before the war so in Tokyo to-day, sovereignty resides, not in the elected Chamber and the parliamentary Cabinet, but in the body of Elder Statesmen who are, or were, the nerve centre of the Privy Council. The original Elder Statesmen, the *Gense*, are all dead but one, the aged Prince Saionji, and it is perhaps, therefore, an anachronism to use the term at all. But whereas Japanese political reformers hoped and expected that the reality of power would gradually pass to the parliamentary Cabinet, as and when the original *Gense* disappeared by death, their hopes have not yet been realised. The process of the transfer of power is under weigh, and it may perhaps be said that the military party are fighting a losing battle to retain their hold over the policy of Japan, but effective power still rests with the inviable forces near the throne, and among them the influence of the army is still great. Moreover, the independence which the fighting services enjoy from real parliamentary and civil control can be measured by the fact that the Japanese War Office and Admiralty are always represented in the Cabinet by a General or an Admiral. They are never placed in charge of a civilian Minister. This means a dual character in government, as in pre-war Germany; and it serves to enlighten the perplexity of the onlooker when he sees evidence of a conflict between the statements of the Japanese Foreign Office and the actions of the military. In judging all contemporary events and policy it is essential to bear this duality in mind.

less in probability, than the price we are at present becoming more and more liable to pay.

In any case, Britain has reached the crossroads in this century as she reached them under Canning last. If she persists in a foreign policy which is perpetually trimmed to the French wind, or likely to be blown away by 'poised sanctions' at any moment, then she must resign herself to reaping a Continental whirlwind in the nearer future - that is to living with neighbours who are perpetually involved in seething and brawling factions, in which she has contracted to join. She has an opportune moment for intervention now. But her destinations must be clear, unmistakable, and unhesitant.

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ON the stage of Pacific affairs there are many actors, but none play parts so moving as China and Japan—and in the scene upon which the curtain rose when the Japanese army took the initiative last autumn in Manchuria the roles of the two actors can only be truly appreciated if their national traditions and the character of their governments are well understood.

When Japan transformed herself into a modern Power last century, she sought the model of her new State in Europe and found it in Imperial Germany. Today even under the pressure of universal disarmament and the growth of a new economic proletariat the model retains much of its original character. As in Berlin, but to the westward, the Japanese Government resides, not in the elected Reichstag but in the parliamentary Cabinet, but in the body of Elder Statesmen, who were the nerve centre of the Prussian Council. The Emperor, State and the *Genro* are all dead but in the age of the *Genro* it is perhaps, therefore, an anachronism to use the term at all. But whereas Japanese youth was determined to put an end to the reality of power wielded primarily by the parliamentary Cabinet, as and when the original *Genro* disappeared by death, their hopes have not yet been realised. The process of the transfer of power is under way, and it may perhaps be said that the military party are fighting a losing battle to retain their recovered policy of Japan. But effective power still rests with the imperial forces near the throne, and among them the influence of the army is still great. Moreover, the independence which the fighting services enjoy from real parliamentary and civil control can be measured by the fact that the Japanese War Office and Admiralty are always represented in the Cabinet by a General or an Admiral. They are never placed in charge of a civilian Minister. This means a dual character in government, as in pre-war Germany, and it serves to enlighten the perplexity of the onlooker when he sees evidence of a conflict between the statements of the Japanese Foreign Office and the actions of the military. In judging all contemporary events and policy it is essential to bear this duality in mind.

In China, militarism is also in the saddle, and the failure of the civil power to control the war lords is one of the prime causes of her disorder. But here the resemblance to Japan ceases. China, like Japan, was aroused from a long slumber by the intrusion of the West; but the awakening produced a very different result. On both sides of the Yellow Sea resentment of the intrusion was equally strong, but the Japanese determined to explore the secret sources from which the Western intruder drew his strength, while the Chinese wrapped themselves in disdainful indifference. From this original contrast in their attitudes towards the onset of European influences the two peoples took widely divergent courses in national development—Japan endowing herself with all the instruments of economic, military, and political power and China refusing (till very recent times) to bestir herself to meet the modern world on equal terms. It has often been said that China is not a State but a great society, in which the Chinese contemned the soldier, conceived statecraft as a ritual, and moulded themselves on the Confucian ideal of the perfect gentleman whose rule was the golden mean. In a static world in which mere remoteness spelled security, this society might have lasted for ever, but fate and the restless 'Ocean Men' of the West decreed otherwise and broke the seclusion of the Middle Kingdom with weapons against which the Chinese could offer no defence. The most piercing of these weapons were not of iron or steel—they were the invisible projectiles of the mind carrying explosive novelties of thought into the heart of the immobile East and blowing up the very foundations of its ancient life. Where Japan, recovering from the first shock of contact, learned the lesson of Western power with zealous application, China opposed a passive resistance which delayed but could not prevent the inevitable result. And to-day the Chinese stand confronted with danger at home and abroad in apparent defencelessness, bereft of nearly all the instruments of self-preservation—except the will to survive—because their forefathers refused to see that the world cannot stand still. We shall see in a moment that China has powers of self-protection against which even the armed might of Japan will beat in vain, but, at the outset, we must first realise that this present crisis in the fate of the nation has overtaken it in a time of transition when the old is in ruins and the new still to create.

These, then, are the two actors in a drama of which many scenes have already been played and the dénouement is still to come. Its origins lie deep in history; but we may take as the opening date that fateful day in 1896 when Li Hung Chang, attending in St. Petersburg the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II., agreed with Count Witte that Russia should build the Chinese

Eastern Railway. From that agreement the chain of events leads through the tortuous paths of diplomacy to the triumphal arrival of Russia at Dairen (then Dalny), in South Manchuria, where she found the realisation of her dream of a Pacific dominion. Her dream was short-lived, for the fear of her encroachment aroused Japan, and in the Manchurian War of 1904 she was driven out once more and Japan took her place in that land of opportunity. The Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) made Japan the heir to all Russian interests in Manchuria south of Changchun, and a Treaty of the same year with China endorsed the whole transaction. But a secret agreement of great significance accompanied the published Treaty with China, for by it the Chinese Government engaged, 'for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of said railway, any main line in the neighbourhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above-mentioned railway.' The reader is here asked to note the words 'prior to the recovery by them *i.e.* China of the said railway'. For ten years later, in the Twenty One Demands of 1915, they acquired an added significance.

In the agreement of 1896 with Russia China was entitled to repurchase the Chinese Eastern Railway including the southern extension to Dairen thirty-six years after the opening of the line, or to take it over eighty years after without payment. The line was opened in 1903, and the repurchase date was therefore 1939. Japan, in acquiring Russian interests, took over this obligation to return the railway to China. But meanwhile Manchuria had gained a new value in Japanese estimation, and the Tokyo Government resolved to make their stake in the country permanent. The Great War gave them their opportunity. While the interested Powers, America excepted, were deeply engaged in the European struggle, Japan presented the famous Twenty One Demands in January 1915, and by the month of May her pressure had overcome the resistance of Yuan Shi-Kai and the lease of the railway was extended to ninety-nine years in all, namely, to the year 2002. The other advantages Japan secured are well known. The foundation of her Manchurian interest was the lease of the Lao Tung Peninsula, and the keystone of the arch the lease of the South Manchurian Railway. By these two instruments of 1905 and 1915 including the Chinese undertaking not to build competing railways, Japan consolidated the position won from Russia and forced China to recognise her hegemony in Manchuria. In them is to be found the *fontes et origines* of the conflict, of which the immediate cause is the Chinese violation of the railway agreement.

Now, in the past, the Chinese have been accustomed to accept with resigned philosophy the reverses of fortune and to hope for better luck next time. The great inarticulate mass of the people had neither eyes nor ears for politics: their only concern was to fill the daily rice bowl. Even the substantial merchants regarded public affairs as the special duty of the Mandarins who were paid to govern, and usually found safety in complete detachment from all share in them. Hence there was no vigilant public opinion to audit the results of Chinese statecraft, and if a given transaction should prove humiliating to the national pride the feelings of the individual official, be he Senior Grand Secretary of State, viceroy or humble taotai, were usually solaced by a good stiff bribe. But about the turn of the century a new force raised its head above the general indifference. The youth of China were being educated in foreign ways; students crossed to Europe and America to study medicine, science and economics, and on their return to China became the creators of a new public opinion. They prepared the way for the revolution, and in the twenty-one years that have passed since it broke out in 1911 they have been the spearhead of an impressive demonstration of the new political spirit. Nothing escaped their vigilance, and at the least hint of foreign aggression, or even of the legitimate exercise of foreign rights under the 'Unequal Treaties' they unleashed the boycott in order to 'save China'.

It is no use railing against the students of China for usurping the functions of their national government. The dangers of this usurpation are great and obvious, and the Chinese cannot afford to allow it to proceed long unchecked, but without it China would have been literally helpless. In the past twenty years these young men, despite all their reckless irresponsibility, have done a solid piece of work; for, by awaking an interest in public affairs where no such interest existed before, they have created an articulate public opinion which should be the ultimate salvation of China. They have resorted to the boycott because it was the last, indeed the only, line of defence. It is a modern form of the time-honoured Chinese way of opposing injustice by passive resistance, with now an added sting in its tail. Its use on a national scale is comparatively modern, and the force of young China behind it is the principal feature which distinguishes the political crises of the past few years from those of the nineteenth century. In the present conflict it is the Chinese reply to Japanese action in Manchuria. To Manchuria we must therefore return.

Manchuria has a threefold importance in Japanese eyes—economic, strategic, and political. Thirty years ago the political and strategic interests predominated; and, though they are still important factors, the economic value of Manchuria is now fore-

most. Japan drove Russia out of South Manchuria in 1905 because the threat of Russian control over the continental coast so near the islands of Japan was a danger to her security. Thereafter the strategic defence of the Manchurian outpost was her first concern, and in establishing it Japan discovered the hitherto unexplored riches of the country. Coal, iron, gold, and timber; rich undeveloped agricultural land and great opportunities of colonisation to relieve the pressure of population in Japan itself; these revealed themselves in almost unlimited measure. The missing factors in development were transport, population, and capital. The backbone of transport was provided by the South Manchurian Railway, a line 417 miles long running north and south from Dairen to Changchun, which Japan inherited from Russia in 1905 and has since transformed into one of the most efficient railways in the world. Capital was found abroad, originally in London and New York, and let us note in passing that British and American investors still hold a substantial interest in the South Manchurian Railway, while the foreign holders of Japanese bonds should also realise that some of the money thus provided, though apparently invested in Tokyo, is actually employed in Manchuria. The third factor—namely, population—came from a source not originally contemplated by the Japanese, and, since the manner of its coming has a prime significance, it must be described in something more than a passing reference.

When Japan took over the lease of the Liao Tung Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway her population was already growing, and, though the pressure on her space had not reached its present intensity, the more far-sighted Japanese realised that an outlet must soon be found. It was found in Manchuria, and the Japanese Government foresaw that if they could transplant to the empty spaces of this golden land the surplus of their home population they would thus help to solve a domestic problem and also strengthen their hold on Manchuria. The Oriental Development Company, founded in 1906 to achieve this object in Korea, was the model on which the enterprise was intended to proceed, and this company received, in fact, the authority to operate in Manchuria as well as in Korea. But the colonisation plan failed. Japan could not induce her cultivators to migrate, and those that did found Chinese competition too strong. Thus to-day there are only 228,000 Japanese in all Manchuria. The settling of some 600,000 Koreans has done something to fill the gap, but the phenomenal Chinese immigration of the last seven years has proceeded on such a scale that the hopes of a strong Japanese element in the population of Manchuria are gone for ever. Colonisation by Koreans had the obvious advantage that, since the Korean

was a Japanese subject and therefore enjoyed extra-territorial right (including the special right to lease and occupy Chinese land in Manchuria), he was an agent of the Japanese purpose amenable to control which the Chinese settler wholly escapes. But this very fact has made him an object of distrust to the Chinese and a source of dispute between Tokyo and Nanking (or Mukden), which became evident in incidents last summer when conflicts between Chinese farmers and Korean settlers compelled the Japanese to intervene with force at the very moment when the tension in Manchuria had already reached the breaking point.

The manner in which the Chinese migration has proceeded is very remarkable. Manchuria was closed to the Chinese of the Eighteen Provinces during the Manchu régime, and was only effectively opened after 1911, but it was not until at least ten years later that the tide of emigration rose to strength, nor did it reach phenomenal proportions till 1926. In 1927 the net total of this great trek was 700,000, and the estimated number of Chinese who have actually settled in Manchuria in the past six years is about 3,000,000, a colossal flight from Egypt to the Promised Land. But it is pertinent to remark that a substantial proportion of these settlers, as I can vouch from personal observation in 1927, 1928, and 1929, went to Heilungkiang, in North Manchuria, which is a day's journey beyond any sphere of Japanese control. Therefore, when it is claimed that Japan is the real creator of their opportunity, the claim must be seriously qualified by the fact just stated. It is true that the reliable service of the South Manchurian Railway and the order maintained by the Japanese in the railway zone are material factors in the whole equation; but the vital factors were the vacant land and the feudal control of the Three Eastern Provinces by Marshal Chang Tso-lin and his allied Tuchuns in Kirin and Heilungkiang. There was greater order in Manchuria than in the rest of China till the other day because the Old Marshal kept it, and when the enthusiastic apologists of Japan give her the credit, we reply with the simple question, Why did disorder spread only after he was killed in 1928?

By this view the perspective of Japan's claims is corrected, and we pass on to the essential factors in the economic value of Manchuria to the Island Empire. Emigration has so far failed to give relief to her domestic congestion, and her energies are therefore turned to an ever more intensive industrialisation, which needs markets and sources of supply. The extent to which Japan depends on raw materials of foreign origin is considerable, but the returns of her trade show that she takes far more from other sources than from Manchuria. Her enormous imports of raw cotton come principally from India and the United States; she

buys 90 per cent. of her wool from Australia ; of the iron ore which she consumes 90 per cent. comes from foreign sources, largely from China proper and from Malaya, none from Manchuria ; India supplied in 1928 one-half of her pig-iron, Manchuria one-third ; Manchuria, on the other hand, supplies two-thirds of her import of coal ; the greater part of her consumption of beans is supplied by Manchuria, but the amount Japan takes is considerably less than the total bean export from Manchuria to America, Europe, and other parts. Of other foodstuffs Japan has to import 15 per cent. of her rice consumption from Burma, Siam, and Indo-China, and the proportion is rising every year ; for wheat she relies upon North America for ten times as much as comes from Manchuria, and the whole of her sugar comes from the Dutch Indies. Thus with the very important exception of coal, and the hardly less important exception of pig-iron, Manchuria does not supply Japan's need to any great extent.

As a field of investment it is important, for there is a total of over £214,000,000 sunk in Manchuria by Japan, but some of it came from foreign sources, and in the South Manchurian Railway the British investor holds a large stake in the form of sterling bonds. As markets for Japanese exports, America in 1928 came first with £32,000,000, China second with £17,000,000, India third with £14,000,000, and Manchuria fourth with £11,000,000. Thus the American market is worth seven and a half times as much as the Manchurian, and China proper over three times. On the import side of the account Japanese customers stand in the following order : (1) America, (2) India, (3) China, (4) Great Britain, (5) Manchuria, with Germany and Australia hard on the heels of Manchuria. No doubt Japan hopes by her proximity and by increasing her control to secure for herself the lion's share of Manchurian trade, as her annexation of Korea has enabled her to do in that country ; and if she were to succeed in ~~the~~ (at present) open door in the former, that result would follow. The Korean figures offer an instructive warning. It could follow, took 90 per cent. of Korean exports, while 75 per cent. 1928 Japan imports came from Japan, the total overseas trade of Korea £78,000,000 Korea being

It is therefore not on the basis of present value, eye to the future, that Japan claims a special stake, but with an She justifies her actions partly by reference to her in Manchuria, rights and partly by the necessity of maintain : explicit treaty territory which has become bandit-ridden and reeling order in a the Chinese revolution. The treaty rights are chaotic owing to much as we sympathise with the Chinese are undeniable, and, against the manner in which some of these rights their grievance still more against the manner in which Japan rights were acquired, an is now protecting

them, the treaties have a legal validity which will have to be recognised in any negotiation. Moreover, the Chinese have a grave responsibility. They have openly violated the railway agreement by pushing forward the construction of lines avowedly designed to compete with the South Manchurian Railway. Japan has protested many times, but refrained from violent action until the physical security of her own line was threatened by disorder.

The other side of the shield is the rights of China, which rest on a more permanent foundation of essential justice than any economic or military interest claimed by Japan. But since the conflict is joined between two sets of rights, and wrongs are done on both sides, it will require something more than the unequally balanced play of the forces of China and Japan to find the right treatment of the whole trouble. Japan, acting under grave provocation, has taken a false step, and thoughtful Japanese must surely see that, by allowing the military cabinet to have its way, they have drawn upon Japan a wholly disproportionate censure and have created widespread sympathy for China. No doubt Japan believed, like Russia in 1924, that the time had come to teach the Chinese a lesson, but though Russia used armed force at that time, she acted on the whole with remarkable restraint which the Japanese would do well to copy. No one can deny that the most urgent need in the Far East is that the Chinese should appreciate the risks to themselves and to others which their disunity and disorder entail. But the Japanese have chosen a method which precipitates international complications, and, by eliciting sympathy for China in America and in Europe, encourages the Chinese to minimise their responsibility for the whole trouble, and so the mistimed endeavour to teach China a lesson actually lessens the likelihood that it will be taken to heart. This is a real vicious circle in which wrongdoing and reprisal, reprisal and wrongdoing have followed one another to the verge of war.

The war cloud arose on the Manchurian horizon last summer in a sky already dark. Ever since Chang Tso-lin died the bonds of discipline had been loosened, the deterioration of the currency had hit the peasant hard at the very time when the general demand for his products was falling, and when the great flood crossed the border from the south. Banditry, political unrest in parts of the country, spread widely and already endemic distressed peasant a lively alternative to penury. None the less, there could still be observed that perennial contradiction so peculiar to China in which trade continues despite hindrances which Business went on 'as usual,' and, since in almost it altogether, the 'usual' must always be stated in terms China and Manchuria.

of what elsewhere would be the 'unusual,' the intensification of habitual difficulties was not regarded as heralding any severe crisis. Nor would it have precipitated anything more than the ordinary friction and dispute between Chinese and Japanese, had not the latter lost patience. The accumulation of unsettled cases of grievance against the Chinese had increased by 1931 to serious proportions: the bandits had grown bolder in their attacks on the South Manchurian line (though not so as to make the ordinary traveller aware of them), a Japanese officer, Captain Nakamura, travelling on the Mongolian border on a mission as yet unexplained was murdered on June 18, and on September 19 the Japanese War Office announced that Chinese troops had blown up the South Manchurian line on the northern outskirts of Mukden, on the previous night, and that the Japanese commander-in-chief had moved his headquarters from Dairen to Mukden to direct the necessary military action against the Chinese garrison at Mukden, whom he held responsible for the outrage. And throughout the general *malle* Chinese agitators and Japanese *agents provocateurs* were at work.

Events of this kind had occurred before, and for significant instance, when Chang Tso-lin's train was blown up within sight of Mukden in June 1928 there was a tense situation in the Manchurian capital very similar to what arose last summer, and the Japanese took similar precautions. But the storm passed without breaking. In the four years that followed the deterioration in the whole situation had increased Japanese vigilance and must have weakened the influence of moderating counsels in Tokyo. None the less when Count Uchida was appointed president of the South Manchurian Railway Company in June 1931 it was announced in Tokyo that he would spare no effort to reach a comprehensive settlement of outstanding railway problems and that the Japanese Government and the Manchurian Government (i.e., the young Marshal Chang Hsueh-lang) had agreed to appoint a joint committee to discuss them. Moreover, Mr. Eguchi, the new vice-president of the South Manchurian Railway, told an American correspondent in August that he viewed with anxiety the increasing friction between 'patriotic Japanese' and Chinese agitators, and contemplated the necessity of curbing certain military, commercial, and young patriot groups of Japanese in South Manchuria who had been organising meetings of protest at which war was proclaimed to be the only way in which 'China can be made to account for her trespass on Japan's treaty privileges.' He further declared that the purpose of the new South Manchurian Railway administration was to secure the genuine co-operation of the Chinese in all Manchurian railway development, and if the effort failed the fault would not lie with Count Uchida or himself.

The American correspondent closed his despatch with the words, 'tension is growing to a point where some minor incident may cause a clash with serious consequences' (*New York Times*, August 15, 1931).

The proposed conference never effectively met, for, though an informal discussion took place at which the date of its first meeting was decided, when the day came the principal Chinese delegate, Kao Chi-yi, failed to appear. The Japanese interpreted his failure as another of those evasive shifts by which the Manchurian authorities have sought to avoid being brought to book for their violation of Japanese railway rights. Mr. Kao's action in burking the conference was probably the last straw. It silenced the advocates of moderation by depriving them of their argument that the conference was the way to a satisfactory solution, and seemed to justify the believers in the 'strong hand.' But we may judge from Mr. Eguchi's statement above that the omens for its success were never entirely favourable, and we know that powerful forces were at work in Tokyo and in Dairen to make it abortive. In any case, events were moving fast. The Nakamura murder and the Korean dispute preceded the conference by several weeks, and though on the Chinese side Mr. T. V. Suong, not for the first time in a Sino-Japanese quarrel, made a notable effort to find a peaceful way of treating the crisis, his attempt failed and the storm broke.

Now, the compass of this article does not allow of a detailed account of subsequent events, which moreover, must be fresh in all memories. But, since the sudden transfer of the scene of action from Manchuria to Shanghai has perplexed the public mind, something may be said of its causes. In their official statements the Japanese Government maintain a sharp distinction between events in Manchuria and the Shanghai crisis. They separate these two because they know that the Treaty Powers have the right to take part in anything that concerns Shanghai, but they propose to exclude the intervention of any third party from the treatment of the Manchurian problem. For the sake of clearness we may here take them separately, though they are only different parts of the same picture.

The trouble spread to Shanghai by a chain of consequences which anyone who knew China could have predicted and of which the Japanese Government ought to have taken full account in preparing to meet the crisis. A situation not dissimilar confronted the British Government in 1926, but in despatching the Shanghai Defence Force the Cabinet gave it a definite limited objective in keeping with the general design of British policy. The Japanese,

by contrast, undertook, first in Manchuria and then in Shanghai, an unlimited liability without any relation to general policy, and have since suffered the fate of all Governments that capitulate to their General Staffs. They have suffered great provocation from the Chinese; but it is doubtful whether it has been any greater than that which England suffered in the Yangtze Valley six years ago at the crisis of the Chinese Revolution. They are now presented with an unmanageable situation fraught with international consequences which the military party in Tokyo failed to foresee.

The capture of Mukden, followed by the advance westwards along the Peking-Mukden line, the bombing of Chinchow, and the expulsion of Chang Hsueh-liang from Manchuria—these evidences of an aggressive purpose aroused feeling all over China and provoked the inevitable result of an anti-Japanese boycott. Shanghai became the theatre of conflict because it is the place to which all lines in China converge, and therefore a disturbance, anywhere from Canton to Harbin, is felt in Shanghai like the influence of a distant earthquake on the seismograph, and for two reasons. First, the banking, commerce, shipping, and insurance of all China, whether Chinese or foreign, are mainly operated from Shanghai, and a *Life in Chung King*, 250 miles up the Yangtze, has to be paid for in London via an office in Shanghai. Second, the same is true of Chinese political feeling, which, spread like the nerves of the human body all over the country, flows in a strong current back and forth from its main power house in Shanghai. I put it thus, knowing that many Chinese will give Canton the place of honour, but I do not agree with them now, whatever may have been true in 1925. These two features present the foreign interests in Shanghai as a specially vulnerable front to the attack of the boycott, for in Shanghai both the boycott and its victims are found in greater magnitude and in closer proximity than elsewhere to China. So when Japan ran amok in Manchuria, China responded to the shock by a boycott, Admiral Shosawa made his *rapide* with an inadequate force of marines, and Shanghai is still ablaze. A vicious circle indeed, which, in the end, nothing but the united pressure of the outside world can break.

Japan is prepared to accept, because she must, this united action in Shanghai, but she refuses it in Manchuria. Now, it is true that the only parties to the principal Manchurian treaties are Japan and China, and any modification of them must be accepted by both parties. It is also true that the Chinese infringement of these treaties must be one of the major subjects of inquiry and negotiation. But since the treaties of 1905 and 1915 were signed the situation has been radically altered by the creation of the League of Nations, under which both parties have accepted obligations which did not then exist. Japan seems to ignore the

change, and intends to pursue in Manchuria a policy which conflicts with the new world order which she helped to create in Geneva. Here, as before, we see evidence of the dual character of her government and of her policy. At home she is a house divided against itself, and abroad this antinomy becomes a public danger. In the end she will not be able to deny the validity of the Chinese claim that the League should take a hand in the treatment of the Manchurian dispute, and she has already committed herself, perhaps unwittingly, to a course which leads to that result, in assenting to the appointment of the Lytton Commission. The Commission is empowered 'to report . . . on any circumstance (in Manchuria) which, *affecting international relations*, threatens to disturb the peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them on which peace depends.' These skilfully chosen words are wide enough to ensure a thorough-going inquiry if Lord Lytton has the courage to pursue it, and they provide the opportunity for a comprehensive review of the whole Manchurian problem. When the Lytton Commission presents its report the Council at Geneva will have a new opportunity to retrieve what was lost to the League last autumn.

A. F. WHITE.

THE ENIGMA OF GERMANY

THE situation in Germany is changing so constantly, the ground is shifting so continuously, that almost anything that is said or written about it appears out of date before it reaches the public. But there are certain fundamental facts and tendencies that remain, and which can bear description or analysis independently of their particular aspect at a given moment.

Tolstoy once said that all families are happy in the same way, but that every family has its own way of being miserable. This can be applied to nations as well—what is Germany's particular way of being miserable, in what way is her crisis different to that facing practically every other country? Is it because the economic crisis in Germany has been more vehement than elsewhere and has brought about the disorganisation of her political and social order? But it could be argued that the economic crisis in England or America is just as far-reaching, and that the equilibrium has been completely upset in every industrial country. Even if it be true that the process is a particularly painful one in Germany, that alone would not suffice to provide a satisfactory explanation. Then again, there is the tendency, especially among the Germans themselves, to attribute the present position solely to Reparations. While it is perfectly true, of course, that Reparations have contributed in no small measure to Germany's difficulties, it would be wrong to exaggerate their influence—at least in the past—on the development of the political and social crisis in Germany. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the creditor nations have also been adversely affected by Reparations. The world's political indebtedness has been, and still is, one of the main causes, but by no means the only one, of international complications and instability.

During a recent visit to Germany I had the opportunity of seeing a very large number of people belonging to all classes and to all political parties, and of discussing their various problems with them. Perhaps the only question on which I found absolute unanimity in Germany was that of Reparations. It is true that the extremists of the Right have made a great deal of political capital out of their opposition to reparation payments, whereas

more moderate groups have until now done their best to come to an understanding with the creditor nations. But at the present moment they are all agreed that the continuation of Reparations is impossible. The difference in their respective attitudes can best be pictured thus: the parties of the Right say, 'We cannot pay, but we would not even if we could, because we do not admit we owe anything'; while the others say, 'We cannot go on paying, and you must understand this, and not compel us to break our word, but release us from our obligations'. As will be seen, it is a question of formula, not of substance. No Government could survive that would reimpose Reparations, and that no more money will be obtained from Germany on account of reparation payments is the only thing on which I think I can afford to be sweepingly assertive.

During the first few years after the stabilisation of the mark foreign loans and credits were actually lavished on Germany. Foreign investors were attracted by the high rates of interest obtainable, and the security seemed good, for Germany had just triumphantly emerged from a devastating crisis and was well on the way to recovery—nay, full prosperity. London and New York were competing in liberality, and the Germans were only too glad to accept the loans thus offered. Municipalities, industry, trade, commerce, the banks—everybody was obtaining financial facilities abroad. The influx of foreign money reached such a point that for a time the dollar actually stood under par in Germany, and the Reichsbank was at a loss to know how to employ its foreign currency. Finally the president of the Reichsbank decided to intervene and put an end to the further raising of foreign loans. But his half-hearted and superficial intervention merely resulted in long term loans now taking the form of short-term credits, and Dr. Schacht must bear a large share of the responsibility for the situation that ensued. Incidentally it appears almost inconceivable that until the recent 'standstill' negotiations the amount of foreign short-term credits should never have been established by the Reichsbank and that nobody knew the actual extent of Germany's commitments or how to meet them in case of need.

The crash came at the end of 1929, and ever since Germany has had to struggle against an almost hopeless and ever-increasing financial and economic crisis. Strict economy and great sacrifices by all classes of the population have enabled the country to eke out a miserable living, but in the second half of 1931 the downward movement suddenly began to develop in what was nothing short of a hysterical tempo. Even up to June 1931 things had been difficult enough. The Reichstag was meeting irregularly, and Dr. Brüning, the Chancellor, was ruling his country by means of

emergency decrees. From the time of the ill-advised September elections in 1930¹ to about June 1931 Dr. Brüning had issued a number of such decrees containing what appeared then to be very arbitrary legislation. The Hitlerites, who had obtained 107 seats in the Reichstag, were troubling peace and stability, and seemed to be preparing for a *coup d'état* even then. Stocks and shares were constantly falling, the number of bankruptcies was increasing daily, and in February 1931 the number of unemployed almost touched five millions.

The full meaning of the crisis, however, was revealed to the masses on that unfortunate June day when President Hoover's proposal of a twelve months' debt holiday became public. For the next seventeen days Paris was bargaining about its agreement to the Hoover scheme. Meanwhile, the very foreign lenders who had so liberally, so lavishly, given short term credits to Germany were seized by a panic, and in a frenzy, regardless of the consequences, they were withdrawing their money. The bewildered president of the Reichsbank was flying from capital to capital hoping against hope to raise new credits, but his efforts were in vain, and his plea that unless credits were forthcoming there would be chaos failed to convince anybody. When, finally, the Hoover Moratorium was agreed upon it was too late, and on July 13 there happened one of the greatest financial calamities of modern times. The Darmstädter Bank, one of Germany's leading banks, had to close down. What followed was a regular stampede. The horror-stricken population hastened to withdraw its deposits from the other banks. It was impossible to stop a run of this magnitude, and on the following day all the banks and the bourse were closed. The economic life of the country suddenly stood still. A number of emergency decrees endeavoring to restore confidence was issued by the Government. The State guaranteed the liabilities of the Darmstädter Bank and took over the Dresdner Bank, which also found itself in difficulties. When a few days later the banks were reopened the calmness of the population was perfectly astounding. The run had stopped as suddenly as it had begun. In August a first 'standstill' agreement for six months supplementing the Hoover Moratorium, was signed with Germany's private creditors. The Reichstag was convened for October, and on the eve of its reopening the parties of the Right held a conference at Harzburg where they indulged in verbose and noisy demonstrations against the Government. Through skilful manoeuvring Dr. Brüning, whose position seemed rather precarious, obtained the rejection by the Reichstag of a vote of no confidence. But in November it seemed that a Hitler 'Putsch'

¹ See 'Germany in the Melting Pot,' by the same author, in the *Northwest Century and After*, September 1930.

was a question of days or hours. Dr. Brüning survived, and on December 8 he issued his now famous emergency decree which regulates almost every single aspect of the ordinary citizen's life, and in many ways means the abolition of personal freedom.

Meanwhile the 'Civil Peace' proclaimed by the Government for the duration of the Christmas holidays has come to an end, and since January 4 political hostilities and the struggle for power have been resumed with even greater bitterness than before. At the time of writing Dr. Brüning is still in office, although there have been daily rumours of his resignation, and it can be said that his own position, and that of his Government varies almost from hour to hour. The immediate issues are the reopening of the Reichstag, Reparations, Disarmament, the Presidential election, the elections to the Prussian Landtag and Unemployment. There are over six million unemployed in Germany now, and this number is still growing.

I remember the Germans when from 1919 to 1923 they were in the depths of despair and when it seemed that the demoralising and devastating effects of inflation would bring about the complete collapse of the German nation. I remember them again when after the stabilisation of the mark they astounded the world and themselves by the speed of their recovery, and when for a while they felt that the world was theirs. Now once again the pendulum has swung the other way, but this time it has gone ever so much further than during the inflation period. Both material and psychological factors render this present crisis quite different to all previous ones. For the real point at issue is whether the régime of at least formal democracy and comparative constitutionalism under which Germany has lived since 1919 is to survive, or whether its place is to be taken by a régime of violence, a new and as yet unknown kind of Fascism as represented by the Nazi movement.

It sounds a commonplace observation, but Germany is at the crossroads. The present situation cannot and will not last very much longer, and, unless it is taken care of, it will develop in its own way. More than ever a lead is wanted. But the German people do not seem to be able to get it—at least not from their Government. Dr. Brüning has nothing of the demagogue, nothing that appeals to the masses. He is silent and self-absorbed and his very silence leads to no end of guesses and combinations among the uninformed. His personal honesty, courage and loyalty are beyond doubt, and therefore the guesswork that goes on in and outside Germany is rather inclined to attribute to him quite remarkable qualities of statesmanship. 'The best since Bismarck,' even a bitter opponent of the Chancellor is supposed to have said. But Dr. Brüning's policy of the last few months

can hardly be regarded as very statesmanlike if judged on its practical results. This policy certainly does not convey the impression of a definite well-thought-out line of conduct, or disclose a precise and fundamental conception of his difficult and almost superhuman task. It rather proves, on the contrary, that even the Chancellor, despite his very great qualities, is suffering from that same incapacity of making up his mind which is typical of modern Germany, and that he is drifting. Only recently he dismissed the very suggestion of collaborating with the Opposition. He proclaimed publicly his refusal to accede to the various suggestions that were made to him of inviting the Hitlerites to join his Government. In fact, Dr Brüning seemed to realise that the time for such an experiment had not arrived, and that it could not but have disastrous effects at home and abroad. Then all of a sudden he did two things, both of which created the impression that he had decided to abandon his old line of policy, or still worse, that he had lost his nerve.

One was his manoeuvre in the Presidential election, and the other his emphatic declaration on the Reparations question. In order to secure the extension of President Hindenburg's tenure of office without exposing the aged field-marshal and the country to the vicissitudes of an election during this time of unprecedented crisis, Dr Brüning addressed himself to the Opposition with the suggestion that the President should be re-elected by a unanimous vote of Parliament with the exception of the Communists. But, instead of revealing the unity of the German people in so serious a situation, the Chancellor's move showed, on the contrary, that those who claim the monopoly of patriotism put party tactics and personal animosity above the interests of their country. Both Hitler and Hugenberg refused their co-operation, and to add insult to injury they accused Dr Brüning of violating the constitution. That the Chancellor was animated by a genuine desire to do the right thing there can be no doubt, but the result of his endeavours not only shows the state of internal utter confusion in Germany but also how completely Dr Brüning misjudged the situation. He ought to have realised the impossibility both for himself and for Hitler to come to an adequate arrangement. A union between them on any issue, even the Presidential election, would be ruinous for either or both. If the representative of constitutionalism—even in its present attenuated form—and the representative of violence came together, they could only do so at the expense of surrendering all they stand for, and that would mean losing what following each can command. The almost animal hatred that animates the respective followers of these two movements is such that an agreement, tacit or open, between their leaders would result in mutiny and actual fighting.

In fact, it may be said that Hitler's trip to Berlin and his meeting with the Chancellor, even if he did refuse to co-operate with him after what appeared to be a moment's vacillation, did him some harm among his followers, and that his closest lieutenants, Frick, Goebbels and others, felt called upon to redeem their leader's weakness by particularly noisy outbursts against the present régime in Germany.

Those who still support the Chancellor felt equally alarmed, and would have been roused to action had agreement been reached. The attempt merely weakened the moral authority of both and involved the aged President in unnecessary complications. His election by the people would have been, just as it is now, assured without all these manipulations, which quite rightly so much upset the old gentleman that he very nearly refused to stand at all. As a man of honour President Hindenburg did not want to be a candidate in opposition to the very groups and elements that originally elected him. It is an irony of fate that the great majority of his former electors have now gone over to Hugenberg and Hitler, whereas his former bitter opponents of the Centre and of the Left are now his staunchest supporters. A non-political group under the presidency of the Mayor of Berlin has at last succeeded in persuading the President to stand again, and has thus wiped out the unfortunate effects of the Chancellor's unnecessary departure from his previous line of conduct. Herr von Hindenburg's re-election can now be considered as assured, for, unless something quite unexpected happens between now and polling day, no candidate of any party has a serious chance against him. The negative merit of Dr Brüning's offer to Hitler and Hugenberg is that through their rejection of it they have definitely become labelled as anti-Hindenburg, and the personal prestige of the old warrior among the masses is still so great that his opponents, whoever they are, cannot hope to achieve very much. Had he refused to stand a very serious position would have arisen, for no other candidate could have hoped to obtain an absolute majority. In a spite vote a Nazi candidate and even a Communist candidate would have had a serious chance. President Hindenburg, who now has not only the support of all the parties of the Centre and the leading ex-service men organisations behind him (although the Steel Helmets, of whom he is an honorary member, have turned against him), may also rely on a substantial Social-Democratic vote. Not to the choice of either letting Hitler or the Communists in or voting for Hindenburg as the representative of law and order, the Social Democrats are certain to choose the lesser evil and give their votes to Hindenburg.

If the vast body of electors—who include practically every shade of opinion from right to left, with the exception, of course,

of the two extreme wings—vote for Hindenburg it is not indeed because they see in him a representative of their political ideology, or even a leader who can ensure the return of Germany to the path of normality, but because his seven years in office have taught them to appreciate his sterling qualities. They know that the presence of that very great old gentleman and patriot in office makes all experiments in Hitlerism or Communism difficult if not altogether impossible—at least, they hope so. They justly consider him as Germany's strongest bulwark against civil war and chaos, and they see in him a most loyal upholder of the republic and the constitution. In opposing the President, Hugenberg declares that it is not the personality of the hero of Tannenberg his party objects to, but to the system now represented by him. He wants to smash this system at the Presidential elections. But how and through whom? Is his party—are the *Deutschnationale*?—going to vote for Hitler, the enemy and dangerous rival who has of late treated them and the Steel Helmets with supreme contempt? Or are they going to put up a candidate of their own who is doomed before he starts? The futility of their position is obvious. Not Hugenberg, but Hitler on the one hand, and the Communists on the other, represent the real danger.

President Hindenburg's re-election does not solve Germany's actual problems, nor does it settle the question of the continuation of the present regime as opposed to the new order of things desired by Hitler and his followers. But it is bound to have a steadying influence on the trend of developments in Germany. It facilitates the gradual instead of the sudden and violent liquidation of the old order of things—liberalism, democracy, personal freedom, unrestricted private property, individualism etc. For, although this may come as a surprise to many who do not realise it yet, all these processes are at work, and become apparent the moment an observer takes the trouble to dive under the surface of things. What the new order of things will be it would be rash to prophesy. But whether you look at the State, whose very basis is daily undergoing the greatest changes, and whose functions multiply in all directions, or whether you look at the ever-increasing tempo of the liquidation of the old economic standards, the process of transformation is most striking. That things cannot go on as they did in the past, and as they do now, is obvious to everyone. There is nothing specifically German in all this: it is universal. But in Germany, owing to local conditions, the process is particularly blatant and particularly painful.

The first question is, Are the Hitlerites going to take the government into their own hands, and, if so, when and how? Ever since the September elections of 1930 the wave of Hitlerism

has been steadily rising. Their majorities have increased at every local election, and of late the margin that separates them from absolute majorities has been rapidly narrowing. There can be no doubt that if the Nazis are in a position to wait long enough they would get their absolute majority. But can they wait, and will they wait? The Hitler movement is an emotional one. It is not animated by great political ideas, nor has it a programme worth speaking of. All Hitler says to the country is that present conditions are intolerable, and that if he takes the power into his hands things will get different. How he is going to achieve this he does not say, but meanwhile he attributes all the blame and responsibility for Germany's hardships to the Socialists and the Jews. To a certain extent he also encourages class hatred, for he conducts a strong agitation against capitalists, bankers, industrialists and their like, which does not prevent him from accepting large subsidies from some of them. Hitler's great strength is the fact that he is the personification of German discontent. His followers are therefore a most heterogeneous crowd. He has attracted all the embittered, old and young, who have not been able to find a proper basis for themselves under the present régime. The youth of the nation, who passionately desire an outlet for their activity and cannot find it, are with Hitler. For them the Republic and democracy are not the result of previous developments, but the cause of their hardships and their disappointments. In Hitler they see a hope, a chance. The declasseed, ruined, and debased petty *bourgeoisie* vote for Hitler because they are angry with everybody else. They have never had a political idea in their life, and have never stopped for a moment to ponder over any political or economic problem. But they have always been actuated by hero worship on the one hand and *ressentiment* against those in power on the other. It is an erroneous contention that Germany derived a considerable benefit from the fact that inflation wiped out her internal debt. What it did do was to destroy the middle classes by annihilating their savings, and it turned them into embittered proletarians. Hitler has managed to attract these former middle classes, not because he is congenial to them, but because the hatred he personifies finds an echo in their hatred. A considerable number of the lesser bureaucracy are also Hitlerite. Then there are all the adventurers and desperadoes, all those who have nothing to lose. They form a large proportion of the Nazi movement and they are a factor of instability in it. Finally there are the genuine fanatics, the sincere enthusiasts.

The thirst for power, for the opportunity of revenge, is the one thing all the groups of the Hitler movement have in common. Hence the unreason which is prevalent even among the Nazis.

They want the power and they want it now, whereas their leaders appear to be definitely against any precipitate action. After his previous unhappy 'Putsch' experiments in Bavaria in 1923, Hitler seems determined this time to take no risks. He knows, furthermore, that in the event of a 'Putsch' there would be organised resistance from the working classes, strikes, fights, and, generally speaking, such an upheaval that the man in the street who might welcome his advent to power in theory would kick for all he is worth if it happened in practice. In the case of a *coup d'état* the odium of his potential followers would easily turn against Hitler, and the hands of his opponents would be strengthened very considerably. Of that he is perfectly aware. He also realises that there is a very great difference between the impersonal act of voting for a party and between openly exposing oneself to the dangers and unpleasantness of acting or even fighting on its behalf. Hitler is therefore determined to take the power into his hands in a legal way. But his dilemma is whether to wait until he is strong enough to do so alone, without the collaboration of other parties of the Right, or even the Centre, or whether to accept some form of coalition with them now in order to satisfy his more impatient followers. There is a risk in both alternatives. If he waits too long, he may lose his following instead of increasing it. And if he enters a coalition, he may not be able to preserve it either. The unreliability of his party is due to the fact that, despite their outward military discipline, the Nazis are badly lacking the all-important inner discipline which is so essential, and that, furthermore, they are totally devoid of any political training. The party is as yet too heterogeneous and has failed so far to produce a nucleus or an organisation on which its leader could depend with absolute certainty. Hence his hesitation to commit himself.

There are many people in Germany who do not belong to Hitler's movement, but who would welcome his advent to power in a coalition government, or even in a government of his own. I have heard this opinion expressed frequently by the upper strata of society and the bourgeoisie. 'Things cannot get any worse than they are now,' they say, 'and perhaps he will do quite well. Anyway, he cannot do any harm.' This defeatist attitude, this pathetic surrender to a régime of murder and violence, is a striking proof of how far the process of decomposition has affected these classes in Germany. The hatred of the Social Democrats—the only really democratic and definitely republican party in Germany—is quite incredible. They have carried the burden of maintaining the German republic since its origin at a great cost to their party prestige, for they have accepted compromise after compromise to avoid internal complications. But by doing so

they have merely incurred general hatred and lost many votes. The groups of the Right and of the Centre whose lives they have saved many a time since 1918 loathe them almost more than they do the Communists. To the *bourgeoisie* Social Democracy means ever-increasing taxation; therefore it accepts Hitler as the lesser evil. But it somehow hopes that the present arbitrariness and uncertainty will come to an end, and that once again there will be 'law and order,' whatever that may mean. 'If Hitler must come,' the *bourgeois* say, 'it would be preferable if he came by means of joining a coalition government.' In other words, it is hoped that the solid block of the best organised and disciplined and homogeneous Roman Catholic Centre Party, of which Dr. Brüning is a member and Monsignor Kaas the real leader, would exercise a restraining influence on the Nazis—in fact, that it would sterilise them as it did the Social Democrats. That the Centre Party itself, under the pressure of the ever-increasing crisis, would have no objection to such a coalition, subject to conditions, of course, there can be no doubt. Nobody can tell the exact nature of the various private negotiations that are being carried on behind the scenes, but many lists of ministers in a future coalition government are being circulated in Berlin. The names of Dr. Brüning, of General Groener, and of Frick, one of Hitler's principal lieutenants, seem to appear in most of them.

If Hitler comes at all, such a coalition is not an unlikely first step. But will he come? That he will wait indefinitely in the hope of winning an absolute majority and meanwhile put the patience of his followers to too great a test is improbable. The hope of many that President Hindenburg's re-election will deal this movement a death-blow and that it will gradually fizzle out has, at least at the present moment, little to justify it. But Germany is a curious country where the unexpected always happens. From an economic point of view the Germans are perhaps the greatest race of modern times. At any rate, they possess a capacity for work unrivalled by other nations. But politically they are incompetent. Many among them are the first to admit it, and this curious absence of an understanding of politics is one of the tragedies of civilisation. Logically it appears that the unavoidable next step in Germany, with the different parties situated as they are, is the formation of a coalition government with Hitler—particularly if the elections to the Prussian Landtag in May result in no party obtaining an absolute majority; for that would deprive the Social Democrats of their last stronghold and open the doors to reaction. Those who look forward with hope to such an eventuality and assert so definitely that Hitler is less dangerous in the government than outside it would

do well to remember the Russian lesson. In 1917 many people thought that the Bolsheviks were safer in government than in opposition, that responsibility would sober them up and that they would soon have to give up their methods of terrorism and violence. To-day, in 1932, the Bolsheviks are still in power, and they have not altered either in their outlook or in their methods.

If Hitler comes, he may begin with a coalition, but he would not stop there. He could not share the power with the Centre Party. Either he would have to surrender completely to the subtle and adroit manœuvring of its trained politicians and get involved in a position that would separate him from his own party, or else, which is much more likely, the Centre Party would surrender to him and he would establish himself as the supreme ruler of Germany. But Hitler's chances must neither be exaggerated nor minimised. The process of transformation of Germany's political, economic, and social structure, which I have already indicated, the unparalleled hardships brought about by the crisis, the historical German or Prussian tradition of discipline and obedience—all these things are in favour of Hitler. Furthermore, in periods of great upheavals there always springs up a chance for strong and even arbitrary government which ignores class interests and ambitions.

Is Hitler big enough to avail himself of such a chance? Contrary to the opinion of many, both in Germany and outside it, I consider that the advent of Hitler to power would have devastating effects in Germany and in the rest of the world. He is neither a Lenin nor a Mussolini. And that is why it is a welcome sign that there has suddenly developed in Germany a counter-movement which is growing daily. This movement, which calls itself the 'Iron Front,' is determined to protect the republic. It is composed chiefly of trade unions of various kinds, of the Social Democratic Party, the Reichsbanner, etc. During the last few weeks it has achieved great progress. The very fact of its existence has had a sobering effect on many. Despite the fact that the leaders of the Social Democratic Party have frequently revealed themselves as feeble and ready to accept any compromise rather than fight, and despite the fact that the leaders of the 'Iron Front' do not display the activity their cause would seem to imply, there is the undeniably favourable psychological effect that something is being done to prevent Hitlerism. Will this movement find the necessary inner strength in itself to fight its enemies with their own weapons, the only hope of ever being successful? New courage and new energy will have to be displayed by the Social Democrats if they really want to save the republic. They are in a difficult position. Hitler on the Right, the Communists on the Left; they are attracted by both of them. The

Communists are biding their time. For the present they are merely augmenting their ranks by the dissidents from the Social Democratic Party, who leave it on account of its moderation. At every election the number of their supporters grows. But their real chance will be if Hitler comes. If and when he does, the Communists will be able to come into the open and create a real 'Red front' against him, which would undoubtedly be joined by many as yet unsuspected supporters, and which may eventually attract some of Hitler's own disappointed followers. This is realised by Hitler, and is yet another reason why he is in no hurry to seize power. At the present moment the danger of Communism is comparatively small in Germany. But if Hitler comes and fails to achieve his promises of a general improvement, vague though they may be, there is every likelihood that his supporters would desert him and go over to the Communists. The advent of Hitler in Germany might open the doors to a Bolshevik revolution.

In a recent pamphlet Trotsky wrote as follows:

On the way in which the German crisis will develop, the fate not only of Germany itself, but of the whole world, will depend for many years to come. The socialist building up of the U.S.S.R., the trend of the Spanish revolution, the development of the pre-revolutionary situation in England, the further fate of French imperialism—all this concentrates directly around one point: Who will win in Germany during the next few months—Communism or Fascism? If you put a ball on the top of a pyramid, a slight push to the right or to the left will make it roll down. This is the situation in Germany, which is getting nearer with every hour. There are certain powers at work that would like the ball to roll down on the right side and thus smash the back of the working classes. There are others who would like the ball to remain on the top of the pyramid. This is Utopia. The ball cannot remain on the top. The Communists would like the ball to roll down on the left side and so smash the back of capitalism. But to wish is not enough: one must possess the ability to act.

It may be Utopia, but I think that every reasonable being, both in Germany and outside, will hope that the ball remains on top of the pyramid. And, after all, perhaps it will, for miracles sometimes happen.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

INDIA: TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

In this country two valuable checks on extremism in public affairs are common sense and a good caricaturist. Both these correctives are now, not before time, being applied to the Indian situation. Lord Willingdon is providing the former and Mr. Gandhi has become an unwitting substitute for the latter. Poor Mr. Gandhi!—with his goat and his days of silence and his new East-end friends, he slipped steadily from the sublime to the ridiculous. Not that this was due, in any considerable degree, to his personal oddities or affectations. We still, it can be hoped, have manners enough left to respect the eccentricities of a Mahatma. What brought us disillusion was the discrepancy between what had been expected of him and what he achieved. As plenipotentiary of the Congress Party he presumably had its authority to co-operate with the other Indian delegates in negotiating the lines of a new constitution with the British Government. As the most powerful individual Indian of the day, he was looked to for an honourable settlement of the communal difficulty which had baffled smaller men. As a lover of peace and of 'non-force,' he was surely going to convert his truce with Lord Irwin into a permanent basis of confidence and progress. Rarely would any one man appear to have had such opportunities for doing great things as presented themselves to Mr. Gandhi during his winter in England.

At every single point he failed, and failed with something like ignominy. His efforts to reconcile the interests of Hindus and Moslems were fruitless, his excuse being the threadbare catchword that no solution is possible so long as 'the wedge of foreign rule divides community from community.' To the drafting of a new Constitution, as he was careful to explain in his closing speech, his only contribution was a dissent from his fellow-delegates in almost every conclusion reached by the Conference. For compromise, or even for negotiation, he showed no aptitude, babbling to the end about complete independence from the 'disciplined and organised terrorism' of our Government, about complete freedom from 'the slave-holder and tyrant.' At the Conference table, he was listened to with growing impatience, even by his own country-

men. As a serious politician or a constructive statesman, his nakedness has been disclosed to the world.

Behind the eclipse of the Mahatma, the background stands out clearer than ever—that sinister, unrelenting background about which those who know it have so often tried to caution our easy-going theorists in this country. The Congress, whose messenger he was, is the embodiment of the ancient spirit of Hinduism, tenacious of its power over the minds and lives of the people, and adamant against any outside influence which threatens its ascendancy. To the old-style British administrator Hinduism was in a measure reconciled. He left its religion alone, and was chary of stirring up trouble in the way of social reform. He kept the turbulent Moslem in order, and the brahmins managed to secure their full share (or more) of whatever power he entrusted to Indian hands. If foreign rule had to be endured, the British were at least more tolerable than their Mogul predecessors. But all this new-fangled nonsense of equal rights and ballot-boxes and manhood suffrage and the emancipation of women, with brahmin and untouchable on a level, reformers in power, the Moslems guaranteed a definite share in the bones and fishes—all this is a very different story. If it is to this end that the British connexion is moving, then the sooner the British connexion is ended the better. How the end comes is immaterial. If it can be brought about by a dexterous use of democracy's own weapons, well and good; persuasiveness and oratory will not be lacking. If sterner measures are necessary, why hesitate? Terrorism can be disavowed without being discouraged. Mr. Gandhi did not himself commend 'the dagger of the assassin, the poison bowl, the sword, the spear or the bullet', but he enumerated them as weapons of those who fight for freedom. Lip service may have to be paid to constitutional methods of revolution, but at all costs British rule must go root and branch, so that Hinduism may be free to reconstruct the machinery of India's life to its heart's desire.

Such being his instructions, Mr. Gandhi had none of the liberty of a plenipotentiary. To ensure against his own kindness of heart, or his yieldings to any generous instincts, the Congress had provided him with a *duenna* in the person of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. A brahmin of the strictest sect, Malaviya has always been uncompromising in hostility to any liberal movement in Hinduism. It is to his energy largely that the sectarian Hindu University at Benares owes its existence, and under an attractive personality he conceals, it is suspected, a dislike of European influences proportionate to his orthodoxy. His vigilance has guarded Mr. Gandhi from any lapse into reason or compromise; and, so far as the Congress is concerned, the second

session of the Round Table Conference ended precisely at where the first session had begun. The curtain rings down, and to prove that he remains uncorrupted by English hospitality the Mahatma proceeds 'to split the ears of the groundlings' by tearing the old outworn passion of civil disobedience to tatters. The situation, however, has grown too big for him to cope with, and, following his standard procedure in similar circumstances, he retires into prison; this being the third, and may we hope the last, occasion on which he has adopted the same device for combining a rest-cure with a complete escape from the responsibility for his own doings.

Goodbye, then, to the Mahatma, and with his exit there comes at last a breeze of common sense into the Indian administration. To say this is meant in no way as criticism of the present Viceroy's predecessors. The patience of Lord Reading, the serenity of Lord Irwin's overtures for peace, served a great purpose, so did the generous labours of the Prime Minister in carrying the Round Table Conference through two Administrations. All this has shown the world that Britain means to do what she has promised; it also nails to the counter the old malicious lie that in India we set community against community in order to perpetuate our rule. But in the governing of a country danger may lie in continuing to cry peace when there is no peace; and in India the danger-point had been reached. The masses of the people were growing restless—whose orders were they to obey, those of the British official, or those of the Congress? They could accommodate themselves to either, but not to a shifting mixture of both. The great landlords, loyal though they had been as a rule to our Government, were beginning to question the advantage of allegiance to a power apparently on the eve of abdication. Even the Princes were turning uneasily to ensure themselves against radical change—the zeal for federation which they suddenly displayed in November 1930 being the measure of their alarm. If there was all this unsettlement, it is sometimes asked, why did not the Princes and the landlords and the masses rally to the British Government and show their disapproval of the Congress and its policy? The answer is that this is not, and never has been, India's way. To the ordinary Indian his traditional conception of a good Government is a Government which is strong enough to defend itself and which will not hesitate to put forth its strength when necessary; a Government which needs popular demonstrations for its encouragement has no place in any political structure within India's experience. A Government that is worth its salt will recognise and reward its friends and trounce its enemies. If it does not, then it will lose its friends.

Whether we like this theory of government or not, we cannot

afford to fly in the face of it in India to-day. Any lingering hesitancy that we may have felt in accepting it has surely been dispelled by the actions of Congress itself. The campaign which Congress has opened, not once, but time and again, against the British Government is not *opéra bouffe*, though that element also is present in the hoisting of rebel flags and the ragged parades of rebel volunteers. There is no comedy in the minds of the ring-leaders; with them it is to be a war of anarchy, designed to swamp the government of the country in torrents of lawlessness. The peasants over large areas have been incited to rise against their landlords on the no-rent plea, and class is being pitted against class. Mobs have been collected and hired to attack police stations and to paralyse the public services generally. Assassinations are applauded, and murderers canonised as martyrs for the motherland. Strenuous efforts have been made to set the North-West Frontier in a blaze and imperil the whole safety of India. The invisible links with terrorism have been strengthened until political murders are daily events. Attempts have been made upon the lives of the Governors of three great provinces, and the Viceroy is obliged to travel about India by aeroplane because the task of guarding his train against bombs and derailment is more than the police can cope with. What is all this but civil war, ruthless and organised—civil war for which Congress is boastfully responsible? As Lord Willingdon told the Legislative Assembly on January 25, no Government could hesitate to accept such a challenge. It has been accepted, Congress has been declared a public enemy, and the full forces of the law are being employed to disperse it and shut down its activities. To India at large—to nine-tenths of its inhabitants—this will be welcome as ordinary common sense, the discharge by a sensible Government of its duty in distinguishing between the friends of the State and its foes.

From some well-meaning people in this country lamentation is already going up that the *régime* of conciliation is over and a *régime* of repression has begun. The answer is best given in Lord Willingdon's words. 'I am conscious of no deviation by myself or by my Government from the path of conciliation until Congress had themselves wantonly torn up the path.' Repression is, of course, foreign to our political traditions, and we dislike being taunted with it. But in this case our hands are clean. Congress was habitually treated by the Government of India as if it were a responsible political party. However extravagant its claims, it was brought into consultation at every stage of constitutional advance. It had the most pressing invitation to take part in the first session of the Round Table Conference, and on Lord Irwin's personal entreaty it allowed Mr. Gandhi to attend the second session. Time after time it was asked, in all sincerity (but always

in vain), to frame and discuss its own projects for the future government of the country. Its leaders sat on the legislative councils; they were brought into constant and intimate touch with the proceedings of the Government; they were given, in short, the same consideration and the same opportunities as any other section of political opinion. Every avenue was open to them for the development, by civilised means, of any scheme, however radical, for changing the system of government. It is well that this should be remembered; for in modern days advocates of constitutional change, whether of revolution or merely of reform, have to choose between two courses, and two courses only. They can use, within the four corners of the law under which they live, their liberty of moulding and mobilising public opinion, of convincing their opponents, of securing the sympathies, if need be, of other nations. Or, in the alternative, they can defy the laws under which they live, strike for their objective by force, and risk the danger of the law being strong enough to defeat them. The Indian extremist has had every opportunity of choosing the former course. He has tossed it aside and chosen the latter. The risk is his and he must accept it. Repression is a wholly erroneous description of the consequences.

It would be equally erroneous to imagine that conciliation has ever meant anything to Congress as a party, whatever may have been the response of individuals to Lord Irwin's persuasive charm. For evidence of this we have only to review its history during the last fifteen years. When the scheme devised by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford for a new constitution was first published, the extreme Nationalists, dazzled by being offered much more than they had ever expected, gave it a grudging assent, and for a few months conciliation seemed to have triumphed. But the first possible occasion was seized upon to reverse the signals. Certain legislation against murderous conspiracies (known as the Rowlett Acts) was made the pretext for attacking the good faith of the Government, and the Constitution of 1919 was declared anathema before it came into being. The cry went up for Provincial autonomy; this was the only evidence of our good intentions which Congress would accept. No great interval elapsed before it was made reasonably clear that Provincial autonomy was the next step contemplated by the Government of India; it had actually been foreshadowed by Lord Hardinge years before. In terror that, on this basis, conciliation might become effective, Congress then announced that nothing but a promise of Dominion status would satisfy it. This in turn elicited the historic pronouncement on Dominion status from Lord Irwin; and here at last it might have been hoped that Congress would join hands with us. The hope was vain; Dominion status was at once thrown on the

scrap-heap and complete independence claimed, with full liberty for India to secede from the British Commonwealth. Not a soul in the Congress camp, in his heart, wants independence, or would know what to do with it. The demand was purely tactical; at every step Congress has meant to claim something to which it believed that we should never agree, thus hoping to make compromise impossible and to keep co-operation at arm's length.

In this frenzied fear of compromise and conciliation lies the whole tragedy of India to-day. The fear is genuine and unmistakable, and the reasons for it go down to the root of our problems. They are simplicity itself. Congress is the political organ of orthodox Hinduism. Orthodox Hinduism is the heir of 4000 years of a static social system; we are the exponents of a brummagem democracy, and the older civilisation distrusts the younger. How deep this aversion goes few Englishmen can fathom unless they have lived with it. It is far greater than any racial animosity, any religious odium in our Western experience. It is based on the conviction that our democratic practice, if forced upon India, would mean an end to the sanctity of the family, the confusion of righteousness with impurity, the overthrow of an ordering of human life which is divine in its origin. If any of us felt equally strongly about a political creed which is being pressed upon us, the odds are that we should be just as vehement as Congress in resisting it.

There is a heaven of thinking men who do not share these extremist fears. They are the inheritors of a generation which, about half a century ago, was fired by the fervours of the Gladstonian school of thought in England, and they have largely abandoned rigid orthodoxy. Though in no sense apostates from Hinduism, they realise the evils of its archaic conceptions, and they are willing for reform, in which they recognise that our co-operation will be essential. Their inclination is all for treating with us on lines of reason, and their case was ably represented at the Round Table Conference under the leadership of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Several times have they come near to throwing in their lot with us, and ever since the days of Lord Morley we have been enjoined to 'rally the Moderates'. Their adherence, however, has never been complete or permanent. The Moderates, like the Liberal Party in this country, suffer much from internal schism. They suffer also from being a middle party. They have nothing in their policy that makes the same appeal either to youth or to credulity as the flamboyant claims of the Extremists. Their sphere of influence is thus limited, and their popularity uncertain. However sincere may be their friendly intentions towards us, the pull upon them from the other side is often irresistible. They are subjected to ruthless pressure, social and otherwise, behind the

scenes ; and from time to time, in mere self-defence, they have to break away from us and to demonstrate to their own people that they also are patriots by some protest or outburst which seems to us merely peevish. It is commonly said that they differ from the Extremists, not in their objective, but only as to pace and methods. To this description they themselves have never demurred ; and, weak human nature being what it is, we cannot count upon them for consistent support.

Finally, in estimating the forces working for us and against us, we come to the Minorities. Many of them, in frankness it must be said, are negligible. Even the vast and heterogeneous mass known as the Depressed Classes has, except for the Justice Party in Madras, no organisation and no tradition, save that of coming to heel when the Brahman whip cracks. With the Moslems, of course, it is very different. They are under no illusions as to the designs and tactics of Congress, and they resent the excess of zeal with which, from certain quarters in England, they were urged to accept the Congress terms. Conscious of the handicaps under which as a community they suffer, they are determined to have the effective protection of constitutional safeguards. By a great majority they are convinced that those safeguards, to be real, must be worked by us and not by a dominant Hinduism, the small and noisy minority which professes sympathy with Congress being largely a handful of the new agnostic type who have laid sacrilegious hands on the ark of Moslem faith elsewhere. There is every prospect that they will resist any attempt to force a new Constitution upon them which does not assure them against being swallowed up in a Hindu renaissance ; and, consequently, the Federation scheme which now holds the field may have to rest, not upon an agreed balance of parties or interests, but upon a settlement imposed by the British Government. In the meanwhile, we may reckon upon the whole-hearted opposition of the bulk of the Moslems to the claims of Congress.

Whatever else the Round Table Conference has done, it must have filled all competent observers with a sense of the appalling complexity of the situation. We have undertaken to allow India to govern herself. Technicalities apart, our pledge implies that she is to have the same political liberty as the great Dominions enjoy. We are now called upon to answer the two inherent questions—first, when will self-government start ? and second, what form will it take ? On the former point we are under no promise. The pace of progress, said Parliament in 1919, was to be determined by the fitness which Indian leaders showed for the task of governing. This test of fitness gave offence to Indian sentiment, and has been tacitly dropped, in name if not in substance. In place of it the Prime Minister has announced that,

during a period of transition (whatever that may mean), certain of the ordinary powers of government will be withheld from the Indian Cabinet. They will be reserved to the Viceroy and, through him, to the British Parliament; and they will include the control of the Army and the protection of Minorities, the public credit and the civil services. Subject to these reservations, the government will be handed over to the Indian leaders as soon as a Federal Legislature is elected to direct the central administration of British India and of the Indian States. On this aspect of the case it may be said that our policy has the support of the Moderates, of the Moslems, and most of the minority communities; while the Princes assented to it with an enthusiasm which now shows some signs of waning. On the other hand, the advanced Nationalist (or Congress) Party demands that the transfer of powers to the Indian Cabinet shall be complete, unconditional, and immediate.

On the second vital question—the form or manner of India's future government—our policy has been sadly lacking in imagination. When we began to talk of self-government, still more when we advanced to talk of Dominion status, we had no other project for India in our minds except a government by the people, through elected representatives in a legislature, from the dominant party in which the Ministers would be forthcoming to conduct the executive business of the country. That this conception was wholly foreign to India's history and traditions mattered nothing to us. It was the scheme under which the British Commonwealth had grown up, and consequently it must be the best thing that human wit could devise for India. We sent out Sir John Simon's Commission to recommend the lines of a new Constitution of this type; and we were startled by the vehemence with which its advice was attacked and rejected. We then set up the Round Table, in hopes of getting Indian opinion to agree upon the framework of a Constitution of this type. The result was failure. On a number of interesting topics—size of the legislatures, methods of election, franchise, separation of Burma, etc.—a considerable measure of agreement was reached. Nevertheless, the hard fact remains that, both in January and in December 1931, the Conference broke up without having arrived at any compromise on the essential character of the new political machinery. To ascribe this to the Moslem dissidence is misleading; it was due to the unrelenting obstruction of the Congress Party. Its obstruction has now ripened into revolution, and the Government in India have been obliged to put the party under necessary restraint and to repress the disturbances for which it is responsible.

All this is involved enough; but the complexity which there

is no unravelling supervenies. In preserving order while men's minds are busy with the political future, the Government are thoroughly justified ; and their position is not new. Enforcement of the law, in order to permit of progress following a quiet path, has often been the way of wisdom ; indeed, there are many who think that it might with advantage have been applied in India several years ago, when Mr. Gandhi first started his spectacular attacks upon the peace of the land. It will now be pursued ; and under its shelter the three committees which have gone out to study some of the details of federation, finance and franchise, will no doubt bring back valuable material for the drafting of the Constitution. But neither they nor the Viceroy's new advisory council will settle the crucial issue which remains for the decision of the British people : is the new Dominion of India to be governed after our pattern, or on the lines of orthodox Hinduism ? We may suppress Congress and ignore its fears and drive it, for the moment, out of its entrenchments as a political force ; but we are not banishing from the Hindu mind its invincible distrust of our methods of democracy. Here is the sovereign complication which we have to face.

What, then, is to be done ? Clearly this and this alone : keep our eyes open to realities and go forward. The movement towards political freedom—as we too often envisage it, is not a movement in which we are going to have a strong popular backing. It will have the somewhat negative support of the Minorities, and the spasmodic co-operation of the Moderates, but to the great volume of Hindu nationalists though as a matter of convenience they may use its forms, its spirit will be repugnant. We are going to have in permanent opposition, not only the strongest political party, but also the best brains in India. Orthodox Hinduism cannot in our time adapt itself to any Western system, but will strive patiently and persistently to absorb it or render it ineffective. Pressure will be exercised untiringly to neutralise whatever safeguards we may impose and to weaken our control with the object, it is true, of expediting self-government, but self-government of a type very different from that with which we to-day mean India to be endowed. That is the first reality we have to face. The second reality is that, if orthodox Hinduism has its way and our guidance is prematurely withdrawn, we shall see catastrophe. Not only will our work in India be undone—that would be relatively a small matter—but internal dissensions of such violence will be unleashed as to make India a danger to the peace of the world.

Nevertheless, we must go forward ; we must fulfil our promise. Should the womb of time contain any political system which will make for greater happiness in India than our Western

democracy, there is no reason why it should not be brought to birth under our régime. Our primary object is to encourage India, with the help of the ballot-box and our protection, to remedy her own evils and pursue her own prosperity. But our system will not be without elasticity, and there will be ample room for experiment in search of that *via media* which is to combine the best of our two civilisations. Indeed, if India's leaders would only show a little patience and a little trust, the way stands open for such experiment immediately in the great provinces. Before the delegates left the last session of the Round Table some of them, realising that its failure must react on the pace of progress, were markedly apprehensive that, for the present, it may not be possible to do more than transfer the provincial governments to Indian hands. Sir T. B. Sapru spoke on the point with some vehemence :

Are you going to send us back to our country with a promise that you will start us with Provincial autonomy and with a further promise that you will work up to federation in India within the next few years? Let me in all humility tell you . . . that your scheme of Provincial autonomy is doomed to failure . . . because . . . it will stop our progress for the future for many years.

The Prime Minister noted the protest, but prudently added : ' It may be that opinion and circumstances may change, and it is not necessary here and now to take any irrevocable decision.' It is the old wearisome suspicion, or make-believe suspicion, of our motives. If we give the provinces self-government in their own affairs, we are going, it is suggested, to dally indefinitely with the transfer of the central authority to a federal Executive.

There is not a shadow of substance for the charge. Everything that is in our power is being, and will be, done to push through the maze of problems which surround federation in practice, as well as to induce Hindus and Moslems to agree on their respective shares in the scheme. All this, however, will take time, as Sir John Simon's Commission pointed out and as the Government of India, with their first-hand knowledge of the human material involved, emphasised later. But the Round Table was in no mood for caution. Federation and liberty floated over it like a golden vision, and as the delegates leaped to seize the prize, their cry was for all or nothing. To-day the vision is hardly so near as it seemed a year ago ; and disappointment takes once again the hackneyed form of threatening us with some dire consequences. To those Indian leaders who abused and rejected Sir John Simon's Report as ' an insult to our intelligence,' it must be galling to find themselves to-day at almost the very point where that Report left them. It had advocated immediate provincial autonomy, with the retention of the status

gas at the centre until such time as the federal idea should develop into reality. Who would venture to say what other or different measure of advance is feasible to-day? Federation is no longer a dream, but it is still a labyrinth. How far the Princes will consent to cast their sovereign rights into the federal pool, how far they will accept interference from outside in the affairs of their own States, how much they will contribute to the federal purse—these and a score of minor questions can be settled only by protracted individual negotiations and the revision of treaties; and the Princes may very well hesitate to commit themselves finally to the enterprise until they see something of the performance of their future partners, the autonomous Governments of the British provinces.

Meanwhile, is it asking too much of the Indian leaders who mean to work with us that they should concentrate with us on the task of equipping the provinces to be masters in their own houses? It is no small or unworthy charge to undertake the governing of Madras with an area greater than that of Italy, or of Bengal with a population much larger than that of France, or of Bombay with its vast commercial interests, or of the Punjab with its military races and problems. Surely in these fields the Indian statesmen of the future will find scope enough for their talents while the larger arena is being cleared. What is even more important, they will be able to show whether Hinduism means to march back to mediævalism, or whether it has the courage to aim at a blend with modern thought and practice which will justify its claims to nationhood and a partnership in the British Commonwealth. The late Mr. Gokhale, a true Mahatma if ever there was one, was fond of quoting Newman's lines

Keep Thou my feet. I do not ask to see
The distant scene, one step enough for me

His motto might with advantage be followed by the wiser men among the Indian leaders to-day

MESTON.

WHEAT

For three generations agriculture has suffered from neglect. We had no comprehensive policy, nor, indeed, was it believed that a prosperous agriculture was, either from an economic or a sociological point of view, a matter of moment. Why trouble about agriculture when our industrial supremacy was unassailable? War did for a time awaken interest in the land, but no sooner was the freedom of the seas assured than once more England forgot the womb from which her strength had sprung. Fortunately a change has taken place. People realise that even to industrial England agriculture is of paramount importance. In 1925 the value of our agricultural output was £125,330,000. This was exceeded only by iron and steel, mining and quarrying, and the textile trades. In 1929 we imported foodstuffs to the value of £296,270,000. Our land could produce more than two-thirds of this. It is not only our national budget which must be balanced. Our trade balance is of equal importance. In December 1931 our imports exceeded our exports by £40,000,000. In our soil lies a great undeveloped source of wealth. But, having been neglected for so long, we must not only frame a policy, we must put money into the industry.

What shall we spend on developing this source of wealth? Shall we, for five years, invest the equivalent of a 10 per cent tariff on the food imports which could be produced here - say, £20,000,000 a year? Let us assume that the country is prepared as a business proposition to have a Five-Year Plan for agriculture. The sum is not large if we have a sense of proportion. It amounts to less than 2½ per cent of the average gross revenue from the industry. No business firm would hesitate. On a conservative estimate, there should be an increased return from the land of at least £100,000,000 a year. All parties claim that they are prepared to finance agriculture directly or indirectly, either through higher prices, capital expenditure, subsidies, or taxes. The 'dear food' cry would be hard to revive. The Labour Government, by their Marketing Act, provided machinery for keeping up the price of home-grown food by fixing minimum prices. But there must be one clear proviso to such public expenditure, one which the

farming community must not forget. The urban voters' money, must not be spent extravagantly, or they will again turn their backs on agriculture, as they did when they repealed certain costly clauses of the Corn Production Act.

We must first decide which branch or branches of agriculture are most important and best suited to our climate, soil, and needs. Which are most likely to profit from an outlay of public money and help to restore our balance of trade, most calculated to give us an augmented land population and ensure the most equitable distribution of our help among the farmers? Is wheat the sheet anchor? Many think that it is. Some do not. I know that in criticising the wheat school one runs counter to orthodoxy; but in my opinion the wheat policy is out of date, and has not been thought out in terms of the modern world. It is extravagant, administratively unsound, and based on several fallacies. I know that it is apparently backed by the majority of experts and farmers, who regard wheat as the pivot of British farming. But this does not prove it to be correct.

The National Farmers' Union, just like the Miners' Federation, have during the past few years voiced eleemosynary orthodoxy, instead of boldly reshaping their programme to fit new conditions. So an unwise and shortsighted policy may well be supported by out-of-date experts and by many 'practical men' of the industry. Actually certain leaders of the farmers' organisations have opposed most of the recent developments which are admitted now to have benefited their business. Their leadership has been shortsighted and timorous. I believe it is changing.

During the last three years grain prices have fallen more severely than the prices of other agricultural produce, therefore wheat-growers have been hardest hit by the slump, they have naturally cried loudest for aid, and have attracted most public attention. Their clamour has been reinforced by landlords, who have had to reduce rents and have been faced with the likelihood of having farms left on their hands. These interests have vocal representation in Parliament, and can appeal to those who know little of true agricultural needs, but in whose minds the memory of our war-time efforts to increase wheat acreage is still alive. The fear of starvation is usually visualised in terms of bread. Most of us are not aware that in another war it would be actually easier to import wheat than meat. Grain lends itself to transportation. It can be stored for long periods without deterioration. On the other hand, meat is bulky. Its transportation is costly and requires refrigerated ships and cold storage. In any case, with our vast population we can never be self-supporting and must depend for our food on the protection of the Navy.

Still, in the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Govern-

ment contemplates providing first and foremost for wheat, and is likely to finance it liberally. Yet this action must be wasteful and may become extravagant unless stringently curtailed, and may well injure agriculture's prospects of expansion. The method to be adopted is the Quota with a guaranteed price. These are new phrases which sound better in the ears of the electorate than if they were translated into ordinary language. Plainly stated, the plan is to give to wheat-growers—(1) a monopoly market represented by about 15 per cent. of the millers' needs; (2) an annually guaranteed profit based on the out-of-date, and costly, methods of production of our grandfathers; and (3) an enhanced price, possibly equal to an import duty of 30 to 50 per cent. on (the quota share of) wheat.

Before criticising the above proposals let me set out a few facts. The value of our wheat crop is only 4.6 per cent. of our total food production. Sales of wheat brought in about £12,000,000, whilst the hen brought the farmer over £17,000,000; British wheat marketed is worth far less than British potatoes, it is 88 per cent. less than our cow and (57 per cent.¹) less than our pig products. Even our fruit and vegetables are worth over £18,000,000, or half as much again as the value of wheat. The wheat acreage is merely 5 per cent. of our agricultural acreage. Our wheat land has shrunk. It is now 1,400,000 acres, in 1918 it was 2,600,000, in 1874, 3,600,000 acres. The wheat school say that we should bring some of this land back to wheat, that we ought to have about 2,000,000 acres under this crop. But why? The 2,000,000 acres of land which have gone out of wheat cultivation are not under thistles. They are to-day being used as pasture, or for roots, or oats; they are producing cattle or sheep or milk. Some may be growing potatoes, some fruit, some poultry. Is the nation poorer if land which used to grow wheat is now producing a greater money value in the form of eggs or dairy produce? Why, then, spend money in trying to produce wheat uneconomically on an arbitrarily fixed amount of land?

On our best wheat land, if the right methods of cultivation are employed—i.e., that is to say, we use the most modern machinery instead of hand and horse labour, if we apply the latest scientific knowledge and thereby reduce costs—wheat can in normal times be grown economically without the proposed extravagant subsidy. This, and this only, is the land which I should describe as being 'suitable wheat land'. So a subsidy is needed only if our objective is to increase the acreage and yield of this crop up to some arbitrary figure. This increased acreage, on

¹ Whenever practicable I use the same figures as in my book *Land and Life*, even though more recent ones have become available since its publication two months ago.

which wheat can only be cultivated if it is subsidised, I should term unsuitable wheat land, even though it may have grown good wheat in the past, or could do so to-day at a price. Most of our wheat land is suited to other crops, though it is claimed that some is not. But the total acreage on which nothing but wheat can be grown profitably is exceedingly small, even though 500,000 acres (i.e., about a third of the present acreage) has been mentioned as a possible figure. It would be cheaper for us to have this land derelict and to give every landlord £1 per acre, every farmer £2 per acre, and every labourer £2 a week to sit at home and smoke in idleness than to pay for the Quota Scheme at recent prices.

Wheat can be produced on the same farm either expensively with human and horse labour or cheaply with modern machinery. The Government's guaranteed price is intended to give a profit to those who grow the cereal expensively. That being the case, those who produce it cheaply must obviously get an excessive profit out of the public purse. The cost of production may vary enormously, according to the system of farming, soil type, and other factors. On heavy soil giving high yields the cost per quarter may be very high owing to the relatively high cost of cultivation; on the other hand, on lighter soil with lower yields the cost per quarter may be low owing to the ease of cultivation. So that actually this land with the lower yield may be better from the economic point of view. The semi-authoritative suggestion recently put forward that suitable wheat land was land capable of growing 5 bushels per acre simply will not bear examination. The yield of wheat per acre depends largely on the treatment of the land during the previous year or two—among other things, upon how it has been manured. It can be made to vary according to the money spent. Almost any agricultural land can be made to yield 5 bushels per acre (with suitable weather) provided one spends enough on it. So yield per acre is not a safe guide as to the suitability of the soil for economic wheat cultivation, nor is it of any use as the basis for a grain-growing policy. No one would dream of saying that only cows which gave 5 gallons of milk were 'suitable cows.' Why try to make this distinction with wheat?

There is another administrative difficulty which leads to waste of public money. Wheat is often grown for its straw, and in this case the grain is merely a by-product. This is done by the cow-keeper who wants straw for his cows, or by the farmer who has a market for straw, whether for box-making, for strawberries, for bedding in stables, or for thatching, etc. In these cases the grower makes a profit on the straw and disposes of his wheat, even though it be of the best quality, at a low figure. Take my own case, I

have a herd of eighty to ninety cows in milk. I grow wheat because I need the straw. I make a reasonable profit on my business as a cowkeeper. The grain is sold as a by-product. The Quota Scheme will force the millers to give me a bigger price for my by-product, and so compel the public to give me an additional profit on this by-product to which, as a dairyman, I am not entitled. Wheat in the past was largely grown with farmyard manure (so requiring stock on the farm), but science has now taught us how to produce it without dung. The result of this is that we have a new type of farm—the so-called wheat factory—where no animals are kept, where everything is mechanised, where labour is reduced in quantity, but is more highly paid, and where the cost of production is enormously reduced.

I have thought it well to set out the foregoing technical facts so as to enable townsmen to realise the difficulty of finding a watertight definition of 'suitable wheat land' on which to base an Act of Parliament. It is evident that neither yield per acre nor character of soil will give us what we want, and that it is impossible to devise a plan which will not plunge us into administrative quagmires and inevitable extravagances. Our aim should be to encourage those who can cultivate wheat economically. This, and only this. Those who cannot come within this category should change over to other products. If this were done, the wheat acreage would be diminished. Let us face up to this and realise that if the land is used properly for other purposes the nation will not be impoverished, but will actually be better off.

The Quota Scheme has a guaranteed price fixed high enough to ensure a profit to those farmers who still use human and horse labour because one of its aims is to enable, even to induce, farmers to grow wheat at a profit without mechanisation. As I have indicated, those who grow wheat cheaply with machinery must get an excessive profit out of the public purse. The result of the Government's plan must be to stereotype old methods on many farms, and is as unimaginative as if we guaranteed a profit to cotton firms on condition that they did not allow more looms to the weaver, or to coal-owners provided that they did not introduce modern machinery. The proposal runs counter to all our industrial progress. Our forefathers were not wrong when they insisted on having the spinning jenny and abandoning the hand spindle; when they gave up stage coaches and canal boats for trains; when they adopted machinery for making boots, cloth, and pottery. In agriculture those who have mechanised by adopting milking machines, or threshing machines, mowers, tractors, or pumps, have not been unpatriotic even though in cheapening costs they have temporarily displaced labour. Yet, last spring, speeches were made in the House of Lords which seemed to argue

that mechanization for wheat production was sheer Bolshevism. If the wheat scheme were to succeed we should induce many farmers to stick to, or embark upon, Victorian methods.

The belief is still widespread that much employment is associated with arable land and that arable land means wheat. It is unfounded. The public is being asked to finance a scheme on the ground that it will keep ploughmen on the land and so give employment. Yet the proposal will actually result in decreased employment on many farms. I know a wheat farm where tenant A., using horses and some thirty to forty men, had to go out of business. The present tenant, B., with machinery and four men, has done so well that he is negotiating for another farm. I know another farmer with not such up-to-date machinery who still is growing wheat at 35s a quarter. A guaranteed price of, say, 45s will obviously give my friends an unnecessarily substantial profit.

At the end of a Quota period of three or four years, what would be the result of a guaranteed price of say, 45s? It would have enabled some to grow wheat who should have gone in for other products. The growers having been induced by Parliament to put their money and energy into wheat, would feel entitled to a continuation of the subsidy. The danger of politicians being squeezed by these specially created vested interests and so continuing the grant would be very real, as we have learnt from the sugar beet venture. The Quota would not have kept all the ploughmen on the land, as many farmers would have realised that increased profits could be earned by mechanizing. It would have put unnecessarily large sums of public money into the pockets of farmers who grow wheat for straw. It would have reduced the amount of wheat which we might buy from the Empire. It would have absorbed so much of our development money and so much of the Government's political courage that the majority of farmers and agricultural districts who grow 95 per cent. of our products would have been starved. It would have done nothing for small holdings. It is a gamble, and a bad gamble at that. We should find ourselves morally committed to an extravagant, unstatesmanlike scheme. Many economists are convinced that world wheat prices will not again rise to such a figure as to enable wheat-growing by costly methods to be profitable without subsidy.

As this article deals with wheat in its relation to British farming, I have dealt only with the domestic Quota. I must, however, refer here to a risk attached to the Dominion Quota. In the past, when harvests failed in, say, Australia, and when Australian grain rose in price, we were free to buy cheap wheat for our bread in, say, the United States. Or if the growers of Canada showed any inclination to combine so as to put up prices unreason-

ably, we have been free to purchase cheap grain from, say, the Danube States or Russia. If, however, in future the millers are to buy 15 per cent. of their bread cereal expensively in Britain and are to be compelled to buy 55 per cent. from the Dominions, a dangerous situation may arise. If Dominion grain-growers were to organise a pool they might force up the price of our bread grain almost to any figure. The English corn trade and millers would have no opportunity of buying enough cheap grain to keep the price of our loaf down, as their 'free market' would have been curtailed to some 30 per cent. of their requirements. Nor could our Government meet such an attempted hold-up by reducing the quota, as the Dominions would have obtained a definite quota for their grain in return for giving us a *quid pro quo* for our manufactures. So our industrialists would use their influence to oppose any curtailment in the Dominion wheat quota lest it react on their sales. But the effect on British bread prices might be dangerous, even calamitous, on inter Imperial relations and goodwill.

The wheat school have not taken warning from the sugar-beet experiment. This latter was urged upon us and is supported to-day by the same orthodox experts who are backing the wheat subsidy. Last year the public paid £11,000,000 for home grown sugar, the equivalent of which could have been imported for £4,703,000. Since the experiment started we have spent £30,000,000 on the sugar-beet industry. The scheme was launched to help agriculture, but only half this sum has gone to the farmers, the balance having been paid to the factories, the shares in which are largely held by foreigners. Even those farmers who get the very small portion which goes to producers represent an infinitesimal number of agriculturists. This country has not much really good beet land, in Wales, Scotland, and a great part of England climatic conditions are a handicap to successful beet production. There is not enough sunshine. All plants are sun plants, but the beet is probably more so than any other plant in the ordinary farm crop rotation in temperate climates. It is very deep-rooted, and therefore does not suffer from drought to any serious extent. Improvements in sugar cane have made it impossible for our sugar-beet to compete with it. The beet subsidy, like the proposed wheat subsidy, was based on the 'average' cost of production. The price paid has just enabled the inefficient to live, and they can no more stand on their own legs to-day than they ever could. But because the subsidy enabled the inefficient to make a small profit, it also enabled the more efficient to make an extravagant profit at the expense of the public. One factory has declared a dividend of 50 per cent. According to the *Economist*, 'Three companies have already returned more than the whole of their share capital in dividends

and amassed a general reserve fund greater than the valuation of their factories in the balance sheet.' These will make gold-white profits out of the nation so long as Parliament and the public are willing to keep the inefficient alive. Exactly the same thing may happen with the wheat quota proposals.

I have used the word subsidy as meaning money paid, in one form or another, by the public and representing the difference between a high cost of production here and a lower world price, or competitive price. The world price of wheat for the 1930 harvest was about 25s per quarter, but the average cost of producing it in England was said by many farmers to be 45s to 55s per quarter. Now this 20s to 30s difference which the farmers would get under the Quota does not drop down from the stars. It comes out of the public pocket. It is more likely to come from the consumers' pocket than a tariff duty of 10 per cent on imported foreign wheat. Owing to the enormous world supplies of this cereal, undoubtedly producers would pay much, probably most, of such a duty. Incidentally, even if producers paid none and if consumers paid all of such a duty, it would cost about £2,400,000, or less than the Quota. If the Treasury paid a direct grant or subsidy, it would come out of the taxpayers' pocket. But in both cases the public pays. It is no good for guileless persons to tell us that if it is paid by the consumer a subsidy is no longer a subsidy. It is also beside the point to inform us that the price of the loaf will be increased by the Quota only by a farthing. These farthings on bread may total annually some £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 sterling which must come out of the public pocket.

If the wheat wheel had had their way and had already increased the wheat land to 2,000,000 acres, and if there had been a guaranteed price of 45s per quarter, it would have cost the public £10,000,000 to buy the 1930-31 English wheat crop. We could have imported an equivalent amount of equally good foreign wheat for £10,000,000. If we spend from £1,000,000 to £5,000,000 on subsidising wheat and from £4,000,000 to £8,000,000 on sugar, we shall have much too small a balance left out of the total grant of £20,000,000 which at the outset we decided to ask the public to spend on agriculture, whether indirectly through higher prices or directly. When we are preparing our budget we must remember that sugar beet represents less than 1 per cent of our food output. We should not invest about half our development money in two branches representing together only about 5 per cent of the industry. I find that producers of the remaining 95 per cent, i.e. the majority of farmers, are at last (though, I fear, too late) beginning to wake up to the fact that they are being sacrificed to old shibboleths, and to the interests of a small minority.

The detailed schedule of commodities on which the Government propose tariff duties has been issued. In a country mainly devoted and suited to live-stock and live-stock products the proposed duties on the raw materials of these manufactured articles can do nothing but harm. Oats, maize, and barley are primarily raw materials for the production of bacon, milk, eggs, and meat. The poultry farmer is to benefit by a duty of 10 per cent. on poultry imports, but if the price of his feeding-stuffs is to be increased the net result, since food is the heaviest item in his costs, will be to leave him very much where he was. On the average farm the cost of purchased feeding-stuffs consumed by the cows is substantial. The increase in the price of purchased foods foreshadowed in the tariff represents a probable increase in the cost of production. The total value of milk produced in England for sale amounts to about £67,550,000. The estimated value of the milk used at 6d. per gallon for conversion into cheese, etc., is £10,050,000, or roughly 10 per cent. of the total quantity. Only this small proportion will benefit by the 10 per cent. tariff on butter, cheese, etc., but an increase in the cost of production will affect the total quantity of milk sold for liquid consumption. But this is not the whole story. Colonial imports are to come in duty free. New Zealand and Canada are very large exporters of dairy produce. In fact, 57 per cent. of our cheese imports will be duty free, so the net benefit to the British farmer, putting aside altogether any general increase in his costs possible under an all-round tariff, will be less than nothing.

Then, again, there is the far more serious problem of the effect of an increase in the price of feeding-stuffs on the production of meat, as imported meat is to be duty free. In 1923 meat represented £103,970,000, or no less than 40 per cent. of our total production of food-stuffs. Whatever advantage the duties on grain may be to the grain farmer will be more than counter-balanced by the loss to the more important live stock farmer. Half the barley grown and imported, amounting to almost 2,000,000 tons, is used directly for stock feeding, and practically the whole of the remainder is also consumed by stock after the process of malting or distilling. The stock farmer is therefore to be taxed directly even on malting barley in order to benefit the strictly arable farmer. The position with regard to oats is still worse. Seventy-five per cent. of the oats grown in Great Britain is used by the grower for feeding purposes. Out of a total of 2,362,000 tons of home-grown and about 300,000 tons of imported oats only some 200,000 tons (or 7 per cent.) are used for human consumption. The remainder, therefore, is used for stock feeding. There is also a further reason for viewing the duty on imported feeding-stuffs with alarm. Ninety-seven per cent. of imported

milling offals come from foreign countries, and are therefore subject to duty. The millers will consequently have a certain control of milling offal prices. Is it not possible that part of the cost of the Wheat Quota, instead of being placed on flour and bread, might be passed on to the live-stock feeder in enhanced prices for milling offals? A rise in the cost of meat production is likely through the increased price of feeding-stuffs. Yet at the same time no protection whatever is to be given to stock farming. This will be a serious blow to by far the most important branch of British agriculture. It might be argued, indeed, that the total benefit of protecting wheat by the Quota and of the 10 per cent. tariff on other farm products will be more than lost on this one line alone. The Government's policy is therefore likely to have disappointing results in rectifying the adverse balance of trade through an increased production of home-grown meat, or in remedying agricultural depression. The unstatesmanlike fact emerges that if the Government after this year continue throwing away more than half of our £20,000,000 development money on bolstering up wheat and sugar they cannot have enough left to help those more important commodities representing 95 per cent. of our husbandry and that if they leave meat unprotected they are likely actually to damage farming as a national industry.

What are the alternatives to the policy of the Government? I should not tax imported animal feeding stuffs. A huge milk market in our midst can be developed. But we must not put up milk prices. It is ridiculous to talk of a milk glut when we consume far less per head than America, Canada, Switzerland, etc. Why not convert C3 children into A1 children by giving every schoolchild a glass of milk daily? If we did this at the public expense the cost would be only half what we paid for the sugar subsidy last year. It would probably not exceed what we shall spend on wheat and would help farmers all over England as well as in Scotland and Wales, and on every size of holding, instead of only a few in the Eastern Counties. But this expenditure is not necessary. The National Milk Publicity Council, spending a paltry £16,000 per annum, can claim to have created an entirely new market already worth well over half a million sterling annually to farmers. Through wise propaganda there should be no difficulty in building up the national consumption of milk so as to take £20,000,000 more milk annually from dairymen.

Next I should help live-stock. Our climate gives us excellent grass. Our live-stock industry (unlike wheat) has expanded. It is now worth about £200,000,000, or fifteen times as much as wheat. At most the Quota will help the balance of trade by reducing our imports of wheat by some £3,000,000. But it may cost us up to £5,000,000 to achieve this. Better spend money through tariff

duties on live-stock and reduce the beef and mutton imports (about £40,000,000) from foreign countries. This would be a straightforward way of helping this branch and better than what some farmers are asking for—namely, a monopoly of the supply of meat to our fighting services. When the budgetary limitation of armaments is being considered at Geneva we cannot inflate our Navy and Army Estimates by indirectly subsidising farming through the expenditure of money on English in place of chilled Argentine meat.

Then why should we import £40,000,000 of pig products? Pigs thrive in Britain. The value of our pig industry is already greater than our wheat. Pigs go with small holdings, whereas wheat does not, and we must certainly need thousands of additional small holdings. Egg production has increased 100 per cent. in eighteen years, yet 55 per cent. of our eggs are still imported—some even from China. Poultry keepers actually prefer English to foreign wheat. Yet under the Quota we are going to force them to buy foreign grain at the same time as we bribe our millers to purchase English wheat which they on the contrary, do not like as much as foreign cereal. Pigs, cows, hens, bullocks, all require cheap grain. To put duties on grain shows as complete a lack of statesmanship among the politicians as we have witnessed among certain leaders of the farmers in the past in their insistence upon lavishing public money on wheat and sugar in the inaccurate belief that this would benefit the majority of farmers. Then the produce of our orchards is already as valuable as that of the wheat-fields. I am glad that we are to spend money in developing fruit-growing instead of allowing other countries to sell us £10,000,000 of produce which might be grown here were we not so busy spending money and energy on wheat and sugar-beet.

It costs about £1,000,000 to create 1000 small holdings. More small holdings would not only increase our wealth by producing large quantities of milk, poultry, pigs, vegetables, etc. but would give us a hardy, thrifty land population. Capital invested in small holdings would pay us a return as rent, unlike the money invested in the beet factories and spent through the Wheat Quota. Even the small holdings created under the 1919 Act (*i.e.*, when land and building prices ruled high and ex-service men had to be provided for in haste) pay about 2 per cent. on the capital cost whilst the 1926 Act holdings pay 1.17 per cent. in rent. We have far fewer backwaters, family farms, peasant proprietors, and small holders than any other civilized country. The nation loses by this. English men and women can succeed on small holdings. Last year I made a tour to see how our county council small holders were doing. I wanted to test the accuracy of the parliamentary returns, which showed that less

than 12 per cent. of the men we had put on to small holdings after the war had failed. I found the men doing well with fruit, poultry, cattle, pigs, etc. Even in the Eastern Counties, our devastated farm belt, they had their heads above water, whilst many of the larger wheat or mixed farmers were in debt to the banks. I found that they had those very qualities of enterprise, self-reliance, industry, that we need. It is better business to create small holdings than uneconomical sugar-beet factories or wheat farms which have to be carried by the public. We could safely place 2000 new families a year on the land in this way.

And by no means last, I would spend money on research and on agricultural education. I would make a survey to see where we should develop colonies of small holders sending their produce to central factories. We do not know yet what surrounding acreage or what number of holdings are required for one processing factory; our farmers do not know what type of pig to breed or how to feed it most economically so as to supply a factory with the graded and properly sized animal required to capture the bacon market. We do not know yet how cheaply we could market British cheese or milk or meat or fruit, if carefully situated processing factories could count upon regular supplies of graded produce from surrounding colonies of small holders and larger farms. Hitherto our small holdings have sprung up quite haphazardly as individual county councils developed keenness or saw farms coming into the market, but there has been no planning to develop economic units of producers working collectively in colonies and in co-operation with existing farmers to reduce costs. Public ownership may have disadvantages. One of its advantages, the letting of farms subject to conditions, has never been utilised by the county councils. These conditions might include co-operation and the use of central factories. Large economies which should be reflected in greater profits for growers and lower retail prices for the public are possible. I would even spend money in persuading the farmer that we are not insulting him when we say that many of his grandfather's practices are out of date. Captains of industry like Sir William Morris and Henry Ford have forged ahead because they have scrapped old methods. We have to-day in our midst some of the best farmers in the world—farmers who have moved with the times, who are prosperous. I would urge their fellows to copy their enterprise, just as I would beg politicians to be guided less by those who have failed to make money.

Well, if we can agree that wheat in 1932 is no longer the corner-stone of our agricultural policy and that we need not lavish money on it, the problem before us is entirely changed. Wheat drops into its proper place as a useful crop, to be helped like other

crops, but not to be stimulated by exceptional methods. The appeal of wheat-growers can then be considered differently. One recognises that they have been hard hit and may require some quite temporary financial help. But, our national objective being directed towards the expansion of live-stock and horticulture, the money given to wheat would be restricted and given subject to conditions. We should no longer aim at increasing our wheat acreage. We should no longer spend money to induce farmers to produce wheat instead of milk, pigs, poultry, fruit.

I should aim deliberately at having milling wheat grown only on land where it could be produced economically without special subsidy in normal times (by which I do not mean the high prices of the past). I should aim at getting efficient cheap production, including mechanisation where this was suitable, and should give help to farmers to carry out this policy. I would be prepared to guarantee wheat-growers against excessive loss if world prices slumped again. It is more justifiable to give to those who produce cheaply a guarantee against ruinous loss in case of abnormal world conditions than to guarantee a perpetual profit to those who produce expensively, as is proposed with the Quota Scheme. Wheat farmers would have a feeling of confidence if they knew that even in bad years they could count on getting a fair, even though not a remunerative, price for their wheat. In good years they would make their profit by efficiency in method and cheapness of production.

This policy may mean that some acres would go out of wheat cultivation. I should face this recognising that it meant neither the ruin of agriculture nor of Britain, but was the natural outcome of the discovery of the New World, of cheap ocean transport, of mechanisation and scientific inventions. The Quota is wasteful chiefly because it aims at preventing any diminution of acreage. Where wheat could not be grown economically I should during a limited period help the industry to develop other branches of farming. The State might give financial help to aid landlords and farmers in providing new equipment, in laying on water, in erecting fences and buildings, planting fruit trees, etc. This would be a cheaper and less clumsy method of financing the change-over than attempting to give money for this identical purpose camouflaged as help to wheat-growers. Backers of the Quota indulge in some difficult juggling when they propose to give money to farmers in payment for wheat-growing, and also simultaneously to pay for planting fruit trees or erecting byres on the same farms on which they are being subsidised to grow wheat. This change-over from wheat is possible even on much of the Eastern Counties land. It is a complete fallacy that the whole of this district can only grow wheat.

The policy I have described may mean fewer men on the wheat-fields. We must balance this loss in our land population by investing State capital in small holdings. And to the wheat farmers of to-day, who admittedly have had a hard time, I should give a subsidy. But it would have to be restricted to a very limited period and amount, and should be scaled down rapidly. The guaranteed price might start at 45s. and be reduced by 1s. a year. This grading down is vital if we really want to treat the quota as a temporary emergency measure. If we give a flat rate of, say, 45s. for, say, three to five years, we shall be subjecting members of Parliament for certain constituencies to most undesirable pressure. Wheat-growers and farmers must be shown at the outset that the dole will not be continued. This can be done most effectively by reducing the subsidy and by giving them direct grants to help start alternative branches.

I have shown that to-day wheat and beet absorb so much of our £20,000,000 development money that the more important branches have had to be starved. The Government, as we see from their proposals, are unable to help live-stock. The tariff duties actually injure meat and prejudice milk. Presumably the Government had all these considerations of statesmanship in mind and decided against protecting the live-stock industry for political reasons—i.e., fear of an increase in meat prices. If the politicians have not sufficient intestinal fortitude to do the right thing, is there not some expedient that would enable them to turn the corner? I believe there is. Sugar is as important to the housewife as meat, whilst its production here is infinitely less important to farmers. At the very outside a 10 per cent. duty on foreign beef and mutton could only amount to £4,000,000. In fact, it would be far less. But we have some £8,000,000 of public money which can be saved on sugar-beet. Farmers as a whole would be much better off if we protected meat instead of sugar, and the consumers need be no worse off through any increase in the cost of living.

Cannot we have a proper Five-Year Plan for agriculture, by the end of which we should have liquidated our expensive commitments to subsidised wheat and beet growing and embarked upon an expanding and continuous policy based on live-stock, fruit, milk, etc., on economic wheat production, on improved marketing, on the deliberate use of applied science, on efficiency and on co-operating colonies of small holdings whose centres would also be available to the larger farmers, who in the future, as in the past, must play a leading part in British agriculture?

Aston

MONEY AND THE WORLD CHAOS

A BUSINESS MAN'S PLEA FOR REFORMATION

HISTORICAL research demonstrates in unambiguous terms that the rise and fall of empires has been promoted by an increase or decrease in the value of money—a rise of prices having created healthy activity, while a fall brought about stagnation ending in decay. We find this best exemplified in the case of Rome, its decline coinciding with a check in the supplies of the precious metals due to their production having become unprofitable, though latterly they were worked by slave labour. The cessation of supplies of gold and silver in turn brought down the level of prices to a point which, during the so-called dark ages, reduced life to a bitter struggle amidst abject poverty. All progress was stopped, institutions decayed and society broke up, while organised production was obliterated.

So much for the lesson of the past, but what of recent times? Never in history has such chaos reigned in the monetary systems of the civilised world. The warring nations recklessly issued on a monumental scale paper money without cover, thus abusing a system of credit which otherwise would have solved that essential human problem a monetary system liberated from the thrall of metallic cover which was invariably subject to the exigencies of a most variable supply of gold and silver. This frenzy of war-time inflation has wrecked the edifice of credit which during the last century had been slowly built up in response to the improved agricultural and industrial organisations, resulting in a vast increase of production. It has fraudulently deprived millions of their savings and capital and has left the world in a state of chaos from which human ingenuity seems incapable of extricating it. The scale upon which the great betrayal has been carried out dwarfs the innumerable incidents of debased coinage and subterfuge recorded in history. Not in vain did Norman Angel preach the doctrine that war was an impossibility in modern times, as the bonds of finance were of such an international character that no nation could conduct warlike operations without bringing the financial machine to a standstill. True, ways and means were

eventually found of prolonging the conflict over a period of fifty-two months, but we now learn the true cost in a world saturated with an unredeemable debt whose burden in our case has been vastly increased by being placed on a gold basis at the very time when commodities were falling rapidly in price. This decline has taken a toll of three to one to meet the interest charge while the redemption of capital is rapidly receding into the realms of Never-never-land. Yet the situation must be definitely faced unless we wish to see the world plunged into the poverty which overthrew past civilisations and inaugurated an era of barbarism.

Spain furnishes another notable example of a nation falling from the height of power through the scarcity of currency. Although flooded with silver bullion captured by infinite cruelty from its owners in Mexico and Peru, or mined with the painful labour of ill-treated slaves, the precious metal was retained by the nobles and the churches who steadily resisted its conversion into useful coin. What the Spanish grandees sought was not rising but falling prices, and so instead of sending their bullion to the mint they continued to pile it up in their vaults awaiting the inevitable hour when from increased scarcity, each ounce when coined would purchase twice as much of commodities as before. What a commentary on the repetition of these identical tactics which we are now witnessing with gold and which are yielding such dire results! History in truth is repeating itself.

Are we to suffer from a recurrence of this *débâcle*, or can we rebuild upon the ruins of the financial machine a fabric strong enough to enable the world to take advantage of our new social organisation which is capable of an output of goods vastly superior to any known in history, sufficient to banish poverty for good, and to endow every man, woman and child with an adequacy of the necessities of life? Upon a right solution of this problem depends the future happiness or misery of the human race.

Already we perceive in Central Europe a return to barter in the absence of the necessary funds or credit to exchange merchandise with the facility enjoyed before the war. Once more vast hoards of money valued at £1,500,000,000 in gold have been withdrawn from their legitimate function to be hidden in vaults in New York and Paris where they lie inert and useless. Individuals emulate the action of the banks—they in turn withdraw deposits to hoard them in private chests. Thus having destroyed faith in paper money, and then having withheld the gold which had been almost universally adopted as the only safe medium of exchange, the world is deprived of any means of exchange, and currency is so scarce that prices continue to decline and must

inevitably proceed on their evil course until bankers take an essential step forward by issuing a plentiful supply of money and credit. Unfortunately, banks are limited to the function of prudently administering the funds committed to their charge, and, finding their resources mainly absorbed in the financing of a mountain of national debt, they have little or nothing left with which to finance industry and agriculture.

But while we ponder on the result of the decadence of former great peoples, attributable in no small part to a scarcity of money, may we not ask why in this enlightened age, with its highly developed credit system, should the shortage of gold cause so serious a check to commerce? International trade is nowadays carried on almost entirely without money, payment being regulated by such credit instruments as cheques or bills of exchange, which, when accompanied by bills of lading and insurance policies, constitute documents which can be sold for their full value to a bank under a trifling discount, the banker in turn collecting the proceeds from the buyer abroad. To secure the smooth working of this simple system there must be free interchange of goods, since the bank or bill broker has to set off his purchase of outgoing documents representing trade flowing in the opposite direction. We need not here enter into details concerning the complicated nature of transactions cross-crossing from one country to another, resulting on balance in a final account which represents the adverse or favourable trade balance, which is in reality the surplus value of goods and services delivered to any one country over and above the value of the commodities and services which the latter has sold or delivered on its part. It is precisely this balance which under the gold standard could be settled by the shipment of gold, in this way maintaining stability of exchange and permitting the excess purchase abroad, within certain limits, by a country desirous of acquiring goods which it could not or did not find it convenient to manufacture at home.

Unfortunately, when America and France monopolised three-fourths of the gold supply of the world, it became impossible to secure the necessary gold to maintain the smooth working of the gold standard, so that the Government of Great Britain had to break with gold by suspending the convertibility of the note issue. From that moment the pound has fluctuated in value in accordance with the variable demand from countries which, having bought our goods, must pay for them by buying sterling and our own requirements for foreign currencies to pay for our imports. It can readily be perceived how weighty is the influence of excessive imports in depressing the pound, and it can be understood why the Government has had to take preventive measures to check the volume of imports so as to prevent depreciation of the pound.

Since Britain departed from the gold standard we have experienced the full effect of any excess of imports over exports, and this is reflected in the fall in the dollar exchange, corresponding with reasonable accuracy to the excess of dollars which must be bought to pay for the surplus shipments. Had we been able to sell a corresponding value of merchandise to America we should have extinguished the debt without any transfer of pounds. It is clear, therefore, that the shortage of gold is not the only cause of our economic troubles. There exists a formidable impediment to the free interchange of products which renders harmony in commerce impracticable and prevents prosperity amongst the nations.

It is becoming daily more evident that an exaggerated nationalism, engendered by racial antipathy, fostered by war and by excessive trade rivalry, is hammering a wedge between the nations. Not only is trade hampered, but the people are denied the use of products which should be made available to all consumers at a price freed from the heavy surcharge imposed by import tariffs that circumvent the abundance which prevails and incidentally check the counterflow of manufactures from the countries which supply our food-stuffs and raw materials. Many new frontiers were created by the Peace Treaty of Versailles, thus erecting further barriers, and the nations whose examples should have given a lead to the less enlightened peoples have been prominently identified with the imposition of an exaggerated tariff policy. If the world should continue this commercial war much longer, the stagnation which has resulted will degenerate into a complete breakdown of commerce. We cannot with impunity defy economic law. War indemnities were feasible in bygone days when the conflict was limited in area, but the World War engulfed all the nations, and the exaction of mammoth indemnities was arranged without any consideration of the possibility of payment. Confused thought, begotten of inexperience in economics and warped by animosity, led the peace delegates astray. They ignored the effect of remittances which must absorb all the gold of the world, and failed to understand that indemnities, like other debts, are invariably, in the long run, paid by goods or services. France needed both these to reconstruct her devastated areas. She was indeed entitled to receive funds for the reconstruction of her devastated territory, but is it not possible that the treaty-makers may have over-estimated her war damages, and that proof of the full measure having been reached was afforded by the accumulation within the coffers of the Banque de France of the vast hoards of gold, now amounting to £380,000,000—more than one-fourth of the total world's supply? A continuation of payments in gold cannot profit

France, who loses interest on a vast scale, while draining the debtor countries of the supply of metal essential for the stability of their monetary systems. In proof of this supposition it may be pointed out that the clogging of the financial machine was not evident until after completion of this work. But the prosperous United States, far from needing goods or services, were obliged to take steps to stem the tide of imports, which threatened to deluge their shores in ever-increasing quantities as the prices of commodities fell. They refused payment in goods, and thus undermined the foundations of credit in all the debtor countries.

Can it be wondered that the world crisis is so deep-seated and so obstinate? Unlike former crises, it shows no sign of lifting, because its roots lie deeply embedded in the false economic system which is now universal. If the trouble were due to a derangement of credit, this could be remedied by a rise in the price of commodities sufficient to restore the buying power of producers of raw materials and food-stuffs—but there can be no extensive increase of values until trade barriers are removed to facilitate the flow of merchandise where it is wanted, and so to dispense with the necessity of pumping redundant goods from debtor to creditor countries. To accomplish this excessive nationalism must be curbed, and some understanding is needed to encourage production where it can be carried on with the best results, and to curb it where it has been organised for political purposes, in defiance of economic realities. In general, it is preferable to leave to business men the task of organising production, as the fear of possible losses will steer them clear of exaggerated zeal, and hope of gain may direct their energies into profitable channels. The efforts of Government to overcome difficult situations arising from excessive production of coffee, wheat, rubber and cotton have failed signally—indeed, the credits granted to growers have aggravated the evil by fostering unwanted production, whereas the customary credit facilities of bankers would inevitably have been curtailed or withdrawn, thus helping to adjust supply to demand in the time-honoured way.

It can readily be seen that the dire results of this medley of blunders cannot be remedied by any one nostrum, since every section of the economic machine is for the moment out of joint. Our withdrawal from the gold standard was the logical sequence of a series of defects in our own economic structure in addition to the causes already mentioned. The step was reluctantly taken, and the Bank of England did not act with a view to improving home trade conditions, though this has in fact, ensued. Nor have we departed from free trade for any other motive than necessity due to the world's faulty organisation. We have had to inoculate the victim of the snake bite with his own venom.

and this should take the world one step nearer the ultimate ideal of universal free trade, which to-day seems farther removed than ever.

To reconstruct the shattered edifice of credit will absorb the intelligence and energy of the ablest men from all centres; but it is to be feared that we cannot look to politicians for a solution of the problem which besets us, because their vision lacks the true perspective. In certain spheres their influence might be applied with effect—for instance, in the readjustment of the war debt burden. Cancellation of debt is repugnant to all creditors, but enhancement of debt must be equally condemned where fair play is desired. Now it can be shown that the fall in commodity prices has imposed an additional burden on debtor nations which has doubled and in some cases trebled the original debt incurred. Common justice demands that in fair play to the debtor these debts should be reduced to correspond to the lower value of commodities, and they should be made payable in kind, and not in money. But it is doubtful whether this reduction would suffice to oil the wheels of commerce well enough to allow the world to recover its equilibrium. Only complete obliteration would relieve the world of an unbearable tension, and should free vast credits for commercial purposes. Many think this a *sine qua non* of economic reconstruction.

It is clear that within a few months the financial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles will go by the board, not as a result of deliberate action, but because they have finally been proved in practice to be unworkable. Incidentally it has also been definitely shown that war indemnities as a means of collecting tribute from a defeated enemy are to-day absolutely futile and anachronistic. Once we have scrapped an unworkable treaty, new conditions will arise which must be instantly dealt with. On the wreck of the economic machine statesmen must build a durable structure which will be adaptable to modern conditions of finance, industry and trade. No country can so well give a lead as Great Britain, first because the integrity of the nation is generally recognised and appreciated, and because our system of finance and our knowledge of the theory and practice of central banking are ahead of others. It is therefore of paramount importance that we should set ourselves the task of preparing a concrete plan as the foundation of a new order.

One by one nations are following our lead by abandoning the gold standard, thus proving its unsuitability for modern conditions; but a sounder system must take its place, and only in Britain does there exist the stable foundation upon which we can evolve a monetary system which will stand the strain of good times and bad. During the war and until 1925 our paper

currency stood immense strain and left the credit of the country unimpaired. We have returned to that system, with the exception that we have committed to the Bank of England the responsibility of controlling the issue of currency. At present parliamentary restrictions limit the issue of currency to a statutory amount (now £275,000,000) without regard to the fluctuating demand of commerce through the rise or fall of prices due to the increased or decreased activity of trade. The latter should be the decisive factor in fixing the issue of currency, and the rise and fall of the index number constitutes an infallible barometer whose readings must define the issuing policy of the Currency Authority. This involves the repeal of the sub-section of the rency Act of 1928 which places a limit on the issue of currency. Credit is closely interrelated to currency, and the restriction now imposed through the limitation of the fiduciary issue is hampering trade development and is undoing the benefits which should accrue through the action of the National Government in relation to safeguarding industry and accelerating re-employment. Further, British exports are being curtailed because there is insufficient currency to finance the exchange operations incident to their payment.

The whole world (with the exception of the United States of America and France) is looking to Britain for a lead and will follow the financial policy which we adopt. Despite its disabilities, sterling continues to be the most accredited currency and is in demand throughout the world, but the limiting factor imposed by Parliament upon its issue is throttling the demand for the pound, which would open up the clogged channels of finance and free the world for a natural development of trade now desperately restrained, since twenty-three countries have imposed intolerable restrictions on exchange operations which are forcing Central Europe back to a system of barter.

The fall of sterling has reduced the equivalent value of our fiduciary issue to £185,000,000 gold, whereas the £275,000,000 was insufficient to sustain prices when trade was slackened in pace. To restore adequacy an additional £100,000,000 is required, and its issue would be justified as a balancing factor against the fall of 32 per cent in the exchange value of sterling. Without such an addition the efforts of Government to accelerate the pace of industry cannot succeed, nor can we bring about the rise in commodity prices so earnestly desired as a means of strengthening impoverished producers now so heavily in debt. Without this rise there can be no betterment. The key to world progress is therefore in the hands of the British Government, and upon a correct solution of our currency problems depends the position Britain will take in the councils of the world. We could lead the

world and set straight its sadly mutilated economic structure; indeed, without British leadership, it is difficult to envisage anything but a policy of drift similar to that of the years following the Armistice. The future greatness of the British Empire depends upon the development of a generous policy founded upon a scientific currency system which will enable sufficient capital to be supplied to potential buyers in need of finance, and will also foster the development of our own Possessions, which have now ceased to count upon Britain for the financial support which is essential for their well-being.

With the abolition of reparations and war debts—an inevitable contingency which prevarication cannot divert—much needed credit will be restored to agriculture and industry, but without a reform of our monetary policy we cannot assume the responsible rôle which awaits us in the great reconstruction which is about to begin. Those responsible for our currency policy meanwhile live in an atmosphere of apprehension regarding inflation. This is a relic of the gold standard, which has passed for good and all. Confused thought is responsible for comparisons of British currency with the depreciated mark and rouble. The position of those currencies was not comparable with that of Britain, their inflation having been part of a deliberate policy to wipe out debt. It is unfair to the public to bring forward these analogies. There is no inflation as long as currency is needed and gets absorbed into commerce. When it is redundant it returns automatically to the Bank to be cancelled. When prices rise unduly, the Central Bank can curb incipient inflation by the withdrawal of currency through the sale of securities or by raising the discount rate. There is evidently a conflict of view between the Bank of England and the business community, the former straining to keep prices down in order to protect the purchasing power of money, the latter conscious that actual prices are wholly inadequate to meet production costs. But selling prices must be raised before there can be a return to healthy conditions and general prosperity. Few can deny that the reasoning of the business mind is sound on this point. For the purpose of restricting the export of currency we have, until last week, maintained an excessive Bank rate (6 per cent) which has undoubtedly tended to throttle trade and prevent development, whereas we should adopt exactly the opposite policy. No doubt bankers fear a further fall in the value of the pound, and this might conceivably happen at the outset, but it should speedily readjust itself as our trade recovers.

To recapitulate, the world is crying out for financial leadership. The United States and France, in spite of the fact that they have monopolised gold, have clearly signified their inability

to replace Britain as the world's financial centre. At present our central banking policy is limiting the issue of money to a degree that holds back development, keeps prices down to the present ruinously low level, which is bankrupting both agriculture and industry, and creates a shortage of currency for foreign exchange purposes, thus hampering the export trade. The repeal of the sub-section of the Act of 1928 which limits the fiduciary issue is urgently needed, in order to permit the issue of currency according to the needs of commerce. Expansion of trade and increase of prices require an expansion of currency, in default of which we cannot fail to precipitate another crisis as soon as trade begins to revive. Without this revival London will be unable to resume her place in the financial world, and Britain's political position will be compromised, while all Europe and other parts of the globe which depend upon British finance will find their development impeded.

We have it within our grasp to become the leading world Power, strengthening with the growth of the overseas Empire, but unless we reform our currency policy the opportunity will disappear for ever, and Britain may follow other countries into the ranks of the third rate Powers. In answer to the school of thought which alleges that the issue of currency according to the requirements of trade is bound to lead to inflation and a depreciation of currency, I would reply that inflation in the sense of a rise in commodity prices is exactly what is most needed. When the price level has once more risen to a level which leaves some profit margin over costs, it should be kept as steady as possible. Any further inflation, as has been pointed out, can be nipped in the bud by the effective control which the Bank of England possesses. It may be admitted that speculators may try to take advantage of the expansion in currency and credit to depress the value of the pound, but no speculation against a fundamentally sound position can permanently hold down the value of any currency, and the stimulation of trade would rapidly counteract the depressing effect of 'bear' sellers of sterling, as the value of the pound would inevitably be increased by additional exports. Authoritative action is needed, and this can only come from Britain. If confidence were restored there would be a speedy revival of trade and the beginning of the rise in prices, without which the world must drift steadily but surely towards bankruptcy.

A WIGGLEWORTH.

THE FUTURE OF BBC TALKS

THE 'Talks' policy of the British Broadcasting Corporation has recently formed the subject of considerable discussion in newspapers and literary journals of many complexions all over the country. The spark which lit this bonfire was the decision to cease broadcast reviews of new novels, not in itself a very momentous decision—in fact to many people the spark has seemed absurdly small for the blaze. The more discerning writers, however, who tried to understand what lay behind the decision, perceived that the attitude of mind shown in the matter of novels had wider implications, and that the spark might betoken the existence of embers. Although the controversy was for the most part conducted in a spirit of moderation and good sense, it was evident that there was a good deal of misconception of how talks were arranged, and indeed of how broadcasting was administered. Some writers, one judged, had had little time to listen to broadcast programmes at all. And yet, since broadcasting in this country is a publicly owned service, the responsibility for seeing that it is as good as it might be lies ultimately on everyone who pays a tax licence. It is therefore important that broadcasting methods should be understood and broadcasting policy be discussed as widely as possible, and it is in the hope of helping to promote a better understanding that this article is written.

In the first place, the history of the BBC is worth a brief summary. In 1922 negotiations began between the Postmaster-General (the Minister responsible for all forms of communications) and a group of radio manufacturers, which resulted in the creation of the British Broadcasting Company in January 1923. The capital of £100,000 was put up by 300 wireless manufacturers and others, with interest limited to 7½ per cent, and the company was licensed, first for two and then for four years, to take over and carry on the experimental transmissions which the Marconi Company had sent out during 1920 and 1921. The Crawford Committee of 1926 recommended the establishment of a public corporation by Royal Charter for ten years, under a Board of Governors appointed for a period of five years by the Govern-

ment. On January 1, 1927, the British Broadcasting Corporation therefore took over the staff and equipment of the old company, and the shareholders were paid out at par. Lord Clarendon was appointed as the first chairman of the new Board (succeeding Lord Gainford, who had been chairman of the company), and he was succeeded in 1930 by Mr. J. H. Whitley, the former Speaker of the House of Commons. Certain far-reaching decisions were taken in the early days of the company which are I believe largely responsible for the position British broadcasting holds to-day, and which reflect the greatest credit on those responsible for them. It was agreed to create a single service for the whole country, in order to avoid the appalling chaos of American broadcasting; to exclude all advertising, in order to avoid a commercial bias in programmes, and to finance the service by means of direct payments from listeners themselves.

A broadcasting service can be financed in one of three ways: (1) by revenue from advertisers, who buy space in programmes and consequently choose what is transmitted; (2) by taxes on wireless sets, valves, etc.; (3) by direct payments from listeners; or, of course, by a combination of these methods. In the United States, in France and elsewhere, listeners pay no licence. The main competing companies in America derive their income almost wholly from advertisements. In Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian countries, etc. various forms of licence systems exist; in Great Britain, by the mutual agreement of the Post Office and the wireless traders it was decided from the beginning to levy a 10s. tax on each listener. Of this the Post Office deducts 12½ per cent. to cover costs of collection, and the B.B.C. then receives 90 per cent. of the net revenue on the first million licences, 80 per cent. on the second, 70 per cent. on the third, 60 per cent. on the fourth, and so on. The remaining 10 per cent., 20 per cent., 30 per cent., 40 per cent., etc. (over and above the 12½ per cent.), is retained by the Treasury. This particular form of sliding scale was no doubt based on the assumption that an increasing audience would not require a relative increase in programme and other expenditure—an assumption which is not wholly supported by facts.

This system of finance makes the body of listeners in effect the owners of the service, and introduces a box-office element which is extremely important. It is a commonplace for leaders-writers and others to ask, 'Does the B.B.C. give the public what it wants?' Sir John Reith is sometimes represented as replying, in the rôle of the strong man of the Corporation, that he has no intention of giving them any such thing. But the question should rather be, 'Does the B.B.C. give the public what it likes?' And to this the best answer is given by the steady, and of

late accelerated, rise in licences. These figures could scarcely be the index number of a wholly dissatisfied public. In actual fact the public cannot know what it wants, and to limit programmes to the level of what is commonly taken to be the public taste would be to reduce them to the lowest common measure, and to do the public a grave injustice. There are, of course, dissatisfied sections and dissatisfied individuals, and, though many of them cancel each other out, there is a wide field for improvement and development all round, as the B.B.C. is the first to recognise. But this leads us to a discussion of how broadcasting is actually administered.

I suppose the B.B.C. presents one of the most interesting and delicate problems in organisation and administration even in this much-organised modern world. Its immense influence, its relations with His Majesty's Government, its educational activities and associations demand an organisation suited to a responsible department of State. The functions which correspond to a large-scale entertainment industry, to a huge concert-giving agency, and to a great daily or weekly journal demand a degree of flexibility and of delegation of responsibility which is totally at variance with Civil Service traditions or practice, and which approximates more nearly to the best methods of business and of journalism. Those who clamour for the appointment to the Board of Governors of great unpractised or experts in entertainment and in music underestimate the complexity of this dual problem of management. The Governors are appointed to take the full and final responsibility for that autonomy which is regarded as inherent in their office. The Postmaster-General's authority is vague, beyond his responsibility for technical supervision which results from his control of the ether. By design and by precedent the fullest responsibility for programmes and general policy as well as for finance is left to the Board of Governors. They act, in a sense, as trustees and guarantors on behalf of the public for the good conduct of the service. The detailed administration lies, however, in the hands of the Director-General, who in turn delegates responsibilities to the heads of the various branches—administration, finance, engineering, information and publications, and programmes, which, in turn, are appropriately subdivided into manageable portions for actual working purposes.

The largest, and in a sense the most important, branch is of course the programme branch, and it is in this branch that problems of administration appear in their most acute form. Programmes are not invented above and delegated downwards to be executed. They originate from below, and, indeed, depend upon the ideas and creative ability of the departmental chiefs.

and their staffs—whether they consist of music of many kinds, vaudeville, plays, light diversions, relays of events, discussions, talks, readings, and so on. They depend not only upon knowledge and experience in these various directions, but on experiment and research into the fine shades of presentation, of broadcasting technique, of the reaction of artists to microphone requirements, and on half a dozen other things. The issue is, however, relatively simple in the case of music and dramatic productions. Both are admittedly the concern of specialists, and there is nothing for it but to secure the best available officials and to judge by results. Much even of their routine work depends upon an encyclopedic knowledge of the artists of all countries, of their movements, fees and foibles, of copyrights and contracts, and the rest.

More debatable territory is, however, reached with talks and discussions. The claims of special experience of editorial instinct to seize the right time, place and manner of presentation, of personal ability to help speakers of all sorts upon every subject to perceive and acquire the peculiar art of broadcasting—all these may very easily be minimised or set aside as being of small importance in comparison with other considerations. Talks are felt to be less of a specialist's job than music, and in a sense this is right. Everyone, after all, knows people who can talk on half a dozen subjects, and claims to special knowledge in this sphere may easily sound arrogant and exaggerated. And yet I think they must be recognised. Anyone who has dealt with this side of broadcasting will bear me out when I say that the longer one works at it, the more one realises how much there is to learn, and the infinite variety of human beings is the measure of the infinite variety of methods that must be discovered and applied in broadcasting. As all good broadcasters know, the art of the microphone is quite distinct from the art of public speaking, or the art of writing—the art of interesting people by wireless is different from the art of interesting them by any other means, and there is no complete set of rules which can be applied indiscriminately to all speakers. The talks official finds that even when he has learnt what to look for in the personality and psychology of possible speakers, he must study each broadcaster as a separate problem. No speaker can be coerced into accepting a technique that does not convince him, or that seems alien to him; it is more important to get him to see what is wanted for himself. He may not unnaturally be suspicious of attempts by amateurs to suggest how he, an expert, should present his material, and any such suggestions, therefore, must convince him of their good sense. Still more, the presentation of a broadcast discussion may require the kind of editorial handling which can produce in good dialogue form exactly what the speakers wish to

say. These and other problems, which form the daily work of those who arrange talks, tend to make them feel that, while their part of the programme calls for a less specialised professional training, it is inherently delicate and personal. The almost inevitable pull between this point of view and the administrative point of view clearly requires a piece of executive machinery which is pretty nearly perfect if friction is to be avoided and efficiency secured.

The co-ordination of the different programme elements, and the creation of a daily programme out of the contributions levied from each department, necessitated a centralising staff to carry out these duties. The gradual stiffening of this control on the one hand, and the constantly increasing complexity of programmes on the other, reached a stage in which the old machinery admittedly proved to be inadequate. If the Director of Programmes was to be expected to carry in his mind the ins and outs and whys and wherefores of all the multifarious activities and advance plans of all the programme departments, in which he was concerned not directly but only indirectly, and if, in addition, he was to be answerable personally for day-to-day arrangements for talks, and for manuscripts in their final form, this meant a bottle-neck of the worst kind, and a weak link between directorate and programme builders. Such a stage was actually reached, but it has already to some extent been successfully passed by the creation of a separate talks branch.

The talks programme itself is composed of three elements: (1) the general talks, which include a morning or early afternoon talk (reviews and surveys of current books, plays, discoveries, etc., at 6.50 and 7.5, and a late evening talk, usually at 9.20, together with discussions and debates, readings of prose and poetry, and occasional regional talks; (2) the adult education series, given mainly at 7.30 and on Sunday afternoons; and (3) the broadcasts to schools, given on five afternoons a week. For a time general talks, adult education and news were united in one department. Subsequently they were split up into separate unconnected units, but within the last few weeks they have been reunited, with school broadcasting added.

School talks inevitably entail an elaborate machinery of co-operation between representatives of the teaching bodies, local authorities and B.B.C. staff, who act in the joint capacity of officers of the B.B.C. and of the School Broadcasting Council. The curriculum is laid down and worked out in considerable detail by the council and its sub-committees.

Adult education may in a sense be regarded as a by-product of all programmes, in so far as they enlarge the range of interest and experience of those who listen to them. But in a specialised

since it became a definite B.B.C. activity as the result of an inquiry set on foot jointly by the Corporation and the British Institute of Adult Education under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Hadow. The Committee spent eighteen months in hearing evidence and in considering the problems presented to them, and reported in March 1928. They recommended the inclusion of educational broadcasting as an integral part of the broadcast programme, planned in co-operation with those bodies already engaged in such work, and they devised machinery to secure the development of discussion groups and systematic follow-up work. The Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education, of which the Archbishop of York is chairman, is responsible, through its Executive Committee and its Programme Sub-committee for arranging, in co-operation with the responsible B.B.C. official, who is also secretary to the Council, the series of talks for the spaces allotted to them. It is the object of these talks to cover a wide field in a reasonably popular manner, to avoid the purely academic approach while maintaining the highest academic standards, and to plan far enough ahead to enable organised groups of listeners to make the necessary arrangements for joint listening and discussion. The Central Council is supported by a number of regional councils, in order to secure the adequate expression of opinion from different parts of the country.

The general talks are arranged wholly inside the B.B.C., if such a description can be applied to a process which involves a continual sounding of outside opinion, consultation with experts, and examination of suggestions, over a wide range of subjects and interests. The general outline of the programme for three or four months is sent up in advance for approval, in the form of a framework rather than a completed schedule spaces being left for topical subjects and personalities, while points of policy are, of course, submitted as they arise from day to day for comment and decision. But in the nature of things the main responsibility for choosing this and rejecting that, for fixing on one individual and turning down another lies with the group of officials whose work it is to see people and test them at Savoy Hill, and to search for material and ideas. It will be seen that whereas in the case of school talks and adult education talks two distinguished councils may be said to support the B.B.C., in the case of general talks the Board of Governors has to take sole responsibility for what is broadcast.

Such a situation, especially if the machinery of liaison is weak, is liable to lead to timidity, to misunderstandings, and to administrative friction. Its inherent difficulties can only be eliminated if there is a degree of sympathy between those who, by the day-to-day creation of programmes, are inevitably building up in the

public mind a conception of B.B.C. policy, and those who have to take ultimate responsibility for that policy. It requires a clear understanding on both sides of what is the general aim, of what sort of general limitations are desirable, and of what is the accepted definition of impartiality. And it requires adequate machinery for securing this understanding.

There are, I suppose, two main policies which can govern a monopolistic broadcasting service—(1) a middle policy, expressing the traditional or what may at any moment be regarded as the orthodox view on most things, with a minimum of latitude on either side of the line; and (2) the expression of all the more important currents of thought on both sides of the line, preserving, of course, a carefully balanced diversity. My personal conviction is that the second is the only policy which can be followed with any hope of bringing the public into touch with the different formative influences of to-day, and of encouraging that flexibility of mind and readiness to adapt to new conditions which all schools of thought recognise to be vital at the present moment. I say all schools of thought advisedly. There are, of course, those who are afraid of all thought and of all new ideas, whether they hail from left or right, or neither. I think it must be admitted that it is not easy to accord what may be regarded as adequate representation to this negative attitude. But with this proviso, I am convinced that a policy embracing a wide range of views can be followed without giving legitimate offence to any, by means of careful choice of speakers and the right presentation.

The decision of the B.B.C. to suspend the reviewing of novels is worth examining in some detail because it illustrates certain difficulties with which broadcasting is confronted. So far as I understand it, it was based upon two different motives—(a) a feeling that the preoccupation with sex which is believed to be characteristic of the modern novel makes such books unsuitable to recommend to the family audience; and (b) a theory that the B.B.C.'s monopolistic position makes it undesirable for it to place any kind of imprimatur on one book as against another through the words of its critics. The decision was not taken, so far as I know, on account of any dissatisfaction expressed by listeners with the B.B.C. novel reviewers. Miss Clemence Dane and Mr. Michael Sadleir, who have given fortnightly talks turn about on new novels for the past year, and who, in common with all previous reviewers, have accepted the B.B.C. view that in reviewing for so diversified a public as is reached by wireless a conservative policy is essential. The most fantastic rumours have, however, been current: the reviewers have been charged, directly and by implication, with an almost systematic poisoning of the public mind. The seed from which this remarkable legend grew was

apparently the series of talks by Mr. Harold Nicolson on 'The New Spirit in Literature.' It seems to be generally unrecognised that this series formed part of the large-scale symposium called *This Changing World*, arranged by the Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education, of which the Archbishop of York is chairman, and which consists of an inquiry into the disturbing, disrupting, and formative influences which have been at work in the last thirty or forty years in the domain of industry, commerce, science, art, literature, and so on. The course which Mr. Nicolson was invited by the Council to give was approved in advance by the B.B.C., and his introductory essay outlining his theses was passed and published. It is difficult to conceive any critic of standing who undertook an inquiry of this sort failing to devote considerable space to the work of D. H. Lawrence, Aldous Huxley, and even James Joyce. Complaints that such writers are unworthy of serious attention, since they merely 'specialise in furtive filth' (to quote an important weekly journal), should properly be addressed in the first instance to the Council which planned the inquiry, although by the terms of its charter the B.B.C. is finally responsible for all that is broadcast. Only ignorance or dishonesty could use this series as a ground for charging the B.B.C. with pursuing a general literary policy of pressing one particular clique or coterie, and of ignoring the great bulk of work produced by writers of other types. Even a cursory glance at the names of the novel critics who preceded Mr. Sadleir and Miss Clemence Dane, at the record of books reviewed, at the range of general literature discussed each week, at the special series, such as those on Mr. Galsworthy's Forsyte Saga, and on the Victorian 'prophets,' would show that the amount of space given to what are sometimes called 'advanced' writers is negligible.

So much for the morality issue, though it might in passing, be noted that the B.B.C. have now modified their new policy by appointing Mr. Eric Linklater, himself one of the modern school of novelists, to review novels for the *Listener*.

But let us examine the alternative case against broadcast reviews—the theory that it is unfair for a monopoly to wield such an influence. If this view were pushed to its logical conclusion, it would be unbecoming in the B.B.C. to invite anyone to express any views at all. It would certainly be inconsistent to continue, as the Corporation is at present doing, the weekly reviews of new books of general literature, or even to continue to issue book-lists and bibliographies, of books new and old, in connexion with all the main series of talks. One might go on to point out that there are commercial implications in broadcasting restaurant hints, excerpts from musical comedies, and a number of other things that are to be found in programmes. Ever since 1925 the

B.B.C. took the view that part of its function, on the cultural side, should be the discussion of new books by critics of distinction and integrity. Mr. Alfred Noyes, in his letter to *The Times* of December 14, 1931, was therefore inaccurate in describing talks on new books as 'a brief experimental departure from a consistent policy,' which was now to be abandoned. The charge that can be brought against broadcasting that it discourages personal effort on the part of the listener can best be countered by a wide encouragement given to reading. A close alliance has been built up with public libraries all over the country, and friendly relations established with the book industry. The range of books covered is wide, as any listener knows, though, of course, it is limited to the better books in the various fields, and the effects on book reading, book buying, and book borrowing are encouraging.

There is one point in the arguments raised during the controversy which has on the face of it a good deal of reason. It is urged that when so much influence is at stake there should be a constantly changing rota of critics. The assumption behind this argument is that without some such provision there is a serious danger of long ruling, prejudice, and favouritism towards publishers, cliques, coteries, and schools. It is of course inevitable that with the best will in the world critics cannot escape from their own personalities, nor wholly from their individual tastes and even prejudices. I am, however, prepared to maintain with confidence that given critics of the kind the B.B.C. has sought, and their co-operation with the responsible officials, these dangers need scarcely arise. By avoiding those who already review new books elsewhere (unless they do so to the extent of two or three books only), above all by avoiding those multiple reviewers who supply the needs of half a dozen papers. By joint efforts to see that other things being equal, all publishers receive a fair consideration. By a strict avoidance of personal or commercial considerations in the choice of books. And finally by a reasonable diversity of individuals. I do not think there need be any misuse of the monopoly. The difficulty of a rota is far greater than is apparent to anyone unfamiliar with the practical side of broadcasting. I doubt if it is yet realised by the average educated person that the key to successful broadcasting in the widest sense is personality, and personality as seen, not from the point of view of the sophisticated listener with interests already alert, but from the point of view of the average man and woman, suspicious of any trace of superiority, of anything that sounds high-brow and of any attempt at education or uplift. I do not mean by this that what is required is something cheap or second-rate. If the experience of the B.B.C. teaches one anything, it is that, though one may get a momentary appreciation for the very

appeal to the gallery, it very soon wears thin; and that the public is quick to appreciate the first-rate, provided the speaker's sincerity, humanity and imagination are apparent from his voice, and provided he or she has in addition those elusive qualities which make possible a personal friendship with an unseen audience. It is idle to pretend that there is available at any time a very large choice of critics who possess all the qualifications enumerated, through whom it is possible to reach far beyond the ordinary library subscriber, the ordinary leisured readers, to a largely new public. In my experience the relationship which I believe to be so essential can only be built up on a long stretch of weekly or fortnightly broadcasting, and when it is remembered that for some time a single fortnightly book talk of fifteen minutes represented the total space available, and that even now one weekly talk has to cover the whole field of general literature, and (until recently) one fortnightly talk the whole output of new novels, any rota system would mean the scrapping of all continuity and the almost complete elimination of the personal factor.

I have dwelt at some length on what may seem a minor point of literary criticism because it illustrates conveniently one of the dangers with which I believe broadcasting is now faced—the danger of putting policy before programmes. No one could disregard the heavy responsibilities of broadcast speech, or ignore the necessity of weighing genuine policy considerations, but it is easy for the term 'policy' to be used to dignify what may be little more than a desire to conciliate, or to avoid giving offence to persons or interests that may scarcely deserve so much deference. Must we face the possibility that the price to be paid for a public service system of broadcasting, which avoids the vulgarities and degradations of a commercial system, is the risk of becoming colourless, timid, authoritarian, for the sake of becoming safe? If the chief test applied to a speaker on any vital or controversial subject is ever allowed to become 'Does anyone disagree with him? Is he the President of this or that Academy, or this or that organisation?'—instead of 'Is he the best broadcaster, possessing qualifications of personality as well as of knowledge and status?'—then not only will the spice of controversy and vitality go, but there will be a grave danger of bad broadcasting, of losing sight of the personal and human factors which are of the essence of broadcasting, and on which the foundations of the service have been built.

A profound student of politics, with a distinguished record of public service, has often maintained to me that, much as he disliked many sides of the American system, he felt that it had a stronger chance of securing freedom of speech at the microphone

than our own, since sooner or later the sheer weight of responsibility borne by those in control of the B.B.C. would force them into a position of narrow orthodoxy, or a neutrality which represented, in fact, a censorship of all new ideas. I do not believe that this is inevitable, given the right conditions. The wide degree of independence claimed by and accorded to the B.B.C. gives it a great chance to build a great tradition. But if timidity should come to be shown, in one direction by undue deference to official considerations, and in another by undue administrative checks on programme enterprise, a deadening and formalising effect would follow. The problem is, in fact, partly administrative, as I have already shown, and depends to some extent upon how far the routine administrator is preferred to the creative programme man, and how far the proper use of both is secured.

It is, of course, idle to ignore the difficulties, whether political or what I may call æsthetic. On the political side it has to be remembered that the leaders of every Government see in the microphone an unparalleled opportunity for influencing public opinion, by means of pronouncements at times of crisis, expositions of policy or of new legislation, etc. This is obviously admirable, and the better any Government understands the business of taking the public into its confidence the more will it wish to use these opportunities. But it has its dangers. In most cases the B.B.C. requires such statements to be 'factual' and not propagandist—but in practice it is difficult to avoid a degree of tendentiousness: moreover each Government invariably feels that its predecessors in office had too good an innings. This leads almost inevitably to a growing pressure on programme space from the Government of the day and its Ministers, and even to a wish to influence the choice of speakers on political and economic subjects—to deprecate the use of any topical or other speaker who may not at the moment be *persona grata* to a particular department or to someone in it. Moreover, even in the process of arranging for the definitely party political broadcasts, there is a real danger that all but the most orthodox party politicians—the 'good boys' of each party—will be squeezed out altogether from the rota, and will not be included in other symposia because of objections raised, or that might be raised, by whips. It will be seen, therefore, that to maintain a fair balance of points of view and of personalities on the political side requires a considerable display of firm yet even-handed justice by the B.B.C.

But if the difficulties are considerable in the political and economic spheres, and the issues of vital importance, they are perhaps more delicate and perplexing, because less clearly defined, in what I have called the æsthetic field, by which I mean literature.

the arts, and the humanities generally. It seems to me quite as important to maintain a width of view in this sphere as in the other, though I know that some of those who would wish to see the widest range of opinions expressed on political and economic subjects may not agree with me. I think this comes from a fear that to open the doors too wide in art, literature, and philosophy is to let in ideas that will not only shock and offend many, but will have a disruptive social effect. One can understand this fear, but I think it is based on a series of misconceptions. In the first place, the spread of an inquiring habit of mind which we owe to science means that free discussion of most subjects comes to the ears of people of all ages including the younger generation. It is useless to expect that young people will not hear what are called 'advanced' theories, facts, personalities and books talked about sooner or later and if by means of broadcasting, they can hear them discussed by people who have been selected because they can be trusted to handle them with discretion, restraint and judgment, is not this a positive advantage? Broadcasting inherently demands a more conservative approach than print or direct speech, because the audience is non-selective. But this, so far from being a reason for excluding all difficult subjects, seems to me a particularly strong reason for facing up to their difficulties, and for getting the best speakers in the country to deal with these less familiar, more challenging topics, speakers who are more concerned to elucidate than to shock, to find the truth in what is new while appreciating the truth in the old. It should not be forgotten that, while it is important to avoid offending the susceptibilities of the older generation, it is equally important not to deserve the contempt of the younger. If broadcasting becomes associated in their minds with what they regard as an ostrich attitude, it will be shirking its chief task.

The question remains whether the broadcasting service as at present constituted can live up to these heavy responsibilities and survive the dangers immediately ahead of it, whether the pressure from every quarter, which is always heaviest from the negative, nervous sides—the tendency towards a tighter bureaucratic administration, due to a perhaps natural timidity and a consequent reluctance to delegate responsibility, and extreme sensitiveness to criticism from certain quarters, may not be too strong for it. Does the situation call for an extension of advisory councils to steady the Corporation in times of storm, and to go bail for its cultural policy? There is no doubt that the Central Council for Adult Education has greatly strengthened the hands of the B.B.C. in developing one side of its work, and deserves the thanks of the Corporation and the public for its disinterested help. How far such a system should be a permanent part of the con-

stitution, or should even be extended, remains an open and debatable point. In an ideal world one would hope that the Corporation would so grow in prestige and authority that it could and would weather any storms unassisted. This is a question which will come prominently before the public and still more before the Government when the choice of three new Governors has to be made during the course of the present year. Given men and women with open minds, tolerance and humanity, a high sense of public duty, and an appreciation of the administrative problems of the service, there is no reason why the high standards set by Sir John Reith and the first Board should not be raised even higher, and still another British institution become a model for the world.

HILDA MATHESON.

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA

SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS A REVALUATION.—I

No very satisfactory definition exists of the term 'psychic,' but in practice there has been little difficulty as to its meaning. If we assume, as was assumed when psychic research first began to be a recognised branch of scientific inquiry, that there is a sharp and natural distinction between mind and matter—defining as material, or objective, the world about which our senses give us direct information, and as immaterial, or subjective, that hypothetical world about which information is said to be received from other, less ascertainable, sources—we can then be certain that the term 'psychic' will refer to phenomena in the latter class. This is not to say, of course, that all subjective experience was regarded as psychic. For a good deal of it some mechanistic or 'normal' explanation could be found. The nightmares of one who had partaken too freely of lobster salad were not called psychic, because, though the experiences through which they took him were not a part of the external world, the physician could confidently ascribe them to the action of toxins arising from excessive indulgence in lobster salad, and so forth. Thus, by a process of elimination, all phenomena for which no 'natural' or 'normal' cause could be found were relegated to that suspect category which has been the death of many a scientific reputation, and the ruin of many an investigator.

For its application as it is generally understood, the term 'psychic' has therefore depended upon an accepted dualism, a division of the universe into 'material' and 'spiritual,' or matter and mind. It is because this dualistic view is becoming daily less tenable that it may be worth our while briefly to look at the whole question of 'psychic' experience and terminology, and see if our ideas do not perhaps need revision. For the whole classification of normal and supernormal has depended upon a belief that material and spiritual are in essence different, and if this belief is no longer consistent with recent physical and psychological discoveries, we ought to consider where, in the special realm we are observing, these discoveries lead us.

Before we go any further, what are the grounds for suspecting the dualistic view of mind and matter? They are of many kinds. First of all, it was discovered that, by a prolonged course of hypnotism, the threshold of consciousness could be raised or lowered to include aspects of the universe above or below the normal focus of sensual perception. In other words, the patient could be brought to see, to feel, to smell, or hear, as external to himself, what hitherto, if it had reached his mind at all, had reached it only as a vague impression. Take him into an empty house, before hypnosis, and he will declare that a certain room gives him an unpleasant feeling. Take him there some weeks later, after hypnosis, and he will see his unpleasant impression as a tangible shape, crouching in a corner of the room. It may even spring at him and knock him down. We do not solve the problem by calling this attack a hallucination, for hallucinations and their causes are often mutually interchangeable. The physician standing by the bed, with his finger upon the pulse of the dying man, smiles when he hears his patient recognise departed relatives, and declare that they are standing in the room with outstretched arms, ready to welcome him home. He knows that these figures are hallucinations due to toxæmia. Yet a severe rise in temperature, all the symptoms, in fact, of toxæmia, can be hypnotically induced in a healthy patient, and will result in precisely similar hallucinations. Appendectomy and even more serious abdominal operations have been performed without anæsthetic upon a hypnotised patient, who not only has felt no pain at the time, but has been prevented, by post-hypnotic suggestion, from feeling any pain for several days afterwards. If you can persuade a suitable subject, under hypnosis, that he is unable to bleed, you may open one of his veins with complete impunity.¹ We all know that infinitesimal lesions, the work of a germ, can utterly change and debase the most exalted character. It is equally true that a psychic shock can convert a sinner into a saint. A materialised figure at a seance will walk about the room, leaving tiny footprints in the sawdust which has been thoughtfully scattered on the floor, to establish not only for those in the room, but for those who come in after the experiment is over, that what undubitably is 'not there' now has been 'there' a short while ago, in ponderable guise, able to leave the testimony of its own imprint. There is no need to multiply instances of what has hitherto been termed the effect of mind upon matter. The only thing is to consider whether such instances have been correctly described or understood, whether there is any longer sense or validity in a distinction which seems to imply no difference; whether we can be certain of any of our terms when,

¹ I am indebted for these facts to a *Medical Times* correspondent.

as the great Irish poet puts it, 'the subjective may walk about the room.'

The time may not yet have come for a scientific revaluation, nor, if it had, am I the man to attempt such revaluation. All I wish to do in this and the succeeding article is to put before your attention certain facts which seem to have a bearing upon the point at issue, and of which the old materialist-spiritist, psycho-physical technique can offer no satisfactory explanation. As it is only fair at the outset to make clear from what angle I approach these problems, I may say that I believe we should never seek an explanation in heaven for what can be explained in terms of earth; in other words, that wherever such knowledge as we possess seems to offer an explanation of any phenomenon, we have no right to prefer an explanation *per ignotum*. There is a 'normal' explanation for all 'psychic' phenomena. I would not for an instant deny the beliefs of the Spiritualists, nor cast doubt upon the communications said to be received from the disembodied intelligences of dead men and women; but as long as there is any possible explanation of any such phenomenon which does not transcend the limits and the possibilities of our earthly knowledge, I should never dare (whatever my private and personal beliefs) to claim a cause from outside. It is only fair to make this clear, for, personally, I have no patience with the type of mind which loses wonder in a miracle as soon as it believes the miracle to be explained. The modernist churchman, who thinks he has accounted for the reported miracles of our Lord by talking about Suggestion, and for whom they would lose all their miraculous nature if it could be established, for instance, that our Lord had used a hypodermic syringe, is to my mind as badly credulous as any mediæval villager who stoned a vampire or ducked a witch. Wireless is no less wonderful for being the commonplace of ten million homes. Birth is still a miracle in the hospital labour ward. The closer our acquaintance with the wonders of the universe, the more wonderful we perceive them to be.

Up till now, the wonder of so-called psychic phenomena in the popular eye has been due to the idea that they belonged to some side of life beyond the reach of the scientific measuring rod. *Quæ ignotum præ magnifico*; and there are many minds which find a further pleasure, almost a relief, in believing the object of their wonder to be unknowable. Deep in his heart the conjurer wishes that he could perform a trick he does not understand. He would give anything if the word 'magician' upon his advertisements were true in the fairy-tale sense. We must not, however, let this pleasant human frailty hinder our investigations or detract from the quality of our results. The ghost in checking chains

must not overawe us into letting it alone, nor lose its quality if we find that it is not exactly what we thought. In psychic research, cheating is not confined to the medium; and half the indignation of the investigators who find they have been tricked is due, not to the trickery, but to the loss of their illusion. Before we assert or deny, therefore, let us consider one or two facts, or hints of facts, which may throw light upon a certain type of mediumistic perception. At the present stage, I offer no hypothesis upon the mind-matter relation, but merely suggest to your mind a picture. You are looking down from above upon a garden. Inside the garden is a big circular path, between high box hedges. At a point on the circumference of the path two men stand fiercely quarrelling. One is a 'materialist,' the other a 'spiritist.' After a bitter argument, in the course of which each calls the other fool and liar, they turn their backs, and hurry off in opposite directions, each vowing that henceforward he will go his own way. They continue to hurry 'away from' one another. You, who are up above, can see what is going to happen. They, not realising the situation, will shortly receive a surprise.

But let us consider the type of psychic perception of which we spoke. It is called, in the jargon of the subject, Psychometry. A certain type of medium, given a watch, a pocket-book, or some article of clothing, will, after a few seconds' contact with it, be able to describe the owner in some detail, or even to give an account of his recent emotional experiences. Such a medium, sitting in a chair habitually occupied by the same person, will receive information about that person. The phenomenon is experienced most vividly when the person to whom the chair or watch, etc., belongs has recently undergone some violent emotional disturbance. On an occasion when a young man had been discovered shot, and there was a doubt as to the manner of his death, a psychometric medium, going into trance in the armchair in which the young man had for some time been sitting on the evening of his death, reproduced a secret emotional trouble the origins of which were entirely unknown to the young man's friends and family, and the agony of mind which culminated in the determination to commit suicide.

Concentrating for the moment upon this particular case, we are naturally led to ask why it was necessary (or whether it was necessary) for the medium to sit in the chair. What part could an inanimate object play in the reconstruction of a state of mind? Here, possibly, certain analogous facts may help us. It is well known that certain adepts in Theosophy can perceive the emotions of those upon whom they look, in terms of what they call the 'aura.' This would appear to be a kind of coloured nimbus or halo round the head of the person under observation;

and it is a striking fact that these mediums, at different times and in different places, agree broadly as to the colours which, to them, signify the various emotions. Coming to the 'material' side of the question, we have the physical theory that thought and emotion are comparable to a chemical effervescence in the brain, a gas given off, as it were, by the changing proportions in the brain's chemical components. The late Sir Frederick Mott, and other physicians I believe, engaged in research based upon this theory, and the hope was expressed that with instruments of sufficient delicacy they would succeed in photographing or otherwise chemically recording this 'effervescence'. I do not know whether they actually succeeded in doing this, although, of course, mentally projected images have frequently been recorded by the camera (a point which we will consider more fully in a succeeding article); but suppose, for the sake of argument, that they had actually succeeded in photographing the chemical results of emotion, should we not at once have a clue towards a possible solution of psychometric phenomena? The young man contemplating suicide sits in his armchair. The emotional strain under which he labours is rayed out from his head in waves comparable to a chemical discharge. Somehow, it impregnates the chair in which he is sitting. When presently the medium sits in the same chair, his mind in a passive condition, he absorbs or is influenced by the residue of the discharge still clinging to the chair, and retranslates it into mental images; much as the needle and the sound-box retranslate the vibrations recorded upon wax into the vocal ghost of Caruso. If this were so, we should at once have an explanation of the Theosophists' perception of a person's aura, for they would thus be people whose altered or extended focus of consciousness enabled them to see chemical discharges which were invisible to the normal focus, and we should have a possible explanation for the type of ghost which appears to haunt certain rooms and localities. If these hypothetical chemical discharges had an endurance comparable to those of some chemical substances, then each appearance of the ghost would merely be a replaying of a gramophone record made it matters not how long ago. Please notice that I do not advance this as an explanation, or even as a suggested explanation, of this type of haunting. It is more than probable, when the real explanation is forthcoming, that it will be in terms of time and dimension rather than of the chemical laboratory. My only purpose is to suggest that, in this instance, there may be a perfectly sound 'material' explanation for an apparently 'spirit' phenomenon—in other words, that our two quarrelsome friends have each completed their semicircle of the path and met face to face.

Having spoken of time and dimension, let us look at two or

three experiences which seem to be most profitably viewed from this angle. The reader is possibly familiar with the work of Mr. Dunne,⁵ and will be prepared to accept as a fact that certain persons have been known to dream of events before those events were normally recorded, i.e., happened. There is ample evidence for this fact in Mr. Dunne's book, so that I need offer no examples from my own knowledge and experience, though these include instances of varying degree, from the exact prevision of an aeroplane accident to a dream foretelling the omission of a certain gramophone record from the current catalogue issued by His Master's Voice. The dream which follows, however, is worth mentioning, because it indicates a possible variation of the greatest significance. A London professional man dreamed that he was walking up the road from Victoria towards Hyde Park Corner. When he reached a certain spot in his dream, the road and his surroundings abruptly vanished, and his next consciousness was of lying, in great pain, with his head shrouded in bandages, in a hospital ward—presumably St. George's. A couple of evenings afterwards he happened, in fact, to be walking up the road from Victoria. Reaching a certain spot on the pavement, he remembered his dream, recognised the spot, and pulled up short. The next instant a tile crashed upon the pavement directly in front of him.

The significance of this incident is, of course, that it was not 'the future' which was foreseen. What was foreseen was that a certain line of action indicating the future of the tile and a certain line of action indicating the future of the man were about to intersect at a given point, *unless a third force should intervene and prevent them*. In some criticisms of Mr. Dunne's theory the obvious consequence that a foreseen future contingency, if avoided as a result of the information acquired by foreseeing it, would not be future at all, caused philosophic distress to the reviewers, why, I cannot imagine. One of the most successful palmists at present practising in London read the hand of Sir Henry Segrave about two years before his death. The palmist was asked, after the accident on Windermere, whether he had not foreseen Sir Henry's death. He replied that he had not explicitly so read it, for the simple reason that it was not explicit in the hand. He saw, he said, two occasions of great personal danger, either of which, on the information of the hand alone, might have resulted in death, and he went on to say that such events, at a distance, could not be certainly predicted, but only the strong likelihood of such events. If he had read the hand a week before the accident, the probability would, he thought, have been strengthened almost to certainty. He had often known an

⁵ *An Experiment with Time*.

interval of two or three years make a decided difference to the tracing of future events upon a person's hand, *owing to the development of other possibilities* (italics mine). I allege nothing about palmistry, one way or the other, though I have personally experienced and known of striking instances of accuracy in predictions said to be derived from reading my hand and those of people known to me ; but no one familiar with the recent physical theory of ' lines of probability ' can fail to be struck by the analogy between it and those two instances. I can understand many readers objecting that it is hopelessly unscientific to throw out hints and suggest analogies in this manner, but, while I agree with them, I am unrepentant. The first step towards solving a jigsaw puzzle is to get the pieces spread out on the table.

The next instance proposed to us should probably be put under the heading ' dimension '. Some years ago I used to visit a professor at an Oxford college every Thursday afternoon to take part with another man in experiments of the professor's devising. A good many of the experiments concerned simple thought-transference, and a rather more ambitious effort was to send a message to somebody in London. A friend of the professor, party to the experiment, enjoyed the services of a charwoman with mediumistic gifts. Every Thursday, at about half-past four, this good lady allowed herself to be persuaded to ' have a good set down and a nice cup o' tea '. In the pleasant vacancy of mind which resulted, she undertook cheerfully enough to look out for and record to her employer any messages or mental pictures which seemed to reach her, and a number of messages had been transferred to her with a very fair measure of success. (It must be explained that the nature and terms of the messages were always unknown to the transmitters until the moment when the professor placed them in their hands, and he as far as possible endeavoured to extemporise the messages.) On the afternoon of which I am thinking, punctually to the stroke of half-past four, the professor went to his bookshelf, took out a volume of pictures at random, opened it at random, and, without looking at it, handed the book to my friend and myself. For about ten minutes we gazed at the picture, concentrating upon its details rather than deliberately willing that our colleague in London should perceive them. The picture was an equestrian study of Charles I. At the end of the ten minutes we adjourned and had tea in the ordinary way, the professor taking the book back and replacing it in the bookshelf.

Next day he received an account of what had happened at the other end. The charwoman had obtained a very clear impression of the picture, with one startling discrepancy. In the foreground she alleged the presence of a large two-wheeled cannon, which

she saw even more clearly than King Charles or his horse; and so vividly and insistently had this cannon impressed itself upon her that her improviser was able to make a rough drawing on a postcard of its size and position relative to the four margins of the picture. Neither the professor nor my friend nor myself could find any explanation for this; but when, at our next meeting, we were turning over the pages of the book, we found, some twenty pages away from King Charles, a picture in which the foreground was occupied by a cannon unmistakably similar in position, appearance, and relative size to the cannon which had been seen at the other end of the experiment. There was no getting away from it—it was the same cannon. But neither the professor nor we had opened the book at that page, or looked at anything but the picture of the King, or had in our minds the image or recollection of the cannon or of any picture containing anything like it. Here, clearly, is no ordinary case of thought-transference. It would seem that the charwoman collaborated with us in a way of which we have at present but little idea—an activity operating in some dimension with which we are unfamiliar. On the old principle of a dualism between mind and matter, such an incident defies explanation.

When, just over two years ago, Berkeley made mind the measure of reality *esse est percipi*, etc. he was not asserting that there was nothing beyond mind, for none knew better than he the limits set to the mind's range. The modern student, considering phenomena such as those we have been discussing, might extend Berkeley's datum, saying that mind was indeed the measure of the material world as we perceive it, since that material world is merely an interpretation put by the mind upon such aspects of eternal reality as it is capable of perceiving. Regarded in this light, Berkeley's view of reality and its persistence as a set of ideas in the mind of God becomes strikingly intelligible to the modern inquirer. In this sense the objects of sight are indeed a universal language. The human mind can never be more than an interpreter of reality, and the material terms in which reality is to be apprehended, those aspects of it that the five senses of man can focus for his apprehending mind, are determined quite simply by the stage of evolution to which he has come. It is necessary to him as a living organism that his senses enable him to perceive a chasm or boulder in his path, lest, by falling over it, he damage or diminish the performance of those biological functions for which he is adapted and designed. Could his perceptions be so far extended as to focus the germs of a pestilence, the approach of some distant catastrophe, or the ingredient in the dish before him which is so dangerous with his system and temporarily incapacitate him, he would be even better

fitted to survive and perform his functions. As things are he is endeavouring in the one case to supplement his vision with a microscope, in the second to insure against unforeseen calamities of every kind, and in the third to compensate himself for the inadequate performance of his senses by creating various organizations to see that such food as is put before him is of a kind to harmonise with his physical nature. His interpretations of reality do not at present extend to these relatively minor points, because Nature is careless of the individual, and works on broad lines. Her safeguarding and legislation, like those of most human communities, are always a little in the rear of what is needed. She will take enough pains to safeguard the majority of her creations in the majority of instances, for anything beyond they must look to themselves.

The effects of shell-shock, hysteria, and various neuroses upon the mechanism of the body need no description here. It is enough that a total inability to function may result to almost any part of the body without organic effect or cause, and that such conditions can be entirely cured if they are treated soon enough—that is to say, before the non-physical condition has had time irremediably to effect the physical power to function. The results (often, alas, but temporary) produced by the late M. Coué, even in cases of pronounced organic disability, have been seen and attested by a large number of witnesses. The records of Christian Science contain unimpeachable evidence of cures effected without orthodox medical aid. To ascribe such cures, loosely, to the effect of mind upon body (I do not, of course, mean that the Christian Scientists use any such phrase) is to raise more difficulties than we explain. It presupposes a mechanism of which no description exists—which shall in some unexplained manner transfer 'mental' energy to 'bodily' tissue. The scientist who sets out to explain, in terms of the traditional dichotomy, how a belief conveyed to the mind can affect a physical condition has, I suggest, a needlessly difficult task before him. If, however, he cares to verify for himself the facts about such phenomena as the 'materialisation' referred to above (which left footprints in sawdust), and to make them the clue for his investigation, he may find his work much simplified.

Even though it may be our perception which gives the universe its reality for us, we have not even an arbitrary or temporary right to deny to the normally unperceived a reality of precisely the same kind. A searchlight, representing our perception, illumines part of a long coastline at night. This does not mean that the rest of the coastline is not there, or is necessarily of an entirely different kind to that part within the beam of our perception. We can move the beam a very, very short distance to

either side ; we can do little more, in fact, than make it visible, to include, partially and temporarily, small portions of the coastline outside our normal focus. They prove to resemble the rest, under the searchlight ; and indeed, if we were able to swing the searchlight freely up and down the length of the universe, we should find all parts of the coastline much alike, for the simple reason that, in order to be perceived by us at all, reality must be translated into terms of three dimensions. What we perceive is an interpretation ; and the forms under which so-called psychic knowledge presents itself are likewise dramatised by our senses, and need interpretation if we are to understand what aspect of reality they represent.

L. A. G. STRONG.

(To be continued)

THE CONVERSION OF EDWARD GIBBON

IN the year 1753, Edward Gibbon, the future historian of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, at the age of sixteen was received into the Catholic Church. He was then an undergraduate of Magdalen College, Oxford, and his change of religion led to his being immediately turned out of the University and caused his father to send him out of the country and to put him in the care of a M. Pavillard, a Calvinist Minister and professor at Lausanne, where within two years he was persuaded to profess himself a Calvinist.

Gibbon's own accounts of this affair may be found in his autobiographies, of which memoirs not less than six different versions are now in the British Museum¹ and have been edited and published by John Murray. The latest and most perfect of these, known as Memoir F, was written in 1792-3 and just covers the matter of the author's conversion. Another account, not nearly so full, appears in Memoir B.² But the main narrative of the affair was given by Lord Sheffield in his edition of Gibbon's *Miscellaneous Works* as long ago as 1796, and is as follows:

It might at least be expected that an ecclesiastical school should inculcate the orthodox principles of religion. Yet our venerable mother had contrived to unite the opposite extremes of bigotry and intolerance, on heretic, or unbeliever was a monster in her eyes: but she was always, or often or sometimes remiss in the spiritual education of her own children. According to the statutes of the university every student before he is matriculated, must subscribe his assent to the thirty-nine articles of the church of England, which are signed by more than one and read by more than believe them. My insufficient age exempted me however from the immediate performance of this legal ceremony: and the vice-chancellor directed me to return, as soon as I should have accomplished my fifteenth year, recommending me, in the meanwhile, to the instruction of my college. My college urged to instruct I forgot to return, and was surprised to find by the first magistrate of the university Without a single lecture, either public or private, either christian or protestant,

¹ Add. MSS., Brit. Mus., 54774 (Gibbon Papers, vol. 1)

² *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*. Printed version from Memoirs published 1814, with an introduction by the Earl of Sheffield. Edited by John Murray (London: John Murray, 1904). The passages relating to the author's conversion occupy in Memoir F, pp. 63-66, in Memoir B, pp. 107-109.

without any academic subscription, without any episcopal confirmation. I was left by the dim light of my catechism to grope my way to the chapel and communion-table, where I was admitted, without a question, how far, or by what means, I might be qualified to receive the sacrament. Such almost incredible neglect was productive of the worst mischief. From my childhood I had been fond of religious disputation: my poor aunt has been often pained by the mysteries which she strove to believe; nor had the elastic spring been totally broken by the weight of the atmosphere of Oxford. The blind activity of illumes urged me to advance without armour into the dangerous mazes of controversy, and at the age of sixteen, I bewildered myself in the errors of the church of Rome.

The progress of my conversion may tend to illustrate, at least, the history of my own mind. It was not long since Dr. Middleton's free inquiry had sounded an alarm in the theological world, much ink and much gall had been spilt in the defence of the primitive miracles, and the two chiefest of their champions were crowned with academic honours by the university of Oxford. The name of Middleton was unpopular, and his pencriptions very naturally led me to peruse his writings, and those of his antagonists. His bold criticism which approaches the precipice of infidelity, produced on my mind a singular effect: and had I persevered in the communion of Rome I should now apply to my own fortune the prediction of the Sybil

Vae profeta saluto

Quod minime vult scire pariter perdetur ab urbe

The elegance of style and freedom of argument were repelled by a shield of prejudice. I still revered the *doctores* or rather the names, of the saints and fathers whom Dr. Middleton exposed, nor could he destroy my implicit belief that the gift of *miracula* given powers was continued in the church during the first four or five centuries of christianity. But I was unable to resist the weight of historical evidence, that within the same period most of the leading doctrines of popery were already introduced in theory and practice: nor was my conclusion altered that miracles are the test of truth, and that the church must be orthodox and pure, which was so often approved by the visible interposition of the deity. The marvellous tales which are so truthfully attested in the *Passio* and *Chrysoloma*, the *Antioch* and *Jerome* compelled me to embrace the superior merits of catholicity, the constitution of the monastic life, the use of the sign of the cross, of holy oil, and even of images, the invocation of saints, the worship of relics, the enthusiasm of purgatory in prayers for the dead, and the tremendous mystery of the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, which irresistibly swelled into the prerogative of transubstantiation. In these dispositions, and already more than half a convert, I formed an unhappy intimacy with a young gentleman of our college whose name I shall spare. With a character less revolute, Mr. (Molesworth?) had imbibed the same religious opinions: and some Popish books, I know not through

¹ This name appears as a note in the John Murray edition of the *Autobiography*. I have, however, searched the records of Magdalen College in vain. It does not appear there—nor any name resembling it. Mr. J. G. Murray (of the Murray House) has not been succeeded, he tells me, in tracing the origin of the note supplying this name, where Gibson left a blank. There was a Molesworth at Wadham at this time.

what channel, were conveyed into his possession. I read, I applied, I believed; the English translations of two famous works of Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, the Exposition of the Catholic Doctrine, and the History of the Protestant Variations, achieved my conversion, and I surely fell by a noble hand. I have since examined the originals with a more discerning eye, and shall not hesitate to pronounce, that Bossuet is indeed a master of all the weapons of controversy. In the Exposition, a specious apology, the center assumes, with consummate art, the tone of candour and simplicity; and the ten-horned monster is transformed, at his magic touch, into the milk-white hind, who must be loved as soon as she is seen. In the History, a bold and well-aimed attack, he displays, with a happy mixture of narrative and argument, the faults and follies, the changes and contradictions of our first reformers, whose variations (as he dexterously contends) are the mark of historical, heretical error while the perpetual unity of the catholic church is the sign and test of infallible truth. To my present feelings it seems incredible that I should ever believe that I believed in transubstantiation. But my conqueror oppressed me with the sacramental words, 'Hoc est corpus meum,' and dashed against each other the figurative half-meanings of the protestant sects: every objection was resolved into omnipotence, and after repeating at St. Mary's the Athenian crowd, I humbly acquiesced in the mystery of the real presence.

To take up half on trust and half to try
Name it not faith but bungling bigotry
Both knave and fool the merchant we may call
To pay great sums and to compound the small
For who would break with Heaven and would not break for all *

No sooner had I settled my new religion, than I resolved to proclaim myself a catholic. Youth is sincere and impetuous and a momentary glow of enthusiasm had raised me above all temporal considerations.

By the keen protestants who would gladly retaliate the example of persecution, a clamour is raised of the increase of popery and they are always loud to declaim against the toleration of priests and Jesuits, who pervert so many of his majesty's subjects from their religion and allegiance. On the present occasion, the fall of one or more of her sons directed this clamour against the university, and it was confidently affirmed that popish monacharies were suffered under various disguises, to introduce themselves into the colleges of Oxford. But justice obliges me to declare that, as far as relates to myself this assertion is false and that I never conversed with a priest, or even with a papist, till my resolution from books was absolutely fixed.

In my last excursion to London I addressed myself to Mr. Lewis, a Roman Catholic bookseller in Russell-street Covent Garden, who recommended me to a priest, of whose name and order I am at present ignorant. In our first interview he soon discovered that persuasion was needless. After sounding the motives and merits of my conversion, he consented to admit me into the pale of the church, and at his feet, on the eighth of June 1733, I solemnly, though privately, abjured the errors of heresy. The admission of an English youth of family and fortune was an act of no small dignity or glory, but he bravely overlooked the danger, of which I was not then sufficiently informed. Where a person is introduced to the use of

* Dryden, *The Hind and the Panther*, l. 141.

THE CONVERSION OF EDWARD GIBBON

Home, or perhaps others to be reconciled, the officers' says, Blackstone's 'anxious to high-treason.' And if the humanity of the age would prevent the execution of this sanguinary statute, there were other laws, of a less odious cast, which condemned the priest to perpetual imprisonment, and transferred the proselyte's estate to his nearest relation.

An elaborate controversial epistle, approved by my director and addressed to my father, announced and justified the step which I had taken. My father was neither a bigot nor a philosopher, but his affection deplored the loss of an only son, and his good sense was astonished at my strange departure from the religion of my country.

In the first rally of passion he divulged a secret which prudence might have suppressed and the gates of Magdalen College were for ever shut against my return.

Many years afterwards when the name of Gibbon was become as notorious as that of Middleton, it was industriously whispered at Oxford that the historian had formerly 'turned papist' my character stood exposed to the reproach of inconsistency and this odious topic would have been handled without mercy by my opponents, could they have separated my cause from that of the university. For my own part, I am proud of an honest sacrifice of interest to conscience. I can never blush, if my tender mind was entangled in the exquiste that seduced the acute and manly understandings of Chillingworth and Hayle, who afterwards emerged from superstition to scepticism.

This account of his conversion, written, let it be noted, in the complete scepticism of his middle life, some forty years after the event, gives us all we are ever likely to know about it, and on the whole it contains rather more details than we should have expected. Gibbon's conversion to the Catholic Faith evidently made a great impression upon him, nor, as we shall see, did he give up his faith as easily as is generally supposed.

As to the conversion itself, according to his own account he holds his college and the University mainly responsible by reason of their neglect of instruction* and quite definitely states that he fell by the 'noble hand' of Bossuet. Lord Sheffield, however, says:

Mr. Gibbon never talked with me on the subject of his conversion to popery but once, and then he imputed his change to the works of Parnassus the Jesuit† who lived in the reign of Elizabeth and who, he said, had urged all the best arguments in favour of the Roman Catholic religion.

* In regard to Gibbon's course see James Harris. *A word or two in Pindarion of the University of Oxford and of Magdalen College in particular from the Posthumous Appearances of Mr. Gibbon*. Privately printed once then. This solemn and indignant tract leads to vindicate but succumbs in answering, the following, for instance, with its glance at the Commission to the Hampshire Yomancy, is not altogether without delight. 'He (the author) cannot however help observing that the favourite reproaches with which the literary Major leads his bounding historical periods when he means to let fly at the Church (of England) are superdition, ignorance and prejudice.' Harris was rector of Bathampton.

† This is the famous Catholic controversialist, Robert Parnassus or Parnassus, B.J., born at North Burway, in Somerset, June 22, 1540, died at Rome April 15, 1610.

So it may have been some work of Fr. Parsons that was lost him.

Gibbon does not tell us how he became acquainted with the 'Roman Catholic bookseller' in Russell Street, Covent Garden. This bookseller was Mr. John Lewis, and Lord Sheffield tells us that he learned from Mr. Lewis's son that 'Gibbon's conversion made some noise' and Mr. Lewis 'was summoned before the Privy Council and interrogated on the subject'. There was a John Lewis, a bookseller and publisher in Covent Garden in or about 1710. He was a native of Denbighshire, and had been educated probably at St Omer's College. He was for many years in the service of James II at St Germain, and afterwards in that of his son the Chevalier de St George, with whom he sailed for Scotland in Queen Anne's time. He was a friend of Thomas Hearne, the antiquary, whom he met at Oxford in 1710, and an ally of the Jesuits, and was brought into trouble for printing a pamphlet, *Vox populi Vox Dei*, which was judged to be treasonable,⁷ and he retired to his native country, where he ended his days. Whether Gibbon's bookseller was his son or grandson or nephew one cannot be sure. I find a bookseller who might be Gibbon's John Lewis, or perhaps his father, named in the Catholic registers kept by the Rev. Bruno Cantrill, O.S.F., 1726-55, and referring, apparently, to the Sardinian Chapel in Lincoln's Inn Fields.⁸ The entry is dated July 5, 1726, and refers to the baptism of David, son of Mr. Lewis, bookseller, born July 3.

The priest who baptised Gibbon is easier to identify. He was Fr. Bernard Baker, a Jesuit, and his name continually appears between the years 1753 and 1770 in the registers of the Lincoln's Inn Fields Chapel, of which he was one of the chaplains.⁹ Through the kindness of the Rev. R. Stewart, S.J., of Farm Street, I am able to give the following particulars of Father Bernard Baker (1698-1773). He entered the Society in 1721 at Watten, near St Omer. He did his higher studies at Liège, and was professed of the four vows in 1739. In the Jesuit *Catalogue* for 1740 he is described as procurator to the London Mission, and he was still in that office in 1773, the year of his death, although in the *Catalogue* for 1767 he is marked as *senis fractus*—'a broken-down old man'. For most, or perhaps all, of this time he was chaplain to the Sardinian ambassador, though it is improbable that he was domiciled at the chapel in Lincoln's Inn Fields.

Gibbon does not seem to have hesitated to acquaint his father

⁷ The printer Matthews was tried and hanged at Tyburn for this pamphlet, November 6, 1710. Cf. Gibbon, *Biographical Dictionary of English Catholics*, vol. II., p. 209.

⁸ Catholic Record Society, vol. xii. (*Miscellanea*, XI.) p. 104.

⁹ Catholic Record Society, vol. xii., *Lincoln's Inn Fields Chapel Register* (*Miscellanea*, X.B.), pp. 200-204.

with the step he had taken, and no doubt in this he was under the direction of Fr. Baker. He describes his letter as 'an elaborate and controversial epistle' which 'announced and justified the step which I had taken,' and Lord Sheffield tells us he described this letter as written 'with all the pomp, the dignity and self-satisfaction of a martyr.' Though the letter had been approved by his director, if it were what Gibbon describes it, it can scarcely have been very tactful or wise. But when we consider the first step taken by that father to win his son from Catholicism, we may be sure that nothing even the author of the *Decline and Fall* could have written would have had much effect. The boy was taken within a few hours of his baptism to Putney and there handed over to his father's friend, the noisy and brutal agnostic Mallet. Small, slight and delicate as Gibbon then was, he was 'rather scandalised than reclaimed' by the philosophy he heard from David Mallet. This man, originally Malloch, a 'whiffler in poetry' and a miscellaneous writer, was 'a great declaimer in all the London coffee houses against Christianity.' His sceptical views, or rather their obtrusion, disgusted even David Hume. He was a mean fellow too, as his conduct to Pope, whose kindness he requited with enmity and abuse, proves. He published an edition of Bolingbroke's works in 1754, on which enterprise Dr. Johnson remarked that Bolingbroke had 'spent his life in charging a gun against Christianity, and had left half-a-crown to a hungry Scotchman to draw the trigger after his death.'

That Gibbon's conversion was sincere he himself declares, and the steady, if passive, resistance he put up in defence of his faith attests it. When he tells us, in his plump and cynical and famous middle age, that 'I must freely acknowledge that the sincere change of my speculative opinions was not influenced by any lively sense of devotion or enthusiasm' he does himself wrong; though it may well be true that 'in the giddiness of my age I had not seriously weighed the temporal consequences.'

These he was now to feel. The first marks of his father's displeasure, he tells us, 'rather astonished than afflicted me; when he threatened to banish and disown and dumberish a rebellious son I cherished a secret hope that he would not be able or willing to effect his menaces.' Eleven days after his baptism, on the advice of Mr. (afterwards Lord) Ebor, whose wife was Gibbon's cousin, he was bundled off to Switzerland to 'the Protestant city of Lausanne' but he 'might be accessible to the seduction' of his new friends. 'No place in England was thought safe and convenient.'

It was Gibbon's fate to be completely isolated. We see him depart from Dover in the care of M. Fry, a Swiss gentleman of letters, on June 29, 1753, and, after 'a pretty tiresome journey of eleven days,' travelling post by the direct road, 'through several

provinces of France,' as he says in his grand manner, by St. Quentin, Rheims, Langres and Besançon, he arrived on June 30 at Lausanne, where he was immediately settled under the roof and tuition of M. Pavillard, a Calvinist Minister.

The picture which Gibbon gives us of M. Pavillard is extremely pleasing. It is true he admits that he was not 'eminent for genius or learning,' and even what talents he had were underrated in public opinion; he was credulous and easily imposed on, without eloquence or memory, so that he was a poor preacher; but he had a clear head and a warm heart, 'his innate benevolence assuaged the spirit of his church, he was rational and moderate.' He eagerly defended the boy against the bitterness and severity of his father and his aunt, and, as it might seem, it was his sweetness of nature and temperament which finally won Gibbon from the embrace of the Catholic Church, persuaded him out of his faith and left him, empty of all conviction, ready for that brilliant and ironical sceptical philosophy which is the delight and the weakness of his great book.

But if M. Pavillard laboured with patience, and at last with success, to know the character and gain the affection of his English pupil, Gibbon was nevertheless isolated and in exile. He could not speak French, and knew little or nothing of the language, he found himself 'deprived of speech and learning,' could not even ask or answer a question in the ordinary intercourse of life. A home-bred Englishman, he 'found every custom offensive.' Moreover, 'I had now exchanged my elegant apartment in Magdalen College for a narrow gloomy street, the most unfrequented of an unhandsome town.' The house was inconvenient, his room small, ill-contrived and ill-furnished, and, instead of the companionable fire of his rooms at Oxford, was warmed by 'the dull invisible heat of a stove.' From a man he was 'degraded to the dependence of a schoolboy,' without money or servant. And Mme. Pavillard was, he tells us, a continual trial. Very different from her husband the Calvinist Minister, she governed the domestic economy with meanness. The food was poor and insufficient, the cooking bad, the linen uncleanly. 'I now speak of her without resentment, but in sober truth she was ugly, dirty, proud, ill-tempered and covetous.' These were some of those temporal consequences which 'in the sacrifice of this world to the next' he had not taken into account. Nevertheless—and it surely says much for the sincerity of his convictions—isolated as he was, in exile, in disgrace, deprived of every accustomed comfort, without money and, of course, above all, without the support of the Sacraments and even of counsel, he held out and defended his faith for eighteen months, against every persuasion of interest and of M. Pavillard.

Turning over the volumes of the Gibbon Papers in the Manuscript Room at the British Museum, one is touched in reading his letters, written in a clear, round, boyish hand, to his father and his aunt, Miss Porter, his mother's sister, to whose care his mother had confided him in her will, by their humility, courage, and good sense. They should have moved those to whom they were addressed, who now appear to us merely stupid and unfeeling in their ridiculous conventionality, utterly unclairvoyant as they were of the bright and glancing spirit, which, in the inscrutable providence of God, they, in their hopeless ignorance and mediocrity, were able to maim and oppress. Over one of these boyish letters one more humane than the recipient has written in indignation the following comment: "Pray remember this letter was not addressed to his Mother-in-Law (Step Mother) but to his Aunt an old Cat as she was to refuse his request." Another volume full of the exquisitely written manuscript of his memoirs and letters contains a great lock of beautiful dark hair which surely cannot have come from the greasy bewigged head of the obese, and, alas, stinking, elderly man of the *Decline and Fall*; it must, one thinks, have been raped from the boy who, in spite of everything, remains among those who in the courts of Oxford saw the vision of a Milk White Hind immortal and unchanged.

The rest is the story, not certainly of Gibbon's return to Protestantism, but of the slow murder — no, that is too violent a word — the slow suffocation in him of the Catholic faith and the preparation of his mind for that ironical contempt of Christianity itself, and of all Christian systems and philosophies, which is at the very root of his great book and his famous sentimentalities over the grave of Paganism and the Pagan Empire.

The story may be followed almost step by step in the letters of M. Pavillard.¹⁰ The first is dated July 25, 1753, less than a month after Gibbon's arrival, and is addressed to Gibbon's father, and, like all these letters, is written in French, which I shall translate. After saying that Monsieur de Gibbon is well and that the writer had reason to think that the boy had taken a liking for him, which charmed him, he continues:

I have not yet undertaken to speak with him on matters of Religion, because I do not understand English well enough to carry on a long conversation in that tongue although I read English authors with sufficient facility, and Monsieur de Gibbon does not understand enough of French, but he is making much progress. I am very content with the manners and sweetness of character of Monsieur your Son, and I flatter myself that I shall always be able to speak of him to you with praise. He is applying himself much to reading.

¹⁰ Add. MSS., Brit. Mus. 24987 (Gibbon Papers, vol. III).
Vol. CXL—No. 641.

This ironical situation continues for a time. On August 13, 1753, M. Pavilliard again writes to Mr. Gibbon :

Monsieur de Gibbon is well by God's grace : I am fond of him and am extremely attached to him because he is *doux et tranquille*. In regard to his sentiments, although I have said nothing to him as yet, I have hope that he will open his eyes to the truth. I think this, because he has chosen two books of controversy from my study which he has taken to his room, and he is reading them. He has charged me to offer you his very humble respects and to ask you to allow him to go to the riding-school : this exercise should help to give strength to his body : that is the idea he has.

In a letter of October 31, 1753, in reply to one from Gibbon *advis* in which he had enjoined M. Pavilliard to keep his son at his studies and hoped he went out little, M. Pavilliard says that 'Monsieur votre fils est d'un caractère sérieux, qu'il se plaît à réfléchir,' and that, in short, it would be wiser to induce him to go out more, lest his character should grow too sombre. He adds :

Je me suis aperçu qu'il était attaché au parti du Prétendant, il s'en est déclaré avec ouvertement dans la suite. J'ai combattu ses idées sans lui faire de la peine, il a répliqué plusieurs fois, mais à la fin j'ai tellement surmonté tous ses raisonnements qu'il n'en parle plus et qu'il s'exprime sur le sujet du Roi d'une manière bien différente de ce qu'il faisait autrefois. Je n'assurerais pas cependant qu'il ait entièrement changé d'idées, parcequ'il parle peu et que je n'ai pas voulu faire connaître que j'avais dommé de l'emporter sur lui.

This seems to be all we hear of Gibbon's attachment to the Stuart cause.

Eight months later, on June 26, 1754, M. Pavilliard writes again to Mr. Gibbon, and we are in the midst of the fight for the boy's soul.

Monsieur. I hope you will pardon my long silence in view of the news I have to tell you. If I have delayed so long, it is neither through forgetfulness nor through negligence, but I believed from week to week to be able to announce that Monsieur your son had entirely renounced the false ideas that he had embraced, but it has been necessary to dispute the ground foot by foot, and indeed I have not found him light minded, one who passes quickly from one opinion to another. Often when I had destroyed all his ideas on an article, so that he had nothing to reply—which he acknowledged frankly—he has told me that he did not think that there was anything to answer to me. Indeed I have not judged it necessary to push him *à bout* and to extract from him an avowal which his heart would not acknowledge. I have given him therefore time to reflect, all my books were at his disposition. I returned to the charge when he assured me that he had studied the matter as well as he was able, *et enfin j'étais en son cœur*.

I was persuaded, that when I should have destroyed the principal

errors of the Roman Church. I had only to make him see that the others depended on the first and that they could not exist when the fundamentals were overthrown; but as I have said, I deceived myself. It has been necessary to treat each article in its entirety. By the grace of God, I have not lost my time, and to-day even though he still preserves certain remains of his pernicious errors, I dare to say that he is no longer a member of the Roman Church. This is where we have got to.

I have overthrown the infallibility of the Church; I have proved that St. Peter was never Chief of the Apostles—that even if he had been, the Pope is not his successor, that it is doubtful whether St. Peter was ever in Rome, but supposing he were he was never bishop of that town; that transubstantiation is a human invention and not really ancient in the Church; that the adoration of the Eucharist and the withdrawal of the Cup are contrary to the word of God, that there are saints, but that we do not know what they do, and in consequence one cannot pray to them; that the respect and the rule that are rendered to relics are to be condemned, that there is no purgatory, and that the doctrine of indulgences is false, that the Lenten fast and the abstinences of Friday and Saturday are ridiculous to-day, and in the way that the Roman Church prescribes them, that the imputation which the Church of Rome makes against us of varying in our doctrine and of having as reformers persons whose conduct and morals have been a scandal are entirely false . . .

Let us pause here after this tremendous achievement of M. Pavillard's, if only to take breath, and let us try to get a glimpse of Gibbon under this avalanche. 'M. Pavillard,' says Lord Sheffield, 'has described to me the astonishment with which he gazed on Mr. Gibbon standing before him, a thin little figure with a large head, disputing and urging, with the greatest ability, all the best arguments that had ever been used in favour of popery.'

M. Pavillard's letter continues

You understand, Monsieur, that these articles made the subject of a long discussion, it has been necessary to give Monsieur your Son time to meditate my reasons and to search for replies. Many times I have asked him whether my proofs and my reasons appeared to him convincing; he has always assured me that they did in such a fashion that I dare to assure you, as I have told him himself that he has not been a Roman Catholic for some little time. I flatter myself that after obtaining the victory on these articles, I shall have it on the rest with the assistance of God. So that I count on informing you in a short time that the work is finished, and I must tell you that although I have found Monsieur your Son very firm in his ideas, I have found him reasonable, he has given himself up to the light, and is not what one calls *obscure*.

With reference to the article of the abstinence of Friday and Saturday, a long time after I had written you that he had not ever mentioned that he wished to observe it, about the beginning of the month of March I perceived one Friday that he ate no meat. I spoke to him privately to know the reason fearing he was indisposed. He replied that he had done it by design, and that he had considered himself obliged to conform to the practice of a church of which he was a member. We spoke for some time

on this subject. He assured me that he only envisaged it as one *problem parmi d'autres* which he ought to follow, though he did not think it holy in itself or of divine institution. I did not think it necessary to insist for the time, nor to force him to act against *ses habitudes*; I have discussed this article which is certainly one of the least important, the least fundamental; and yet a considerable time was necessary in order that I might undeceive him and make him understand that he was wrong to subject himself to the practice of a church that he no longer recognised as infallible, that if this practice had some utility in its institution yet it had none in itself, since it contributed in nothing to the purity of morals, so that there was no reason, either in the institution of this practice or in the practice in itself that authorised him to submit himself to it—that to-day it was only one *affaire d'intérêt* since with a little money one could obtain *Dispensations pour mariage* &c. In such ways I have brought him back to Christian liberty with much trouble and only in the last few weeks. I have made him promise to write to you to tell you where he is and the state of his health, and I believe he has done so.

It is curious that in all this discussion with M. Pavillard, in which so many great questions are disposed of and so many dogmas refuted, we have only a passing reference to 'the hard doctrine of transubstantiation,' which, as Gibbon tells us, when about to become a Catholic, 'was smoothed by the protestant belief in the mystery of the Trinity.' But if the great dogma scarcely appears in M. Pavillard's letters it was discussed and disposed of with the rest. In the Autobiography we read

Pavillard was not unmindful that his first task, his most important duty was to reclaim me from the errors of Popery. The intermixture of sects has rendered the Swiss Clergy acute and learned in the topics of controversy, and I have some of his letters in which he celebrates the dexterity of this attack and my gradual conversion after a firm and well-managed defence. I was willing and I am now willing to allow him an handsome share of the honour of my conversion: yet I must observe that it was principally effected by my private reflections, and I still remember my solitary transport at the discovery of a philosophical argument against the doctrine of transubstantiation 'in that the text of scripture which seems to indicate the real presence is attested only by a single sense—our sight, while the real presence itself is disproved by three senses—the sight, the touch and the taste.

Evidently those 'acute and learned Swiss Clergy' were not unacquainted with St. Thomas Aquinas and we may be forgiven perhaps if we prefer his philosophy as well as his poetry:

Vires, tactus, gustus in se fallitur,
Sed auribus solo tuto creditur
Credo, quodquid dicit Deus Filium
Nil hoc verbo Veritatis varium
In Cruce latet solo Ductus,
At hic latet simul et humanitas,
Ambo tamen credens atque confitens
Fides, quod patitur latere possit.

The end was evidently at hand. M. Pavilliard's letter of June 26, 1754, is followed by another letter six months later, dated January 28, 1755, addressed to Gibbon's maternal aunt and guardian, Miss Porter. It is written in English and in Gibbon's round, neat, boyish hand; one may suppose he translated it from M. Pavilliard's French, which, presumably, Miss Porter would not have been able to read.

MADAM,

As I have a piece of news extremely interesting 'to' acquaint you with, I cannot any longer defer answering to the letter you honoured me with. God has at length blessed my cares and I heard your prayers. I have had the satisfaction of bringing back Mr. Gibbon to the bosom of our Reformed Church: he has communicated with us Christmas Day last with devotion, he appears satisfied with what he has done and I am persuaded is at present as little inclined to the sentiments of the Church of Rome as I am myself. I have made use with him neither of vigour nor artifice. I have never hurried him in his decisions, but have always left him the time to reflect on every article: he has been persuaded of the integrity of my intentions: he has heard me as a friend and I have served him as a guide to enter into the road of truth. God Almighty be blessed for it. I pray that God to strengthen him more and more in the right way and to make him a faithful member of his church. I ought to render him the justice to say I never found him obstinate. He has been fixed in his ideas, but when he has seen the light he has corrected himself. His behaviour has been very regular and has made no steps except that of coming twice and living much more than I desired. I hope Madam you will acquaint Mr. Gibbon with your satisfaction and restore him your affection, which though his errors may have weakened they have not, I am sure, destroyed. As his father has allowed him the bare necessaries but nothing more, I dare beg you to grant him some tokens of your satisfaction. I am convinced he will employ them well and I even flatter myself he will give (me) the direction of them. As he has promised me never to play any more any games of Chance. I wish you Madam all kinds of prosperity."

In February Gibbon himself writes to Miss Porter to tell her the 'good news,' and how he declared it to the ministers of the town assembled at M. Pavilliard's who having examined me approved of it, and permitted me to receive the Communion with them which I did Christmas Day from the hands of M. Pavilliard, who appeared extremely glad of it. I am so myself and do assure you feel a joy pure, and the more so as I know it to be not only innocent but laudable. The various articles of the Romish creed had disappeared like a dream.

A note of perhaps unintentional irony, creeps into this letter:

I have (he writes) in all my letters taken notice of the movement of my mind. Entirely Catholic when I came to Lausanne, wavering long

" Add Mrs., Mrs. Mss. 3483 (Gibbon Papers, vol. x.).

between the two systems and at last fled for the Protestant, when that conflict was over I had still another difficulty. Brought up with all the ideas of the Church of England, I could scarcely resolve to communion with Presbyterians, as all the people of this country are. I at last got over it in considering that whatever difference there may be between their churches and ours in the government and discipline, they still regard us as brethren and profess the same faith as us.

One passes on with a smile not only at the slip in grammar; one passes on to ask why was this boy left in such complete isolation by the vast international community which had just received him. *'Entirely Catholic when I came to Lausanne, wavering long between the two systems . . .'* What, then, one asks, was the Church doing?

Gibbon himself is astonished and hurt at the isolation in which he was left to sink or swim. 'I have since reflected with surprise,' he writes in middle age, 'that as the Romish Clergy of every part of Europe maintain a close correspondence with each other, they never attempted by letters or messages to rescue me from the hands of the heretics or at least to confirm my zeal and constancy in the profession of the faith.' Again he writes 'My pride was perhaps offended by their neglect.'

Had Gibbon been a boy in our day, I suppose at the age of sixteen he would have been refused baptism without the consent of his parents, till he was of age, unless, indeed, he were in danger of death. Yes, but Fr. Bernard Baker, S. J., did receive Gibbon and baptised him. From that moment he was a Catholic and the Church responsible to God for him. I cannot answer the points which puzzled Gibbon. Why he was so neglected, why no letter at least to confirm him, a neophyte, in his new-found faith ever reached him. I cannot answer. Were there no 'neighbouring priests of France and Savoy who must have corresponded with their English brethren?'

But if the Church slept, the Master was at hand. There is a very significant remark in the letter he wrote to his father, still in that boyish hand, on March 1, 1755. 'The only news I have to tell you is that the famous M. de Voltaire is come to spend as he says the rest of his days here.'

Gibbon's first essay in writing had been prompted while he was still an undergraduate at Magdalen by Voltaire's *Age of Louis XIV.* The interval between this and actual personal contact with the great French sceptic had been filled with that vision of the Catholic faith now 'faded as a dream,' and never to return—indeed, to appear thereafter as a nightmare. The Master was come. Henceforth Gibbon is the pupil of that clear and mighty French intelligence, his mind but a reflection of the far greater mind which in its exquisite and unscrupulous irony was

to destroy the society in which both it and its child were at home.

It would be an impertinence to praise *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, a book so famous, a book which I love and revere for its majesty, its beauty, its irony and learning, and have read, and shall read as long as I live, over and over again. But perhaps it may be permitted to one of my persuasion just to glance at, just to suggest, the far greater book there might have been if Gibbon had remained a Catholic. That book informed with the philosophy of St. Thomas would not have mistaken the gold for the glitter, would not have been obliged to forget the Middle Age, would not have been unable to explain Chartres and Rheims and Wells and Exeter. But one might as well regret—as one does—that Milton was not Catholic, one might as well dream of what *Paradise Lost* might have been. It is ill blaming a book or a poem because it is not something quite different. It is perhaps just permissible to point out how very near Gibbon was to being on the side of the Angels.

EDWARD HUTTON.

GOETHE A HUNDRED YEARS AFTER

'Wir können euch hoffen.'

GOETHE's two most recent biographers, Professor J. G. Robertson in 1927¹ and Mr. H. W. Nevinson in a centenary volume, remind us that his lifetime extended from the age of Frederick the Great through the French Revolution and Napoleon to the epoch of the Reform Act in England—from August 1749 to March 1832. Thus, a flexible writer, borrowing a trick of style from the impressionist school of historians, and winding distant horns through homely scenes, might bid us hearken to Fickling's Tom Jones when Goethe is lying in his cradle and to Browning's Pauline while he is carried to his grave.

These sounds from without are the more harmonious because Goethe was a great European. He may fairly be called the greatest European since Erasmus. In some respects he reminds us of Erasmus. We think of both in European terms and in relation to the movements of their own times. Not so much the movements of kings and armies, though Goethe accompanied these now and then, and, like a *Genius capta* in his own person, met the rude Corsican and captivated him, but the march of mind and the growth of knowledge, which take no count of national frontiers. Erasmus, 'the educator of Europe,' as Foster Watson called him in this Review exactly sixteen years ago, was born at Rotterdam and educated at Deventer and other centres of learning in his day. He drank up the Renaissance on its native soil, and after several visits to England, including one when Colet founded St. Paul's School, he settled at Basle in 1524 till his death in 1536. Goethe, our 'spiritual teacher,' as Carlyle called him in the tribute from fifteen Englishmen which reached him on his eighty-second and last birthday, was born at Frankfurt and educated at Leipzig and other university centres. He, too, found his soul in Italy, and, though he never came to England, he was close to the minds of Scott, Carlyle, and Byron. He settled at Weimar, where he was associated with Schiller from 1794 to 1803. Erasmus and Goethe, living more or less dependent lives near a patron and a printing-press or theatre,

¹ *The Life and Work of Goethe*, new edition, rewritten, 1925.

were yet independent of their surroundings; they practised a happy faculty of sudden flight and were in the midst of Europe where they dwelt. They might have said of Europe as Sir John Denham said of the poets' hill:

Where the Muses and their train resort,
Parnassus stands: if I can be to thee
A poet, thou Parnassus art to me

One touch in common should be indicated. Mr Saintsbury, the octogenarian *de nos jours* whose sayings will one day make a saga, reminds us that the *Colloquies* of Erasmus contained the seeds of the drama and the novel. 'Everybody ought to know,' he tells us in the manner of Macaulay and his schoolboy, 'the way in which the failing and still admirable art of Scott has turned, with the slightest possible alteration, the famous account of the German inn in the *Ivroggeria* into a vivid chapter of *Annals of Gerstein*.' I confess that I had not realised it till he told me, but probably everybody knows what 'we in England cannot forget,' as Professor Robertson says, that Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen* may have been the acorn from which sprang our *Waverley Novels*. So Scott, who also died in 1832, joins us to both great Europeans.

Writing of Goethe's English contacts we come to a kind of triple link in the famous apostrophe of Carlyle: 'Close thy Byron, open thy Goethe.' It is more often repeated than understood. What Carlyle meant, or may be presumed to have meant, if we measure the dictum by a passage in his *Lectures on Heroes*, is that Byron sought but did not find, 'what we may call a life in the Divine Idea of the World.' Carlyle admits that he is speaking figuratively. He refers in that context, it will be remembered, to the 'Tombs of literary heroes, 'monumental heaps under which three spiritual giants he buried.' The three were Johnson, Burns and Rousseau, partial heroes in Carlyle's estimation, and Byron's cairn might have made a fourth. Goethe, he said, would be found to surpass them all. The prediction was conjectural at the time which was not yet ripe for a full study.

At present, such is the general state of knowledge about Goethe, it were worse than useless to attempt speaking of him in this way. Speak as I might, Goethe, to the great majority of you would remain problematic, vague, no impression but a false one could be realised.

But partly by the boon of his long life and partly by the power of silence, which Carlyle counted as the gift of unharmed years, Goethe was expected to excel the three brave men who fell before 'mountains of impediment'; and elsewhere, writing in 1832, Carlyle put off till 'a century hence'—the present

year, as a fact—the true measure and estimate of Goethe's significance.

Even so, the Goethe-Byron Janus ritual strikes modern readers as a little rash. For Goethe himself never closed his Byron. He opened him wider than before in act iii of part ii of *Faust*, where the vision of Euphorion dead was to recall Byron's 'well-known figure' to the perceptive, romantic audience, and Carlyle, too, could not shut Byron out. In all but the accidents of fate and fortune the proud peasant had more than he knew in common with the proud peer. Both hated shams and pretence. Both inveighed against custom and opinion. Both were unconventional moralists and masters of the rhetorician's arts. Compare the opening of the *Lectures on Heroes* ('The Hero as Divinity') with the close of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (canto IV., xciii. and onwards), and this essential likeness emerges through all superficial differences. The likeness is deeper than the differences, and, if due allowance be made for the unequal fate of these contemporaries—Byron died in the reign of George IV.; Carlyle lived till within six years of Queen Victoria's first jubilee—it will be seen to absorb the differences in the clear light of a common purpose. For Byron, too, in a sense—a very charitable sense, it may be, and haply to the detriment of right action—was likewise preoccupied with righteousness. Lord Morley, writing in 1870, when Carlyle was still living, declared that Carlyle's doctrine had effectually 'routed Byronism'. But the fact is, Byronism was routed, not by Carlyle or another, but by the death of Byron himself. Add to Byronism the fulfilled renown which Carlyle lived to inherit, and Morley's notes of contrast are touched to a deeper sympathy.

Carlylium (he writes) is the male of Byronism. It is Byronism with flesh and nerve, bare pipe and shaggy bosom. There is the same grievous complaint against the time and its men and its spirit, something even of the same contemptuous despair, the same sense of the penitence of man in the centre of a cruel and frowning universe—but there is in Carlylium a deliverance from it all, indeed the only deliverance possible. Its despair is a despair without misery. Labour in a high spirit, duty done, and right service performed in fortitudinous temper: here was not indeed a way out, but a way of erect living within.

It was, I fancy, this 'deliverance,' or *Erlösung*, extra to Byron in Carlyle and recognised by Carlyle in Goethe, for which he made us exchange the two prophets. It was an exchange, not for contrast, but for complement. Byron had died and Goethe was alive. It was not a time for heroes to die.

Neither then nor later did it much matter that the 'deliverance' was by faith, not by works. When a 'Voice (from above)' at the end of *Faust*, part I., corrected the verdict

of Mephistopheles on Margaret from 'she is judged' to 'is delivered,' it corresponded to the voice which still speaks of hope to suffering humanity. Carlyle may have found more in Goethe than he ever put into his philosophy. The actual basis of Goethe's belief in salvation by pain and tears may have been shallower than it seemed to the author of the doctrine of work. But the hundred years which have elapsed since Goethe's death have been extraordinarily kind to his teaching. They have emptied philosophy of many shibboleths and shaken the foundations of belief, thus taking us further from the mood in which Carlyle worshipped his German master, but they have filled the husks with his good grain and stopped the flaws with his fair hope. He did not suit the middle of the nineteenth century, the time shortly after his death, so well as he suits the present day. Professor Robertson notes that the centenary of his birth in 1849 was the occasion of a 'lukewarm celebration,' when 'the esteem in which Goethe was held was at its lowest ebb.' The centenary of his death this year sees that esteem at its highest. Carlyle's vision of his supremacy is justified, though not precisely, as sometimes happens for the causes adduced by the seer. We live in a less exacting age. The sterner tenets of the gospel of work do not fit the conscience of a generation which has conceded deliverance by the deol. Goethe is lifted out of the scum-milieu in which Carlyle would have subdued him to the presbyters, and is available for erring mankind. We learn to read him over again without the portentous recommendation to close our Byron for the second lesson. We move the more freely, accordingly in his serene and tolerant light.

It is hardly fanciful to say that the twentieth century has come to meet Goethe along two lines of modern sympathy. The first is his interest in science. Professor Robertson writes that

It is no idle claim to say that Goethe was the last of the great minds of our race to be at home in both poetry and science, which the nineteenth century, with its enormous strides in scientific discovery, was to separate by so wide a gulf and often bring into irreconcilable antagonism.

This claim, though not idle, is rather big. A Victorian memory recalls from Huxley's biography and other sources that men of science hastened in 1862 to do honour to Tennyson as a *confidant*, and the present generation professes in *The Testament of Beauty* a physician-poet's bridge across the gulf. They made, it is true, enormous strides, the scientific discoverers of the nineteenth century, but it was then view, not ours, that they were separate from the poets and divided from them by an irreconcilable antagonism. Science is nearer to poetry to-day than Goethe imagined or Erasmus Darwin fancied. 'The most poetical of the sciences' Sir James Jeans has called the study of astronomy,

and Goethe would not gainsay him. Indeed, we may go further and submit that Goethe would be equally at home to-day in talking to Sir James about the stars or to Sir Arthur Keith about morphology, or even to Einstein about relativity. For the sciences have come to meet Goethe by shedding a little of their dogmatism, and filling their margins with lucent hope. It is not what Goethe discovered, the value of which is disputed, but the spirit in which he sought and his perception of the unity of knowledge which join him to the progressive minds of our own day.

The second line of sympathy which brings us back to him is his unashamed love of women. The particular interest in sex matters which has broken the bounds of the nineteenth century may go too far for some tastes. But we shall not be wallowing in it if we claim that it has humanised much biographical literature. Byron himself, Shelley, Lytton, Nelson and others are better known to us. It has increased appreciation of Wordsworth by exhuming his first daughter from her French grave, and it is adding a psychological condonation to G. H. Lewes's description of Goethe as an 'inconstant lover'. *Nunquam fœdus nisi fœdager* was the confession of an old Roman poet, and if Goethe's gout took a livelier form his metre too was less halting. Whenever he loved he wrote poetry, not mere love-poetry, be it noted, if that epithet may stand, but poetry inspired by mortal love to rise to the love which moves the sun and other stars. Verily his *Dichtung* led to *Wahrheit*. He transmuted his experience into wisdom, and it was in the search of wisdom that he loved and rode away. The sorrow of love brought the joy of loving.

Da gingst, ich stand und sah zur Erde,
Und sah dir nach mit närrischem Blick
Und doch, welch Glück geliebt zu werden
Und haben! Götter, welch ein Glück!

The lover's flight led him back to love

Empfinde hier wie mit allmächt'gem Triebe
Ein Herz das andre zieht,
Und dass vergebens Liebe
Vor Liebe flieht.

The lovers' paradise shone afar

Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen,
Im dunkeln Laub die Gold-Orangen glühen,
Ein sanfter Wind vom blauen Himmel weht,
Die Myrte still und hoch der Lorbeer steht—
Kennst du es wohl? Dahin, dahin,
Möcht'ich mit dir, O meine Geliebte, ziehn!

Always, through all the changes in the name of the beloved

(Name ist Schall und Rauch,
Unverletzt Himmelsgut).

the Zug nach Liebe with irresistible might drove him on :

Das Ewig-Weibliche
Zieht uns hinan

The critics' categories vanish before Goethe in the noise and smoke (the 'Schall und Rauch') of the names of love, and this, too, brings him nearer to our own time. The old, tiresome distinction between Classic and Romantic, which has absorbed so many gallons of ink, was obliterated by Goethe while Mme. de Staël was still alive. It might be her unenviable privilege, claimed for her in 1814 by a *Quarterly* reviewer, to have 'made the British public familiar with these expressions'. It was Goethe's boon to lovers of great literature to make them meaningless in practice. He dramatised Götz and Tasso, he learnt from Herder and Schiller, he wrote ballads and epigrams, he composed in folksong and hexameters. But we need not insist on these fused opposites. Their proof is contained in Euphrosion, the offspring of Helena and Faust, and the reconciler of the *querelle des anciens et des modernes*. For Byron, as Goethe said to Eckermann, referring to Euphrosion's outward features, was neither classic nor romantic, neither *ancien* nor *moderne*, 'he is as the present day itself'.

There is a brilliant passage in Mr. Newman's centenary volume (*Goethe as Man and Poet*) which I should like to quote at this point. If I were making an anthology I should put it next to the well-known passage beginning 'Where does it all come from?' in Dr. Garrod's essay on Virgil in *English Literature and the Classics*. It reads:

In those days Germany was still the home, sweet home of ghosts, and now the Romanticists enticed them from their lurking places in swarms. Out they all tumbled: spectres of faunes and cobolds and elves and sprites, melancholic water nymphs, men without shadows and shadows without men, and phantom bedchambers and chimney brides. Out they tumbled, delighted to exchange chilly old castles, churchyards and fens even for the garrets of literary men. Intruding into the lecture rooms of the University itself, they danced round the professor's chair and whirled in his brain. They amalgamated with national life. They inspired the national contest for freedom, and in the vast turmoil of the next ten years there were combatants who have never been matched by military historians.

Goethe responded to this ghostly summons, and even heard it in the midst of sterner calls. His *Erkenntnis* was as true to his philosophy as was his part in the Duke of Weimar's campaign :

his *Salmonell* was as real as his administrative talent. By some critics the catholicity of his intellect has been contrasted with the 'provincialism' of his life. He was content to be what his countrymen call *Heimstädtig*. He only once visited Berlin. The horizon of the duchy sufficed him, despite the gossip about Christiane, and municipal duties, and the poodle on the stage. But he was content to be provincial in his surroundings, a provincial dweller though never a parochial thinker, because his kingdom lay without. Like Shakespeare, whose mastery he acknowledged in an age which deemed him uncouth, Goethe found his Stratford in Weimar and his America at home. After all, what has the aeroplane added to the mind which invented Hamlet either in range of perception or in swiftness of communication? They confound the body with the soul who infer a spiritual narrowness from the cubic area of Goethe's *Gartenhaus*. When his spirit was in danger of domestication he moved his huge body away, and laughed and loved in another place. He was always the guardian of his own soul, so much so that he would not even yield it to the blithe young mother in Frankfurt to whom he owed his *Frohneier*. Fathers of poets are often figures of fun (or is it that most fathers are, and only the poets let us know it?), but their mothers have been held in higher honour, and Goethe's infrequent visits to the Frau Rat, particularly after her widowhood, are more noticeable than his change of loves. He took his comfort where he found it, extending a tolerant tenderness, of the surface rather than the depths, to mother, wife, and son, the last of whom exacted most, but was always self-dedicated to further objects. Without insisting too strongly on the comparative worth of those objects, we may compare his attitude to family ties with that enjoined in certain passages of the Gospels.

And this brings us to Goethe's central fire. The 'hope' which he proffered to humanity in a European orical as searching as our own was not to be attained without effort. Goethe was no easy optimist, no armchair spectator of others' woes. The doctrine of *Entsagen* and *Versöhnung*, of renunciation and doing without, was essential to his creed and practice. To follow him was to follow a teacher who travelled light and high. Open his pages where we may, we find him relentless in pursuit. He loved and lost, as has befallen lesser men, but he kept silence about his loss.

Eine Liebe hatt' ich, sie war mir lieber als alles!

Aber ich hab' sie nicht mehr! Schweng' und ertug' den Verlust.

He studied physics and other sciences.

Sei es mein ständiges Glück, dich zu berühren, Natur

But the study was not enough for him :

Dem unthörend
Ist die Natur,

and the sun shines on good and bad. Man is reserved for another destiny, and by his power of discrimination and judgment can achieve the seeming impossible and find eternity in an hour :

Nur allein der Mensch
Vermag das Unmögliche,
Er unterscheidet,
Wählt und richtet
Er kann dem Augenblick
Dauer verleihen

With this perception we may associate the unsurpassable *finis* to *Faust*

Das Unmögliche
Hier wird's Programm
Das Unerschrockene
Hier ist es gethan

For the revelation of science is inadequate not because men seek it without pains, but because it reveals less than truth. They must eat their bread with tears and spend their night-watches a-weeping, if they are to know the whole. Who will not follow this counsel -

Der kennt auch nicht die himmlischen Mächte !

He is not to envy their beauty, but to look up at it with joy, but for all the joy of the daylight

Verweilen laßt die Mächte auch,
So lang ich weilen mag


A strange teacher and an odd charter—Goethe vindicating the right of weeping, and indeed, it seems to contradict his *Frohmaner*. But was he so naturally joyous? His mother was, and perhaps she jarred him lest she should pierce his disguise, wherein may be the explanation of his rare visits to Frankfurt. Certainly, as a working poet, he was moved by grief rather than by joy. The suicide of his friend Jerusalem in 1772, the death of Schiller in 1805 were the events which stirred him most deeply and helped to make his *Werther* and his *Faust*. But he was not stirred to complaining or to eulogy—his few memorial verses on Schiller are not elegiac in tone, with their invective at the bondage of *des Gemeins*. Always he urged *Leiden ohne Klagen*, the unspoken tears of the heart that builds on ruin, the constructive mood which turns personal loss into others' gain. And so we see the true meaning of his pursuit

lytic, in which the quiet of folded hills and the hush of songbirds in the woods are rendered into the peace of those who have learned to wait. Patience is the condition of action, renunciation is the beginning of attainment. It is sound doctrine now as then.

LAURIE MAGNUS.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AGE, 10 & 12, Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C. 2.

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.



THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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ECONOMY—FALSE AND TRUE

THE need for public economy is now so completely an article of popular faith that there are few who question its reality. Here and there, no doubt, there is still a lurking belief in the heart of some Socialists in the efficiency of doles and relief schemes as a cure for our ills. To the great mass of British citizens, however, the crisis of last summer, followed as it was by the approval and acceptance by successive Governments of stupendous cuts and economies, was a sufficient demonstration of the necessity for retrenchment. Indeed, if further proof of this were needed, it was supplied by the exposure of the evils which were inherent in an unbalanced Budget and a collapse of credit. The very completeness, however, of the conversion of public opinion to the need for economy on the part of the State has led to a danger of an opposite kind.

A widespread but very mistaken idea has become prevalent that, because strict economy and retrenchment are essential in public expenditure, it is equally essential for private citizens to follow suit and to cut down their own expenditure in every way.

possible. Instances of this—small in themselves, but important in the aggregate—are constantly occurring. City corporations suspend their annual dinners; repairs to house property are put off to a more convenient season; household and office staffs alike are cut down; companies decide against proposals for re-equipment and extensions. In this way expenditure is postponed, which is in itself justifiable and sometimes very necessary.

Much of this curtailment is, of course, involuntary. The demands of the tax-gatherer, to which such loyal response has been made, in many cases leave little margin for expenditure in other directions. But, above and beyond this, there is a wave of retrenchment which is due to other motives. Men and women were thoroughly frightened last autumn, and the effect of this fear has been the more potent because it was well founded and was not to be explained away. The danger to savings which was involved in a collapse of credit created a sense of insecurity as regards the future in many minds. The natural result of this was a desire to save, so as to be prepared to meet unforeseen but possible contingencies. Others, again, have drawn the inference that if the State sets an example of economy, the patriotic citizen should follow it. Such a belief may be natural, but it involves a most lamentable misapprehension of the needs and circumstances of the time.

In normal times, economy on the part of the individual citizen is a virtue, and indeed, like mercy, is 'thrice blessed.' It benefits the man who practises it, and the State in which he lives. The processes by which this result is produced have often been stated. They are only recapitulated here in order to illustrate the contrast between the value of economy in normal times and in a period of depression, particularly when the depression is so severe and so prolonged as the present. The whole need for economy lies in the eternal balancing of the present against the future, of present abstinence against future more ample satisfaction. Most comforts in themselves are desirable, and there is no intrinsic merit in stinting them. As was said long ago, civilisation had its origin in securing the necessities of existence, but its essential purpose is to secure greater comfort and amenity in the conditions of life and to make possible the higher activities of mind as well as of body. But the mechanism by which all this is achieved wears out and wastes. Something, therefore, must be subtracted from the complete satisfaction of the moment and diverted to maintaining and replacing the mechanism which will supply future needs. If this is not done, the equipment of a country runs down. This was, indeed, the experience of this country in the war period, with its intense concentration on the immediate needs of the conflict. Time and effort, bringing dis-

improvement in their train, were consequently needed in post-war years to restore the national equipment to its old efficiency.

In a progressive community, however, this is not enough. As discoveries and inventions succeed one another, processes improve and more efficient machinery is devised. In normal times present abstinence, under such conditions, will receive a still greater reward in the future. The truth of this as it affects the individual citizen is not only the subject of copy-book maxims, but is demonstrated by innumerable cases in daily experience. The frugal man who invests his money wisely benefits, not only himself, but the nation, by increasing its productive power. Even if he does not invest his money, but leaves it in his bank on deposit, it is not unfruitful, like the talent which was hid in a napkin, since in normal times his bank will do his duty for him by making advances to industry on the strength of his deposit. In either case the country benefits.

Since the war improvements in processes and in machinery have been particularly rapid. The means whereby these can be adopted or installed can only be furnished out of the savings of the whole body of the people—a fact which indicates alike the need for economy and its reward. Too little, indeed, is known of the amount of savings devoted to reproductive purposes in this country in these latter years. It is, however, a matter for some anxiety. It is quite possible that during the decade following the conclusion of peace the aggregate amount of savings has not been as great as it should have been. If so, it is probably due in part to the redistribution of income which has occurred during those years, under the incidence of income tax, super tax, and death duties. The effect of this change has been enhanced by the recent fall in prices, and the further redistribution of income which has been occasioned by that fall, in conjunction with the fixity or comparative fixity of debt charges and wages. The nature, therefore, of the expenditure by the mass of the citizens of the country and the amount and manner of utilisation of savings is a problem of national importance which should be more closely investigated.

Government economy differs from private economy in several important respects. Ideally, the general object of expenditure by a community—whether the central Government or a municipality—is the same as that of private individuals—the well-being in its widest sense of its citizens. But the conditions under which the State functions differ vitally from those which obtain in the case of individuals. A few State activities are or may be self-supporting. The Post Office pays its way and presents a profit to the Government. Tramways and other municipal undertakings, such as water and lighting, may do the

same. For the most part, however, services which are rendered by the central Government and local bodies are paid for out of rates and taxes, which are taken from the pockets of citizens, who would doubtless have found some use for the money had the tax-gatherer not claimed it.

The utility of such public services, of course, varies infinitely. Without proper roads and drains an industrial community could not exist, and certainly could not produce and trade efficiently. Again, no one can conceive of a modern State or municipality without adequate systems of education and of public health. Both education and health affect the productive capacity of a nation powerfully, though indirectly. At the same time, it is recognised that one object of the expenditure upon them (in differing degrees, of course, in the two cases in question) is to give people the opportunity of a higher level of culture and artistic enjoyment, apart from any question of improving their efficiency in material production. Expenditure on art galleries, grants to museums, the erection of fine municipal buildings, the creation of public parks, all represent forms of public expenditure of which the primary purpose is to promote culture and to increase the general amenity of life. Within the limits of what is reasonable this is right and fitting in an advanced community. It may even affect productivity in a remote degree, but only in a similar manner and extent as would result from the private expenditure of an individual who, through the purchase of a ticket to hear George Robey, returns to his work next morning exhilarated and refreshed.

State expenditure, therefore, represents a difficult problem of balance. In the one scale are the uses, of greater or lesser value, to which taxpayers would put the money if it were left to them to spend. In the other scale is the particular State service which may be in question, with all the advantages, differing in degree, which we have discussed. It is generally a nice, often a very controversial, question whether the expenditure of some particular sum is justified. The scales, however, are weighted against the taxpayer in two ways. In the first place, State servants, like other men who work a system, naturally like to see it made as perfect as possible. Secondly, an individual in contemplating any expenditure must cut his coat according to his cloth. If the State or a municipality wants a larger coat, it can extort the cloth for the cloth from its constituent members. There is something of general truth, therefore, in the dictum that the first approach to any new proposal for public expenditure should be one of suspicion.

State expenditure may also exert an influence of quite a different kind upon trade and, through trade, upon the public

volatility. In normal times trade is continually expanding and contracting, with shorter pauses at the crest of the wave, and longer periods in the trough of the succeeding depression. The half-century before the war was marked by a series of such fluctuations. The influence of Government expenditure and the propriety of the objects to which it is directed differ according as trade is upon the up grade or the down grade. In periods of expansion opinion is hopeful: there is a demand for credit; expansion follows and the velocity of credit is also increased; business is brisk, prices rise, and the revenue is buoyant. At such a time the ideal course would be to put a brake betimes on the expansion of credit. This can be effected by using the superabundant revenue in paying off debt, rather than in making remissions of taxation, the effect of which would be to stimulate still further the general optimism. Conversely, when the tide has turned it might then be possible to diminish the repayment of debt and thus avoid the acceleration of the downward movement by the imposition of fresh taxation. It might also be possible in the period of expansion to postpone public works and building programmes, of which the need was genuine, although not imperatively urgent, and to put them in hand during the depression. All this may seem theoretically possible, especially in retrospect. As a practical problem, however, it would have involved making an estimate of the length of the depression and then of taking action on that estimate. With the scant data on the subject which was then available the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day would have needed to be both a superman and a prophet—a superman to have resisted the temptation to reduce taxation during his time of office, and a prophet to have discerned how long it would be before the tide turned.

Possibly in the future, with the greater knowledge and more accurate data which are now available, it may be possible to mitigate the fluctuations of trade and unemployment, but the dangers inherent in any such attempt are obvious, as is shown by our post-war experience. It is not only the depression of the past three years which is abnormal. The previous years from 1922 to 1929 were, for this country, equally unprecedented in character. During those years there was a continuous depression in trade—moderate indeed as compared with the present slump, but severe as contrasted with pre-war experience. The fundamental cause of the depression was the excessive costs of British production, and no improvement was possible unless those costs were reduced. The trouble was treated, however, as a passing phenomenon similar to those with which the country had been previously familiar. Government schemes to help

employment were initiated during most of these years in the form of road schemes and other works of construction, anticipating what it was assumed would be necessary in five years' time. These schemes were carried out with labour that could not be, and was not, properly efficient. To-day, as a result, we are burdened with taxation for works which did not justify the money which was spent upon them, and of which the benefit in giving employment has long since passed away.

Such was our preparation to meet the great depression which has swept over the world with an intensity only equalled by the great blizzards of the antarctic. One great alleviation of our lot has indeed been vouchsafed to us. Even in these bad times this country draws a huge income from its foreign investments. The ability to import large quantities of food and raw materials, which but for this income would have been impossible, has prevented unemployment in this country from reaching a figure much higher than the present total. On the other hand, the position of England as the 'world's banker' was one of peculiar vulnerability. A bank must keep its resources more liquid and be more above suspicion than an ordinary trading concern. So it was with this country. Yet during this critical period the stagnation of British export trade and the thinly veiled deficits in our annual budgets were undermining confidence abroad in British stability. When, therefore, the crisis was precipitated in the summer of last year by events in Austria and in Germany, its effect upon this country, culminating as it did in the suspension of the gold standard, was almost inevitable. The handwriting on the wall had been all too plain for those who could read.

The events of the last six months are fresh in the minds of everyone, and need no restatement. It is very necessary, however, to examine the present situation in the light of those events and so to determine the inferences as regards economy, both public and private, which follow logically from them. Great Britain has been 'off the gold standard' for six months. Most of the nations of the world have also abandoned it, either avowedly or implicitly. It is indeed truer to say that the gold standard—through the interference with its proper working caused by the maldistribution of gold—has left these nations than that it has been left by them. It is most unlikely that those countries will return to a gold standard until the maldistribution has been remedied, and the causes removed which have led to it. Meanwhile the pound sterling is to-day a better criterion of values than is gold. Measured in terms of sterling, wholesale prices to-day would be much what they were in 1923-1925 before the disastrous fall in gold values upset the economy of the world. The pound sterling is still the great medium of the world's commerce. If this is to continue,

however, it must be as stable as possible. Fluctuations in value are as detrimental as they are upsetting to trade. Stability, however, is not easy of attainment with a managed currency. Witness the currency speculations which took place on March 7 of this year, with the consequent movements of capital, which led to an appreciation of 6 per cent. in the pound sterling in a single day. More important still is the avoidance of too premature a permanent appreciation of the value of the pound. Most disastrous of all, however, would be a great fall in its value, which would destroy its reliability. Such a fall would destroy our international position as surely as it would upset our domestic situation. The maintenance of the pound sterling is, therefore, all-important. It depends, however, on a combination of what we ourselves do and of the view which other nations take of our action. It is essential, therefore, for us to balance our budgets and to deal with the balance of trade. Both of these operations take time to effect, particularly the latter. In the meantime, the opinion which is held by other countries of our determination to carry them through is all-important. Great Britain is, indeed, the cynosure of every eye. To balance the Budget is, therefore, urgent and essential. This clearly calls for actions which are not naturally desirable in a time of acute trade depression. Normally in such a period it would be advisable to have rather more than less elasticity; it would be better to run the risk of a deficit than to depress trade further by heavy additional taxation. The present unprecedented state of affairs, however, and the peculiar position of this country in view of recent events, imposes a categorical imperative which overrides other normal considerations. If the course of British overseas trade had not been so unfavourable in recent years, there would not have been the necessity for such an excess of virtue in balancing budgets with an almost Pharisaical naivety. But had the balance of trade not been so unfavourable, and, as a condition precedent, had the causes been absent which made it so, then the crisis of last August would probably never have occurred and the present situation would not have been reached. As things are, however, this country has to face the necessity of balancing its budgets. How formidable is the task is shown by the summary table on p. 392, taken from the parliamentary return.

The financial year 1931-32 has just closed. Prospects for the current year have changed in several very important respects since the publication of this table in September of last year. A 20 per cent tariff has been passed which, it is hoped, will bring in a revenue of £30,000,000. There is every hope that the estimated average figure of 3,000,000 unemployed will not be reached, but no one can foresee the future in this respect. It

depends on world causes, which we may influence but cannot control. If this hope is realized, however, it is probable that at least £1,000,000 of expenditure may be saved under this heading. On the other hand, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has benefited during the year 1931-32 by getting two years' income in one. Not only has he received the extra quarter of the annual income tax which was made legally payable in January last, but the loyalty of the response to his appeal has brought into the Exchequer before the end of March payments which usually would not have been made until after the financial year had closed. These receipts must, in the aggregate, have amounted to a large sum. The need for economy on the part of the State is therefore still urgent, as may be seen from the following table:

	1931-32	1932-33
	£	£
Estimated deficit on existing basis	74,679,000	170,000,000
Economies	22,000,000	70,000,000
Saving on debt amortisation	13,700,000	20,000,000
New taxation :		
Inland Revenue	29,000,000	57,500,000
Customs and Excise	11,500,000	24,000,000
	76,200,000	171,500,000
Estimated surplus * on new basis	1,521,000	1,500,000

* These surpluses are reached after providing in each year approximately £20,000,000 out of revenue for amortisation of debt and after charging against revenue the amounts for the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Road Fund, which have hitherto been obtained by borrowing.

The position of the individual citizen is different. Times are indeed abnormal. But matters can only be made worse by ill-timed parsimony, based on a misunderstanding of the situation. 'Economy' is indeed the wrong word to apply to such mistaken abstinence from spending. The true meaning of economy—the old Greek *oikonomia*—is the proper management of a household, and under proper management there are times when it is right to spend wisely, just as there are times when it is right to refrain from spending. In a time of acute depression like the present considerations become important which at other times are comparatively negligible. In ordinary circumstances it is a good thing for a man to save his money and either to invest it prudently himself or to put it into his bank, which will make loans on the strength of the deposit. In either case, his savings are utilized for the benefit of industry. This presupposes, however, that trade is at least tolerably active; that the activity causes a

demand for credit which causes banks to welcome deposits which will enable them to satisfy the demand for credit; or, again, that there are purchasers for the articles made by the business in which he may invest his money. At the present time these suppositions are not fulfilled. Trade is stagnant; the turnover of credit is slow; the volume of purchases is at a low ebb. The whole situation is thus altered, and maxims which are applicable when times are normal no longer apply.

What should a man do? In the first place, it is clear that he should not take Government action as an example on which to model his own conduct. The duty of economy is imposed upon the Government by considerations of an international character, which do not apply to the individual in the ordering of his private affairs. A man must consider what are the circumstances of the time and adjust his behaviour accordingly. We are in the midst of a world depression. No country can enjoy complete prosperity in a depressed and shrunken world. At the same time, the domestic situation within a country can be greatly affected both for good and evil by the behaviour of its inhabitants. If British citizens had been seized with a panic during the first weeks after Great Britain had abandoned the gold standard, that panic would have caused disaster. They kept their heads, and because they did so it was possible for the Government by firm action to keep the situation in hand. It was this fact, together with the inherent strength that underlies the British position despite the surface weakness that caused the crisis of last August, which has restored the prestige and position of British currency. Just as the common action of thousands of individual citizens made it possible for the Government to save the currency position, so it is possible for the same citizens to improve the industrial situation of the country. A trade depression is a vicious circle. Declining consumption leads to decreased production; this, again, affects consumption. If undue 'economy' is practised now by private individuals, the domestic situation will be made still worse. A further curtailment of the demand for goods will increase the unemployment figures. The downward movement must be stopped somehow, and, in the present circumstances, it is probably at the point of consumption rather than at the production point that the vicious circle can best be broken. In other words, let men and women take their courage in their hands and buy. There are many reasons why those who have money to spend should spend it now. One of the causes which made people contract their expenditure was fear of the future. Fear for savings and fear of fresh taxation operated together. There should be no further need for fear on this score. Moreover, those who have naturally frugal minds

should remember that world prices have now fallen to the lowest figures. They can buy goods now at prices at which they will not be procurable in a year or two. Above all, let everyone who is prepared to spend wisely persuade others to do likewise, since it is only a general movement in the direction of wise spending that can confer a substantial benefit on British trade.

The Empire Marketing Board recently carried on a campaign for 'Buying British Goods.' It is a great pity that the Board failed to cover effectively one-half of the field of its missionary enterprise. 'Buying British' was a good slogan, and particularly necessary before a tariff came into operation. Unfortunately, it was interpreted as an exhortation merely to refrain from buying foreign-made articles. That was only half the moral. Wise spending is as essential a part of the lesson to be learned as mere abstention from foreign travel or the purchase of foreign goods.

How, then, can money best be spent? First and foremost, let it be devoted to reproductive uses. A tariff in this country ought to give security to producers. But if it is to be a blessing, and not a curse, this security should provide an opportunity to re-equip or to rebuild industries where necessary, so that an appreciable rise in prices in this country may be prevented, apart from what may ensue here, in common with other countries, as a result of a world improvement in trade. Money for such re-equipment will be needed, and money invested in this way should produce a good return as well as fulfil a real need. The execution of repairs and the purchase of articles of enduring utility are other desirable forms of expenditure. If houses or cottages need repair, if baths, water, gas or electric light need to be installed, it is better to do it now than later. Such expenditure will benefit not only the building trades, but, through them, the engineering industry, in which there is much unemployment at present. The mention of such kinds of expenditure does not, of course, by implication exclude other forms. When normal times return, then let the prudent people curb their spending. To-day, if ever, makes private 'economy'—so mis-called—is not a virtue, but a vice. It is good to spend money for reproductive purposes. It is good to spend on objects of permanent utility. It is good, also, to spend on articles of immediate consumption. And if those who have enough and to spare of these have yet the means left which have escaped the tax-collector, let them choose this moment for increasing rather than decreasing their subscriptions to hospitals and similar institutions. This expenditure will help the nation's trade as well as benefit individuals.

To spend wisely but boldly is as truly a virtue at the present moment as was abstinence from panic last September or payment of taxes in January of this year.

The truth of the whole matter, therefore, is this. The economy to-day imposes a twofold duty—retrenchment by the Government and wise spending by individuals. By retrenchment the Government can maintain the currency and our international position as the 'world's banker.' By wise spending individuals can sustain our domestic trade. Courage, commonsense, and public spirit are required if the twin objective is to be attained. If the British nation is once convinced that an effort is needed in the public welfare, their response can be magnificent. So it will be now if the right appeal is made. The opportunity may once again be ours to save this country by our efforts, and the world by our example. In June the nations meet at Lausanne. A great example by us may help to restore general prosperity by bringing back some measure of wisdom and co-operation into a jarring and disordered world.

ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE PACIFIC

No Briton who cares intelligently for peace can have watched the crises in the Far East and at Geneva without deep misgiving. Directly and indirectly they have raised, for the British Commonwealth, issues more anxious than any that have arisen since the end of the Great War. The light-hearted dogmatism of the greater part of our Press in proclaiming that, come what may, this country must not suffer itself to be 'drawn into war' by the League of Nations, has revealed the prevalence of an evil and ignorant temper—evil in its repudiation of our Treaty obligations, ignorant in its denial of their bearing upon our national and Imperial interests. We have never been in danger of being 'drawn into war' by the League. We have been—maybe still are—in danger of placing ourselves in a predicament which, a few years hence, might compel us to fight for the very existence of the British Commonwealth. Now the crisis seems—I say advisedly 'seems'—to have taken a turn for the better, thanks in part to the leadership of the United States and to the firm support which the smaller nations have given to the League Covenant at Geneva. But the position still demands careful thought on the part of all who are capable of looking ahead, and are jealous alike for their country's welfare and for its good name.

In fairness to those who may read, a writer on public affairs ought frankly to confess his bias. My own bias is twofold. I hold peace, both in its negative form as the prevention of war, and in its positive form as constructive international co-operation, to be the supreme interest of this country and the Commonwealth; and I am persuaded that this interest can best be safeguarded by active fidelity to the engagements and implications of the League Covenant as supplemented by those of the Kellogg Pact. I should look upon any relapse into the pre-war system of secret alliances and competitive armaments as a threat to our national and Imperial welfare. Having said this, I must add that I am not an expert upon local conditions in the Far East, for I have never visited either China or Japan, or studied the Pacific problem from any point of vantage nearer the scene of the present conflict than the Pacific coast of the North American continent from

Canada to Mexico. But, ever since the war between China and Japan in 1895, I have watched continuously the changing position in the Far East, albeit mainly with an eye to its bearings upon Canada, the United States, and Europe. During the past thirty-five years I have also profited by confidential intercourse with many British experts and with not a few Japanese diplomats and statesmen. My idea of Japanese interests has been drawn mainly from exchanges of view with the broad-minded and far-sighted Japanese public men whose friendship I have, at various times, enjoyed.

Soon after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, a distinguished Japanese statesman, who still holds high office in his own country, startled me by expressing his fear lest the triumph over Russia encourage Japanese military and other advocates of an expansionist policy in Asia one day to attempt the conquest of China. Twice in her history, he said, Japan had made this attempt. Twice it had failed disastrously, the second effort bringing upon his country such misfortune that she had thereafter shut herself up for centuries in seclusion from the outside world. Not less startling was the behaviour, early in 1911, of a Japanese diplomatist who forgot his customary self-control so far as to shed tears of rage and of patriotic grief after reading to me the text of the twenty-one demands which Japan had just presented to China. 'This policy,' he exclaimed, 'will be the ruin of my country. People at Tokio must be both blind and mad.' But it was not until I came into contact, in Western Canada during the summer of 1921, with representatives of the over-bearing, swash-buckling type of Japanese who are affiliated to the notorious pan-Asiatic 'Black Dragon' Society that I understood the kind of influences that may have lain behind the attempt to dominate China which the twenty-one demands represented. In fact, after listening for a while to these 'fellows of the baser sort' and to their denunciations of the British Empire, I had to show them the door without any of the courtesy which I had, until then, felt to be inseparable from intercourse with their fellow-countrymen. This incident caused me to wonder whether the type to which Japanese diplomats and statesmen usually belong would really be, in the last resort, the determining factor in Japanese policy.

I knew that, on the outbreak of the Great War, there had been a contest of influences at Tokio; and that, though Japan was then the ally of Great Britain, the Japanese General Staff had favoured intervention on the side of Germany. On the other hand, the heads of the Japanese navy, like the Elder Statesmen and the Emperor, had supported the Allied cause, with the result that Japan fought on our side. But I knew, too, that during the war sundry Japanese agents, presumably connected with the General

Staff or with the 'Black Dragon' Society, had sought to make trouble in India, until the nature of their activities was detected by some shrewd Anglo-Indian officers who contrived to read the instructions, in Chinese code, which these agents had received from Tokio. Trustworthy evidence which I found in Western Canada, Oregon, and California during 1921 went to show that Japanese agents of this type had been and were working all along the Pacific seaboard of the North American continent, as far south as Mexico; and their presence made it hard to dismiss as altogether fantastic the belief, then current, that a war between Japan and the United States might break out in the near future.

At that moment (July-August 1921) preparations were being made in every country with interests in the Pacific for the Washington Conference which was to meet in the following November. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 was still in force, though Great Britain had stipulated, when it had been renewed in 1911, that its provisions should not apply to a conflict between America and Japan. The League of Nations, of which Japan, like Great Britain and all the Dominions, was a member, involved certain definite and some less definite commitments. The United States had, however, repudiated the League Covenant and the Peace Treaties, in all of which the Covenant had been embodied at the instance of President Wilson. What, in these circumstances, ought the policy of Great Britain to be at the Washington Conference?

On the agenda of that Conference stood the limitation of naval armaments and the problems of the Pacific. It had long been clear that the United States would insist upon the principle of naval equality with Great Britain—an insistence closely connected with the American doctrine of 'the freedom of the seas.' At the Paris Peace Conference, after the adoption of the League of Nations Covenant on February 14, 1919, President Wilson had explained to anxious American inquirers that the Covenant said nothing of the 'freedom of the seas' because, in the League of Nations, there would be no neutrals. Any Covenant-breaking State, he added, would be treated as an outlaw and would not be entitled to claim belligerent rights or protection for its seaborne trade with neutrals. It was virtually, if not explicitly, on the strength of this understanding, and in the belief that the United States would belong to the League, that Great Britain had accepted the formidable obligations laid down in Article 16 of the Covenant, and particularly the obligation immediately to subject a 'Covenant-breaking member' to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between British nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal

interests between the nationals of the Covenant-making States and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.' But, upon the rejection of the Versailles Treaty by the American Senate, the United States became a prospective neutral in regard to the League, and 'the freedom of the seas' emerged once more as a disturbing influence upon Anglo-American relations. What, in these circumstances, would be the position of Great Britain as an ally of Japan (though not an ally against the United States) and a member of the League in the event of a conflict between Japan and the United States?

In the British Cabinet opinions were divided. The Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, were understood to hold that Great Britain and the Empire should strive for peace in the Pacific by keeping the balance even between Japan and the United States. To this end they are believed to have thought that the British Imperial Delegation at the Washington Conference should follow a policy of lofty, albeit friendly, neutrality so that its impartiality might not be open to doubt if British good offices should be needed in any dispute or clash of interests that might arise between Japan and the United States. My own inquiries made me doubt the wisdom of this policy, all the more because Canada, if not Australia, had raised objections to it at the Imperial Conference in June 1921. I thought that, since the British Empire could not side with Japan—in arms or politically—in the event of a Japanese-American war, and since it might not be possible for some portions of the British Empire to keep out of the conflict, Japan ought to know that a provocative policy on her part might compel all the English-speaking nations to side against her. Clearness on this point, it seemed to me, would strengthen the hands of moderate statesmen in Japan by helping them to curb their extreme nationalists and thus to increase the chances of a successful Conference at Washington. No position, I felt, could well be less dignified or more dangerous than that of a British Delegation which, after trying to be benevolently neutral as between the United States and Japan at Washington, with the result that the suspicions of both would be aroused, should presently be compelled, by care for the cohesion of the British Empire, to support the United States. No offence to Japan would necessarily be implied by a straightforward course; for the Japanese Government would understand that, in working for a settlement in the only way in which it could be attained, Great Britain would be serving the well-considered interests of Japan herself.

As a result of a journey through Canada and along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States in July and August 1922,

and after subsequent consultation with members of the United States Government, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington and the Canadian Government at Ottawa, I wrote, on my return to England towards the end of September, a confidential memorandum which presently received the approval of some of the leading British naval authorities. Mr. Balfour (leader of the British Delegation to the Washington Conference), Sir Robert Borden (the principal Canadian delegate), and Senator Pearce (the delegate of Australia) likewise agreed with it. After examining the considerations in favour of a British policy of neutrality at the Washington Conference my memorandum said:

Starting from the assumption that the prime interest of the British Empire is peace in the Pacific and elsewhere, it follows that the object of British policy should be to secure peace and, with it, a resumption of trade and of normal economic life throughout the world. A war in the Pacific, such as the Japanese have cogent naval reasons to wage not later than next year, would disastrously handicap a revival of trade and a return of international confidence. The chief naval experts in the United States and in Great Britain are believed to incline towards the view that, with their actual and prospective naval superiority, the Japanese could, in a few months, sweep the American navy off the Pacific, capture Hawaii, the Philippines and Guam, establish, with a comparatively small military effort, their political and economic control over China, and make themselves the masters of Eastern Asia.

There is reason to believe that this, or something like it, has been for years the settled aim of the Japanese General Staff, whose pan-Asiatic ambitions are no less certain than were the pan-German ambitions of the Prussian General Staff in 1914. Such ambitions are incompatible with British interests either in the Far East or in Asia generally, but, by itself, the British Empire might not be in a position to counter them or even to place a serious check upon them.

Into the difficult question whether the moderating influences which undoubtedly exist in Japan are strong enough to control the General Staff, it is needless now to enter. The balance of informed opinion appears to tend towards the view that, in a crisis for which the ground has been carefully selected in advance so that a point of national or racial honour might seem to be involved (such as the immigration question), the General Staff would be able to sway Japanese policy even more easily than the Prussian General Staff swayed German policy in 1914.

One consideration alone seems likely to cause hesitation among the pan-Asiatic elements in Japan—the consideration of ultimate risk. Were it certain that the British Empire would be ranged against any aggressive Japanese tendencies, the influence of the wiser and more moderate elements in Japan might be greatly increased, since they would be able to urge that, however sweeping her initial successes might be, Japan could not, in the long run, hope to prevail against the active hostility, naval, financial and economic, of the United States and of the British Empire, coupled with the passive resistance of the Chinese people. The way might then be opened for a British policy on the part of Japan, a policy with which Great Britain and the United States might be able to co-operate.

Against these considerations of a general order, contingencies might arise within the British Empire such as to affect a policy of neutrality towards an American-Japanese conflict. As a result of some inquiry, of which I have since verified the conclusions wherever feasible, it seems to me a matter of grave doubt whether British Columbia could or would remain passive in the event of a war in the Pacific. The bare possibility that so important a province of Canada as British Columbia might be compelled by local circumstances to take up an attitude at variance with that of the British Government, or even with that of the Ottawa Government, is a matter that needs to be the more carefully weighed, because British Columbia is, in all other respects, the most pronouncedly British of all the provinces of the Dominion of Canada.

The position in British Columbia was, indeed, alarming. Though the Japanese colony there numbered little more than 15,000 out of a total population of 450,000, it held a practical monopoly of the sea-fishing rights and was rapidly extending its grip on the land both along the seacoast and near important waterways of the interior. For these and other reasons the Japanese had incurred the suspicion and the dislike of the bulk of the British population. The Japanese colony was highly organised, and all its able-bodied male members were subject to Japanese military discipline. Many authorities in British Columbia believed—and I discovered later that the American Navy Department at Washington shared this belief—that if, in the event of a Japanese-American conflict, Japan should look upon British Columbia as potentially hostile, her agents could isolate the province by land and by sea in twenty-four hours. They were in a position to extinguish every coast light, to sow mines in every navigable current, and to blow up or otherwise damage every railway bridge that spanned the deep gorges and torrents between the Rockies and the sea. If this were done, the only railway communication between British Columbia and the rest of Canada would be a line running through American territory and therefore not available for the transport of troops except in the event of an Anglo-American Alliance. Having verified this information at Ottawa, I suggested in my memorandum that the only sound policy for Great Britain to follow at the Washington Conference would be to realise the possible implications of a Japanese-American conflict and to work for a general settlement of Pacific problems.

It was in this sense that the British Imperial Delegation worked at the Washington Conference. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was merged in the Four-Power Agreement of December 1911 between the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France for the protection of their insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific. The principle of equality in battle-fleet strengths was accepted between Great Britain and the United States, the

Japanese battle-fleet strength being fixed at three-fifths of that of the British or the American navy. In February 1922 these arrangements were supplemented by the Nine-Power Treaty, by which all the Powers with interests in the Pacific subscribed to a self-denying ordinance in favour of China, and undertook to seek no exclusive territorial or commercial advantages in Chinese territory. Those who believe or suggest—as General Sir Ian Hamilton assured the British Legion last February—that ‘all the trouble in the Far East was the fault of those who forced us to break our Alliance with the Japanese’ must be unaware of the facts. Into the precise merits of the present conflict, which began with the Japanese seizure of Mukden on September 18, 1931, it is unnecessary now to enter. A League of Nations Commission under Lord Lytton will presently report upon them. The findings of this Commission may substantiate Japanese claims, or they may support the view expressed last month by a correspondent of *The Times* in Manchuria that the immediate consequence of Japanese action was the paralysis of the established Chinese authority both in the capital and in the country. This correspondent added:

Whether intended or not, the consequences for the millions of inhabitants during the succeeding months have been disastrous. The mechanism of trade and commerce has been thrown out of gear at a time when, among other causes, the world ‘slump’ in prices had already led to widespread financial depression. Worse still, the country became infested with roving bands of brigands, horse and foot. It is true that during normal years brigandage is endemic in the land, though held in constant check by the authorities. But now, owing to the dissolution of the greater part of the provincial army, lawlessness with its attendant savagery prevails throughout vast areas, causing untold agony to the respectable classes of the community, especially to the modest Chinese women.

Until the breakdown of authority in September the taking of life by the robber bands was rare. It was the Japanese initiative which gave rise to a state of insecurity, likely to continue either until the invaders spread their military control throughout the whole vast extent of Manchuria, which is twice the size of Japan, or until the legitimate Chinese authority is permitted to return.

But the greater part of the British Press did not pause to reflect that there might be two sides to the Manchurian question. No sooner had the Chinese delegate at Geneva drawn the attention of the League Council to the action of Japan, under Article 11 of the Covenant, than British Conservative journals, with hardly an exception, set themselves to encourage Japan, to denounce the ‘interference’ of the League Council as ‘meddling’ and ‘mischief-making,’ and to foster a belief at home and abroad that, League or no League, Great Britain did not intend to be drawn into ‘other people’s’ quarrels. More than one reputable

journal and writer actually congratulated the Japanese General Staff upon the technical smartness of its operations. At a time when serious admonition by the British Press would have strengthened the hands of moderate Japanese statesmen, British Liberal and Labour journals were almost alone in discountenancing the Japanese military adventure. For this display of ill-timed partiality the Government was not without responsibility. A single speech by any leading Minister, reminding the country of its obligations under the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, would have restored a sense of balance and would have helped to steady the course of events in the Far East. No such speech was made. The protests of the Liberal journals and of the weekly reviews went unheard. Supporters of the League of Nations were daily derided and denounced. The repeated violation of the assurances given by Japanese delegates to the League Council was never officially condemned. When in October a hint was received from Geneva to the effect that the only means of giving pause to Japan might be firm language in the British Press, neither the Foreign Office nor the majority of the journals in touch with it paid any heed. For this impolicy there might have been some excuse had not the United States formally promised its support to the League Council from the outset. Seeing that the brunt of any action by the League would fall upon Great Britain, unless the United States were associated with it, extreme prudence on the part of the British Government would have been warranted had there been any reasonable doubt in regard to the American position. This was not the case. The plain truth was that the Government, possibly under the influence of the Conservative majority in the House of Commons, recoiled from any open declaration of readiness to support the League, even were the League backed by the United States.

It is a curious fact that this mood was not at all the mood of the country, as any man with experience of popular meetings during the past six months can testify. The 'rot' was in 'political circles' which did not hesitate to exploit the genuine detestation of war among our people by asserting that the League wanted to drag us into war. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the record of the League Council from September to January should have been one of hesitation, half-measures, and general inefficacy. As truthfully set forth in a devastating series of articles by 'A Student of the League' in the *Manchester Guardian* last January, it forms one of the least creditable chapters in recent international history. Another chapter was soon to open. On January 7 Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State in President Hoover's Administration, addressed to China and to Japan the warning that :

In view of the present situation, and of its own rights and obligations, the United States Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments or their agents, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty or independence or territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or their international policies relating to China, commonly known as the Open Door policy.

The United States Government does not intend to recognize any situation or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both Japan and China as well as the United States are parties.

The United States let it be known that it would be glad if Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, as the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 1922, would convey similar warnings to Japan and China. Had Great Britain responded to this suggestion it is probable, to say the least, that the other signatories would have followed her lead and that the Japanese attack upon Chepai a fortnight later would not have been made. But since Sir John Simon preferred merely to ask the Japanese Ambassador in London to repeat, for the benefit of Great Britain, the promises which Japan had often made to the League Council, and had invariably broken, the inference was not unnaturally drawn in Japan that from Great Britain there was nothing to fear. Where lies the explanation of this mystery? Did Japan threaten to treat as an act of war any severance of commercial relations such as Article 16 of the League Covenant foreshadows? If so, did Great Britain quail before this threat? According to persistent rumour the British Ambassador at Tokio reported that Japan was in a mood to fight anybody and everybody rather than give way. In any event, the mood of British official circles was one of acute circumspection, and no appeal to British Imperial interests, or to the duty of Great Britain under the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, availed to dispel what amounted at times to abject fright. Among the Government majority in the lobbies of the House of Commons the word went round that, if Great Britain were to move a finger against Japan, the Japanese navy might bombard Hongkong and Singapore!

The landing of Japanese marines at Shanghai and the bombardment of Chepai changed this mood of acute circumspection into one of acute annoyance. Here it was no longer a matter of mere treaty obligations. Tangible British interests might be at stake. Besides, on February 2 the Disarmament Conference was

to meet at Geneva. 'War in all but name' was being waged in the Far East. Something had to be done. Therefore the meeting of the Disarmament Conference was postponed for an hour in order that the Secretary of State for the Dominions might lay before the League Council five proposals with which the United States was understood to be in agreement. They ran :

- (1) Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides forthwith.
- (2) No further mobilisation or preparation for any further hostilities whatever.
- (3) Withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese combatants from all points of mutual contact in the Shanghai area.
- (4) Protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of neutral zones to divide the combatants, these zones to be policed by neutrals, the arrangements to be set up by the Consular authorities on the spot.
- (5) On acceptance of these conditions, prompt advances to be made in negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and the resolution of the League of Nations of December 9, without prior demand or reservation and with the aid of neutral observers of participants.

Though the League Council adopted these proposals, the Japanese Government rejected the more important of them ; and the British Government took the rebuff without public murmur. Once more the feeling that it was too risky to try to do anything seems to have supervened. Japan was sending reinforcements to make good the mauling her marines had got at the hands of the Chinese, and might be trusted to walk through the Chinese lines without serious resistance. Then, on the basis of accomplished facts, an armistice might be arranged and the sponge passed over the whole unfortunate episode.

But just as in August 1914 the unexpected resistance of the Belgian army had upset the plans of the German General Staff, so the unexpected gallantry of the 19th Chinese army dashed the hopes of the 'let things be' school. Public feeling in Great Britain, the United States, and, indeed, throughout the world, turned strongly against Japan, and, as *The Times* was moved to admit on February 18,

sympathies which were gained to Japan are now lost to her. Public opinion is being consolidated more and more on the side of China. And the effectiveness of League action depends almost entirely upon the solidity of public opinion in any international dispute. Not merely is unanimity necessary in the Council itself, but it can obviously act with effect only when it has the moral support of massed opinion behind it. Recent Japanese action has driven opinion wholesale to the side of China ; and the League supported by united opinion must at any time be a far more effective body than when opinion is divided.

Why so few efforts had been made in this country to foster

unanimous opinion in support of the League. *The Times* did not explain, nor did it lend its powerful support, a few days later, to the appeal which Mr. Stimson made on February 24 in his letter to Senator Borah. As the Washington correspondent of *The Times* pointed out, this appeal was especially addressed to Great Britain. After repeating the warning given in his Note of January 7 to Japan and China, Mr. Stimson said :

If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other Governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon each action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation.

In public, at any rate, this appeal was not more favourably received in London than Mr. Stimson's original Note had been. His invocations of the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Washington Treaty for the limitation of naval armaments seemed to fall on deaf ears, though his clear intimation that all the Washington treaties, including the Treaty for the limitation of naval armaments, were interrelated cannot have been altogether overlooked in Downing Street. This intimation clearly pointed to the conclusion that, should Japan be allowed with impunity to break one of these treaties and the Kellogg Pact, the United States might no longer hold itself bound to refrain from fortifying the Philippines and Guam against Japan or from restoring the 'commanding lead in battleship construction' which the United States held, and relinquished, at the time of the Washington Conference. Unless Great Britain were prepared to abandon the principle of naval equality with the United States, and thus to compel the Dominions in or bordering upon the Pacific to look for American rather than British protection in the event of a war in the Pacific, the implications of Mr. Stimson's letter must have shaken His Majesty's Ministers out of their belief that, if we only 'kept out of it,' all would come right in the end. At long last a British Minister, Lord Hailsham, did state in the House of Lords that the position in the Far East was hard to reconcile either with the League Covenant or with the Kellogg Pact. In the next breath he dwelt, however, upon the importance of keeping an open mind and of not sympathising either with China or Japan. Meanwhile, the United States had begun to put silent pressure upon Japan. No attention having been paid to hints given to the British and French Governments—that if the League should feel bound to take economic action under its Covenant the United States would support it—the United States Government tacitly encouraged American citizens not to buy Japanese silks (of which 20 per cent. go to the United States), Mrs. Hoover and other American ladies took to wearing cotton gowns, American mar-

banks called in their credits from Japan, and American banks refrained from granting loans to Japanese applicants. It is a singular circumstance, which can hardly have been a coincidence, that these movements in America were hardly reported in the British Press, though their political significance was undeniable. In point of fact they did more to check Japanese aggression than had been done by months of wordy wavering which the great European Powers had mistaken for policy at Geneva.

Then China came to their rescue. Her delegate at Geneva insisted upon asking for a special General Assembly. Without enthusiasm among the Great Powers—they could manage the Council, but feared they might not be able to manage an Assembly—the request was granted. In the Assembly things soon reached a critical point. The League itself was in danger of collapsing in discredit. A few veterans, notably M. Motta, President of the Swiss Confederation; Dr. Benes, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister; and M. Hymans of Belgium, President of the Special Assembly, took command and, supported by the Scandinavian States, Holland, Portugal, and a dozen other 'little nations' in all parts of the world, as well as, *mirabile dictu*!, by South Africa, forced the Great Powers into line with them (and with the United States) for the defence of the League and of the Kellogg Pact. The upshot was the lengthy resolution, adopted by the whole Assembly (except China and Japan) on March 10, and the appointment of a Committee of nineteen members to watch over the situation until the Assembly meets again. In the resolution the main points are that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the dispute in the Far East, more especially the principle of scrupulous respect for treaties and for the undertaking that members of the League shall respect and preserve each other's territorial integrity; the invocation of the Kellogg Pact in renunciation of war, and the declaration (in line with Mr. Stimson's Note of January 7) that 'it is incumbent upon the members of the League not to recognise any situation, treaty or arrangement which may be brought about by means contrary to the League Covenant'. Not only the war round Shanghai, but the Manchurian dispute itself, is kept by the resolution within the competence of the League, and the unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Chinese territory near Shanghai is insisted upon.

Had a resolution of this character been adopted by the League Assembly last September, it is highly improbable that Japanese operations in Manchuria would have been pushed far beyond the zone of the South Manchurian Railway, and it is certain that the Shanghai war would not have been fought. The United States, which was already backing the League, would have been con-

winced that the League was both willing and able to act promptly and effectively, with the result that American co-operation with the League would have grown closer and closer. Two Japanese public men, the late Mr. Inouye and Baron Dan, might not have been assassinated. British prestige would have stood high throughout the Far East, the goodwill of the Chinese—whose country is a not unimportant market for British goods—would have been secured, and a strong presumption would have been created that in no quarter of the world are territorial or other advantages likely to be secured by violence.

It is easy, and short-sighted, to suggest that the action of the small Powers at Geneva was 'cheap' because they run no risks in the Far East and were merely engaged in a pedantic affirmation of abstract principles. While it is not true that countries like Holland and Portugal run no risks in the Far East, it is true that the smaller nations in Europe and elsewhere know that their only hope of security against aggression lies in the maintenance of the principles enshrined in the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. Therefore, in seeking to uphold these principles, they were striving to avoid for themselves and for Europe the danger of a relapse into the pre-war system of competitive armaments and secret alliances. Only those who would welcome such a relapse are entitled to cavil at the sincerity of their motives.

Something of weight must assuredly have been gained, or saved, when the special correspondent of *The Times* at Geneva, by no means a wild enthusiast for the League and its ways, can write as he wrote on March 11 of the Assembly Resolution:

The result was regarded in all quarters as eminently satisfactory. It was an achievement to obtain the complete assent of the Great Powers and the small Powers of the League, the fullest approval of the United States (of which definite assurances were received to-day), and the prospective co-operation of the protagonists in a settlement that is conciliatory but far more forcible than could have been anticipated at the outset. The fact of Japan's abstention does not detract in any way from the obligatory character of the resolution.

The resolution is a beginning, but as it is apparent that, for a variety of reasons, the Japanese are now rather anxious to get out of their Chinese adventure, it is thought that the steps already in progress will suffice.

They may suffice or they may not. Further steps may be needed. They are the less likely to be needed in proportion as the great Powers of Europe stand firmly on the ground which the United States and the small Powers have now led them to take up. But the mystery of British policy during the autumn and winter will still await explanation. No country, not even the United States, has wider or more important interests than Great Britain in the Pacific. These interests are both national

and Imperial. They can be safeguarded by respect for treaties—or by war. No country, except the United States, has more ardently advocated the reduction of armaments on land and sea, a reduction that is not conceivable save in so far as international security against war is provided by collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace. Few countries, if any, have less reason than Great Britain to welcome the violation of the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, and the Washington Treaties. Yet at a moment when Covenant, Pact, and one at least of the inter-related Washington Treaties were being flagrantly broken, no great Power has seemed less eager than the British Government to support those who urged the necessity of upholding them. Its conduct may have been inspired by prudence, acute circumspection or—as has been widely assumed at Geneva and elsewhere—by weakness and fear. If so, the conduct of the Government has cast an unmerited slur upon the spirit of the country and of the Empire. Why, we are entitled to ask, did not Great Britain associate herself warmly with the United States, from the very outset, if her Government thought it would be imprudent to be faithful to its commitments by itself? Can it have been for the reason that, as some of its supporters murmured, the obligations of the League Covenant might become really binding if the United States stood behind them? The country is entitled to know; and, to a far greater extent than most Ministers imagine, its judgment is already in process of going against the Government by default.

WICKHAM STEED.

IRELAND AFTER THE ELECTIONS

DRAMATIC developments may very possibly occur in the Irish Free State before this article can be published, if the leaders of the I.R.A. are determined to force the pace. But a crisis is otherwise scarcely likely, in view of Mr. de Valera's dependence upon the support of the Labour Party in the new Dail. Though reduced in numbers, and deprived of the leadership of their former chairman in the Dail, Mr. T. J. O'Connell, the Labour Party represent a large and important element in the electorate. They have hitherto supported Mr. Cosgrave in his insistence upon a faithful fulfilment of the Treaty of 1921. As their chief concern is to relieve unemployment and to obtain wider measures of public assistance to the working class, they are most unlikely to support any policy which would intensify economic depression by provoking an open conflict with the Imperial Government. On the other hand, their opposition to the Cosgrave Administration has been based very largely upon the same grounds as those of the Fianna Fail Party. Mr. de Valera should therefore have little difficulty in giving effect to many of his electioneering pledges by concentrating for the present upon those questions in which Labour and the Republicans have voted together since the Republicans decided to enter the Dail five years ago. In so far as the elections indicate a positive desire for new policies—apart from the overwhelming desire for a change of rulers after ten years—the combined opposition vote may be regarded as showing that the country desires to try the programme which is common to Fianna Fail and the Labour Party.

No one who has followed political developments in the Irish Free State at all closely can have been greatly surprised at the failure of Mr. Cosgrave's Ministry to secure a new lease of life, after ten years of continuous administration. When all allowances are made for the great difference of Irish conditions, the situation before the recent election may be compared to what the position in this country would have been if Mr. Baldwin had been in office continuously since 1922, having been returned at five successive elections, but never with a clear majority and always requiring the support of Independents. That the desire for a change of

Government would grow increasingly during ten years was only to be expected. And in Ireland the reasons for desiring a change of Ministry are much stronger than can be easily imagined in this country. Not the least difficulty has been that the Irish Ministers were almost all young men, who have held the same positions year after year, and would presumably have continued to hold them for four years more if Mr. Cosgrave had been returned again. The normal casualties in any Ministry which occur in England through the death or retirement of older men, or through elevations to the House of Lords, always create opportunities for promotion or change which have been absent in Irish politics. Moreover, in Ireland, with so small a population, any Government must inevitably become a vested interest after ten years. Local appointments tend more and more to become the monopoly of a narrow circle of persons who have the ear of the Ministers and their friends. Unless there is a reasonable alternation of Government by the rival parties, discontent and impatience are only to be expected. Had Mr. Cosgrave succeeded in winning, the result would certainly have shown rather a determination to avoid the risk of allowing Mr. de Valera to assume office than any real desire to continue the existing régime. The electorate has now shown that it is prepared to take the risk. It has undoubtedly been influenced by the imminence of the International Eucharistic Congress in Dublin in June, which is regarded as so important an event that no party would produce a political crisis which might interfere with its success. There is no reason whatever for interpreting the result as evidence of any strong desire to repudiate the Treaty of 1921, except in regard to the younger voters. The Government had become increasingly unpopular for a variety of reasons; while Mr. de Valera is no longer regarded generally as being likely to destroy the large constructive work which has been carried out by Mr. Cosgrave and his able young Ministers. How far that assumption is justified remains to be seen.

The main line of attack upon Mr. Cosgrave's Ministry has been the allegation of extravagance, and of favouring the small number who pay income tax to the detriment of the great majority who do not. At each election the Government have been increasingly aware that they might be overthrown by the propaganda against their policy in finance. Mr. Blythe, as Finance Minister, has introduced no less than nine successive Budgets; and on each recent occasion the Labour Party have declared their despair of obtaining any remedy until a new Finance Minister was placed in charge. As an Ulster Presbyterian, Mr. Blythe is very unlike the usual conception of Irish politicians. Managing the finances of the Irish Free State with the mentality of a chartered accountant, he has produced a balanced Budget, paid off the huge bill

for compensation arising from the close of the civil war, and established the credit of the Irish loans on a level which had at one time risen above that of British Government stocks. The only direction in which he has ever been willing to sanction expenditure on purposes which do not show financial results has been the encouragement of the Irish language. He is one of the few members of Mr. Congrave's Ministry who has learned to speak Irish fluently, and is one of the principal champions of the Gaelic revival in the Government party. But, except for this aspect of his political creed, he has been ruthlessly severe in discouraging every form of experimental finance. On commercial questions he has in general been a resolute free trader, accepting protective tariffs only where it could be conclusively shown that substantial employment would be created by fostering some Irish industry to supply the home market, without any serious increase in the cost of living.

By meticulous attention to the details of expenditure Mr. Blythe has made many enemies. He has caused much disappointment by refusing to sanction schemes for drainage or other works which would not have paid their way. He has created widespread hostility by reducing the number of persons employed by the State, and even by reducing the scale of old age pensions for a time, until he found it necessary to restore the former scale in deference to popular agitation. While he has thus made himself extremely unpopular as a strict economist, he has deliberately pursued a policy of encouraging rich people to settle in Ireland by lowering the rate of income tax. When he made his drastic cut of the income tax to 3s in the pound he explained openly that this was being done in order to bring back rich people who had left the country, and to persuade others to settle in Ireland for sport. He has since claimed repeatedly that the policy has succeeded to a considerable extent. Shortly before Christmas he told the Dail in answer to criticisms by the Labour Party that any serious raising of the income tax might lead to the departure of rich people whose contributions to the Budget average several hundred thousand pounds every year.

Purely as a business proposition, that policy had much to commend it. But, unfortunately for Mr. Congrave's party, the number of income tax payers in Ireland is very small. Of those who do pay income tax the majority derive little benefit from the lower standard rate, because the allowances in relief of small incomes are much less generous than in England. Only those who have incomes of £700 a year or more have any appreciable advantage in comparison with the English taxpayers. Inevitably resentment has grown in the Free State at finding that savings by English administration are used to encourage a very small number

of rich people, while the demands of the Labour Party—which in this matter have also been adopted by Mr. de Valera's party—are constantly refused. Consequently the Government has for years been denounced throughout the poorer counties as being committed to helping rich people alone. The fact that such people provide most of Mr. Cosgrave's party funds has not helped his popularity, and has given colour to the accusation that he was identified with the old Unionists.

Propaganda against the Government on these lines has been very skilfully conducted. With it has been coupled a persistent denunciation of the number of large salaries paid to Government employees. Some years ago the Fianna Fail Party placarded the country with posters giving a complete list of all salaries of £1000 a year or more. When all judges, important civil servants, State lawyers, and such people are added to the list of Cabinet Ministers (who have been paid much less than £2000 a year for strenuous constructive work) the list is quite considerable. It is easy to understand the effect of such propaganda in nearly all parts of Ireland, where small farmers scarcely ever see any considerable sum of money except at fair days and regard a salary of even £500 a year as disgracefully extravagant. The women voters are still more susceptible to such propaganda; and among the agricultural labourers it has produced an overwhelming revulsion against the Cosgrave Ministry.

On such lines Mr. de Valera and his friends have gradually persuaded a great proportion of voters that the Government are a self-seeking group, whose chief concern is to provide handouts for themselves and their friends at the public expense. They have been assisted particularly in this matter by the scale of remuneration which, under the Treaty, is paid to the Governor-General. The Treaty stipulated that the Governor-General should be appointed under the same conditions as in Canada, which meant that his salary must be £10,000 a year, with an adequate establishment. The combined vote for the Governor-General and his establishment has totalled more than £20,000 a year; and although his income is in fact taxed on the full scale, his salary has been denounced as the symbol of the 'grand Imperial scale' which the Government was accused of adopting. On every occasion the Labour Party hitherto has voted with the Republicans for a drastic reduction in the Governor-General's expenses. It may be assumed, therefore, that this question will be raised in the first Budget introduced by the new Government. It has been argued throughout that, even if the salary of the Governor-General is fixed by the Treaty, the scale of his establishment is open to revision; and in the present state of financial stringency everywhere the new Government will scarcely anticipate serious

...the Government's programme.

To cut down the salaries of Cabinet Ministers, judges, and civil servants will presumably be one of the first items on the Republican Government's programme. Though the total economy will be small, the moral effect will certainly give prestige to Mr. de Valera. Ireland has so far escaped the full blast of the 'economic blizzard' which has stricken most other countries. There has been no overwhelming compulsion to reduce salaries. Mr. Blythe, in introducing his supplementary Budget last October, announced that he would meet half the anticipated deficit by economies and the remainder by raising the income tax to 4s. in the pound, and the petrol tax to the same level as in England. But he did not specify what economies the Government would enforce. It might have been better politics for Mr. Cosgrave's Government if they had risked the anger of their richer friends by reducing salaries forthwith instead of having to face the accusation of being impatient allies of the well-to-do.

A much more serious retrenchment problem will arise in regard to the army. From over 50,000 men when the civil war ended in 1922 the army has been reduced to little more than 5000, and its cost is below £1,500,000 a year. Its efficiency is remarkable, as anyone who has seen the military tattoo in Dublin can testify. Mr. Fitzgerald, as Minister for Defence, has also made good progress in establishing several categories of reserves which have been steadily increasing in numbers. But the Labour Party, with its pacifist theories, has consistently voted against expenditure on the army as sheer waste, while the Republicans have complained (not without reason) that its only real purpose has been to reinforce the police against the possibility of any revolutionary attempt to overthrow the settlement based on the Treaty. What will be done about it now is one of the vital questions for the future. Mr. de Valera insists that the gunmen are no serious menace, and that all reason for revolutionary tendencies in the I.R.A. will disappear if the oath of allegiance is abolished by a simple amendment of the Constitution. Mr. Cosgrave refuses to regard the gunmen as being so easily satisfied. Mr. de Valera can scarcely abolish the army in conformity with his principles of making Ireland a self-sufficient State; and it may quite conceivably be required to deal with the gunmen if they continue their activities against those who have hitherto given evidence against them. The most reckless and determined of them have been kept under detention by Mr. Cosgrave's Government, especially under the recent Public Safety Act, which was introduced to stop the widespread intimidation of jurors and witnesses. But both the Labour Party and the Republicans are pledged to repeal the Public Safety Act.

having conducted its progress at every stage. Mr. de Valera's last action has been to release most of the revolutionaries whom Mr. Cosgrave had imprisoned. They both assert that there was neither justification nor need for the drastic powers which Mr. Cosgrave's Government assumed under the Act, even though he made it a permanent part of the Constitution. They claim that the whole revolutionary movement will cease once the oath of allegiance is removed from the Constitution. It is, of course, just possible that they are right, though their view appears remarkably optimistic. But if experience shows that their optimism is mistaken, then the new policy towards the army may be extremely dangerous. If the Republican-Labour alliance reduces it to impotence in the name of economy and undermines its morale by leaving it in doubt as to its proper functions, the gunmen will naturally be emboldened. The position of the police, who have hitherto been engaged in repressing the illegal societies, will in any event be far from enviable.

Another question of retrenchment which may easily assume much larger dimensions is the future of the Senate. Mr. de Valera has consistently demanded a reduction of its size on grounds of economy. He has also expressed scepticism as to its value as a part of the Constitution. Its history has not been altogether impressive. At first it consisted largely of a nominated element which gave substantial representation to the landowning and business interests. Under the Constitution there were to be triennial elections to renew one-quarter of it until it became wholly elected. The original plan of treating the whole Free State as one constituency for these elections proved unworkable, as only a small fraction of the electorate took the trouble to vote. The Constitution was then amended to provide that the Dail and Senate should vote together to fill the vacancies. The result of that system has been to make the present Senate more and more a replica of the Dail, divided into parties which vote strictly according to their party allegiance. But the Senate still includes a number of prominent public men who would never be elected to the Dail—men like Mr. Jameson, Mr. Guinness or Mr. Crooke, and others who represent either the public-spirited landlords or the banking and business interests. With their support it may be that a majority will be found to resist Mr. de Valera's efforts in the Dail to abolish the oath of allegiance. But if that should happen, Mr. de Valera might very probably go to the country at an early date, with the total abolition of the Senate as one of the principal planks in his platform. He would probably gain much support for that policy as a measure of economy, and Mr. Cosgrave would certainly not have his hands strengthened by being identified with whatever attitude the Senate may adopt.

On all these questions of retrenchment, which will probably figure in the first Budget of the new Government, the Labour Party may be expected to support Mr. de Valera wholeheartedly. The question of the oath of allegiance is much more complicated. The Labour Party have never troubled much about it. As upholders of the Treaty, they have hitherto regarded it as indispensable; but the Statute of Westminster is generally believed to have given the right to the Free State to make any alteration it wishes in its Constitution, and there have already been seventeen separate amendments to it. On principle the Labour Party dislike the idea of any oath being administered which may prevent an elected representative from taking his seat. If the oath could be abolished without serious consequences, they would certainly vote for its abolition. After the recent conference of the Labour Party in Dublin it was announced that they would support Mr. de Valera's attitude; but a few days afterwards Mr. Norton, who will lead the party in the Dail as Mr. O'Connell has lost his seat, announced that the party would not allow Mr. de Valera to sidetrack its economic programme by indulging in purely political controversies. The Labour Party has suffered at each election by the loss of its ablest leaders in the Dail. Mr. Thomas Johnson, who is an Englishman, and has been much the ablest leader of the Party, found refuge in the Senate. He and his principal colleagues are much too internationally minded to incur a political conflict with London if it can be avoided, for fear of economic reprisals and the withdrawal of Imperial Preference for the Irish export trade.

Procedure by negotiation would seem probable in regard to Mr. de Valera's claim to withhold payment of the land purchase annuities, amounting to £3,000,000 a year, which have hitherto been paid under the Treaty by Mr. Cosgrave's Government. Unless Mr. de Valera wishes to court defeat in the Dail, he can scarcely take any direct action which would involve an immediate conflict with Great Britain, because the Labour Party would never risk the economic consequences that would involve. But Mr. de Valera has put the issue formally to various distinguished lawyers at the Irish Bar, and he claims to have a decided opinion from three of them that there is a clear legal case for withholding payment. They are able lawyers of high standing; and in his own party Mr. de Valera is fully supported by other prominent lawyers who hold the same view. It would seem that there is at least a sufficient case to lay before a judicial tribunal. But the question of what court Mr. de Valera would recognise for such consideration raises many vital questions. The Labour Party have been persuaded that the matter ought to be raised, instead of paying the money without question to London every year; but

they may find themselves caught in far-reaching controversies over this question. Mr. de Valera would certainly refuse to recognise the right of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to decide the matter. He would presumably demand that it be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. But as the British Government has firmly refused to admit of any inter-Commonwealth dispute being settled by outside intervention, there will be difficulty in finding a basis of agreement. Even Mr. Cosgrave's Government has persistently challenged the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. On the claim that all the Dominions should resist any right of appeal beyond their own supreme courts in ordinary private law-suits they have met with considerable support at the Imperial Conferences. The question has been left undecided, but in regard to inter-Commonwealth disputes the Cosgrave Ministry would probably have admitted the authority of the Privy Council. The Labour Party, however, has taken a special interest in the development of Dominion status in the League of Nations, and has pressed Mr. Cosgrave's Government hard to insist upon treating the League as the only international tribunal. The Cosgrave Government shared this view to the extent of signing the Pact for Arbitration on International Disputes without those reservations which the British Government inserted to exclude inter-Commonwealth disputes. Even in Mr. Cosgrave's party there are probably some members—and there are certainly some of the Independents—who would join with Mr. de Valera and the Labour Party in insisting upon a reference to the Hague Tribunal. The land annuities may very possibly become a test case in this matter, which will strengthen Mr. de Valera's desire to challenge the claims of the Imperial Government.

But while the Labour Party's previous record suggests that they may easily become involved with the Republicans in a conflict with the British Government over arbitration on the land purchase annuities, the prospect has been greatly complicated by the adoption of Protection in Great Britain. To refuse the benefits of Imperial Preference to the Irish Free State is now a perfectly simple matter; and the Irish Labour Party may show much less interest than hitherto in their demands for extending the latitude of 'Dominion status' if they are faced with the possibility of losing the present advantages of that status. They are primarily a group of earnest trade unionists desperately concerned about unemployment and bad housing conditions. Unemployment has grown seriously during the past year, through a shrinkage of the agricultural export trade to Great Britain during the trade depression. It has been increased by a considerable influx of returning emigrants from Great Britain and America, who have come home

to their own people in Ireland for support in despair of finding work abroad. Emigration had fallen to a very low figure for some years past, and now the tide has actually turned the other way. The influx of unemployed would be very rapidly increased if a political conflict between Dublin and London should create prejudice against Irish workers in Great Britain and lead to the repatriation of Irish men and women who are now receiving unemployment relief here. That prospect, and still more the fear of losing Imperial Preference in the British markets, would unquestionably affect the attitude of the Labour Party; and Mr. de Valera would have great difficulty in keeping their support if he were determined to carry his political convictions into practice.

On the other hand, the Irish Labour Party share Mr. de Valera's ardent faith in protective tariffs. They have both attacked the Government consistently for its general policy of promoting Anglo-Irish trade. The conflict of policies is familiar in every country. Mr. Hogan, the Minister for Agriculture, has been the chief exponent of the view that prosperity in Ireland can only be increased by improving the quality and quantity of agricultural exports to England. He has achieved magnificent results in fostering Anglo-Irish trade, and has even persuaded the farmers to accept cheerfully his drastic legislation for the inspection and grading of exports, for which exporting licences are now required. Mr. de Valera has repeatedly acknowledged the courage and candour with which Mr. Hogan has advocated that policy. But both he and the Labour Party denounce it as a deliberate renunciation of the policy of making Ireland self-supporting. Mr. Hogan replies that their policy of high protective tariffs must raise the cost of living in Ireland, and lead back to a simplicity of life which may have satisfied Robinson Crusoe but will not satisfy modern Ireland. Mr. de Valera has never denied that high protective tariffs would make it necessary to do without certain things, but he claims that a self-respecting nation must be willing to make such sacrifices. The Labour Party, who represent a working class which has no luxuries to lose, support Mr. de Valera's programme of tariffs in the belief that it must create new industries in Ireland and so provide employment. To that the Cosgrave party reply that every reduction of imports must recoil on the export trade, and that the Irish farmers will be so injured that unemployment in agriculture will grow much faster than employment can grow in industry. That controversy will probably endure for generations in Ireland, as in all countries. But the protective policy will certainly be tried boldly by the new Government. Under existing economic conditions, in a country which has scarcely any industries and depends overwhelmingly

upon the export of its agricultural products, the results can scarcely fail to intensify economic depression. But Mr. de Valera has always told the people that they must be prepared to make sacrifices for their ideals. They have now returned him to power, certainly not with any desire to incur sacrifices, but in the belief that by his retrenchment programme and by withholding the land annuities he will have a sufficient margin to tide over the experimental stage. He is certainly helped rather than hindered by the fact that his Government cannot hope to live for long. Economic depression cannot possibly be eased within a short time by the programme which he intends to carry out; but he will win popularity by taxing the rich and by initiating plans for creating Irish industries behind tariff walls. A good deal will depend upon the attitude of the Senate towards his programme. It is generally unpopular, as a body which exists chiefly to represent the wealthier classes; and it is still regarded as the last stronghold of the former Unionists. If it should obstruct his programme in any important matter—and most of its members will probably wish to obstruct nearly all that he has in view—then a direct conflict between the two Houses, combined with a strongly Nationalist appeal concerning the land annuities, would give him every prospect of success at the next election later in the present year. He has gained an immense advantage by at last obtaining the initiative in political strategy. Mr. Cosgrave's party will under the new conditions have a thankless task, for they no longer have their former prestige as an indispensable Ministry, while they will be identified with all the Imperial and conservative interests which Fianna Fail intends to attack.

But no one can say yet how Mr. de Valera will respond to the responsibilities of his new position. The prevalent conception of him in England is widely mistaken. He has none of the usual talents of a demagogue, but is a pedantic and long-winded speaker with a monotonous voice and delivery. Although he is an American citizen, he is half Irish, being the son of an Irish mother who married a Spanish musician in the United States; but his public career has shown none of that impetuosity which might be expected of his southern blood. Even his rise to prominence in Irish politics was due simply to the accident of his being the only survivor of the leaders of the insurrection of 1916, when his sentence of execution was commuted because he was an American citizen. A mathematician of considerable attainments, he never escapes, even in politics, from the atmosphere of abstract calculations. It is not even true to say that he hates England. He is hostile only because the British connexion prevents Ireland attaining the full logical development of his nationalist principles. Compromise is entirely alien to his nature, and his

intemperance is greatly strengthened by his ecstatic desire for martyrdom, which he is able to inspire in others, expecting that all his followers will share it. To fail in a direct challenge to the British Government would be to him more glorious than to achieve even a compromise which gained much more than anyone expected. That was his attitude in 1916, and again in 1921. It will surprise all those who have watched his career if he changes, even under the necessities of presiding over a Government which does not command an independent majority. But experience in office has always produced unexpected changes in politicians; and in Ireland, not less than in other countries, politics are full of surprises.

DENIS GWYNN.

THE TRAGEDY OF IVAR KREUGER

MANY people have heard or read about Ivar Kreuger, but the number of those who had met him was comparatively small; that of people who knew him was smaller still. To the world he was just a great figure, 'the Swedish Millionaire Match King,' in the same way that there are oil, or copper, or even pork 'kings.' Yet the popular idea of the financial or industrial magnate was never less applicable to anybody than to the astounding Swedish genius who has just so unexpectedly put an end to his life. Ivar Kreuger was in every way a most extraordinary personality. There was nothing he loathed more than to be made a centre of attention, and, unlike so many others who pretend to hate and shun publicity, but do everything to get it, he was genuinely concerned if people wrote or talked about him. His modesty and his reticence to make himself seen or heard were proverbial. To his fellow-students he had been known under the nickname of 'The Silent One.' When he was at the very pinnacle of fame he might have been described as 'The Invisible One,' since he possessed a unique capacity for avoiding people.

Ivar Kreuger may be said to have had no personal requirements. Only lilacs of the valley formed a poetical exception, and had to be put on his table irrespective of the season. He was fond of books and good pictures, but was never a collector. He read a very great deal and was familiar with a large part of European literature in the original texts, not from translations. His command of English was perfect, but he spoke with an American accent acquired during the seven years he spent in the United States from the age of twenty to twenty-seven. He also spoke excellent French and good German—curiously enough, rather more with an American than a Swedish accent. Like Napoleon, he could sleep at any hour and in any circumstances. One night in New York he returned with one of his collaborators from some very late conference. He sat down and fell asleep immediately, while the other man wrote a report of their meeting. At regular intervals his colleague would wake him up and read out bits of the report; Kreuger would discuss in the minutest way the details, and then sleep again till the next portion of the report

was ready. On the other hand, he sometimes went for several days and nights without any sleep at all. If his brain was absorbed by some great scheme, he forgot all about food too. He would sometimes sit for several days without interruption and ignore all suggestions of food, until, finally yielding to the pressure of others, he would order something and eat it without rising from his desk.

So much for the personal idiosyncrasies of this remarkable man: they deserve attention only because of the importance of the work which he accomplished. The rapidity and scope of the expansion of the Kreuger interests in the world represent a unique achievement. Within an almost incredibly short time the Swedish engineer Ivar Kreuger became not only his country's and the world's match king, but also established his group of companies as the leading financial organisation of Europe. In addition to these interests he also controlled, or very largely influenced, the international mortgage and bond markets, as well as a number of banks in various countries, and also the pulp, timber, iron ore, cement, electrical, telephone, and ball-bearing industries. He also bought large quantities of real estate, and his group own a very great number of houses in most of the capitals of Europe, particularly in Paris and Berlin. The basis of his interests was constantly widening: only recently he had turned his attention to the gold mining industry.

He was by training a civil engineer and a steel specialist. After a fascinating and adventurous career in America, Mexico, and South Africa he returned to Stockholm, and, still a very young man, he founded in 1907, with his friend Paul Toll, the firm of Kreuger & Toll. It soon became one of the leading building firms in Sweden. In 1913 for the first time he turned his attention to the match industry, in which his father, Consul Ernest Kreuger, was interested as the director of a small match manufacturing company in his native town of Kalmar. Within four years Ivar Kreuger developed the match factories with which he had become connected to such an extent that his principal competitors could be persuaded to amalgamate with him. Out of this amalgamation of Kreuger's 'Förnuade Tändsticks' combine with the 'Jönköpings' group arose the great Swedish Match Trust, which was started in 1917 with an original capital of 45,000,000 kronor. Through a number of extremely complicated transactions Kreuger acquired, despite his comparatively modest investment, control of this company, and used for this purpose the original concern of Kreuger & Toll, which he turned into a holding company. Under his personal guidance, and thanks to the well-planned-out and scientific management, the Swedish Match Company soon began to conquer one export

almost after another. When, after the war was over, a number of States decided to establish their own match industries and to protect them with tariffs, Kreuger saw his great chance and adopted a system which not only removed the obstacles to his further expansion, but actually consolidated and facilitated it.

The new method was that of combining his match transactions with State financing. Since the manufacturing of matches formed a considerable source of revenue to most States, it was possible for Kreuger to institute his system in a large number of countries. It may be said that without this combination of State financing and the acquisition of State monopolies the Swedish Match Trust and its presiding genius would never have gained the position in the world that they did. The world production of matches is, after all, a relatively small matter if compared with some of the other leading industries. It is said that Kreuger controlled 160 factories distributed over forty different countries. But when it is remembered that the total number of those employed in these factories amounts to only 60,000 people, then, even making every allowance for rationalising devices of all kinds, a supreme degree of mechanisation and highly skilled labour and scientific management, it becomes apparent that on the purely industrial side the Kreuger match combine is reduced to rather limited proportions. What gave Kreuger an unprecedented and unrivalled position in the world of industry and finance was, not the production of matches important though it is, but the fact that this production became for him the stimulus for assuming other and vital functions. He became a great international distributor, or re-distributor, of credit. To obtain his match monopolies, or at least a large share, in the match production of the various countries he granted them loans. Fifteen 'Match Loans' have been granted by the Kreuger group in this manner, totalling 1,200,000,000 Swedish kroner. Thus he acquired the match monopoly in Yugoslavia against a loan of 22,000,000 dollars, in Hungary against a loan of 36,000,000 dollars, and in Roumania against a loan of 30,000,000 dollars. In Lithuania and Latvia he obtained the monopoly by loans of 6,000,000 dollars to each, and in Bolivia and Ecuador for loans of 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 dollars respectively. Kreuger's biggest loan was to Germany. To that country alone he lent 125,000,000 dollars against a large participation in the German State match monopoly. At a time when the monetary position of France was very different from the present, and when she could not raise money anywhere else, Kreuger lent her 75,000,000 dollars and helped Poincaré to carry through the stabilisation of the franc. He did not obtain a match monopoly in France, but secured various commercial advantages for his group. Thus he gradually gained

control over four-fifths of the world's match industry. Ivar Kreuger was his only serious competitor, and made several unsuccessful attempts to blackmail him into including her among his clients, a list of which is given in the following table:

Country	Currency	Amount
Germany	U.S.A. dollars	125,000,000
Poland	"	42,400,000
Hungary	"	36,000,000
Roumania	"	30,000,000
Yugoslavia	"	22,000,000
Turkey	"	10,000,000
Latvia	"	6,000,000
Lithuania	"	6,000,000
Danrig	"	2,000,000
Ecuador	"	3,000,000
Bolivia	"	2,000,000
Guatemala	"	2,000,000
Total		<u>245,400,000</u>
Greece	Pounds sterling	1,000,000
Roumania	"	380,600
Total		<u>1,380,600</u>
Esthonia	Swedish kroner	<u>7,000,000</u>

Where and how did he find the funds, not only for these match loans, but for his other investments conducted on so wide and so international a scale? Furthermore, what prompted him to make these investments? It was only possible for the Kreuger combine to carry through its numerous transactions because it succeeded in building up large capital resources of its own, and at the same time establish a very close connexion with the world's principal money reservoirs. Kreuger realized at an early stage of his expansion the need of securing British and American financial support, and set himself the task of achieving this. He was most successful. With the help of the financial circles of Great Britain and America he made the Swedish Match and the Kreuger & Toll shares and debentures into a most popular international security, quoted on most of the leading stock exchanges. Side by side with the extension of the activities of his Swedish companies Kreuger created, together with some prominent American financiers, the International Match Corporation, a concern with immense resources at its disposal. This company acquired large interests in Canada, South America, Japan and Europe. Since 1908 the original holding company of

Kreuger & Toll was given a new field of activity. It became a kind of financial agent and broker to the Swedish Match and to the International Match Companies, one of its functions being the raising in Sweden and abroad of the funds which these companies could re-lend to other countries, or which would enable them to acquire and hold in their portfolio long-term obligations that could not be re-financed elsewhere.

The methods of financing the daily growing engagements of the Kreuger group were comparatively simple. The flotation of issues, while market conditions throughout the world favoured his issuing policy and the issues were readily absorbed, was the first and principal channel through which he obtained his vast resources. Here it may be observed that Kreuger never acted as an issuing house and never floated off his loans to the various countries as such, but that the securities issued and introduced by him on the New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Zürich and other bourses were securities of his own companies. Thus it may be said that at times his international credit stood higher than that of the countries he wanted to finance, for he frequently succeeded in borrowing the money required for financing them, when they themselves could not do it. But it is important to emphasise that he did not grant loans in a rash or indiscriminate way. The terms and conditions on which these were granted even to the poorer countries were such that they provided for the maximum degree of safety.

Whenever Kreuger came to an understanding with a country with regard to the creation of a match monopoly the following methods were adopted. The State established a fiscal match monopoly, which was endowed with the wide rights of manufacturing, importing and selling matches. This monopoly was then assigned by the State to the Swedish Match Company, or to one of its subsidiaries, for a period of years against the payment of a certain annual royalty. The royalty increased with increased consumption. A contract to that effect was sanctioned by the Parliament of the country in question and became law. These royalties, together with a Government guarantee, formed the basis of the monopoly loans. The amount of each loan was usually established in such a way that interest charges plus amortisation were calculated on a basis of a 25 to 30 per cent. cover per annum, and sometimes this margin was even greater. Kreuger's caution went so far that numerous contracts also contained a clause that the Swedish Match Company was to pay its royalties into a special banking account in New York, on which the respective Governments could only draw after the full amount required for payment of interest and amortisation charges of the loan had been handed over to the representative

of the company. In most countries the Kreuger group managed to take the administration of the monopoly into its own hands, and thus it actually controls the revenue that forms the basis of the interest service on the loans. Some countries have also provided the Swedish Match Trust with additional security for their loans. In Hungary the Kreuger loan of 1908 received considerable land mortgage guarantees; in Greece the special guarantees are in charge of the 'International Finance Commission'; in Yugoslavia and Roumania they are in charge of the independent Monopoly Administration. But the German loan has no special guarantees, and the revenue of the match monopoly is not payable into a special account, as in some of the lesser countries. The German Government was anxious to preserve the dignity of German credit in this aspect, but sufficient assurances were given that, even if a moratorium of the Young Plan became necessary (and it must be remembered that in addition to the 125,000,000 dollar match monopoly loan Kreuger, as a gesture of confidence in Germany, subscribed 50,000,000 kroner of the Young Loan), the payment of interest on the Match Loan and the Young Loan would not be suspended.

These details concerning the conditions and terms of the various Kreuger loans are interesting, because they prove the extreme soundness and solidity of that enormous and imposing superstructure he succeeded in building in so remarkably short a time. What greater safeguards could have been created? Most of the Governments to which he lent money could not touch it until they had put him in funds for the payment of both interest and amortisation charges. Others, like Germany, were estimated to be incapable of defaulting. And the commodity on which the loans and monopolies were based (matches) was less subject to fluctuations than almost anything else. But with the continued progress of the Kreuger combine as a factor in international finance it was becoming more and more apparent to its leader that he had to seek an ever-increasing field of activity offering stable earning possibilities. His fundamental idea that the profit from match manufacturing was a most stable source of revenue enabling him to pay interest and dividends still held true. It was essential, however, to find other sources of stable revenue as well, for Kreuger realised that the continuation of his issuing policy depended on his capacity to maintain a big dividend rate. That is why he began to take up large participations in the various other industries I have mentioned, as well as in the bond market, mortgages, real estate, and banks. Thus he tried to distribute his risks over a number of investments which appeared to be least likely to be affected by the downward movement which had already set in. In this domain, too, the rapidity of the

expansion of the Kreuger interests was an astounding one, the growth of the actual match business, and here also the vast invested amount to many hundreds of millions of Swedish crown.

It is inevitable that in the course of this amazing development he should have exposed himself to the attacks of enemies, rivals, blackmailers, or just ordinary gamblers also conducting their operations on an international scale. Kreuger's very universality and the international character of his numerous interests greatly facilitated all such operations. While the prices of the various Kreuger securities were usually determined almost entirely by the London and New York Stock Exchanges, since the inception of the downward movement quotations on the Stockholm Bourse were not infrequently under par. An international consortium gambling *à la baisse* seemed to exercise the highest possible pressure. The enormous commitments in Germany were made the subject of most unfavourable comments. Then the rumour was spread that the Soviet Government was behind the great onslaught on Kreuger. Finally, even the legend of the invention of a permanent match or lighter was used to contribute to the prevailing feeling of uneasiness about the Kreuger companies. Even if the two latter weapons proved ineffectual, because they were rapidly discounted by the public at their proper value, the emphasis of the heavy German commitments did not fail to have a harmful effect.

Then a transaction, which Kreuger carried through despite the increasing crisis, also found a wrong and harmful interpretation. He established a community of interests between the Swedish telephone company of L. M. Ericsson, controlled by Kreuger & Toll, with the International Telephone and Telegraph Company in America. The assumption that he was 'getting out' of his telephone interests, or that he was trying to get rid of them because the burden was too heavy for him, was absolutely wrong. Not only was there at that moment no apparent reason for Kreuger to wish to free himself of this commitment, but nothing could have been in more flagrant opposition to his business methods than to sell his interests in a business, to which he had only just turned his attention, for the mere purpose of taking a quick profit or of escaping a fresh liability. What did take place was an exchange of shares between the two companies, and, among other things, an agreement to exchange patents and to collaborate in the negotiations or working of further concessions. The initiative of this arrangement belonged to the Ericsson Company, and its object was to avoid unnecessary and costly competition in the future. It was pointed out that in many countries, as, for instance, in Mexico or the Argentine, two telephone companies were in operation, and not only fought each

other bitterly, but, of course, had also to bear the cost of two separate installations. And the advantages of the exchange of patents, of general scientific and commercial collaboration, as well as of an alliance instead of a war in the field of concessions require no comments or explanations. This exchange also made the Kreuger group the biggest, or at any rate the most important, shareholders in the American company, thus consolidating its influence in the United States.

The fear that this indefatigable man would finally succumb under the strain and burden of his work, his enormous responsibilities and attacks of his enemies, has been frequently expressed. But for years he appeared to possess nerves of iron and a perfectly amazing constitution. Only his most intimate friends knew that the heart disease, which he had acquired as a result of yellow fever when building a bridge in Mexico many years ago, and which seemed to have completely vanished, had suddenly returned and developed as a result of overwork and struggle against his unsurmountable difficulties. His recent stay in New York seems to have completely wrecked his health, and when he realised his true position he had a nervous breakdown.

Those who observed him in conference, however, could have noticed that even in the past his peculiarly acute sensitiveness betrayed a high degree of nervous tension. His receptive powers and the intuitive way in which he grasped the meaning and intentions of men's words and actions were extraordinary. There was something infinitely attractive in his sincerity and artlessness, in his charm and obvious honesty. He had a quiet, reticent, but persuasive manner, which was perhaps one of the principal causes of his success. Kreuger's personality inspired confidence—his ways were soothing and removed the possibility of conflict. He never destroyed his competitors or his enemies, but usually tried to make peace with them on terms they could not but find honourable, and frequently quite profitable too. During the last few years he was devoting all his time and energy to the financial aspect of his vast organisation. The actual management of the Match Trust, the telephone, the pulp and wood, building, real estate, cement, ball-bearing, iron ore, gold, and various other industrial and commercial interests was in the hands of his trusted collaborators. He knew how to select his colleagues and assistants, and how to ensure smooth and successful work in the common interest. If he acquired the patent of a new machine, he also secured the services of its inventor. The kindness and comprehension with which he treated his subordinates made him easily accessible to all of them, but nobody would have dared to approach him in any trivial or unimportant matter. He was known to them as 'I.K.' and they used to say that if

they were talking to him about something which was a matter of long, he understood it before the twentieth centimetre was reached and promptly gave his decision! Paul Toll, also an engineer, his old friend and original partner in their first venture, is still in charge of Kreuger & Toll. Of the other principal collaborators, many are friends who were either at school or studied engineering with him. The number of engineers employed by Kreuger was very considerable, and they rather disproved the popular contention that, whereas a business man may successfully manage a technical undertaking, a technician is seldom a good business man. The presence of so many highly capable people in charge of the group's interests not only helped Kreuger to achieve his successes, but is a justification for the hope that the great Swedish trust will carry on even after the disappearance of Kreuger himself. This is not the least of the dead man's merits.

The reasons which prompted Ivar Kreuger to commit suicide will always remain a matter of conjecture. But let us try to reconstitute the atmosphere in which he lived. In that light his death acquires a tragically symbolic aspect. His suicide was certainly not the desperate gesture of the gambler who has failed, nor was it that of a moral coward. This man, who for a number of years had been the world's greatest financial and industrial 'enormateur,' was an optimist. He had a great plan, a great idea, which was the transference of capital from the rich countries into the poorer ones for purposes of investment. To achieve and facilitate that object he built up his enormous organisation, and for a while he was successful. He tried to nurse a very sick world back to health and prosperity again, and, as was pointed out in the leading article of *The Times* dedicated to his memory, in that respect he acted not unlike the Bank of England. The very juxtaposition is the highest possible tribute that can be paid to an individual financier and industrialist.

There are, of course, two methods of curing a patient. One is to administer a strong purge, which, painful though it may be, sometimes brings about a speedy recovery. But sometimes it also kills the patient. Another method is the infusion of new blood, which is sometimes also fraught with mortal danger. The pessimist invariably prefers the first method. The optimist adopts the second one. And Ivar Kreuger was an optimist. He believed in humanity's instinct for self-preservation and in its common sense. He thought that with encouragement it could accomplish a return to prosperity in a short time. He tried to provide the necessary stimulus. Perhaps the tempo adopted by him was too rapid. But he became the master of expansion, a supreme artist in the constructive utilization of credit. His calmness, self-possession, detachment, personal disinterestedness and determina-

tion in face of this stupendous task he had set himself were absolutely unique. He was not an international speculator who had lost all measure of proportion, but a man who was animated by an idea, and, despite the greatest handicaps, he was carrying it out.

I have tried to show how solidly his superstructure was built, how sound the foundations were on which he had established it, but he had not taken into consideration the possibility of an earthquake. Can one blame him for that? That earthquake—the world crisis—destroyed those very foundations and upset the normal functioning of his intricate and enormous organisation. The overwhelming crisis of illiquidity, which spread over the world during 1931 and affected debtor and creditor nations alike, could not but affect a group with such world-wide ramifications and commitments.

In days of comparative prosperity he had obtained the necessary funds through the flotation of issues; later, when things began to get difficult and the issuing of securities had to be discontinued, he still managed to obtain large banking credits on an international scale. Meanwhile, however, the problem had arisen, not so much of how to transact fresh business, but how to finance the existing commitments till such a time when the international markets would once again be capable of absorbing his issues and thus enable him to carry on. Yet this time, to which the optimist Ivar Kreuger was looking forward as a certainty, was moving further and further away. And the crisis was progressing. Could he have foreseen that half the world would default? Could he have foreseen that since the abandonment by England of the gold standard about 750 foreign exchange regulations would be issued in various countries, making a continuation of normal business quite impossible? Could he have foreseen the tariff bog into which this world is rapidly slipping? He did not believe that the crisis could gain such proportions, and he staked his optimism against it. He lost. Perhaps if he had been able to secure further help in his native country or abroad he would have continued to live and to work. But Sweden alone could no longer carry him—he had already drawn on her resources to the utmost limit of her capacity—and the rest of the world was either incapable or unwilling to increase its existing commitments in the Kreuger group. All he could hope for was the co-operation of Swedish and foreign interests in the work of gradually reducing the size or even of dissolving his concern. He preferred to withdraw altogether from the stage. Perhaps it was only because he was tired and disappointed and broken in health. That is what he said in a letter to one of his friends. Perhaps, also, he thought that his disappearance would facilitate matters for everybody, and make the task of settling the last order for his successors. But there can be no doubt that he realised the

bankruptcy of his idea, which, I hope, does not mean the bankruptcy of his companies.

He was in many ways like his compatriot Charles XII., King of Sweden. Their native land was too small for both of them, and they both set out to conquer the world. Both had experienced an incredibly rapid rise to fame and power, an even more rapid decline, and finally the tragic end by means of a bullet. The death of both provoked consternation, general lament and genuine sadness. Yet somewhere in the background there was a certain feeling of relief in both cases that a great adventure had come to an end. For they had demanded an effort from their country which it could hardly bear any longer. But in both cases brave little Sweden stepped into the breach after their death and took over the heavy inheritance without a word of reproach. A curious resemblance! Both of them were bachelors: both Spartan in their habits, reticent, uncommunicative, modest; yet animated by ambition and fantastic plans for conquering the world, which was theirs almost before they had begun. Both were cool, precise and practical in the actual realisation of their wild dreams. Both began by conquering Poland and failed to conquer Russia: both fell victims to circumstances, and could no further resist the pressure of what must be described as historical developments. Both suddenly felt weary, disappointed and ill, without further material or physical means of continuing the fight: both realised one day that Fate is stronger than Man, however gigantic his stature. Both died through a murderous bullet; though the one was killed by another's hand, while the other killed himself.

The atmosphere of almost daily catastrophes, in which the world has now lived for some considerable time, has not unnaturally resulted in a state of atrophy. We meet the news even of the greatest calamities with comparative equanimity, if not with indifference; we simply refuse to be stirred. And yet from time to time some particularly dramatic event catches the imagination of the world and produces something like an emotion. The effect soon evaporates, and the vicissitudes of daily life recapture their predominant place. There can be no doubt that the suicide of Ivar Kreuger stirred up general emotion. If it were possible to hope that it would have the beneficial and sobering effect of a lesson to those responsible for the conduct of the world's affairs, then the passing of that symbol and embodiment of enlightened capitalism would perhaps have a purpose. But for the moment there seems little to justify such a hope. This Ivar Kreuger who certainly did not live in vain, has he died in vain? That such should have been his fate is tragic enough; but how much more tragic would not the fate of our economic system be?

GEORGE SOLOVYTSKY.

WHITHER THE POUND?

It is a fairly safe conjecture to make that only a very small minority indeed of those professionally interested in monetary questions—whether as Treasury or Bank of England officials or as economists—could have foreseen last September, when Great Britain abandoned the gold standard, the present, to all appearance, very paradoxical state of affairs. There may have been rejoicing in the camp of the advanced Monetary Reformers that at last this country had shaken off its shoulders the Old Man of the Sea who was strangling the possibilities inherent in an autonomous monetary policy. There may have been, even in those quarters where belief in the gold standard was a prime article of faith, a certain measure of relief, once the mood of bitterness engendered by a sense of failure had passed away—relief at the prospect of at least temporary escape from nerve-racking responsibilities. But both sides would have concurred in thinking that the probabilities of the situation pointed, not only to some check to imports and stimulus to exports so long as the fall in exchange was not offset fully by a rise of prices, but also to a rise in the general price level and the cost of living, as well as to considerable uneasiness at home and abroad as to the future course of sterling. The paradox of the present situation lies in the circumstance that, whilst some of the favourable consequences to be expected from a fall in the gold value of sterling have actually manifested themselves, most of the unfavourable ones do not appear to have been produced. Unemployment has fallen, but, in spite of a reduction of nearly one-third in the gold value of the pound, prices at the end of 1931 were actually lower than they were at the end of 1930. The Board of Trade Index Number at the end of 1931 stood at 63.7, as against 65.5 twelve months previously, a reduction of 2.7 per cent.; the Food Index alone at 67.8, against 69.8, a reduction of 2.9 per cent. In February 1932 the Combined Index was still below the figure for the same month of 1931. The Cost of Living Index, which in July 1931 stood at 145, stood at 147 in February 1932, a hardly perceptible rise. How is one to explain these results? Have economists been quick to operate, or are the statistics entirely misleading?

A great deal turns on ascertaining the true explanation of what has been taking place, for the public's satisfaction with the results of going off gold is based in large part upon the fact that the rise of prices so freely predicted does not appear to have taken place. It is true that an important section of economic opinion holds that an ultimate improvement of economic conditions can only come about if prices do rise; for only by this means can the burden of fixed debt resting upon the taxpayer and the industrialist be appreciably mitigated. But public opinion is not concerned with matters so far removed from its immediate preoccupations. The General Election was largely won by appealing to the fear of inflation: by an appeal, in other words, to the desire to conserve the purchasing power of the pound. Events seem miraculously to have confirmed the wisdom of the choice made by the electorate: the pound still buys more than it did a year ago. But can this state of things continue, and what are the choices open to us to prevent public confidence in a paper instrument of exchange from being rudely shaken?

The relations between the price level and the rate of exchange, given a paper standard, are complicated and require explanation before the statistical and other facts of the present situation can be dealt with. Under an international gold standard, so long as it is effectively maintained, the rate of exchange cannot vary except within very narrow limits. The result is that, if the price levels in two gold standard areas are markedly different, it is only by adjustments in these price levels relatively to one another that equilibrium can be brought about. Goods will move from the low-priced to the high-priced area, and gold from the high-priced to the low-priced area: i.e., one country will have, for the time being, a favourable, the other an unfavourable, 'balance of trade.' The method by which adjustment will be brought about eventually is through gold exports stimulating credit expansion in the one case, and causing credit deflation in the other, with the final result that prices will tend to rise in the one area and to fall in the other. The attainment of equilibrium conditions, however, is by no means automatic: to bring it about, the social and economic structure must be sufficiently elastic to enable wage rates and other money incomes to respond to changes in the volume of credit, and the volume of credit itself must be regulated in accordance with the inflow and outflow of gold. But this by no means invariably happens: in fact, one of the reasons for the breakdown of the gold standard in recent years has been the refusal of the responsible monetary authorities to allow gold movements to affect the credit structure to a sufficient extent. But, in any case, given a gold standard, adjustment comes about through variations in the relative price levels

induced by changes in the volume of credit, such changes themselves being brought about through changes in the volume of gold held.

In the case of an inconvertible paper standard it is not the price levels which change in the first instance, but the rate of exchange. Suppose a country with a paper standard. Imports and exports of gold do not affect its price structure. If, at the rate of exchange ruling at a given moment, its price level is not in equilibrium with the price level outside its area, its exports will be checked and its imports stimulated if the rate of exchange results in its prices being abnormally high to the foreigner; or in a stimulus to exports and a check to imports if the ruling rate of exchange results in its prices being abnormally low to the foreigner. But the first situation results in an increased demand for foreign currency and so to a decline in the value of the country's currency abroad, whilst the second situation results in an increased demand for the country's currency in foreign areas, which will lead to the foreign value of its currency rising. In equilibrium, the rate of exchange will be such as just to offset the relative differences in the price levels inside and outside the area. But equilibrium may take a long time to bring about if, before the rate of exchange has had time to adjust itself to the original position of the price levels, these price levels themselves alter.

If the general direction which the exchange rate ought to take, so that equilibrium can come about, is a downward one, the cost of imports is bound to go up, assuming foreign prices to remain unchanged. The cost of imports ought to rise in order that consumption of them may be checked. So far as such imports are competitive, demand will change towards home-produced goods, which have not yet risen in price. This will cause further activity in the industries producing such goods and may lead to an expansion of credit, through increased demand for bank loans. But if the volume of credit is expanded, prices will tend to rise again inside the country, thus necessitating a still further fall in the exchange before equilibrium is produced. Again, suppose the imported goods to enter into the construction of the cost-of-living index. If, as a result, wage rates are adjusted upwards, and if, in order to finance higher wage payments, employers borrow from banks so that the volume of credit is expanded, again the equilibrium rate of exchange will have to be lower than it needed otherwise to have been.

Equilibrium, again, may be delayed, not by any rise in domestic prices, but by a further fall in foreign prices. If British prices in terms of paper money remain unchanged, whilst foreign prices fall, what is the result? The cost of imports, at the ruling

rate of exchange, will be less than if foreign prices had not fallen, but this stimulates their importation. But, relatively to foreign goods, British exports will be more expensive than they were before foreign prices fell, and exports will consequently be checked. The rate of exchange will move against this country, in order to check additional imports and stimulate exports, but it will have to move *further away* than it needed to have done if foreign prices had not fallen. It is true that falling foreign prices enable us, in the circumstances imagined, to buy our food and raw materials more cheaply, and are so far to the good; but that fall also checks exports and necessitates a more far-reaching fall in exchange to overcome the disadvantage so resulting to the export industries.

A further complication arises from the influence on the rate of exchange of capital transactions. If France or the United States 'call in' their balances now held by London bankers, these balances can only be effectively liquidated, from the economic point of view, by an export of goods or by a transfer to France and the United States of goods which inhabitants of this country might otherwise have consumed. Every other form of so-called 'liquidation' of balances is only a transfer of ownership, but not a final wiping out of the debtor-creditor relationship. If, e.g., French sterling balances are sold to Dutch speculators in sterling, this transfer still leaves London a debtor on balance. Now, how can the additional quantity of goods necessary to effect a *final* liquidation be obtained? A further fall of exchange is necessary to check imports and stimulate exports, *over and above* the fall (if any) necessary to equilibrate the price levels. Such a fall will, of course, have the effect of making imported goods still dearer and our goods still cheaper to the foreigner. But it is only when the exchange and the price level in conjunction give such a bonus to exports and such a check to imports that exceptional capital transfers become possible. Such a rate of exchange which is lower than is necessitated by a direct comparison of prices is said to 'under-value' the local currency. As soon as exceptional capital transfers cease the rate will improve, provided that, in the meantime, foreign prices have not fallen further, or local prices risen any more.

Complication upon complication, it will be said. But, unfortunately, it is considerations like these which govern the rate of exchange when a country is off the gold standard, and they form the necessary background to what has been happening since September, and to what will happen in the future.

What, then, explains the course of prices since September? In the first place, though prices are still lower than they were a year ago, they are higher than they were when we went off the

gold standard. Part of the satisfaction with the present state of affairs is due to the choice of dates. The *Economist* index number (1927 = 100) shows that prices on September 18, 1931, were 60.4, on December 30 were 63.8, and on March 9, 1932, were 66.2, a rise of over 10 per cent. On the basis of September 18, 1931 = 100, the complete index on March 9 stood at 109.8, and the index of seventeen primary products stood at 116.0, after having been as high as 120.9 on February 24. The fall in exchange has thus already produced some effect upon our price level. That it has not produced more is due to a variety of circumstances. We are not the only country which has abandoned gold; on the contrary, practically the entire raw-material producing world is off gold. To the extent that the former premium upon sterling in terms of various currencies has declined, import prices in this country have risen, but the existence of paper currencies in the outside world has lessened our dependence upon gold countries, injured their exports and kept prices steadier here. In the next place, gold prices of primary products, after an initial rise from the middle of October to the middle of November, have fallen much below the September level. Thus the *Economist* gold index for the seventeen primary products stood at 94.7 on September 18, rose to 103.5 on November 11, and fell away again to 90.3 by the beginning of March. In the third place, trade has been and is depressed, and there are large stocks. Under these conditions there is inability as well as unwillingness to raise prices to the full extent of the fall in sterling; further, the fear of being charged with 'profiteering' may have acted as a deterrent. Fourthly, the extent to which the cost-of-living index is directly affected by changes in the cost of imports is usually exaggerated: only about one-third of the index is directly so affected, and it so happens that about half the food imports are from countries not upon the gold standard, so that Professor Bowley has calculated that a 25 per cent. appreciation of gold in terms of sterling would cause the cost-of-living index to rise by only 4 per cent. Lastly, and very importantly, the existence of a high bank rate and the general uncertainties of the time have prevented credit expansion, and, therefore, the beginning of anything approaching inflation.

The sterling cost of imports at any moment of time is, of course, the direct resultant of the price ruling abroad and the current rate of exchange. The current rate of exchange is in the neighbourhood of \$3.70 to the pound sterling, and there can be little doubt that at this level the pound sterling is considerably under-valued. The *Economist* index for the last week of February stood at 110.9 for Great Britain: the United States figure (the Irving Fisher index) stood at 90.4. On this basis it should be equal to \$4.05 approximately, instead of being worth

nearly one-third of a dollar less. The under-valuation of the pound is to be explained in terms of the effect of holders of sterling balances to withdraw them, thus forcing exchange down, at a time when the disorganisation of world affairs was in fact neutralising the existing and very considerable exchange bonus to British exporters on their sales in gold currencies, and when, at the same time, the decline in the earnings of British shipping, the falling off of revenue from financial and commercial services rendered to other countries, and the cessation of income from past investments abroad were reducing the British capacity to pay for imports except by the current export of goods. For it must not be overlooked that one of the vital ways in which world depression is affecting this country is to reduce our income from abroad—whether that income is derived from the rendering of services or the ownership of securities. The exchange market is having to adjust itself, not only to relative changes of prices, but to changes in the size of the national income and to changes in the net position of indebtedness on long and short-term account. Our assets are largely frozen, our liabilities are to a large extent quick liabilities, and, at the same time, international depression is reducing the inflow of current income with which we might in part have met any draining away of our foreign balances. So far as there is any speculation in the pound sterling, it was probably *à la baisse* until recently. Such speculation, whilst in the long run it must steady the value of sterling—for 'bear' sales have to be covered by purchase—had for the moment also the effect of depressing the rate of exchange. The forces which thus combined to cause sterling to be under-valued are cumulatively very considerable. Any changes in the international situation which would increase the inflow of income, reduce the pressure to remove balances or reverse the direction of flow and stimulate buying orders, would improve the sterling rate of exchange, reduce the cost of imports (assuming foreign prices to remain unchanged), but would at the same time reduce the export bonus, in terms of sterling, which at present accrues to exporters in so far as they are selling in terms of gold. The abrupt upward movement of sterling in the first week of March caused great alarm on this very ground.

From the standpoint of British policy, both political and financial, the important matter is: What is going to happen in the future? From the purely economic standpoint, it must be emphasised, there is no problem in the sense that the exchange, freed from association with gold, cannot, in the long run, fail to find an equilibrium level. However severe the pressure upon the 'Balance of Payments' through the falling off of income and the pressure to transfer balances, as well as through a decline in current prices abroad in consequence of world disorganisation,

the rate of exchange can be relied upon to fall until imports are checked sufficiently, even if exports cannot be greatly increased. But the price we should have to pay might be a very low rate of exchange, so low (if world prices go on falling) as to cause prices to rise appreciably here. But a falling exchange, while a country is off gold, brings with it the danger of psychological reactions. The falling exchange may create alarm, leading to a further withdrawal of balances and therefore to the necessity for a further fall of exchange, which, under the conditions presupposed, ought to take place in order that consumption of imports may be checked. But if the imports are, e.g., food-stuffs, necessary for the existence of the population, it may require a very high price domestically, and a very considerable fall in exchange, before equilibrium is restored. It is true that, provided credit policy is rightly managed, a currency cannot "fall to pieces": the Continental cases, where a fall in the external (exchange) value of the currencies preceded final collapse, were due to failure by the Central Banks of the countries concerned to take the appropriate steps. But the psychological aspect ought not to be overlooked, and, in any case, given the continued dependence of this country on foreign food imports, as well as the fact that a large part of our overseas investments is payable in sterling, a very low rate of exchange may prove disadvantageous to us, even apart from the influence it may have upon public opinion. The immediate manifestation of unrest in Parliament and the Press when sterling fell sharply in the late autumn of last year shows very clearly the political risk which may be involved in allowing economic forces to work themselves out.

Assuming that it is not desirable that sterling should go on falling, what are the natural economic conditions consistent with a cessation of the fall? First, as regards the price situation. Contrary to common opinion on this point, a continuously falling price level, whether gold or paper, in foreign countries does not mean, if our prices remain stable, a rise in exchange or even a cessation of the fall, or ultimately the absence of a rise, in the cost of imports. For, as already explained, falling prices abroad render British exports less attractive, and the pressure to adjust both sides of the account will force exchange down and the cost of imports up. Again, it is not the case that rising prices abroad necessarily imply that our imports will cost us more in terms of sterling. For rising prices abroad, whether paper or gold, will increase the competitive strength of the British exporting industries, and the pressure to adjust both sides of the account through a falling exchange will relax—i.e., a rise of prices abroad enables the equilibrium rate to be higher than would otherwise

be possible, and the cost of imports to be lower, in order of standing.

The actual set of circumstances, which have to be taken into account, relate to those forces which result in an 'under-valuation' of sterling, i.e., a depression of its value below the point justified by the relative position of price levels. If the international situation improves, if confidence in the political and economic stability of the country becomes strengthened, then the temporarily depressing influence of 'bear' speculation will cease; the pressure to export to pay off balances will relax; the pressure to cut down imports through a falling exchange will also diminish, and the rate will improve, up to that point at which the exchange will equilibrate internal and external prices. It may even go up beyond this point, so that exchange becomes 'over-valued,' which would create grave difficulties for the exporting industries, and stimulate imports to the same extent that exports were depressed. It is not a 'high' or a 'low' exchange which matters, but a rate high or low relatively to the position of the internal and external price levels.

It follows from what has been said that Great Britain is still intimately interested in the fate of the world's price level. Any further fall of prices, by increasing the difficulties of the export industries, will more than neutralise any beneficial effects which might be exercised upon the cost of imports, because, although imports might be cheaper if the rate of exchange were maintained at a given level, it is difficult to suppose that the exchange will in fact be able to be maintained. It is true that at present, with sterling under-valued, exports are encouraged and imports discouraged, but this under-valuation may cease, and then the real difficulties of the situation would begin. For a period of rising exchange would, in the event of world prices continuing to fall, be followed by a new period of falling exchange, especially if, in the interim period, credit expansion were permitted and the British price level allowed to rise.

The equilibrium position of the rate of exchange must constitute, then, a major preoccupation of any British Government so long as we remain upon paper. On the course of world prices we cannot, in the main, exercise any influence, except to the extent to which British fiscal policy may embarrass foreign suppliers and thus cause their prices to fall, and to the extent to which the abandonment of the gold standard, by reducing the aggregate demand for gold, will ultimately help to lower its value, i.e., to raise gold prices. But these are only indirect influences, and not of major importance in so complicated a price situation as the present one. For the greater part, therefore, any influence which can be exerted by us upon the rate of exchange

must be through operating upon our own price level or through the other factors which help to determine the rate of exchange.

We have the choice of allowing the rate of exchange to settle itself, however low the level to which it may fall, or of attempting to keep it from falling below a certain limit, in the event of world prices not recovering: for a rise of world prices, provided we prevented our price level from rising as quickly, would automatically improve the exchange. From the economic standpoint there is much to be said for allowing exchange to find its own level, for every attempt to keep it in the neighbourhood of a certain dollar value implies the reproduction of conditions analogous to those obtaining under a gold standard. If the rate is not to be allowed to fall, other factors in the situation must be adapted to the exchange, and not the exchange to the other factors.

The alternative policies which could be adopted to prevent exchange from falling are really only three in number. It is possible to borrow abroad; it is possible to keep the level of British prices and incomes at such a figure that, even if world prices do go on falling, the exchange will not decline too far; lastly, it is possible to attempt to keep exchange up by a general restriction upon imports. The first of these alternatives is the one utilised during the period 1924-1931. It has the great disadvantage that it exposes the borrowing centre to panic influences unless the loans are formal, long-dated ones, not subject to instant recall. The two other alternatives can be summed up as the method of *Income Deflation* or *Tariff Inflation*. It is the latter policy which the National Government has chosen to adopt.

These phrases sum up, not merely alternative policies, but historic controversies, whose roots reach back to the very beginnings of modern economic doctrine and, although at the moment the country is to link up its fate with Protection, the intellectual battle involved has not by any means been decided. The important question is: Are these two alternatives real substitutes for one another? Can deflation be avoided and the exchange be protected by the use of tariffs? It must be understood that what is being dealt with here is not the advantages or disadvantages to particular industries arising from the imposition of a tariff, but the influence of tariffs upon the rate of exchange. How, in other words, do these various alternatives work out? Both are alike in this respect—namely, that, if the world price level goes on falling, a cumulative use must be made of them, in order to maintain a given level of exchange; i.e., neither instrument will yield its fruits without further application of the same remedy if the general price situation alters. So far as concerns the process of adjustment, deflation, by reducing the volume of money incomes, prevents us

much being bought at any given level of world prices and of exchange—i.e. it deters purchases, not by increasing the price of imports, but by decreasing the funds with which the imports are bought; that is, it makes the British a bad market to sell in by forcing prices down. At the same time, it stimulates exports, because, at the given level of exchange which it is desired to maintain, the cost of British exports to the foreign buyer falls; relatively to the level of foreign prices, the British cost and price level has been reduced—even if foreign prices are falling, the difference of price levels has been narrowed. Under a tariff the direct effect is to cause a lessened consumption of those imports, the price of which, plus duty, is higher than the cost of competing products in this country, though if the articles made at home are made of imported materials the *net* advantage is much smaller than appears at first sight even if possible repercussions on credit expansion are neglected. If the articles cannot be made here and there are no substitutes consumption will still be lessened in all probability, but not to the same degree. In the case of raw materials of production destined to be worked up and re-exported, there will be lessened consumption unless a rebate is given on export, because the higher cost of the raw material will cut off part of the foreign demand for the finished product. In this case, clearly, the check to imports will be accompanied by—in fact caused by—a fall in exports. But even if raw materials of industry are excluded, the difficulty attaching to a use of the tariff as an instrument of exchange control lies in *all* cases in the repercussions upon the export situation. For since, in the case imagined, foreign prices are assumed to be falling and British prices have not, the higher level of exchange which the imposition of import duties may permit will not be offset by lower prices and costs in the country, with the result that exports will be checked and the maintenance of the exchange at the desired level will be imperilled. Moreover, the increased pressure on foreign price levels due to intensification of competition abroad due to goods being excluded from the British market must tend directly to reduce the sale of British goods in neutral markets.

These conclusions may seem disappointing to those who have been taught to think that the abandonment of the gold standard emancipated this country from the pressure exerted on its economy by price changes in the outside world, and to those who find in the tariff a solution of all our difficulties. A free exchange can only help us if it is allowed to find its own level, and we are prepared to accept the results of a falling exchange on the value of imports and on the cost of living, etc. The tariff, in so far as it is successful in excluding imports and keeping up the rate of exchange, at the same time checks the growth

of exports and thus increases the difficulties of the export industries. Imports may indeed be less than they would have been without the tariff, but this is not the same as proving that they will therefore be less than they would have been if the rate of exchange had been allowed to fall. Exports may not be less even with the tariff than they might have been without it, given the same rate of exchange, but this is not the same as proving that they will therefore be as great as they would have been if exchange had not been kept up. The fact is that this country is so intimately bound up with the world order that, whether we are upon gold or upon paper, whether we are Free Trade or Protectionist, our fate, it is clear upon reflection, is largely dependent upon the course of prices abroad.

T. E. GREGORY.

THE STATE AND THE BLIND

RELATIONS between the State and the blind, bespeaking sympathy and interest and a real desire for the emancipation of blind people, are of very recent development. They have grown out of the mounting body of public opinion that blindness was not a disgrace, not a hopeless, ineradicable infirmity, but a handicap which merited all the time and attention which could be spared for its reduction. The attitude of the Roman emperors, and even of the Norman kings of England, in depriving of sight their enemies and those of their subjects who trespassed against them was only a reflection of the attitude of the common people of those times. The blind person was the person without hope; one would almost sooner be dead than have to stand in his shoes. How, then, inflict a severer penalty than by forcing this degradation upon your Christian who would not acknowledge your gods, or your peasant who dared to take to himself the royal prerogative of dining off venison? It was only later, when blinding as a punishment had been abolished, and blindness could therefore be looked on as an unmerited misfortune, that the thought crept into the minds of the ordinary man and woman, 'There, but for the grace of God, go I'. It is a short step from this self-centred view to a practical sympathy—official investigations began to be made and laws for the amelioration of the lot of the blind to take their place upon the Statute-book.

Even then the State lagged heavily behind public opinion. The first voluntary institution for the blind in England, for instance, was founded in Liverpool in 1791. The Blind Persons Act, which set on foot a widespread national scheme of State aid for the blind, became law in 1920. The institutional system alone, while opening wide its gates and caring most admirably for those who found their way within them, could not hope to cover the whole of the ground. Yet the voluntary system led the way. The State, at last fully alive to the importance of the blind adult as citizen and the blind child as potential citizen, only followed down the paths to which others had fixed the sign-posts.

One of the earliest cases in which we hear of the State—in the form of the ruler—coming forward as champion of the blind

remained in Japan. When the Emperor visited the blind, one of the first things he did was to ask them whether they desired a personal interview with him, and the point, on receiving the permission, distributed his hands among them. This was the all. Several blind men of proved capacity were taken into Government service, and a device was found giving over the production of messages entirely into the hands of the blind. Whether we can look upon the granting of this employment favour as being due to the impartial judgment of an impartial Government, or whether we must see in it only the result of the affliction of a powerful prince, is largely dependent on our point of view. There is no doubt at all that blindness affecting the households of the wealthy or socially important has been a noticeable factor in the growth of an interested public opinion, and on of an interested State. There are in almost numerous cases all over the world of philanthropic effort initiated by educated blind people; in a very real sense, from the earliest times, the case has been that of the blind leading the blind.

Unfortunately, the sequel to the story of Prince Hitoyasu occurred centuries later, when in 1870 the privileges of the blind in Japan were swept away and those with sight were permitted to enter into competition with them. In recent years, however, Japan has developed methods of caring for her blind comparable with those in force in other countries.

There is no example now of State monopolies being granted to the blind. The nearest we get to State interference in the employment of blind people is in Germany, where by a Reich Act of 1923 the engagement of a small percentage of disabled men, including the blind, among normal workers was made compulsory. A recalcitrant employer might be fined. In France also a Compulsory Employment Act was passed in 1924, but only those blind persons who lost their sight in the World War can claim benefit under it. Here and there, too, in Europe, where there are State monopolies in handling tobacco or matches, a preference in the matter of employment has been granted to the disabled, including the blind. England's very mild version of this official interference is a recommendation by the Government to the Government departments and local authorities that, other things being equal, they should give preference to goods produced by workshops for the blind. Scotland gives a preference to the blind in the matter of employment as home teachers of the blind.

It can be readily understood, the war of 1914-18 gave a great impetus to the movement for the emancipation of the blind. The Government involved in the holocaust was driven to face the problem of making some provision for a number of victims

...the blind, which had been hanging fire, or had been received with half-hearted support was speeded up. So it came about that the civilised blind, the men and women who (many of them) had once known sight, found their position firmer and their prospects brighter through the accession to their ranks of thousands of men who had grown to manhood in full enjoyment of all their senses.

Thus did history repeat itself, for the earliest public institution established for the blind which still exists, now under State management, was the Hospice des Quinze Vingts in Paris, said to have been founded by Louis IX. (Saint Louis) about 1250. The men who had been blinded following his banner to the Crusades. Civilians soon attached themselves to this institution, which had gathered much wealth, although at its inception the inmates were encouraged to beg for their living. One scarcely needs the assurance that such encouragement is not given nowadays. In its stead all efforts are brought to bear that these blind, as also the blind in every civilised country in the world, shall aim at self-support. One of the most important results of State legislation for the blind is, indeed, that begging by the blind is more or less sternly discouraged and that an increasing number of authorities are making assistance conditional on the practice of mendicancy being discontinued. Nevertheless, even legislation has not always been guiltless in this respect. At one time begging by blind persons was specially legalised in certain countries. In truth, all down the pages of history the dragging stick, the piteous cry for alms of the blind beggar, rings in our ears. 'Pity the blind!' 'Pity the blind!' It was when this cry began to sound unnatural to those who heard it—when the reaction to it came to be 'Why pity the blind? Why not help them, and help them to help themselves?'—that the citizens of each country banded themselves together in voluntary organisations, and, eventually finding these efforts insufficient, pressed the State to share their burden.

Apart from a few instances where the ruler of a country has taken upon himself the responsibility for at least some of his blind subjects, there is little heard of any Government action till the nineteenth century. Certainly the Institut National des Jeunes Aveugles—the first school specifically for the blind—had been taken over by the State in Paris in 1791 during the French Revolution. But in its early stages the growth of activity by Government was slow. It was with the development of the idea of universal education that the problem became for the first time

indicated. What were you to do with your blind children? Unless special provision could be made for them the aim of universal education was a sham. So special provision was made, and legislative enactments passed in a number of countries, requiring the establishment of schools for the blind, and, in some, making school attendance compulsory on blind children. The cost of this education was taken over in varying degrees in whole or in part by the State, the public authorities, and voluntary societies. Even maintenance costs, where the parents were indigent, began usually to be met by the local Poor Law authority. The lot of the uneducated blind child was felt to be the unhappiest lot which could fall to human experience. At the same time it dawned on the State that such a child must necessarily grow up to an adult life dependent always on public moneys. Sentiment and cold expediency went therefore, for once, hand in hand. There are few countries, as a result, where the provision of special education for blind children is not now made. In many countries it is still the only form of State action, and the difficulties of the blind man or woman who has passed school age are relieved only by voluntary societies.

The acceptance of responsibility by the State for the welfare of the blind, as such, is indeed comparatively rare. In most cases the adult blind are provided for in the same way as other citizens. That is, if they are indigent they come under the Poor Law; if aged, under old-age pensions schemes; if disabled, under invalidity and disablement insurance. On the other hand, in many countries which do not make direct provision for the blind, the work of voluntary associations is often encouraged and assisted by the grant of State moneys. Usually the war-blinded are placed in a separate category and are given preferential treatment both as regards work and pensions.

Generally speaking, the countries which come best out of the test of State responsibility for the blind are the English-speaking countries. In a number of the States of the United States, State commissions for the welfare of the blind have been set up, and many States grant pensions to blind persons as such. In Great Britain limited State pensions are paid, and a variety of local services are insisted upon by the State and supported from public funds.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that this activity, though it had its beginning before the war, was stimulated in a very natural way by the return of blinded men from the fighting forces. For example, in most European countries, voluntary effort arising spontaneously out of the needs of the war has spurred civilian agencies to greater efforts. The needs of the blinded soldier, being much advertised and calling forth generous responses, have encouraged the general idea of giving

help to the blind. And again, in Germany, the Conscription Employment Act, originating as a result of the war, to find work for disabled soldiers, including the blinded, was later amended to include the civilian blind.

In many countries, too, the entry into the blind world of young men cut off from their usual avocations by their disability has reinforced the ranks of the natural leaders of the blind. This is specially noticeable in the British Empire, where in no less than three of the Dominions national organisations for the welfare of the blind as a whole have been initiated or have been very greatly developed, largely through the individual efforts of returned blinded soldiers who received their initial training and inspiration at St. Dunstan's. It may be said that the State is now fully alive to its duty towards the blind, and that the next decade will see even greater development towards universal State assistance than has been attained in the most forward countries and the acceptance of State responsibility by those which are still backward.

If this historical survey conveys anything like a true impression of the development of the care of the blind, the first lesson to be derived from it is that voluntary effort has played and still plays a noteworthy part. There will be in every State at every time a minority who are in advance of the majority in their view of their duty towards their neighbour. These will band themselves together voluntarily to make provision for the sick, the poor, and the blind. There are foundations in every civilized country which bear witness to early movements of this nature. There will always be such persons, and consequently there will always be voluntary efforts, going beyond the efforts of the State, pioneering, inventing, devising new means of helping. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a State, so satisfied with its efforts for the unfortunate, will make voluntary effort illegal. It would be an infringement of the liberty of the enlightened pioneers which they themselves ought not to tolerate.

On the other hand, the volunteers must not be permitted to establish vested interests in voluntarism, and if and when they and others can persuade the State to take over and administer routine methods of assistance out of public funds they should not resist. There should be a gradual evolution which allows of the State taking up and operating approved and tested services for the blind as the material wealth of the society, and the general opinion of its citizens, makes it possible and desirable. And wherever such routine operations are taken over by the State the voluntary spirit and machinery should be maintained and diverted to new fields of activity. The needs of the blind are so great that every resource must be mobilised to meet them. The conclusion

needed, therefore, is that there should be co-operation between the State and voluntary effort, and that aid for the blind should be developed by these two agencies on co-ordinated lines of true and friendly partnership.

Broadly, the development in the care of the blind by the State is only a specialised part of the care of unfortunate citizens as a whole. The primary motive which moves human society to care for its unfortunates is, not sympathy, but self-preservation. There cannot be a healthy and progressive society if many of the units which form it are starving and discontented. Hence, as the idea of governance develops and a national conscience is awakened, the executives take upon themselves the task of caring for those who cannot adequately care for themselves. At first coldly self-protective, the State moves gradually towards a more humane and philanthropic outlook. There are many thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals who are moved, sometimes unwittingly, by the Christian ideal, to sacrifice time, labour and money to help their unfortunate fellow-beings, and particularly those who are blind. These are the backbone of the voluntary work which is done all over the world. But they are also to be found in large numbers in Government offices and Parliaments, municipal departments and local councils. Thus the whole question as to what the State should do for the blind is influenced by kindly personal sentiment. It is legitimate for those who seek favours for the blind to accept the advantages of this goodwill, but they should never take advantage of it.

Much loose talk abounds as to men's rights. The right to live, the right to a living wage, the right to justice as opposed to charity, are proclaimed all over the world by blind and sighted alike. The truth is that there is no natural right to live, and that the statutory rights or traditional rights acquired by those who need other people's help in living their lives are concessions made to them for the sake of or by the goodwill of the community. It would be well if blind people were to realise this truth, for, human nature being what it is, they would secure more satisfaction from their lives and greater assistance from their fellows if they approached them in this spirit.

Not all blind people must be wholly dependent upon those who can see. Many find themselves in positions in which they can choose who shall care for them, and many may contribute much by thought and deed to the well-being of the society in which they live. But as a whole the blind throughout the world must needs ask help from those who can see, and it would be more graceful and fruitful for them and their representatives to ask reasonably than to demand, basing their claim upon some supposed natural rights which are fictitious. They may be

assured that whenever and whenever they ask for consideration of their proposals they will be well received. They should be careful, however, neither to overstate their case nor to press their demands too strongly, lest they do harm to the cause they desire to help.

Why should there be legislation for the blind as a special class? Probably there is no logical answer to this question. Certain writers suggest a reason in the thought that the blind are much more severely handicapped from an economic point of view than the deaf or the crippled, and that this distinguishes the blind as a class apart from other disabled persons, and justifies special legislation on their behalf. No doubt this is an important consideration. In addition, perhaps there is a peculiar sentiment for the blind arising out of some of the factors mentioned earlier, and again there is a larger number of persons incapacitated by blindness than by any other single disability of the same magnitude. Another point may be that, although definition of any class is difficult, it is easier for practical purposes to define blindness, and to treat those coming within the definition as belonging to a special class, than to define other disabilities and classify those who suffer from them. The phrase 'The world of the blind' indicates how the popular imagination can appreciate the peculiar position of this class, and can isolate them from the rest of mankind. We seldom hear the phrases 'The world of the deaf' or 'The world of the crippled,' and such conceptions are difficult.

Perhaps imagination, not reason, is the principal answer to the question. Every seeing person can imagine himself blind; it is so easy to achieve blindness by merely closing the eyelids, or by trying to find the way in a really dark place. Moreover, fear of the darkness is instinctive.

This Act was the first attempt to provide nationally and comprehensively for all sections of a blind community.

Mainly, the Act falls into two parts: (1) That which the national Government undertakes to do entirely from its own financial resources—namely, to pay pensions to practically all blind persons over fifty years of age; (2) that under which the national Government requires local authorities to make a comprehensive scheme, the expense of which will be shared from national and local funds. These schemes may include the establishment and maintenance of homes, hostels and workshops, the payment of allowances to the unemployable blind, and the organisation of home teaching and home workers' schemes; they may be undertaken either directly through machinery owned and operated by the local authority, or in conjunction with or through the agency of voluntary bodies. Generally speaking, the local authorities have operated their schemes in conjunction with

voluntary agencies in their desire to make use of the special knowledge and voluntary services which were already available.

There is a good deal of argument as to whether the second part of the Act should have compelled a national standard of care for the blind instead of permitting a large local discretion. The general question may be put thus. How far can and should the central authority in an administrative unit like Great Britain impose upon subordinate local authorities the duty to initiate social services or to maintain them at a prescribed standard? Politicians who call themselves progressive or socialistic take the view that all local authorities should be compelled to maintain a high standard of care for the blind and that the expense should be wholly or mainly borne by the Exchequer. More conservative thinkers consider that a large degree of autonomy in local government is a sound principle and that local administration should be to a substantial extent locally financed. This course prevents local authority spending huge sums of money provided by the Exchequer, without due regard to the interests of public economy. If the local authority can secure an important social service without the citizens as such having to pay for it, there is a check upon most rapid development—good in itself, but possibly disastrous in its cumulative effect to the solvency of the national Exchequer.

The Blind Persons Act takes a middle course. It compels local authorities to submit a comprehensive scheme which they will be prepared to carry out, but it does not compel adherence to a particular method, and it leaves the generosity of the scheme very largely for local decision. The result is that there are great variations in the scale of treatment of the blind. These present anomalies which may be criticised, but English tradition is opposed to undue compulsion of local authorities. In all probability a opportunity will present itself in the next few years for the whole subject to be re-examined, and by that time a natural level, to which probably the majority of local authorities will conform, will have been reached. When this is the case the time will have come to compel the minority who have been less generous or enterprising in their aid for the blind to advance to the standard of the majority.

There are in addition two forms of registration incorporated in the Act—registration of the blind persons themselves as registration of voluntary charities operating on behalf of the blind. The former requires little comment; it is merely an attempt, which has been singularly successful, to secure through local sources exact information as to the names, addresses, and circumstances of all blind persons. It will readily be understood what an advantage this is to Government departments concerned

with such matters as the prevention of the causes of blindness, as well as to the local bodies themselves, who can thus base their plans upon accurate statistics.

The second form of registration—namely, that of voluntary agencies—is more open to argument. The object of this registration is to give the public some guarantee that charities for the blind are operated *bona fide* in the interests of the blind and are not conducted for improper objects or for the benefit of the people who initiate or manage them. It is open to question whether some of the smaller local authorities are competent to exercise supervision of this sort. In general, however, opinion seems to agree that registration of great national collecting bodies by a competent authority such as the London County Council, in whose area most of these national bodies have their headquarters, is a sound and proper interference by the State with the liberty of the subscribers and managers of the voluntary organisations. Registration by local authorities does not involve interference in policy, but ensures merely that accounts are kept, that the objects of the trusts are carried out, and that the administration comes up to a reasonably high standard of efficiency. The cause of the blind makes such a strong appeal that unscrupulous people are apt to use it to their own ends. In these circumstances it is probably in the interests of sound and established charities for the blind to be registered, which prevents abuse, and thus avoids the possibility that generous people may hesitate to give donations or subscriptions for the welfare of the blind.

The Act, of course, includes a definition of blindness, as does a much earlier Act which made State provision for the education of blind children. Any statute making special provisions for a section of the community must define the persons to whom it applies. This is a difficult problem, and as a result there are a variety of standards in operation throughout the world. This renders comparison of statistics relating to the blind in various countries difficult, and it is time that international action was taken to explore the possibility of setting up international standards.

The age at which pensions are now paid in Great Britain—namely, fifty years—should be gradually reduced, and the amount of the pension increased, as and when Parliament can be brought to face the necessary expenditure. Such reduction of the age and increase of the amount should continue until a subsistence pension is payable to all blind persons in respect of their blindness, and for no other reason, after the age of sixteen, or when they cease vocational training or education. There should be a means test of a simple character which prevents the pension being paid to blind people who have independent means or are engaged in

professional occupations which render it unnecessary for them to be subsidised in this way. The means figure above which the pension would be stopped should be a relatively high one, so that all but a few fortunate blind people would receive the pension.

Some critics of general pensions believe that any general pension paid to the blind is undesirable because it lessens their desire to work. The great majority of blind people cannot in any circumstances at present, or soon likely to be available, maintain themselves without assistance. It seems, therefore, that a disability pension is the simplest and most efficient, as well as the most sympathetic, method of meeting the difficulty of providing them with the means to live, or compensating them for their handicap. In the present depressed state of the country no Government, whatever its political views, would grant really generous pensions to all blind people. Even when better times return, such pensions as may be granted will provide only a mere subsistence, and there will still be a strong incentive to all who are capable, and have the opportunity, to augment the pension by useful work.

The activities of State and municipality are so varied that they come into contact directly or indirectly with almost every type of professional or industrial employment. There are, therefore, many opportunities for Government and municipal departments to give direct employment to or influence employment for professional and non-manual blind workers, such as teachers, mameurs, organists, telephone operators, typists, etc. In some departments trouble is taken to fit suitable blind persons into such posts, but much more might be done. It is a matter to which all concerned should give more consideration than is given at present. It is far more difficult to find congenial employment for mental ability than for physical ability amongst the blind, and the State and municipal authorities should not only help to solve this problem, but should set an example to other employers.

The natural leaders of the blind are those who have the requisite character and ability and are themselves blind. They have the advantage in representing the case of the blind that they are themselves representative of the class for whom they plead. They have a greater understanding of the psychology of the people with whose affairs they deal, and frequently added authority is given to what they say to their followers by the fact that they see themselves experts in overcoming the difficulties imposed by blindness. Government departments, municipal authorities, and voluntary associations for the blind should, wherever possible, give employment to suitable blind persons in advisory and executive posts.

THE STATE AND THE BLIND

Blind people throughout the world owe the improvement which has taken place in their lot to the understanding, sympathy, and sacrifice of their sighted fellows. But the public conscience has at all times been stimulated to a fuller conception of its duty towards the blind by the personal example and advocacy of outstanding blind people, such as Henry Fawcett and Arthur Pearson. This should be borne in mind, and in every country encouragement should be given to young blind people, who have the gift of leadership, to come forward and help to guide the blind community towards greater opportunities for material and spiritual well-being.

IAN FRASER.

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA

SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS A REVALUATION—II

THE Great War, with its agonies of separation and bereavement, was the natural prelude to a wave of thaumaturgy. As the slaughter grew, and more and more instances were recorded of lost ones appearing again in dream and vision, the bereaved turned passionately in thousands to any channel which promised a communion with their dead. Many consulted professional mediums; others broke their health in the effort to pierce the veil; to others visions came unsought. The level of the world's consciousness was disturbed. For a time the cult of communication threatened to upset the proportions of traditional religion. Those to whom visions were given were so full of awe and thanksgiving that the bare suggestion of scrutiny must have seemed impious. And, indeed, who in those days had the heart to question what was for so many their one stay and comfort? To-day, however, our hands are no longer tied. Now that a decent interval has elapsed and the first raw ache of our pity has eased, it may be opportune to look closely into these visions, and to realise that, quite apart from all belief or disbelief in their alleged causes, there exist grave reasons for caution, for which we need go no further than the nature of our own perceptions. Whatever we think, however strong our faith, we shall do it no harm by inquiring as closely and as scrupulously into this branch of human experience as into any other. If we establish nothing scientifically, we shall at least clear the ground and provide data for our successors.

First of all, then, let us set all questions of self-delusion, trickery, and the like, upon one side. We are not interested in fraudulent mediums; their exposure only confuses the issue. It is not evidence one way or the other. It may show that a particular communication was a fake, but that does not mean that all communications received through the same channel were faked. It affects the central truth no more than the malpractice of an individual priest affects his religion. Nor will it help us to establish that Mrs. Smith, of such and such a street, who related

vivid and circumstantial visions of her dead son, was liable to fits of hysteria and exaltation. What we should do, all we need do, is to take the type of case which appears to be 'genuine,' in the sense that it contains no humanly discernible point of falsehood or misapprehension, and consider the likelihood of its being in fact what the seer believes it to be.

A man—upright, sober, matter-of-fact, known and respected by a wide circle of neighbours—is advised by telegram that his son has been killed. He bears his sorrow bravely, and it in no way changes the habit of his mind. There is no challenge to his faith. Soon afterwards, sitting in his garden, he has a clear vision of his son, standing a few feet away, smiling down at him. There are details about the vision which he does not understand at the time. Why was his uniform different? What had happened to his eyebrows? It is not till he receives letters from his son's friends, with a copy of a photograph taken a few days before death, that he realises their significance. The queer addition to his uniform was the new regulation so-and-so, to be worn in such-and-such conditions; and he singed his eyebrows a few nights before he died, when a stove flared up in the dug-out. All of these facts are unknown to the father at the time of his experience. Here, on the face of it, would seem to be a good case: super-normal sight vouchsafed to a trustworthy observer who neither went out of his way to seek it, nor needed it to confirm his faith. Even if we hold that the information may have reached him, telepathically, through the living agency of his son's friends (an advance reading, as it were, of the letters already on their way to him across the ocean), we must still admit that this knowledge dramatised itself to his senses in a super-normal manner. In other words, he had a vision. We may not assert that this vision was not all it seemed to be. We do not know enough, one way or the other. But we can examine the principles under which such super-normal sight develops in the individual; and wherever possibility of human agency exists, we are not justified in going for an explanation outside it.

Here we may lay down an axiom. 'The thing seen is not necessarily the vision, nor the thing heard the message.' Before attempting to develop this, let us consider for a moment what happens in a dream. A lorry, laden with loose sheets of corrugated iron, has occasion to pass along a suburban road at four in the morning. The clatter it makes rouses some sleepers altogether. Upon a few fortunate others it makes no impression at all. The remainder hear the noise, but it does not wake them; they are aware of it in dreams. One man dreams of a prolonged naval engagement. His wife dreams that the new maid-servant has dropped the laden tea-tray down the kitchen stairs. A young

man dreams that he is watching a football match, and has a police rattle in his hand. He whirls the rattle, which makes a noise so loud that the whole game stops, and everyone looks accusingly at him. A grandfather dreams that his naughty grandchild is persistently banging the door on purpose to infuriate him. And so on, *ad infinitum*, as the lorry goes its nefarious way between the rows of silent houses. Now there has in each dreamer's case been a real physical disturbance, the noise of the lorry; and each dreamer has become aware of that disturbance, but not in its original form. The senses of each individual, assaulted by the noise, have presented it to the sleeping consciousness in an individually appropriate guise. They have dramatised the original disturbance according to the peculiarity of the dreamer. The brain of each sleeper receives an image which is an interpretation put upon the original disturbance.

Consider another instance, in which the various grades from interpretation to reality were experienced by one dreamer in a single dream. A well-known lecturer in a London hospital dreamed that he was taking a long country walk. He heard an explosion, and concluded that blasting was going on somewhere. Another explosion, some ten minutes later, confirmed his theory. The next explosion came after a shorter interval, and sounded louder. He looked about, and saw aeroplanes. Bombing practice? Yes, for another explosion followed, and he presently saw a puff of smoke where the bomb fell. Soon, however, his interest gave place to uneasiness, for the bombs were dropped more frequently, and the aeroplanes were coming nearer. They were dropping one every half-minute—every ten seconds—every five seconds: the noise was deafening, the aeroplanes were just overhead; and he woke in terror, to hear his watch ticking loudly close to his ear. It had somehow slipped from beneath his pillow, till his ear was almost touching it. This dream, apart from its interest as evidence of the time-sense in dreams, shows clearly enough the protest of the senses gradually penetrating to consciousness, in growing intensity, till the dreamer wakes, and moves the offending watch to a place of silence. The message is received, but not in the original words. The familiar nightmare of the black cat sitting on one's chest comes under the same category. The bedclothes have somehow been pulled over the sleeper's mouth. His breathing is hampered. His senses, casting hurriedly about for a means of arousing consciousness to deal with the obstruction, derive a terrifying message which causes the sleeper to labour through the first stages of terror and disorientated co-ordination, till he wakes with a cry and flings the bedclothes back. It will be seen, therefore, that in all these cases a real and exterior happening has been dramatised, or interpreted.

by the senses of the dreamer. And a dream, considered in relation to waking life, is a form of super-normal perception. We do not want to lose ourselves in a psychological morass, but I think we can all agree that the aeroplanes, the bombs, the black cat, etc., were not seen in the sense in which we see houses and tramcars and people in the street.

Now let us take our examination a little further. In all the dreams we have considered there has been an ascertainable physical cause for the various images presented to the dreamer's consciousness. These images were 'visions' only in the sense that their correspondence to a material fact was inconstant and distorted. They had no cause outside this material fact and the personal idiosyncrasy of the dreamer. But let us consider a case in which there is still an ascertainable source for the dream, but one which could not normally present itself to the physical senses. A young man, an undergraduate at Oxford, dreams one night that an armchair falls down a flight of stairs and breaks its leg. The next morning he receives a telegram to say that his father has fallen downstairs and broken his leg. He puzzles over the dream for a long time, and tells it to his family. Their only explanation is that when he was a young child his father had had an illness, and used to sit in an armchair by the fire, while the child was brought in and played on the floor. Thus the urgency of his family to inform him of the accident seems telepathically to have reached his sleeping senses, and they in their turn got the message through, except that the symbol which they took from his unconscious memory was no longer valid: the first image which had meant 'father'.

Here is another example, which nearly failed to 'get across' owing to its obscurity. A bachelor, thirty-five years of age, met on his summer holiday a girl some ten years younger. They became great friends, going for long walks together, and talking of every subject under the sun. The girl taught at a school in the North of England; the man was an architect, living in Sussex. They parted at the end of the holiday with great reluctance. The man told her, on their last day, that she was wonderful; that she disproved the old saw about friendship being impossible between the sexes. About six weeks after he had gone back to work he awoke one night from a very vivid dream. He had been sending a telegram of the greatest urgency—but to whom? Rehearsing the dream, he saw the telegram he had sent. Instead of the name and address, there were written a few bars of music. He whistled the air; it seemed familiar, but conveyed nothing to him. The text of the telegram was a blur, but it was signed 'Lee.' Lee was an old nickname of his, long buried. At a stage of his holiday friendship, when rather

they had decided to use a less formal method of address than Miss and Mr., he had suggested it as a substitute for his own Christian name, which she did not think suited him. He got up early the next morning, and rushed round to a medical friend. 'What's this tune? Do you know it?' 'Do I? Wait: let me see. Yes, I've got it. It's from *Mirella*.' The dreamer staggered. *Mirella* was the name, never spoken, which he had given the girl in the privacy of his own mind. So great was the impression of urgency the dream had left, that without a word he travelled north to where the girl was. He found her ill, but so overjoyed at his coming that she progressed several days toward recovery in a minute or so. In answer to his anxious questions, she admitted that she had wanted him to come—had hoped and prayed that he would. The journey and his anxiety had taught him the real state of his feelings towards her, and the two were married soon afterwards.

This dream is remarkable for its indirectness—the incompetence, one might say, with which the senses dramatised the message transmitted to them (I am assuming that in cases of thought-transference the senses act as receivers.) The source of this dream was purely mental, and the form as obscure as the real emotions which the dreamer entertained for the sender of the message. Possibly it was the very depth and secrecy of those feelings, unconfirmed by the conscious mind, which were responsible for the obscurity of the dream.

In the dream which follows occurs a similar reference to a private nickname, though here it was communicated somehow to a third person. S—, a schoolmaster, was about to travel up to London to interview the parents of a girl he wished to marry. His chances were not rosy, as her parents could not regard him as a good match, financially or socially, at any rate, they had the right to expect a better. Just before he started a colleague came and rather awkwardly handed him a bit of paper. 'I tell you this for what it is worth,' it read. 'Last night in a dream I saw the words, "Mrs. Constantia Sylvia S—, of Summertown, Oxford." ' Now there would be nothing remarkable in this were it not for the fact that the girl's name was not Constantia. The schoolmaster had been struck some time previously with a fragment of Latin verse, '*Constantia periet omnis*'; and this fragment had become associated with the girl in his mind. He had never breathed a word of it to a soul—never even called her Constantia in his own thoughts. (The omen, incidentally, proved a happy one.)

Endless examples could be given of this class of dream, but we must confine ourselves to a minimum. Here is one with distortion, misunderstood by the dreamer, but containing a grotesque

element of prophecy. A young composer, brilliantly gifted and of a fine character, dreamed that he was led into a house and tempted by a woman of wonderful but evil beauty. As soon as he yielded to her she disappeared, and he felt another human shape under the clothes on which he was lying. Stripping them off, he was horror-struck to find the dead body of his father, who had died years before. Overcome with remorse, he bent over his father's face; whereupon there appeared upon the forehead a message in old black-letter writing. When he awoke he could remember nothing of the message. The dream made a terrible impression upon him, and he read it—I remember his very words—as a warning that 'the weakness of his flesh would be the end of him.' He was right, but in what a twisted, quibbling sense!—for the weakness of his flesh, which stretched him on the same bier with his father, was not venery, but valvular disease of the heart.

Enough, then, has been said to suggest that in some dreams there is apparently a substitution of images, and that they need scrutiny, not only to read their meaning, but to decide what objects in waking life their images represent. In other words, the 'thing seen' is not always the vision, nor the 'thing heard' the message. Bearing this point in mind, let us now look at another type of dream, the type which is popularly called a vision. Mrs. Jones has lost her son at sea. One night she wakes to see an angel standing by her bed. The room is full of light. The angel looks at her, and tells her that her boy died quickly and without pain, and that he is now happy in heaven, after which Mrs. Jones finds herself in the room alone. No questioning can shake her. It was not a dream—she woke up and saw the angel, and the room full of light. The angel was tall, shining, and very beautiful. Had he wings? Of course he had—lovely long white wings, folded at his back. It is this question of the wings which will be found to agitate Mrs. Jones' community most. Some will accept them as proof that the visitant was 'a real angel.' Others, more sophisticated, will take them as proof that the vision was entirely subjective, since they cannot accept a heavenly being clad in what they regard as the trappings of superstition. But it is Mrs. Jones who is (unconsciously) nearest the truth. Of course her angel had wings; for in all reverence, in what other shape would a heavenly visitant be able to convince Mrs. Jones of his status? Accustomed from childhood to the conventional idea, she would not recognise any other. Her vision has no bearing upon the question whether angels actually possess wings—supposing that such a question could be entertained. Any

image of the Infinite must be a dramatization, like the dramatization of human understanding, partial and inadequate; so that, if we accept the hypothesis of a super-human Intelligence concerned to comfort Mrs. Jones in her affliction, we seriously underestimate its powers if we suppose that it would not very well know how best to drive its message home. If we do not accept that possibility—i.e., in other words, we do not accept the full history of the Christian faith (and we naturally have no right to assume its truth in this context)—even so the wings of Mrs. Jones' angel are no proof that super-normal knowledge has not been conveyed to her. According to our thesis, her senses may have dramatised something in such a way as to give her conscious mind a precise and definite impression.

This dramatisation would appear to be a constant feature of visions. Anyone who has read the story of Jeanne d'Arc will remember the controversy at her trial over the language in which her voices spoke to her. No seer has experienced difficulty in understanding the words of revelation, because the actual words are supplied unconsciously by the seer. Sometimes, however, there are no words heard, but a sound or an impression which the seer claims to have understood. An Irishman of very simple and saintly character, who was killed in 1917, told me that while undergoing an operation some months before his death he had a vision. There were no forms in it, and no words—only wonderful shimmering colours and a dazzling radiance, with deep marvellous notes of a music which he knew to be the voice of our Lord pleading with God the Father not to destroy the world. Before such a record, and from such a source, we must bow our heads in silence; but it is perhaps allowable to observe that a less highly spiritual perception would probably have supplied forms and the spoken word. Many will remember Flaubert's story of the dead maid-servant who came to associate a stuffed parrot with the Holy Ghost. Dying, she saw with the last light of her consciousness '*dans les ciels entr'ouverts . . . un perroquet gigantesque, pittoresque, adouci de sa tête*'. It is no more than reasonable that revelation should come in forms that the seer can recognise; and less fanciful to attribute these recognisable forms to his own mind than to the nature of the mysteries represented.

We must let all such cases as unverifiable, of course insisting at the same time that scrutiny into their details is not necessarily foolish—a point which the traditional Christian is reluctant to grant. That such scrutiny is necessary, whatever its direction or result, must be emphasised too strongly. There is nothing more important than for the man gifted with vision to trust blindly to his power. The power to 'see' and 'hear' is easily developed, and the seer must have control of it. There was an English poet,

once likely to be famous, now all but lost, who wrote a magnificent poem as the result of a vision. Thinking he had found the secret, he indulged in meditation, and encouraged his gift. For a while all was well. Then his admirers noted with consternation that he was beginning to plagiarise. At last a particularly glaring example was pointed out to him. He flew into a rage. The accusation was impious: his poem had been revealed in a vision. He had so cultivated the faculty of 'seeing' that even his memory had learned the trick, and dramatised itself anew before his eyes. How such dramatisation may attain a temporary objective reality—objective, that is to say, in the everyday sense of the word—has already been suggested. Apart from such manifestations as the figure that left footprints in the sawdust, and those which depend upon an altered level of consciousness, we have, according to evidence recently published, a Japanese medium in whose presence was transferred to a sealed photographic plate a recognisable image of a man upon whom his faculties were concentrated. Many mediums have succeeded in similarly reproducing geometrical shapes, and other less elaborate images—suggesting that in favourable circumstances certain shapes or images, the origin of which is purely mental, can so far become objective as to be recorded by a mechanical instrument.

This takes us back to the point discussed in my first article, the alleged objective reality of thought, whether as radiation or energy comparable to a chemical discharge. If the terms in which Sir Frederick Mott's suggestion¹ was illustrated are just, if the claim of the Theosophists to perceive emotion and thought in terms of colour has the physical basis without which it is unthinkable, if the activity of so-called 'mind' can produce effects upon so-called 'matter,' if our Lord's insistence on the importance of right thinking was based upon an understanding of the reality given a terrestrial currency by thought, then one hitherto puzzling class of phenomena, those known as 'spirit' photographs, appear in a new light. The 'spirit' photograph may be nothing but the photographic record of a materialised image derived from the minds of the living sitters or of the photographer. I was personally forced to this conclusion some years ago, much as I would have wished at the time to believe all that was claimed. Such photographs, genuine in the sense that there has been no trickery, are in no sense evidence upon the question of spirit presence. The celebrated photograph of an Armistice Day service at the Cenotaph, showing numerous faint figures above and among the crowd, is only what we might expect in the light of these

¹ That thought and emotion are comparable to a chemical effluvescence, as it were, in the brain, and that with instruments of sufficient delicacy this might be photographed. See my former article in the March number, p. 124.

BIRTH CONTROL AND EUGENICS

Violent feelings are aroused by the subject of Eugenics. The recent utterances of Mr. Justice McCardie have been broadcast in headlines by most of the newspapers in the country, and have provoked much correspondence from their readers. In his plea, not only for the wider dissemination of knowledge of contraception, but also for the legalisation of abortion, the learned judge quoted cases which appealed mainly to our humanitarian sentiments. But his references to the contemporary problem of mental defectiveness showed that he was not unaware of the racial aspects of the measures he advocated. Though the emphasis of eugenics is upon the racial implications of ill-regulated fertility, humanitarian considerations are usually adduced as well by its advocates. Though these two arguments are essentially distinct, a close and instructive relation exists between them which will be discussed in what follows.

If we compare the birth control and the eugenic movements in England to-day, we find that they do not always have the same supporters. Birth control finds its most energetic advocates among feminists and adherents of the Labour Party. From the birth-control propaganda of feminists, the male sex comes out badly. Birth control, it is alleged, will liberate women, not only from the drudgery and suffering of unwanted pregnancies, it will also emancipate them from the tyranny of men. In the Labour Party the argument which probably carries most weight is that the facilities for practising birth control now available for the rich should be made universally accessible for the poor. I have frequently found that among working-class audiences the belief was prevalent that the inhabitants of Mayfair and Kensington had at their disposal perfect contraceptive methods by which, with perfect satisfaction to themselves, they prevented or regulated the birth of their children, but which they kept a closely guarded class secret. I well remember giving a lecture to an exclusively male audience of waterside labourers in Canning Town in the year 1926. The liveliest astonishment was expressed by these men when I finally convinced them that 'the rich' were acquainted with no such methods.

The appeal both of feminist and Labour propagandists is to humanitarian sentiments, and it is to be noted that, of the three political parties, it is the supporters of Labour who most insistently demand that knowledge of birth control should be made generally available. And it is by the Labour Party that the teachings of eugenics are at present most strenuously opposed. The reason for this is not far to seek. As the word implies, eugenics is concerned primarily with the welfare of the race, and only secondarily with personal and humanitarian issues. For reasons which will be set forth later, the eugenicist regards the differential birth rate as racially harmful. He beholds the 'classes' which he considers naturally ill-endowed contributing more than their share to the next generation, while the 'classes' which he regards as best fitted to become parents are contributing less. He will therefore concur with the advocate of birth control in desiring a wider dissemination of knowledge of birth control; but he will do so for different reasons. He will not be primarily actuated by a desire to spare the working-class mother avoidable suffering, but rather by the consideration that on racial grounds the fertility of the 'lower orders' should be restricted. By persons of Labour persuasion, therefore, the doctrines of the eugenicist are regarded as profoundly suspect. If, say these, the poor are inferior to the rich in physique or intelligence, we must seek for the cause of their inferiority in the unfavourable conditions of their environment, in the drudgery of their lives, in their bad food, in the overcrowding and bad housing which is their lot, and not in their inferior hereditary equipment. If, as is alleged, there is a larger proportion of high-grade defectives and subnormal persons among the poor than among the rich, the remedy must be sought in improving the conditions of the poor. Eugenics, a creed which attributes their subnormality to bad heredity, is an elaborate system of rationalised class prejudice, masquerading in the guise of a science.

It will be argued in what follows that an indispensable condition of eugenic progress is the creation, throughout the community, of a eugenic conscience. It is obviously of special importance that such a conscience be inculcated in those who are unfit to become parents. It follows that if the eugenicist intentionally or unintentionally conveys to the depressed classes (among whom he thinks are to be found a large proportion of hereditarily subnormal people) that he wishes their fertility restricted, not because he desires to spare them and their children suffering, but because he dislikes them, he will defeat his own ends and stultify the cause he has at heart.

The eugenic movement derives its impetus from two quite different causes. The first is the popularisation of the evolution

theory and of the Darwinian conception of natural selection; the second is the differential birth rate, a phenomenon which has come into especial prominence in the last fifty years. While the first requires no comment, something may be said of the second. It is well known that the population of these islands has very greatly increased in the last 150 years. It is less well known that the main cause of this increase is to be found in changes, not in the birth rate, but in the death rate. The various factors which have contributed to the fall of the *death rate* in the earlier of these years have been carefully analysed by Mr. G. Talbot Griffiths in his valuable book *Population Problems of the Age of Malibus*. It is not easy for us now to realise what a heavy toll of life was taken in the recent past by such epidemic diseases as small-pox, typhus, cholera and enteric fever. And the mortality rate of those zymotic diseases which are still prevalent among children was rendered much higher in the past than now by reason of the almost universal prevalence of rickets. The fact that rickets was brought about by the absence from the dietary of a necessary vitamin was not known when, in the early stages of the industrial era, the agricultural resources of the country were unequal to supplying the needs of the expanding and congested manufacturing towns. Judged from one aspect, life may be compared to an obstacle race. At different ages, the individual has to overcome certain typical diseases and vicissitudes, which may be compared to hurdles in the race. The effect of the advances in medicine and the improvement in our system of public health which have taken place in the period specified has been to lower the hurdles and to increase the individual's chances of survival. In consequence, many more persons than formerly of inferior resistance and physique now reach maturity and reproduce their kind. Especially from diseases of infancy and childhood have the chances of survival been increased. With the exception of small rises about 1770 and 1820, the death rate has fallen continuously since the year 1730.

As is well known, the *birth rate* began to fall at about the time of the Bradlaugh-Besant trial which took place in 1875. By this trial, wide publicity was given to discussions of birth control, and much controversy has revolved round the question of whether these discussions were causally related to the decline in the birth rate. In the writer's opinion this event exerted its chief effect in spreading the conception of what is now called *Scientific Humanism*. The realisation of man's power to modify his environment to his advantage had been nourished by progress in industry and by the era of scientific invention. It was a logical step to extend this idea to human reproductive processes. Civilised man had learnt to protect himself from hostile natural

agencies to which he had previously resigned himself as if they had expressed the will of God. The idea, now only rarely found among the poor of the older generation, that children are sent by God was doubtless then prevalent. The Bradlaugh-Besant trial constituted a challenge to this quasi-religious belief. From the period of the trial the birth rate has progressively fallen, but has always maintained itself above the death rate, with the result that the population has continuously increased, and is still increasing to-day.

It is a commonplace that the fall in the birth rate has not affected all 'classes' equally. Though the deliberate control of conception may not have been the sole cause of the differential birth rate, most authorities agree that it has been an important contributory factor. It is not difficult to understand how this has come about when the contraceptive methods now at our disposal are scrutinised. Though this is not the place to discuss the matter in technical detail, it may be said that, with the exception of the Gräfenberg ring method, which will be referred to again later, all the contraceptive procedures now in common use demand of the couple practising them either the taking of precautions involving forethought or an act of great self-control at a moment when self-control is not easy, or certain measures of after-care. It will therefore be obvious that not all persons have the capacity to utilise these methods. Anyone who has walked through a slum district on a Saturday night or on a bank holiday and who has looked into the publichouses will quickly realise that many of the men and women he there sees will, on returning to their homes, be relatively incapable of employing existing contraceptive methods. Far less will they be able to exercise that self-control which is still extolled by many dignitaries of the Church as the only permissible means of regulating conception.

These *a priori* expectations are borne out by the findings of the different birth-control clinics which now exist in the United Kingdom. The necessary precautions can be taken either by the man or by the woman. With the exception of one of these clinics—the one which has been founded in Cambridge—the method most frequently taught is one which places the responsibility upon the woman. All the clinics try to maintain contact with their cases, the usual procedure being to ask the woman to visit the clinic every six months. A proportion of the cases, varying from about 90 to 60 per cent. in the different clinics, fails to do this. If reminders by post do not produce the desired visit, the only way by which information can be obtained about these cases is by sending a social worker to their homes to make inquiries. The clinics which, at the time of writing, have insti-

tuted the most careful system of home visiting have been those in Cambridge and North Kensington. The finding of both these clinics is that among the women visited there has been a larger proportion than among those with whom the clinic has maintained contact of cases who have found the method in one way or another impracticable or objectionable and have given it up in favour of some other method or of no method at all. Among these women, the number of unwanted pregnancies is greatly in excess of the number which occurs among those who use the method taught at the clinic, and with whom the clinic maintains touch. It has furthermore been the impression of Mrs. Margaret Lloyd, who obtained particulars, by home visits, of 460 women, who ceased to attend the North Kensington clinic (a majority of whom had abandoned the method taught them at the clinic), that on the whole these women were poorer and lived in worse neighbourhoods than those who visited the clinic as asked, and who used its methods.

A similar general conclusion was reached by the recent Mental Deficiency Committee in regard to the assemblage called by it the 'Social Problem Group,' to which further reference will be made later. This title was invented to embrace a heterogeneous class of persons among whom are included the bulk of chronic unemployables, paupers, inebriates, prostitutes, habitual criminals, epileptics, slum-makers, and *high-grade* mental defectives which afflict the community. Of the fertility of the 'Social Problem Group,' the Mental Deficiency Committee pronounced as follows:

In point of fact, the disparity in the fertility of the normal and sub-normal sections of the population is increasing, the families of the sub-normal group remaining as large as hitherto, while those of the better social classes are steadily diminishing in size.

Many criticisms of birth control are advanced on national, social, personal, and moral grounds by its opponents. The social argument against it frequently takes the cogent form that, from their very nature, existing birth-control methods must act dynogenically by reducing the fertility of the better endowed strains while they leave relatively unchanged the birth rate of the 'Social Problem Group,' whose survival rate is being much raised by the philanthropic activities that are being directed upon it from all sides, and whose contribution to the next generation is therefore much higher now than formerly. It is on considerations such as these that the popular conception of eugenics is sometimes based. As has recently been stated, eugenics involves 'the study of the principles of human heredity in their bearings upon the conservation and progress of the human race. It aims at improving the race by (1) promoting the reproduction of sound

stock, and (a) restricting the fertility of stocks with bad heredity and inferior capacity.' These are the aims of 'positive' and 'negative' eugenics respectively.

To the principles of positive eugenics everyone is prepared to pay pious lip service. All are willing to concede that persons who are physically and mentally healthy, intelligent, and socially useful should have three, four or more children. No antagonisms are excited, and no prejudices are evoked. Yet it is by no means easy to devise appropriate means by which these affirmations may be translated into actions. It has sometimes been argued that if the average citizen was prepared, on behalf of his country, to face the risks of life-long mutilation and of painful death in the emergency of a war, he will *a fortiori* be ready, in peace-time, to make the lesser sacrifice of comfort and luxuries involved in bringing up three or four children, provided that he can be convinced that this course of action is really demanded by the interests of his country. This argument may well be pressed, but French experiences throw much doubt upon its validity. There is a sense of adventure and glamour about setting out for a war. The imagination is stirred, and powerful instincts are aroused in a way that can rarely occur in peace-time. The campaign for more babies and larger families has received political backing in France. It is often reinforced by a system of family allowances and by the fear of a hostile and thickly populated Germany. Yet its results leave much to be desired from a nationalist standpoint.

In Italy the campaign would appear to have been more successful. What would be the results of such propaganda in England? It is difficult to answer this question. The economic inducements are difficult to regulate in such a way that they will not act dysgenically. An allowance of 5s. a week for each additional child would provide little inducement to parents with a relatively high standard of living to increase their families; but it might easily constitute an incentive to members of the 'Social Problem Group'. The various ways in which family allowances might be regulated have been closely studied by the Family Endowment Society¹ and have received careful attention from eugenicists such as R. A. Fisher. Complex sentiments are aroused when a parent is asked to decide between the national and racial claims of a large family, and his own inclination to produce only as many children as he can have educated in a manner compatible with his family tradition and his parental ambitions. In such issues the British system of public schools and universities is involved. At present the general belief that this country is over-populated militates with the success of a comprehensive scheme of positive eugenics. So does the increas-

¹ 10 Abingdon Street, London, S.W. 1.

ing financial stress by which the country is burdened. But conditions may become more favourable in the future. If, as is prophesied, the population of this country becomes stationary about the year 1950, or if by then it has begun to decline, and if the economic situation of the world becomes stabilised in such a way as to justify provident people in looking to the future with confidence instead of with the profound misgiving which now universally prevails, then the precepts of positive eugenics may find fruitful acceptance. Or they might yield results before then if they were vigorously expressed in a combined appeal from a National Government, the United Churches, and the Royal Family. As frequently observed by foreigners, it is impossible to predict how the English will behave.

The principles of negative eugenics, unlike those of positive, are far from commanding universal assent. Their practical application by such means as contraception, eugenic sterilisation, and legal prohibition of marriage are often opposed on religious grounds. And on social grounds powerful beliefs operate against them. While freely conceding that 'heredity plays a part' in the breeding of race-horses and live-stock, and that it has been the dominant factor in the process of artificial selection by which we have acquired our domesticated plants, many people refuse to acknowledge that it has any significant bearing on human beings. The man who fervently believes that all men have equal rights, often further believes that they have equal endowments and aptitudes. Environmental causes are held accountable for the differences which people exhibit in these respects. Such causes are discerned in the deplorable conditions of the poor in industrial towns, in air raids and other 'pre-natal' impressions, in minor accidents or injuries sustained by the pre-parturient mother, in psychic traumata that deform the mind in infancy, and in other occurrences. Diseases and defects of genetic origin manifesting themselves in children are almost invariably 'put down to' some such causes as these by their parents, as was recently noted in an investigation of the reasons assigned by parents for the mental defectiveness of a group of children in London County Council Schools.² By people whose minds are thus oriented the principles of negative eugenics will be found highly obnoxious. I have even encountered some to whom they appeared sacrilegious in that they imputed deliberate maleficence to the Deity. Nevertheless, practical results would seem at present to be more attainable in the sphere of negative eugenics than in that of positive.

There are two large groups of people who should be supplied with means for limiting or preventing the output of children.

² Annual Report of London County Council, 1931.

The first group comprises those who exhibit or carry hereditary diseases or defects; the second those who are innately or endowed in respect of the characteristics that make for useful citizenship that they prove themselves to be incorrigibly burdensome to the community. I will briefly touch upon these two groups.

Many agencies are now conspiring to inculcate a sense of the responsibilities of marriage and parenthood. One of the effects of this growing awareness is an increased demand for eugenic prognosis. If a person contemplating marriage has ancestors or collateral relatives who exhibit a hereditary disability, and if that person is conscious of his parental and social duties, he will probably be moved to seek advice as to the chances of the disability appearing among his descendants. In the course of the last eighteen months my opinion has frequently been asked about such problems. I have found that the question usually takes one of the following three forms: 'Ought I to get married?' 'If I get married, ought I to have children?' and 'If I have children, what are the chances of their being affected by such and such a disease?' It is obvious that the first two questions are more general than the last, and place upon the doctor a double responsibility. In the first place, he is expected to form a private opinion of what the chances are of the defect appearing; in the second, he is asked to advise the questioner as to the course he should adopt. That is to say that the obligation is here placed upon him of taking into account the good qualities exhibited in the questioner's pedigree no less than the bad, and of giving a balanced judgment in which personal and racial considerations simultaneously enter. But when the problem is put to the medical adviser in the form of the third question, he is not expected to balance the favourable and unfavourable elements in the pedigree. He is merely asked to give an estimate of a possibility or a probability. On the basis of this estimate, the questioner is, in this case, prepared to take the decision as to whether he will or will not get married, or as to whether children will or will not be born. He does not want the doctor to decide for him.

In the present state of our knowledge of hereditary diseases, it is by no means easy to make these prognostications. The literature of the subject is widely scattered, and, in many cases, is thickly interspersed both with the special terminology of the new science of genetics and with higher mathematics. With neither of these is the average medical man familiar. Though two valuable books have recently appeared upon the subject of hereditary diseases,² they are neither of them written by medical men, and

² *Mendelism in Man*, by Professor R. Gates (Constable); *Human Mendelism*, by Barr, Fisher and Lane (George Allen and Unwin).

they somewhat lack the clinical orientation which is needed for the purpose of giving a eugenic prognosis. With the aim of remedying this deficiency I am now engaged in editing a book which will have this essentially practical object. It will take the form of a symposium of contributions, written by medical men with special knowledge of those categories of disease which are recognised as being hereditary, and will be arranged in such a way as to place before the general practitioner, in language intelligible to him, the information at present available for giving eugenic prognoses. In the majority of cases these prognoses will be tentative and uncertain. Our knowledge of the mode of inheritance of many hereditary diseases is still fragmentary, and the available pedigrees have not been subjected to the necessary mathematical treatment. If, however, an interest in the subject can be awakened throughout the general population and the medical profession, there is every reason to hope that more abundant and accurate data will become available. Co-operation must be established between the clinical observer, the geneticist, and the statistician. Along statistical lines valuable work is now being done by Dr. Lancelot Hogben, the recently appointed Professor of Social Biology at the London School of Economics. By methods such as those being elaborated by him our knowledge of the genetics of many human traits and diseases will be made more accurate and complete, and our powers of giving definite and useful prognoses enhanced. It must always be remembered, however, that the people who ask for such prognoses may be superior people with many socially valuable qualities. The improvident and feckless will not seek advice upon such matters. We must, therefore, be on our guard against allowing our knowledge of the genetics of human disease from acting dyogenically.⁴

I now turn to the second group above mentioned of persons whose fertility there are grounds for wishing restricted—namely, those who do not necessarily exhibit specific hereditary diseases, but who have innate characteristics which make them socially burdensome or harmful. In an investigation into the incidence of mental defectiveness recently instituted jointly by the Board of Control and the Board of Education, it was found by the Mental Deficiency Committee previously alluded to that the families into which low-grade and high-grade defectives were born showed different characteristics. Since environmental causes such as post-natal diseases and birth injuries contribute more to the production of low-grade defectives (those defined by

⁴ Those interested in the recording of pathological elements in their pedigree, or in making records of their pedigree which will be of genealogical rather than medical interest, can obtain information by communicating with the Secretary, the Eugenics Society, 20 Convent Garden, London, E.W. 1.

low as idiots and imbeciles) than high-grade, and since the incidence of these environmental factors is largely unselective, it would be surprising to find that low-grade defectives occurred more frequently in any one element of the community than another. This expectation was borne out by a finding of the Mental Deficiency Committee that the homes of low-grade defectives differed in no significant respect from the homes of average normal people. Since, however, hereditary factors contribute more to the production of high- than of low-grade defectives, it would not be surprising to find that high-grade defectives were born from families which, in respect to their social efficiency and the conditions of their homes, are appreciably below the average. Again, this was borne out by the investigation.⁵ In brief, it was found that high-grade defectives appeared in families whose other constituent members, while not necessarily certifiably defective, were below average in health, intelligence, and social usefulness. Among them would, in the words of the report, be found 'a much larger proportion of insane persons, epileptics, paupers, criminals (especially recidivists), unemployables, habitual slum dwellers, prostitutes, inebriates and other social inefficients than would a family not including mental defectives'. For reasons set forth in the report, this assemblage was named the 'Social Problem Group.' Of this group the report further stated that its anti-social characteristics are the result mainly of inferior heredity, and that its fertility is higher than that of any other social element. The existence of such a group has not been seriously questioned by anyone. From all points of view, it is surely desirable that every facility should be placed at the disposal of the members of this group for restricting the output of children.

If, then, it be agreed that (1) certain sufferers from or carriers of hereditary diseases, and (2) members of the 'Social Problem Group' should limit or prevent the birth of children, what methods are we to advocate for bringing this about? The following means have been suggested: abstinence from sexual intercourse, legal prohibition of marriage, segregation, contraception, sterilisation, and abortion.

Sexual abstinence is usually advocated by persons who are influenced by religious preconceptions rather than by facts. The relevant facts concerning the sexual habits of married couples have been carefully investigated in America.⁶ And as there is no reason to suppose that the sexual behaviour of married couples in this country differs greatly from that of American couples, it seems to me that those who preach abstinence as a generally

⁵ Part IV., p. 202.

⁶ *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-one hundred Women*, H. B. Davis (Chicago), p. 21.

practicable measure are completely out of touch with realities. They fail to recognise that there are few respects in which men and women are more variable than in their sexual needs, and that a measure which is practicable, if not actually easy, for a person with weak sexual instincts or else with a developed capacity for sublimation may be harmful or even impossible for persons otherwise constituted. While abstinence is indubitably the best method for certain probably rare types, the simple statistics of the sexual habits of married couples show that it is a waste of time to advocate it as a general principle.

The legal prohibition of marriage has been advocated by the Board of Control, the recent Mental Deficiency Committee, and by certain medical writers as a means, not only of retaining control of mental defectives under guardianship and supervision, but also as a means of checking their fertility. The measure is obviously inapplicable to any but defectives. To me it seems that, in so far as this measure is intended as a check upon fertility, it would be ineffective, cruel, socially dangerous, and administratively inexpedient. It would be ineffective, because it would not prevent illegitimate births, which already are all too common among high-grade defectives; cruel, in that many high-grade defectives have strong sexual needs which could without social danger be gratified in marriage, provided one or both partners were sterilised; socially dangerous in that the measure, involving as it does a frustration of sexual needs, would constitute an incitement to promiscuity, and would consequently promote the spreading of venereal diseases, and administratively inexpedient in that it would seriously interfere with the processes of ascertainment and certification. (The parent of a defective child might well hesitate to consent to the certification of that child if he knew that an inevitable consequence of this procedure would be that the child would be for ever prohibited from marrying.) It is indeed surprising that this stupid and futile measure should have received such widespread support.

Like the legal prohibition of marriage, segregation is a measure which is only strictly applicable (apart from criminals and sufferers from infectious or contagious diseases) to mental defectives. For those defectives whose anti-social propensities are so marked that they are unfit to live in the general community even under close guardianship or supervision it is incomparably the best method. In fact, it is the only possible method for those short of euthanasia. By the Mental Deficiency Committee, however, it was only deemed necessary to provide institutional accommodation for one-third of the total of 300,000 defectives who are estimated to exist in England and Wales. The accommodation available at present falls far short of this requirement,

and it is to be hoped that, despite the economic depression which now prevails, it may prove possible to remedy this unfortunate deficiency. It will be clear, however, that segregation is wholly inapplicable to the mentally normal sufferer from a hereditary physical disease or defect, and to the 'Social Problem Group.'

The inadequacy of existing contraceptive methods for the 'Social Problem Group' has already been commented upon. The ideal contraceptive should be wholly reliable, fool-proof, harmless both to the couple practising it and to children they may later wish to have, aesthetically unobjectionable, and cheap. No existing method fulfils all these requirements. While the methods taught at the clinics under the jurisdiction of the Society for the Provision of Birth Control Clinics and at the mothers' clinic of Dr. Stopes are uninjurious, they are not wholly reliable, nor are they fool-proof. The Gräfenberg ring method, though fool-proof (the woman is absolved from taking precautions after the ring has been inserted in the womb), is neither reliable nor harmless.¹ Pending the discovery of simpler and more reliable contraceptive methods, it is in the direction of sterilisation that we must look for the best means of limiting the fertility of the 'Social Problem Group.' The legalising of sterilisation for mental defectives and the utilisation of this measure for sufferers from hereditary diseases or defects have recently been much discussed in the Press. The subject is highly complicated, and only one of its aspects can be touched upon here—namely, the inexpediency of making the measure compulsory.

Sterilisation laws are now in operation in nineteen of the States of the United States, wherein 10,877 operations were officially performed before January 1, 1930. In seven of these States provision is made for compulsory sterilisation only, in seven for voluntary and compulsory sterilisation, and in five for voluntary sterilisation only. The tendency in those States which have both compulsory and voluntary clauses has been to use the compulsory clauses less and less. That low-grade persons should have children is clearly undesirable both in their own and in their children's interests. In the measure that this fact is realised and a eugenic conscience comes into existence, so has it been found that sterilisation is voluntarily sought. The principle of compulsion, even if compatible with the political ideals of certain American States, is unsuited to the sentiments which prevail in this country. Moreover, it could justly be represented as constituting a form of religious persecution. By Roman Catholics and others sterilisation is opposed on religious grounds. If sterilisation were

¹ Cf. Report for 1931 of International Medical Group for the Investigation of Contraception. Obtainable from National Birth Control Association, 25 Euston Street, London, S.W. 1.

made compulsory, the measure could logically be applied to Roman Catholics and to their children. It, however, is made conditional on the consent of the subject as well as on other safeguards, as has been done in the Bills drafted by the Eugenics Society; conscientious objectors have no adequate grounds for opposition. Because persons of Jewish persuasion think it immoral to eat the flesh of the pig, they do not find it necessary to impose dietetic restrictions upon people who do not share their scruples. People who disapprove of contraception and sterilisation on religious grounds should remember that their views as to the moral turpitude of these actions are not universally prevalent. Such people should therefore be prepared to concede to others the liberty of conscience and of practice which is conceded to them.

The 'Social Problem Group' has a high reproductive rate. This is undoubtedly in part attributable to the fact that contraceptive methods are not yet sufficiently simple, fool-proof, and cheap. But it does not follow from the fact that the group is a fertile one that all the children born in it are wanted. Among members of this group, I have rarely found that more than the first three of their often numerous children were deliberately wanted. The others are frequently conceived accidentally or in a spirit of dumb unquestioning fatalism. Attempts on the part of the parents to limit their families perhaps more often take the form of efforts to procure abortion than to make use of birth control. Though the question of legalising abortion is highly complicated, particularly in respect of the psychological effects upon the woman, it seems to me that, in view of the inadequacy of available birth-control methods for the 'Social Problem Group' and of the possible reluctance of the group to ask for sterilisation, the measure would, so far as this group is concerned, have valuable eugenic effects. When contraceptive methods are improved, however, abortion will be much less practised than now.

But it must always be remembered that the group as a whole is an unhappy one, wherein much suffering is endured. Those who, on racial grounds, wish to see the families of this group reduced are by no means blind to the hardships against which they have to struggle. If the measures which we place at their disposal for limiting their fertility are voluntary measures, their successful operation will clearly depend on the existence throughout the group of a eugenic conscience. It is surely obvious that those so-called eugenicists, who talk contemptuously of 'the lower orders' and refer to the 'Social Problem Group' in such terms as 'drugs' and 'scum,' will engender, not only in the group itself, but throughout the working classes generally, a profound mistrust of the whole eugenic movement. They will defeat their own ends and stultify the cause they are trying to espouse.

In the opinion of the writer, the cause of eugenics can at the present time be most usefully served by the pursuit of three aims. In the first place, let us continue to inculcate a eugenic conscience throughout the community, and let us so train this conscience that it will serve the ends of positive eugenics no less than of negative. In the second place, let us realise that at present we can only give eugenic prognoses with any pretence of accuracy in a small number of rare and socially unimportant *diseases*, and that much more knowledge is required before such prognoses can play a significant part in preventive medicine. And lastly, let us not speak disparagingly of the 'Social Problem Group.' Let it be felt in our references to them and in our propaganda among them that we wish to help them and to alleviate their hardships. Though the racial and humanitarian issues are distinct, they are here compatible and complementary. By stressing the humanitarian rather than the racial, we shall best serve our interests and, more important, theirs. And—a point sometimes forgotten—we shall further display the elementary virtues of tact and politeness.

C. P. BLACKER.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE FRENCH EXHIBITION

I do not know whether the old game of 'French and English' is still played as I remember it at school. It doubtless dated from the ancient tugs-of-war between those nations, as did my nurse's earlier encouragement, 'He'll live to fight the French.' I actually lived to be a champion of the French at a time when their modern art was far from popular among us, and I have survived to see a mounting flood of admiration which had its high-tide mark with the recent exhibition—so high that in the spate of books, articles and lectures called forth our native art has been having a bad and humble time: 'poor' Reynolds dismissed with a shrug; the giant Turner left out of enumeration or used as a foil for the mild gifts of Pissarro; Alfred Stevens, whom Ingres would certainly have appreciated, left out; Constable alone unsubmerged and allowed to be great because of French approval.

A hundred years ago the tug-of-admiration was from the other side. Géricault had been to England and had been ravished by the portrait, landscape and animal painting he found. 'There only,' he says, 'does one know what colour and effect are . . . one must not blush to return to school . . . here they complain of the bad character of their drawings and envy the French school as more skilful; why don't we also complain of our defects?' What he needed, he felt, was 'to be steeped in the English school.' James Ward was among those he justly admired and copied. Delacroix took up the strain. Not only was he an associate of the Fieldings and admirer of Bonington in France. The kind of conversion of the eye that he owed to Constable is famous, but he also admired Turner as 'an innovator'; over the sketches of Wilkie he became rhapsodical, and he has praise for lesser men like Lealie, and for English drawing:

France, the pretended land of drawing, has really no trace of it, and the most pretentious pictures no more. In those little English drawings each object almost is treated with the interest it demands; landscapes, interiors, costumes, battles, all is charming, hitting the mark, above all, *drawn*.

Nor did his appreciation stop there. As Professor Tonks has reminded us, the Pre-Raphaelites found him alert and receptive as ever. He goes on:

POSTSCRIPT TO THE FRANCE EXHIBITION 409

If one turns to another place, and a novel one, what is called 'the dry school,' recalling Flemish primitives, under that look of reserve in the dryness of the procedure is to be found a feeling of genuine, native truth. What good faith in the midst of the pretended imitation of old pictures! Compare, for example, the *Order of Release* by Millais with our 'primitives,' our Byzantines, obstinate stylists, who, their eyes fixed on the images of another time, took from them only the stiffness, with nothing added of their own. That troop of diurnal mediocrities is enormous; not a touch of the truth that comes from the soul; not one like that child who slumbers in the arms of his mother, and whose little silky hair, his sleep so full of truth, all the features to the red legs and feet, are singular for observation, but above all for feeling.

The *Strayed Sheep* of Holman Hunt gave him as sharp and agreeable a thrill. 'The picture which appears the most false is precisely the most true.'¹ Three years later (1858) there is another note. He says that if he came to London he would have 'to break a lance for Reynolds, and for the ravishing Gainsborough.' But for a time he was no less excessive and forgetful in his admiration and contempt than our own critics now, for we indulge ourselves, not seldom, in outrageous modesties and abasements. Twenty years later the Impressionists declared their debt to Turner, and on Renou there was almost certainly an influence from Millais.

Unfortunately for us, these warm acknowledgments from artists were not accompanied or followed by any marked importation, public or private, of the English school: Gainsborough and Turner are still misrepresented in the Louvre by false attributions, and others by inconsiderable work. The modern section is a little better off with gifts from England. France is a strongly self-sufficient country, in art as in corn and wine; it is part of her wisdom and her luck, if she imports, it is painters, not pictures. England is the huge importer in kind, with such benefits and such pains of indigestion as that implies.

The nineteenth century was given the foremost place at the exhibition. Was it, in a long review, the 'great century' of French art, as we are told? The most original, perhaps, in oil-painting, with Oriental and English roots for the originality. But the greatest period in which France led the world was surely the Gothic age of architecture, sculpture, glass-painting, tapestry and the rest. Nicolas Poussin, in the century of Rubens, Velasquez and Rembrandt, reached world rank. If we are ever tempted to think of him as merely a French 'Old Master,' emerging for them from the days of the Italian eclectic decline, and painting Bacchanals in the wake of Titian that sometimes remind us

¹ Baudelaire, endorsing Gautier, 'qui est immédiatement britannique en genre,' adds the names of William Hunt and Cattermole, J. Chalon, 'gauche comme Watteau, rêveur comme Claude,' Sir F. Grant, 'héritier de Reynolds,' Macdonald, Mack, Landseer, 'dont les bêtes ont des yeux pleins de pensée,' Noel Paton.

of Oxford done practising the Morris dance, a picture like *L'Inspiration du Peuple* is there to give us the lie. In the matter, as in the lesser counts of painting, this was the masterpiece of the exhibition, and if Poussin had painted no other it would stamp him as having relit, in the torch-race of the nations, one guttering flame. French painting turned to other sources, and a lesser man, his fellow-exile Claude Lorrain, was to be a fruitful influence with ourselves.

In the Gothic period England had been a province of the Christian art which centred in France. Religion and politics broke up that relation and she turned her eyes northwards. In the eighteenth century, though French civilisation filtered in to mould our then compact and well-balanced society, little of contemporary French painting was imported. Our collectors took France as a stage on the Italian pilgrimage. The Revolution and Napoleonic wars shut the gates again, and behind them our landscape school of Crome and Constable and Turner grew to its dominating height; to be followed by the peculiar English development of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. When Delacroix became ardently aware of both we seem to have been incurious about Paris. Turner, a mighty traveller, did call on Delacroix, but not to much purpose; Rossetti admired Ingres, but detested Delacroix as 'slosh'. Ruskin must have been unfortunate in the examples he came across; the salons of the 'sixties and 'seventies concealed, by exclusion, most of the new talent; the officially and popularly eminent blocked the view. Then, in the 'eighties, the teaching of Legros helped to determine a stream of students to Paris, to learn drawing, and the New English Art Club was founded, with, at first, a strong flavour of Bastien-Lepage. But even in the 'nineties it was impossible for Manet and Degas, Monet and Renoir, to make any headway with English collectors. In Scotland there had been considerable buying of Courbet, Corot, Rousseau, Daubigny, Dupré, Monticelli, along with the contemporary Dutch, and the 'Barbizon school' made some lodgment in Bond Street. That movement culminated in the Glasgow Exhibition of 1900.

If private collectors were slow, the public collections were slower. The National Gallery had never bought a French picture even of the eighteenth century, except a Vigée Le Brun; it was the gift of the Wallace Collection that brought in the most French of the ages, with the omission, alas, of Chardin and Perronneau, and a less carefully assorted nineteenth century, doubly taboo in Trafalgar Square. It was by the formation of Hugh Lane's collection that the 'Impressionists,' so-called, first made good over here, to be accepted, after rejection in Dublin, for exhibition in the National Gallery, then rejected, and again accepted.

THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE FRENCH EXHIBITION

When I negotiated with Lord Curzon for their exhibition at the Tate Gallery he frankly admitted that he had been 'appalled' when he saw the pictures.

The next step in the friendly invasion was taken at a very different pace. I know that a certain mythology already surrounds it—namely, that the 'Post-Impressionist' exhibitions met with execration. No doubt from some visitors they did; but the fact remains that conversions took place by platoons, and that the solid newspapers were on the side of the unfamiliar. Nearly everyone, now, was eager to be 'advanced,' and acquisition followed, at an accelerating speed.

The exhibition, if not up to living date, was a register, in a rough way, of backward-looking taste. Such a judgment by the French organisers is of course not final—fashion plays a part; but both judgment and fashion have their interest. Of the eminent *salonniers* who would have filled such a collection fifty years ago few survived; the door was held ajar for single pieces by Baudry, Cabanel, Henner and Bonnat. Time may bring some revenge. The amusement to be obtained from the art of Modigliani's dolls may wear thin beside character as recorded in Victor Hugo's portrait by a poor relation of Rembrandt; for painting is history among other things. Twenty years later Courbet, Corot, Millet, Monticelli, the painters of Fontainebleau, Troyon, would have taken the lead. Courbet's most ambitious picture was skied, as was Millet's *Spring*. His *Homme à la Houe* was on the line, but embrowned, both in colour and, by the current suspicion of rhetoric, in esteem. More striking still was the repudiation of what may be called the Chauchard Corot, the stereotype of vaporous trees with a furniture of nymphs. Not all of that Corot will die, but too much is dead-alive, and contemporary taste falls back on a few of the chiefly Roman pieces and the little studio figures that he never exhibited. One of these only was shown, the delightful girl in a rose dress. Unfamiliar painters were few, but that rare Marseillais, Paul Guigou, who for years has been one of the charms of the Luxembourg, was given the place he deserves. Later still Claude Monet would have been in the forefront: he, too, is out of fashion; he was poorly represented and displayed. But before dealing further with his period two masters are to be reckoned with who have escaped in the taking down of idols. Ingres and Delacroix are still left on their pedestals in a world that has ebbed away from classic or romantic grandeur. I do not think any English critic except Charles Ricketts (a sworn Baudelairean in these matters) has ever been able quite to match the French fervour over Delacroix. Another of our painters, indeed, has put it that he was 'a French Sir John Gilbert,' and there is an unkind truth in the saying about much of his diffused illustration.

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The *Femmes d'Alger*, which was taken from its consecrated place in the Louvre, has few of his merits. It is like a magnified, lumpy Bonington. Suffering, passion, violent action were required to call out Delacroix' gifts of form and colour; witness the widow in the *Justice of Trajan*, her intensity of appeal, the flash of pallid flesh and of blue and white about it. He knew himself that she was the best part of the picture. But there is another figure in the crowd which has a curious interest, because it brings Delacroix and Ingres together across the categories in a common love of the plastically heroic. Ingres' *St Symphorien*, so dull in spite of buried beauties of drawing, has a victor in the foreground, inspired, I suppose, by Raphael's slave in *Lo Spasimo*, where Christ is dragged to execution. There is a magnificent drawing by Ingres for this figure, which is ever so cunningly posed and turned so that it is firmly based on the straddled legs, with arms and head and torso compacted into monumental form. In Delacroix' picture there is a corresponding figure, with just those variations that the borrower introduces to justify his loan. And Sir William Rothenstein, to whom I mentioned this, remembered that he had once possessed a tracing, by Delacroix, from Ingres' figure.

But that is a detail. Those artists mark the point from which the heroic, in painting, was to dwindle. A *St Symphorien* or *St. Sebastian* or a romantic lover transcends mortality because of his belief in immortal survival; when that goes, the wind of passion drops. Millet's transposition of the heroic into peasant forms, Puvis's pastorals, Chassériau's lost frescoes were lingerers on the stage. Sculpture, by its nature, was less amenable to change.

What remained for the painter? An immense deal, of course, at a lower temperature, that safe world of everyday which already had its masters in the seventeenth century Louis Le Nain and the eighteenth century Chardin, with their fine scrutiny of the object and rich grain of pigment. And the world of the common made clean and of the 'ugly' seen as pictorially beautiful widened immensely for the artist when the all-accepting eye of the camera had been turned upon the casual. In the old poetry only a very few things could be spoken of; Whitmanism dumped a stores catalogue upon the page. So in painting the rigorous tradition of human pose and natural 'properties' was thrown to the winds. Courbet was the revolutionary figure. More was interred at Ornans than the local corpse, though there the burial was still monumentally attended. The inclusions were not always happy. Snow, for example, is a striking spectacle, but it calls for management in the tone and colour of light and proportion in distribution if it is to be pictorially tolerable. With Courbet it

can be a chilly negation of the picture. Nor are his *renuissaux cheveux* very well chosen, unless, as Degas so wickedly put it, for another purpose. That painter's curiosity in new matter was matched with a designer's eye for cryptic balance; but in how many of the 'Impressionist' Sunday-out landscapes is the diagonal of the near river-bank and horizontal of the farther, along with some blot of a bridge, helplessly accepted?

The casual throws up unintended beauties, no doubt, and the mechanical has its own austere graces; but the steady encroachment of the machine is a killer of vital beauty, the reason being that the sources of power and movement are no longer visibly expressed. The automobile hurtles through space, but the secret of its movement is concealed; the tractor covers the ground economically but stupidly, replacing the ploughman and his horses, who will soon, like the thresher, be legendary; Trajan sits at the window of his car, even the airplane does not flap its wings, but shoots like a parcel, and those intermediate forms the paddle steamer and puffing engine give place to vehicles obscurely driven. The visibly heroic in War and Love and Labour are going the way of other uncomfortables, and Ruskin, the unheeded prophet of the beginnings, is far outpaced in the dizzy race of progress by the prophet of a brave new day, Mr. Aldous Huxley.

The exhibition did not go far beyond the Ruskinian period. If it had, we should have seen how the artist, sensitive to a changed world, could lose interest in the appearance of humanity, of the office and the factory-insect, and was fain to lump man with the machine in a geometry no longer intentionally tragic, as in the *Avignon Field*. Something of the sort had already been practised in Lagado, capital of Laputa, as described by Mr. Huxley's prototype.

Their ideas are perpetually convergent in lines and Figures. If they would for example praise the Beauty of a Woman, or any other animal they describe it by Rhombs, Circles, Parallelograms, Ellipses, and other Geometrical Terms, or by words of art drawn from Music, here needless to repeat. I observed in the King's Kitchen all Sort of mathematical and musical Instruments, after the Figures of which they cut up the Joints that were served to his Majesty's Table.

What will be the fate of the post-Courbet painters in another twenty years? Clearly it will go hardly with them when there is no strong element of design to reinforce casual charm. Much of Monet will go under for that reason, and even the positive part of him, the fine discrimination of colour-play, is already suffering, because oil paint is a terrible reducer of high pitch and of nuances. The variations in Constable's greens that Delacroix noted are not

so obvious to-day. But in twenty years the tiresome misdescriptions and blinding theories associated with the labels 'Impressionist' and 'Post-Impressionist' will have faded out, and the painters will be accepted more nearly for what each of them is. If 'Impressionist' means the group who exhibited together under that nickname, then Manet, Degas and Cézanne were impressionists as well as Monet and Renoir. If narrowed to Monet's characteristic painting, 'Impressionism' means out-of-door notation of transient illumination, and chiaroscuro reduced in favour of coloured shadows. Manet was drawn away on this track, and if he gained some beauties lost others, and greater. Degas might have attempted the open-air, but the dazzle of light was too much for his eyes, 'trop Monet pour moi'. Cézanne adopted the out-of-door programme in a desperate wrestle, because he was a slow and painful worker. He preferred the broader painting of Manet to the smaller analysis of Pissarro and Monet and some part of Renoir.

Before I deal further with Monet's co-exhibitors I will indulge in a rather personal aside on that question of labels, for critics, as well as painters, suffer from ticketing. Professor Herbert Read has recently taken me to task as a victim of 'strict' categories because of an attempt to give a useful sense to the terms 'Classic' and 'Romantic', and rather paradoxically he complains that I have not included yet another—namely, 'Intellectual' art. His account of that, in his little book *The Meaning of Art*, bristles with contradictions. But the terms as I used them, along with a third, did precisely define three intellectual attitudes of the imagination. And my view of categories is this. If we attempt to say anything of a general character about a group of artists we inevitably introduce a category, and the category, if it is to have any value, should be strict, and not vague. But if we fall in love with it, and press it beyond its relevance all that it leaves out in the living variable works of art escapes from its constraint to mock our pedantry. There is good sense in calling Ingres a Classic, but there are parts of him, as of the ancient Classics, which may be dubbed Romantic. It is vaguely laudatory, but inapposite, to call Cézanne a Classic.

But my immediate difference is with writers like Mr. Fry and the critic of *The Times* who ticket me off as a champion of the Impressionists, and of them only. It is true that I rashly took over the word 'Impressionism' to mean the action of the interested eye as it affects the field of 'camera' vision, controlling its detail and imposing design upon it for the spectator's purpose. The business man, hurrying to his station of a morning, is a wild impressionist, in that sense, in what he picks out and discards: so the painter, for his purposes. But this use of the word had no

restricted application to the Impressionists proper, just as little as the theories of three-dimensional design have to do with 'Post-Impressionists.' My appreciation of Monet was always a guarded one. I thought he had conventionalised one intoxication of the eye, that he was an original artist, but incomplete. As an eminent student of art put it to me the other day, 'The artists give us so little, we must be glad to take what they give.' It seemed to me that Manet and Degas gave more, and they, therefore, in this group, had my chief devotion.

I think so still. Manet, it seems to me, is the real master of that period, however much his designing power became whittled away. His *Olympia* is the great achievement of the later nineteenth century in France. The idol-woman has run through French art since the beginning. She is behind the hieratic geometry of Fouquet's *Virgin*, declared in the adorable sculptured virgin from Toulouse who is so distracted from her Child; from Fontainebleau and Clouet, Gouyon and Germain Pilon, she passes to the eighteenth century painter-gallants and to Houdon. But this last of the Adorations, which seemed at first blasphemous, because of the old strain, is also new. It has absorbed broad Oriental colour-plotting without renouncing the Western birth-right of modelling. It has the 'poster' virtue of high visibility without shallowness. It is a wonder of design, and of sensuous pleasure in the handling of his material by a native of paint. The exhibition brought out a less familiar example, and a less exacting, in the *Soap Bubbles*. How it took the eye, far or near, boldly but delicately silhouetted its rich greys separating out their elements in the blue of the dish, the muted rose and yellow of the flesh. Chardin's treatment of the theme should have been here, but his *Desnudeur*, big-in-little, has a like breadth and subtlety. How he had distributed his red and blue elements, tearing a little hole in the draughtsman's coat for a spot of the former, dosing that and the wall with the gray-blue powdering of light! The *Bon Bock* also is safe for the future. The *Brioche* and *Folies Bergères* are on the border-line, with exquisite Paris. In the former the blue-white napkin is lovely in itself, but, unlike the sheets in the *Olympia*, isolated as a colour-shape, the flowers and the fruit fall away in quality.

Renour has had better luck than Monet of late years, and was evidently the darling of the organisers, for there were inclusions such as the *Pierrot* and a wretchedly spotty garden scene that only an overweening fondness could explain. With him, too, design is spasmodic and often absent. Mr Wilenski, it is true, ranks him among 'architectural' painters, yet the *Mother and Child* he gives for example has as much architecture in it as a Victorian 'pouf.' *La Yole* has the fascination of its shimmering blue

atmosphere ; but how helpless a disposition of forms ! *La Loge* has the personal charm and the harmony of black, white, rose and pearly flesh in the principal figure ; but there is dislocation in the balance and direction of the man's. The leading count in Renour is, after all, the forbidden charm of loveliness, the deliciousness of his young girls along with the blond glister of their flesh. Such attractions would be rebuked in an English painter, but they pass through our critical custom-house perhaps as 'psychological volumes,' the latest alias under which meaning may be smuggled into the 'purity' of a picture.

Degas was more variously than conclusively represented. The Orient brought him novelties of design in perspective and balance, but his curiosity of beauty started him on many tracks. What a tantalising beginning was the *Mlle Fiocre*, Orchardsonian drama, with a richer envelopment, tempted him in the *Interior* (originally *Le Viol*), and he could be intensely simple, and perfect, as in the tiny *Melancholie*.

Last, among the leading fellow-exhibitors of that group, was Cézanne. Benefiting or suffering from the landslide in fashion that I have spoken of, he has been preposterously exalted to the position of a new Giotto, Rembrandt or Velazquez. Mr Sickert has rudely spoken of an 'idiot hypnotism,' and hypnotism there has certainly been. There is an immense new crowd susceptible to the lecturer and broadcaster, incapable of individual perception, 'seeking for a sign,' delighted to believe that queerness or distortion in itself is the mark of excellence, and in the absence of instinct, hungry for theory. The drier-out or the schoolgirl is sure of being 'right' if the *Card Players* is picked out as the treasure of the exhibition, to put beside the sausages of form or mountain landscapes by our sculptors with pin-point heads that are hailed as 'plastic discoveries' in human form.

Now, fortunately for sanity, there was in the collection a picture by Cézanne which would justify a great deal of enthusiasm—namely, the *Pendule de Marbre Noire*. This had his virtues of rich, dense colour in a range from black to white, passing through blue-black, sharp shell-pink and lemon-yellow, and the distribution of blocks of these and of their echoes was happily and subtly contrived. But such successes were rare in his work, and opposite was a still-life as unsatisfactory as this was fortunate, a scatter of disconnected fruit in shrillish notes amid a dull jumble. The *Montagne Ste Victoire* is a pleasant tapestry. He has not here, as in the Louvre *Estaque*, succumbed to a hopeless collocation of forms, nor, impatient in revolt, simplified them all to an angle of forty-five degrees as in *Le Lac d'Annecy*. Did the worshippers who repeat his phrase about 'doing Poussin again after Nature' read the lesson of *La Mente* in its uncertainties

compared with the cubic stability and decision in Poussin's treatment of the like material (*Paysage avec St. Mathieu et l'Ange*).

Critics are liable to the temptation of snatching at any theory that will serve to underpen their admiration. But in the case of Cézanne the theories, for anyone capable of testing them, are too obviously a misfit. He has been praised as a master of construction, of space-organisation, of three-dimensional design. I think I have sufficiently disposed of the claim for lucidly organised planes,² and M. Jacques Blanche, who as a painter knows what he is talking about and is an admirer of Cézanne, has politely shown them to the door.³ Since perspective, light and shade, and atmospheric colour are the indications of recession, three-dimensional design is not a cap that fits Cézanne. But, say the theorists, we are not talking of ordinary three-dimensional space. Up to this point they have—but they now take refuge in 'ideated' space. With that we must leave them till they explain its structure, but the ground is thorny, for Cézanne himself attributed the deviations in his drawing to a failure in eyesight. How, then, decide where this tripping-up leaves off and 'ideation' begins? Whatever the physicists' equations may involve, the painter has nothing to do with Einsteinian space—he deals with either two or three dimensions of visual space, and when a painter reverses the perspective construction of a table he is not demonstrating a new 'construction in depth,' he is dislocating the third dimension because he thinks his two-dimensional flat pattern is improved by it. Such waywardnesses seem to have had their day, but there remains an attribution of some special virtue of design in three dimensions to quite ordinary and dull naturalistic stuff which has no other claim to consideration. And here I must guard once more against misconception. Mr. Fry, in a review of my recent book, a handsome one in view of the provocation I had given him, has seized upon a passage which was evidently not sufficiently guarded. I should be the last to minimise the part played in painting by 'three-dimensional design'. I long ago used the phrase myself and the other, slightly Laputan, of 'the music of spaces'. I should like to continue the discussion at length, but my point was that indications of the third dimension inevitably come up for judgment in the picture-flat as well: to put it succinctly, a cube in perspective becomes a hexagon in the picture-flat. I have a great admiration for the tireless ingenuity of the critic of *The Times*, but in this matter he seems to me to float in a literary region, and to distribute certificates of organisation and design in depth to pictures in which those virtues are not discernible.

² *Confessions of a Keeper and Other Papers*, chap. xxvii.

³ *Les Arts Plastiques*, p. 296.

But fashion has had its most curious freak in respect of another artist. If the 'impressionism' of Monet is dismoded, the 'neo-impressionism' of Seurat is exalted. Here was a painter wrecked by theory. He began with a charming sensibility for colour; but a pseudo-science of optics was fatal to him, a method of dot-painting in which the dots, being pigment and by no means 'primary,' refuse to act like the pure colours of the spectrum. And behind this hail of dots his drawing stiffened into a wooden vulgarity. Is there a more disagreeable picture, on every pictorial count, than the *Poudreuse*?

The chief 'Post-Impressionist' admitted by death and nationality was Gauguin. He was richly endowed on the side of colour, in a scale of citrons, cerulean-blues and smouldering crimsons; he was considerably endowed in formal design. In both respects he could invent, he was potentially a carpet-designer, and how rare has that been in the Occident! Now invention, as opposed to discovery in colour, means that the painter must sacrifice the depth element and approach the convention of the Orient. Hence the drift in his painting, more or less marked, to the 'decorative' poster. This drift to the poster, with its flattening effect, is the most general feature of modern French painting, implicit in Manet, strong in Cézanne, fully exhibited by Matisse, and actually applied to advertisement by Lautrec. The advertisement and poster are the commercially living art and mural painting of our time. They call for a high degree of abstraction. No one who has practised transparent water-colour can be unaware of the rigorous abstraction in form and colour required, if the virtues of the medium are respected. Oil painting is not so sternly limited, so that it is a matter of choice for the painter if he checks its natural succulence and range of elaboration. The invasion of oil-painting by more or less justified abstraction, more or less amusing distortion, by the ideals of textiles and ceramics will probably, when the threads are followed out, be traced to the English arts and crafts movement. Nothing was more notable in a recent exhibition of posters at South Kensington than the supremacy of two English, or must I say 'British,' artists, Nicholson and Pryde, authors of the *Don Quixote* and *Lyceum* designs.

Here I must end these notes, reflecting how contentious and competitive such exhibitions are; how a picture that, seen singly, in the civilised Japanese fashion, might content the eye and mind, can miss its mark through excess of matter, random hanging, ill-chosen backgrounds, and pressure of the crowd. We move all together if we move at all, and get jammed in the process.

D. S. MACCOLL.

MARCEL PROUST IN RETROSPECT

THE publication of the last two translated volumes of the long novel sequence of *A la recherche du Temps Perdu* gives an opportunity for scanning down a long vista of retrospect which constitutes the bulk of Marcel Proust's writing. The untimely death of Charles Scott-Moncrieff left the translation of this concluding instalment (*Le Temps Retrouvé*¹) incomplete, and it has fallen to the lot of Mr. Stephen Hudson to round off a series which constitutes a landmark in English interpretation of French literature.

Proust did not let himself be troubled by the novelist's usual preoccupation with the problem of where to begin his story and from which angle to tell it. Instead he ranged to and fro amongst his memories of the past and did not trouble to cultivate that pseudo-impersonal manner of narration which at one time seemed to breathe the most intimate atmosphere of veracity into the pages of fiction. Gathering reflected courage from his method, let us plunge straight into the latest development in his plot and reserve till later the opportunity to pass in review his earlier work and the significance of the whole.

Often in Proust's work recurs the simile of the different aspects shown by various objects on the landscape as the traveller pursues his course, and once again he has recourse to this in his concluding volume when re-assembling his characters, as it were, for a final tableau. But it is not for a neat setting out of hero and heroine that he groups so many of our old friends at this afternoon reception in the salons of the Princesse de Guermantes that we are thus to enter for the last time, nor yet for the long overdue disentanglement of those misunderstandings in which lovers have, it seemed, obtusely persisted because of a novelist's need for a few thousand more words. Misunderstandings amongst Proust's creatures are but rarely unravelled, and then only to give place to new misgivings. Proust, it is true, does not jerk them, marionette-wise, to a conclusion. He treats them with the impartiality that his standard of truth demanded. But if he does not take sides against them, it is often because he is as much

¹ *Time Regained* (translated by Stephen Hudson. Chatto & Windos, 1931).

baffled by them as by the enigmas which human characters present in real life. Having elaborately reconstructed their motives in terms of his own introspection, he would topple over the whole edifice on the appearance of some unassimilated phenomenon in their behaviour.

Talking to the Duchesse de Guermantes at the Princess's reception, Marcel (Proust's protagonist in this semi-fictional autobiography) notes with astonishment how little his fellow-guest, the famous Oriane, recollects of the circumstances in which he first came to enter her 'set'. She now imagines that it was when dining with her that he had first met M. Swann. Actually he was an old friend of Marcel's family, and used to visit them in Marcel's childhood at their country house in Combray, where they were neighbours of the aristocratic Guermantes, though not acquainted. M. Swann, the paragon of Marcel's youth, was the son of a wealthy stockbroker, but had by his elegance and wit come to be one of the most sought-after men in society. He jeopardised his career in the *monde*, however, by marrying his mistress, Odette, and finally closed the doors of the Guermantes upon himself by embracing Dreyfusism at a time when anti-Semitic feeling had grown most impassioned in the aristocratic circles, where, owing to his brilliance and his fact, Swann's partially Jewish ancestry had been overlooked.

Typical of the irony of events which Proust delighted to portray was the career of Odette de Crécy. Odette in Swann's lifetime had persuaded him, a man of society, to frequent the set patronised by those wealthy Bohemians the Verdurins. Odette, for whom Swann had had to forswear the fashionable world, had by the time of this reception become the mistress of the Duc de Guermantes himself. Three years hence Proust foreshadows her bereft of all admirers and voted '*un peu gaga*' at her own daughter's reception, when, for the lack of the power which being loved had given her, she had at last become a sympathetic character. Mme. Verdurin, her old friend, who had once voted the Guermantes set stupid because it was too exclusive to receive her, had since her husband's death married, successively, the Duc de Duras and the Prince de Guermantes, whose fortunes had been diminished as hers had been augmented by the war.

It was not, however, Proust's purpose just to contrive these reversals of fortune so as to represent with rasping cynicism the ruthlessness of fate, apeing the de Maupassant manner with that cult of neo-paganism that has replaced the old melodrama of virtue rewarded with even cruder and cheaper effects. His concern was more to try and discover some kind of law governing the manner in which people in human society react to one another. The ambition to 'get on' that impels most of us took in his

instance the form of wishing to get to know the historic families of France, whose famous traditions had fired his youthful imagination. On achieving his objective, the Faubourg Saint Germain, once a magic land as seen from afar, he found it inhabited by creatures with fundamentally the same potentialities for nobility and baseness of character as the servants' kitchen. Only their social technique was more subtle. And this is a very large 'Only'. Society comes together largely for the sake of the common feeling engendered by the particular 'set,' and hence—what Proust excelled in analysing—their common standard of value, dictating as conditions of membership their common method of viewing outsiders.

It would follow that Oriane, whom we first encountered in *Swann's Way* as the *Princesse de Laumes*, with her beauty, quick intelligence, nice wit and inconsiderable intellect, excelled as a leader of society. The Guermantes set under her became more brilliant than the equally aristocratic Courvoisier circle through Oriane's infusion into their midst of men of talent, injured, however, to carrying what weight of learning they possessed lightly in society. And then the very originality and audacity of Oriane (qualities relative to the standard of mentality obtaining in the Faubourg Saint Germain) led her, by her cultivation of theatrical stars at the expense of the aristocracy she more and more discarded, down the social ladder, till by the end of *Le Temps Retrouvé* she stood at the same level as Mme. de Villeparisis, another society monoclast.

Proust seems to have had a particular sympathy for this form of social intransigence. Swann is another favourite specimen of this same type. A man of considerable charm and supple intelligence, he was prompt to adapt himself to the quacksilver conditions of society, and yet it was hardly surprising that a man of his personality would find insufficient outlet for his activities there. With far too much social grace to commit the solecism of weighing his wail in public in the sacred cause of self-expression, he must, however, have subconsciously courted ostracism by his impossible marriage and exposure of the unpopular cause of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. And yet another instance of the dissatisfied men of culture in society is provided in Baron de Charlus, Oriane's brother-in-law, drawing out conversation at the end of a reception because that was the only outlet that he knew for his need of self-expression which yet remained unappeased.

Leon Pierre-Quint tells us of Proust that 'the very exaggeration of his courtesy' when he was expressing gratitude was for the novelist the mask of a certain disdain, 'a manner of protecting himself in relation to society, of stopping it short at the very

entry to one's personal life, of preserving a complete independence without giving offence.' From the account given of Proust as he struck his contemporaries in youth—for instance, Robert Dreyfus and Simone de Caillavet—we can get a picture of his extraordinarily sensitive mentality, constantly propitiating his friends in the manner of a child who, though almost preternaturally intuitive and perceptive at times, has little objective sense of the world's reactions to his claims.² From this maladjustment it follows that Proust must have been conscious of finer perceptions which he could not share in the give-and-take of friendship. Significant in this connexion is the remark of Proust's 'hero' Marcel in *The Budding Grove* (vol. II.):

... and friendship is not merely devoid of virtue . . . Like conversation, it is fatal to us as well . . . for the sense of boredom which it is impossible not to feel in a friend's company . . . for those of us in whom the law of development is purely internal.

In this same volume is related how on going to the seaside at Balbec he meets an old friend of his grandmother, Mme de Villeparisis, and through her, to his great joy, makes the acquaintance of the dashing young Marquis de Saint-Loup. Later he is thrilled by the sight of the throng of young girls, one of whom, Albertine, is destined to play such havoc with his affections. And here again he comments:

Whereas, with Mme de Villeparisis or Saint-Loup I should have displayed by my words a good deal more pleasure than I should actually have felt, for I used always to be worn out when I parted from them when on the other hand I was lying on the grass among all these girls the plenitude of what I was feeling infinitely outweighed the poverty the infrequency of our speech.

In gradually withdrawing from society for the sake of realising the literary ambitions that clamoured more insatiably for appeasement than did even his gregarious instincts, Proust made no stentorian renunciation of the 'follies' that he was abandoning, too conscious of the fact that humbug is one of the instinctive defences of the human organism and is sometimes not even absent from the armour of the most militant anti-snob. Interesting in this novel is the anti-snobbery phase through which we find Saint-Loup passing when Marcel first meets him. Just as the Duchesse de Guermantes in her youth had quoted Tolstoi to the amazement and alarm of her family, so, probably, it was

² To be recommended for those who wish to study the reactions into introspection or intense life of action which such maladjustments cause is the little book on Proust by M. Arnold Dandieu, recently published by the Oxford University Press. It is worth remarking that M. Dandieu does not repeat the common blunder of confusing Proust's avowedly vacillating introspection with Freud's method of analytic interpretation.

the same scarcely perceived desire for striking out on a line of his own, coupled with a certain generosity of character, that prompted Saint-Loup to scorn society, study the works of Nietzsche and Proudhon, and indict in the strongest terms the profligacy of those who in the aristocratic world led promiscuous lives. He was just going through the stage of being abandoned by his mistress, the young actress Rachel, and his uncertainty of her affection intensified his own need of her and made him conscious of the need to asseverate his own fidelity and the obligations to fidelity of all like him. Admirably Proust portrays the ingenuous earnestness of youth and the way it protests its principles before it has come to learn their real meaning.

Perfectly genuine, if a trifle doctrinaire, was the manner in which Saint-Loup came to discover the wrongs of society. It is not impossible for scions of governing families to realise their responsibilities in this fashion, if only they grasp at the substance of the rather humdrum realities that underlie all forms of government and are not merely content with the shadow of the quaint heroic paradox of being renegade.

Shrewd, too, in his sense of human values is Proust when comparing Saint-Loup with his father, described as a

man of brains who transcended the narrow confines of his life as a man of the world. If M. de Marantes with his extremely open mind would have appreciated, if he had lived longer, a son so different from himself, Robert de Saint-Loup, because he was one of those who believe that merit is attached only to certain forms of art and life, had an affectionate if contemptuous memory of a father who had spent all his life hunting and racing, who yawned at Wagner and raved over Offenbach. Saint-Loup had not the intelligence to see that intellectual worth has nothing to do with adhesion to any one artistic formula.

And then the comparison of Saint-Loup with his uncle Charlus :

Perhaps, also being less metaphysical than Saint-Loup, less satisfied with words, more of a realist in his study of men, he did not care to neglect a factor which was essential to his prestige in their eyes.

And here, I think, we begin almost to catch the accents of Tolstoy the novelist, whose range of vision transcended his actual ideas as puritan and agrarian reformer.

No agreement can ever be reached between men of his [Charlus] sort and those who obey the ideal within them which urges them to strip themselves bare of such advantages so that they may seek only to realise that ideal, similar in that respect to the painters, writers who renounce their virtuosity, the artistic people who modernise themselves, warrior peoples who take the initiative in a move for universal disarmament, absolute governments which turn democratic and repeal their harsh laws though (adds Proust characteristically) as often as not the sequel fails to reward their noble effort ; for the men lose their talent, the nations their secular predominance, pacifism often multiplies wars and indulgence criminality.

Much of the sharp force of contrast observable in the analyses of the characters of Charlus and Saint-Loup was attributable, no doubt, to the fact of the latter's extreme youth. Charlus' nephew, however, was a character not destined to mature as he grew older. His mental alertness turned to shiftiness, though he retained the instinctive modesty and that incapability of vaunting himself that he owed to his charming mother and to the unconscious assurance of position.

In nothing is Proust more sagacious than in his reluctance to pass final judgments on his characters, well knowing how time may alter them. Interesting in this connexion is that passage where the great Elstir (in describing whose landscapes Proust seems to have had Monet in mind) admits to Marcel that he is the former *protégé* of the Verdurins, where he is remembered as the foolish M. Tiche, but adds:

The lives that you admire, the attitudes that seem noble to you, are not the result of training at home, by a father or by master at school. They have sprung from beginnings of a very different order: by reaction from everything evil and commonplace that prevailed round about them. They represent a struggle and a victory. I can see that the picture of what we once were, in early youth, may not be recognisable and cannot certainly be pleasing to contemplate in later life. But we must not deny the truth of it, for it is evidence that we have really lived that it is in accordance with the laws of life and of the mind that we have: from the common elements of life . . . extracted everything that goes beyond them.

Analysing the achievements of the novelist Bergotte (for whose character Anatole France, perhaps, among others, served as a model), Proust says that it was not in the extent of his culture—for in this, judged by the standards of some, he was notably deficient—but in the very fact of creating, that he soared above his contemporaries. Probably here we find some reflection of the debt that Proust owed in point of social initiation, and even in the way of regarding such mysteries to Count Robert de Montesquiou, upon whom the character of Charlus was evidently based, and who, in addition to this, had reason to be piqued on finding, as the Countess de Clermont-Tonnerre in her little book on the two men has described, his *protégé* achieving success with novels that his own aspirations as a lyric poet had never attained.

Since it was upon the power of evoking memories that Proust principally relied—indeed, it became almost an article of faith with him—as an artistic medium, it follows that some of the most penetrating of his reconstructions of situations and character consist of those incidents where childhood first begins to realise how different are the calculated intentions of an adult from the spontaneous wishes of a child. There is the instance of M. de Norpois, the Ambassador, promising jokingly to mention to

Mme. Swann, the next time he sees her, the admiration for her that he had just heard the boy Marcel express. Marcel blurts out his gratitude, but unfortunately, in an excess of candour, adds that he has not yet been introduced to Mme. Swann. Immediately in the Ambassador's eyes the child detects that 'vertical narrow slanting look' which one addresses to the invisible audience whom one has within at the moment when one is saying something that one's other audience, the person whom one is addressing is not meant to hear. The Ambassador had silently resolved not to fulfil his promise.

What a gallery of glances with their various meanings could be compiled from the pages of Proust with quite an anthology devoted to the character of M. de Charlus by himself! While Marcel is at Balbec, Charlus suggests that he and his grandmother should call on Mme. de Villeparisis that evening when he (Charlus) will be taking tea with her. When Marcel and his grandmother make their appearances Mme. de Villeparisis shows genuine pleasure and surprise. Charlus feigns surprise to see them; his monstrous egotism, the prey of the constitutional disequilibrium gnawing within him, would not permit him to concede that he had lowered himself so far as to invite these two bourgeois. The youthful Marcel, puzzled by this, asks Charlus if in point of fact he did not invite them, but the Baron's silence makes it dawn upon this unsophisticated young person that it is not always by asking questions that one gains most information.

And yet another similarity remains to be explored between Marcel and Swann. Of the latter's tastes in women we read:

there were as often as not women whose beauty was of a distinctly 'common type,' for the physical qualities which attracted him instinctively and without reason were the direct opposite to those he admired in the women painted or sculptured by his favourite masters. Depths of character or a melancholy expression on a woman's face would freeze his senses, which would, however, immediately melt at the sight of healthy, abundant, rosy human flesh.

In something of the same way, among the '*petite bande*' of girls at Balbec, Marcel soon experiences a preference for Albertine over Andrée, though the latter shows greater tact and consideration for him. Andrée, whose athletic prowess on the beach had given him an early but illusory impression of care-free recklessness, proved to have been taking exercise on the ground of her health, and the discovery that she is neurotic like himself and literary (she is described as being engaged upon the translation of Ruskin's works—actually one of Proust's earliest achievements) completes Marcel's disillusionment. It would appear that both Swann and Marcel needed, to put it crudely, to be 'vamped' in love. Both showed an almost wilful blindness, swayed irrationally towards

frustration, in choosing to love women who could not appreciate them and with whom they suffered torments of jealousy from their intense need of being loved.

Sheer impatience with the author may be the instinctive reaction of some readers on finding with some relief that this, at any rate, has not been their experience. It is, however, an important clue to the character of Marcel and, probably, of Proust, as is also that passage which describes how, with the gradual fading of passion, Marcel can no longer, in Albertine's continued absence, picture her as he would have her, but grown older, faded, a trifle masculine, the outline of her face already beginning to take on something of the contour of her aunt's unprepossessing features. One day, long before this, while Albertine was still his mistress and Marcel was feeling particularly jealous, suspecting her of all manner of promiscuity, she began, with characteristic zest for mimicry, to repeat the cries of hawkers they had heard vending their wares, and it was with horror that he had heard from her lips the cry of '*maqueriau*' - which in French has a slang connotation of *souleneur*. It might have pleased Proust, with his taste for the macabre in simile, to know that on some parts of the Scottish coast the mackerel has the ill reputation of being a fish which preys on the bodies of drowned seamen.

Proust is very much the novelist's novelist (especially for those who have not yet written their novel), with immense space given up to what is practically a monologue of discussion nowhere definitive upon the problem of composition. He was fascinated, moreover, by all forms of technique - a high-sounding word most appropriate to his preoccupation with the detail of getting anything done, a reflection, no doubt, of the enormous effort such matters cost him in his own life. This keen interest in the minutiae of other people's lives packs his volumes full with a very wide range of interest. Sometimes, however, the dabbling character of his amateur existence is palpably betrayed. Indeed, the reputation which Proust's early articles in the *Figaro* tended to foist upon his work, that of a man of society toying with letters, was only gradually dissipated. But after a time the critical approval of the *Nouvelle Revue Française* group was won over. And in 1919 he secured the Prix Goncourt at the second attempt.

The late Paul Souday, in the *Temps*, was one of the first to acclaim his genius, while deploring grave divagations from tradition in his use of the subjunctive. To this critic, too, such complexity and copious fecundity of detail seemed more in keeping with the manner in which an English novelist might convey a sense of life to his work. In fact, some French critics have declared that Proust was making a mistake in cultivating that taste for the unexpectedly and piquantly irrelevant which they

seem to regard as the distinguishing characteristics of the great English humorists. Proust's real potentiality, according to this view, lay far more along the lines of such a moralist as Montaigne. Just those less charming traits in his characters which a more rigid mind might have ascribed to fundamental baseness Proust often attributes, as we have seen, to a human creature's constant need to represent, in a direct or indirect way, every succeeding change of circumstance as supporting his self-esteem in the eyes of the outside world and consequently in his own. As his self-esteem becomes more and more established by the corroboration of circumstances, less and less need has he to convince others. With this, what we might term—'central' view of character, which we look to find in the harmonious and ordered culture of France, what reason had Proust for his moralistic vein?

Readers of a collected assortment of his earliest contributions to reviews published in 1896 under the title of *Les Plaisirs et les Jours* will have remarked an underlying note of melancholy that is mannered but intense to the point of morbidity in its preoccupation with the theme of a child fearing to cause its parents grief. This theme is particularly exemplified in that passage of *La Confession d'une jeune fille* depicting a child's sorrow at missing its mother's good night kiss—a theme which later recurs under a more developed form in *Swann's Way*, where little Marcel finds that by inducing his mother to yield to his entreaties he has defeated the reluctantly imposed discipline which she had adopted in his own interest. It was, then, upon the maiden, fantastically trivial though it may sound, that Proust pins the whole story of his hero's (and his own) failure to make what he would of life, till in writing this virtual autobiography he recovered himself from his own misfortunes.²

² Proust owed, no doubt, his somewhat un-Gallic affinity with Dostoevsky to this strain of irrationality, to understand which the intuition of sympathy is needed—but he never attained to that great Russian's power of extracting some significant truth out of a shameful incident which is the sole vindication of the didactic artist. Again and again Proust seems on the point of bringing something more than pathos out of such situations—Mlle de Vinteuil and the incident of the spitting on her father's portrait, for instance, or the dying actress Berma, hastening her end through giving a tea-party in honour of her son and daughter-in-law, only to find that all the invited have gone instead to a performance by her rival, Rachel, a fashionable event to which the son and daughter-in-law steal away as soon as they decently can. Proust does not seem to have manipulated these organs of remorse

² This theme has been treated more fully by Mr. Edmund Wilson in *Jeff's Castle* and by Mr. Samuel Beckett in a recently published essay on Proust.

deliberately to harrow our feelings. But with something of the morbid pleasure a hyperæsthetic child might take in nightmarish sources of horror, he found the instinct to achieve a sensation of this kind almost obsessive. Pathos was too persistently besought by him ever to wear the full aspect of the grandeur of tragedy. But it is one thing for the critics to make this calm judgment from an easily assured altitude of intellectual detachment, and quite another to be able to perceive how a creative writer needs a more real courage not to contest or argue with his facts, but to present life as revealed by his peculiar sensibility.

As anyone who has followed this article so far must have already concluded, there is no neat, convenient moral to be drawn from the career of Marcel Proust. In his very readable biography translated by Hamish and Sheila Miles, Leon Pierre-Quint remarks: 'Rarely in a *bourgeois milieu* is the profession of art looked upon as a legitimate one. Marcel Proust was not understood by his father.' It is, however, arguable whether the growing craze for the artist may not prove more vitiating for him than the former much bemoaned neglect. In Proust's instance, in spite of misunderstandings, considerable indulgence seems to have been shown. The facts of his life, stated in bald, unsympathetic terms, would be that he was the pampered son of rich parents and might have mitigated, if he could not have cured, his asthma, which was doubtless a drag upon his vitality, but which he allowed himself to aggravate by the manner of his life. This doubtless hastened his end, which came in November 1922 at the comparatively early age of fifty-one, though the constant prospect of death threatening to interrupt the completion of his task must have seemed to him an involuntary and inexorable fate. After his previously formless existence, marked by the tyranny of habit which so often characterises the apparent freedom of the leisured dilettante, Proust felt the need to organise his will-power for his literary task by such a strict *régime* as would counteract his tendency to drift, and it was evidently this severity that killed him. Inspired by this indomitable ambition to satisfy the critical integrity which must have been constantly carping within him at the back of real criterion in the life of society, Proust emerges from the conflict of will-power nearly a very great writer.

Proust's passion for truth precluded him from that petty form of self-assertion in print which leads smaller minds to attach superior importance to their own qualities, but impartiality, unless it is to be artificially conceived, must relax where conviction will not rise to it. One of the loopholes into the shortcomings of his personal life is seen in his work, where, generalising from the passive strain in his own character that we have seen

exemplified in Swann and Marcel, he concludes that slavery to habit and incapacity to prepare for the future are the almost invariable concomitants of the possession of sensibility and intellect.

' Might have beens ' form such an idle subject for conjecture that it is hardly worth while to speculate what could have been the outcome if Proust had taken his life in hand earlier. To attempt to point out where Proust's work might have been greater would be practically to set one's own views against his and to quarrel with him for not achieving an objective he never had in mind

BERNARD CAUSTON.

MR. WELLS SURVEYS MANKIND

IF any English writer except Mr. H. G. Wells announced in his first sentence that his book¹ was 'intended to be a picture of all mankind to-day, a picture of living mankind active working, spending, making and destroying' most people would regard the claim as so outrageously arrogant that they would read no further. Even with Mr. Wells we feel doubtful. The task is so vast, so complicated. If one man knew enough, would he not be crushed by his own knowledge, mentally jolted, so that, though he might ooze facts about the world, he could not possibly give a clear, coherent, organised picture of it? But Mr. Wells soon sweeps such doubts away. For *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*, whether one accepts or rejects the picture it paints, agrees or disagrees with its proportions and values, does in fact give just what Mr. Wells promises: 'a picture of living mankind active working spending making and destroying.'

The greatness of this undertaking, its breadth of conception and richness of detail, are no less astonishing than its success. In this book Mr. Wells has written with more than his customary verve and gusto. It is incredible that a single individual limited by the inescapable limitations of life and knowledge and experience should view with so true an eye the complexity of human organisation and the social currents and economic tides at work relentlessly throughout the world, as well as the spiritual and personal longings and phantasies, hopes and desires of the individuals who compose the half-ordered, half-disordered throng of humanity. Only a writer compact with the imagination of the novelist, the knowledge of the historian and social psychologist and economist, the detachment of the scientist, and the inspired zeal of the social reformer could bring such a gigantic task to successful completion. Only the most skilled and accomplished writer could make his story readable. And that is a vital fact about *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*. It is readable, irresistibly readable. A great book, a landmark in the intellectual life of this generation, a landmark, but not a

¹ *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind* by H. G. Wells (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1932. Price 10s. 6d. net).

monument, for it inspires its readers to press on with the work which must be done if our race is to realise its destiny—it is in many ways the supreme triumph of Mr. Wells, the novelist turned emancipator of men's minds.

What are the elements of the picture Mr. Wells paints? His book, supremely short considering the ground he covers—it contains only 350,000 words—is far too tightly packed to be summarised. If a summary were attempted here, it would be arid and jejune and monotonous, a dead misleading effigy of what in Mr. Wells' pages is intensely and vividly alive. Perhaps Mr. Wells himself may some day try his hand at a shorter version. Even he may not succeed, lesser writers are bound to fail. For when a single volume ranges from man's earliest origins as a rare animal roaming the primeval forests to the highly organised life of modern cities, sweeps from the hot and teeming plains of Bengal to the frozen solitudes of Labrador wastes, describes the great conquests of mankind over substances and Power and Distance and Hunger and Climate, sketches the organisation of Distribution and Production, analyses the motives which impel men to their daily tasks, exhibits the nature and working of money and property and the antagonisms of rich and poor, examines the position and functions of women in the world's work, inspects with a critical eye the governments of mankind, the organisation for war and the disorganisation for peace, reviews the numbers, qualities and races of human beings, casts an illumining eye over men's leisure time activities, and gathers up all that has gone before in an immense survey and criticism of present day education and an exhortation to reorganise our education lest we perish, when all this is done in a mere 800 pages, and done not in dry generalities but with vivid colourful sketches of the men and women whose activities and emotions are thus portrayed, with vignettes of their personalities, with devastating pictures of their cruelties and basenesses in Putumayo and the Congo, with close-up shots and panoramic views that make an incomparable film of the vast world-drama, then the reader whom the swiftly moving pages has held enthralled, when he becomes writer in turn, will, if wise, abstain from a task of abbreviation which can be at best a catalogue and at the all-too-easily attainable worst, a confusion. To attempt to summarise Mr. Wells is to do him and his book an injustice. What is really necessary is an examination of the truth and proportion of his leading ideas, a survey of the tasks he shows to be urgent with a view to carrying them further.

The descriptions of how men transform and utilise substances, harness power, overcome distance, feed, clothe and house themselves, which Mr. Wells gives in his early chapters with his

customary vividness and skill, are fascinating and instructive but relatively unimportant. What are really important are the leading ideas which run through the book, and their essential truth in themselves and in their proportions.

The first of these leading ideas is that man, who began his life as 'a rare and rather solitary and self-centred species of primate,' has never become temperamentally adapted to work or co-operation, but 'at bottom' is still a highly individualised animal, resentful of subordination, competitive and exclusive, demanding freedom and the world for himself. Furthermore, these basic biological qualities are likely to remain. Science may yet spring a surprise on us, biology may still stumble on means for deliberately improving the quality of men. But so far as we can now foresee, such developments are unlikely.

There is considerable finality about *Homo sapiens*. For many generations, and perhaps for long ages, we must reckon upon a population of human beings not very different from those we have to deal with to-day. We shall meet with the same mental and temperamental types and the same racial characteristics that we encounter in the cast of the human drama to-day. The deliberate improvement of man's inherent quality is at present unattainable.

Subject to amendment by prospective biological discovery, this fact is basic and final. But not a reason for pessimism. Man is what he is through nature and nurture. And the full constructive possibilities of education, the right education, have still to be explored. It is to a better education and to a better education alone, therefore, that we must look for any hope of ameliorating substantially the confusions and distresses of our present life.

Second among the basic facts of human society as Mr. Wells analyses them is the dominance over conduct of men's ideas of the *roles* they play. Here Mr. Wells breaks new ground of great importance in social analysis. From the dawn of human society *Homo sapiens* is at war with himself and subject to restraints imposed from without. For profound psychological reasons mere recognition of these restraints and necessities is not enough; men must supplement the unpleasant facts of life by a conception of themselves as agreeable, as a *focus* of their motives, as they can contrive; and this concept of their *role*, this 'guiding and satisfying idea,' Mr. Wells, adopting a term of Jung's, calls the '*persona*.'

Mr. Wells distinguishes three main types of *persona*—the *persona* of the peasant, the *persona* of the aggressive nomad, and the educated *persona*. The peasant *persona*, distinctively characterised by 'its complete acceptance of the idea that toil

is virtue, and its close, intense adhesion to property and the acquisition of property,' seems to be 'the basal mentality of that traditional social order from which we are now emerging.' Associated with this basal type are offshoots and modifications—the 'normal townsman' who is only 'a transplanted peasant'; the acquisitively successful in town or countryside, moneylender, middleman, big peasant, rich farmer, on another side, the expropriated poor—the 'proletariat' of Communist nomenclature, and the fisherman. The *persona* of the aggressive nomad is different in its attitude towards work and property. Fundamentally, he despises both, 'not to get easily and give freely reflects upon his force and vigour'. The aggressive nomad 'is, and in his *persona* he knows himself to be, a fine, reckless, desperate fellow'. Out of this stuff kings, nobles, soldiers and rulers have been made throughout the ages. The third great type of *persona* is the educated *persona* and its derivatives, represented in the beginning by the priest, but now including professional and semi-professional workers in many fields—teachers, writers, artists, judges, lawyers, administrators, technicians and scientists.

The distinctive element of the educated *persona*, writes Mr. Wells, is the conception of self-alteration, of devotion. The individual is supposed not to work directly either for his own enrichment or for his own honour and glory. He belongs, he has made himself over, to an order concerned to ends transcending any such personal considerations. This third great class of *personae* is modelled and its qualities are evolved out of terms of purpose which remain latent in all the less educated elements of the social mélange. That is the key fact to the study of social psychology. It is in the *inevitable* idea of *disinterested integrity* which this priestly learned class alone has fostered that the future of humanity resides.

Are *personae* real? Are there different types of *personae* in the world? How are they related to themselves, to the conditioning circumstances which produce them, to one another? Are the types Mr. Wells has distinguished fundamental? These questions everyone must answer for himself or herself. I am of the opinion that in this conception of *personae* of different types Mr. Wells has forged a tool of much importance for social analysis, the application of which to human affairs will cut away many irrelevancies and expose essentials in a new light and proportions.

The third great element in Mr. Wells' survey is science. Science is the great beneficent genie of the modern world. Its power to release mankind from the racking toil of earlier ages, its wealth-giving potentialities, marvellous already, though even now scarcely applied in their full amplitude, form the real content and half the meaning of Mr. Wells' earlier chapters. For the rest, these chapters describe the far-flung economic system we have

built on the knowledge provided by science. They supply indispensable material for understanding the social significance of that system—that to-day, to a degree unknown and inconceivable at any previous time, we are all members of one another. We enjoy the greater freedom of greater wealth,—but we are no longer independent.

From which flow consequences of the utmost importance. For many of our institutions and ideas are not at all adapted to mutual interdependence, and particularly ill-adapted are our ideas about property, our monetary arrangements, our governmental machinery, our nationalisms, and war. The examination of these institutions forms the core of Mr. Wells' book, just as the challenge they throw down threatens the continuance and survival of contemporary civilisation.

To most people other than a few rare students the idea of property always conveys the dual concept of possession and absoluteness. 'What I have I hold,' and 'can I not do what I like with my own?'; the power to keep and the power to dispose according to one's own will—these are the root ideas of property. Thus 'craving for absolute property,' Mr. Wells truly observes, 'is perhaps the most vigorous survival of the primitive savage in modern life.' But savages can no more run the complex interdependent system of modern civilisation than untrained blackboys can build or operate an electric turbo-alternator. Not, indeed, was the fiercely egotistical attitude towards property of the primitive unsubordinated savage ever compatible with social life in any form. At no time in history, so far as we can discover, have absolute rights vested in all forms of property. From the earliest days restrictions have been imposed on the individual's freedom 'to do what he liked with his own.' Personal property one might treat according to one's whim; property such as land, in which the community possessed a social interest, was subject to rules, regulations, conventions. The truth, of course, is that property rights represent claims to use things in certain ways, claims which ebb and flow and alter as the objects to which they attach and the social conventions about their proper use fluctuate and change. Essentially a property right is a right to administer, and there are as many possible modes of administration as there are things and relations between society and things.

At the present time we are concerned less with such general considerations than with the question whether we will be able to amend our ideas about property and our administration of property rights swiftly enough to adapt them to the complex explosive needs of modern civilisation. Here the interaction of the several types of *persons* with current ideas and institutions becomes vitally important. The peasant type of *persons* in

particular resents any infringement of its rights. And the peasant type is composed not merely of farmers, but of many (though by no means all) business men, traders, financiers, landowners, parliamentarians, of scores and hundreds of millions who possess, direct and enjoy the bulk of the material goods of mankind.

On this subject Mr Wells' views are important and worth quoting at length. 'The peasant's craving for land and tangible property generally,' he writes -as well as such more complex motives as moved the unregenerate Soames Forsyte--

is not a fundamental motive. The human animal wants a feeling of security and it wants freedom and the feeling of power. Those wants are truly fundamental. The ideology into which the peasant and business man and other developments of the peasant have been born, has moulded these natural fundamental and ineradicable motives into the form of tangible property which carries with it to them the assurance of satisfaction for these essential desires. Their *premise* is that of the struggling or successful owner, and they can see themselves comfortably in no other rôle. But the experience of the 'educated' series of types shows that the satisfaction of these desires (security, freedom and the desire for power) can be guaranteed in quite other forms. And just so far as it is guaranteed in other forms, so does the desire to possess tangible property evaporate as a social motive.

The lawyers have always exercised the function of taming unregenerate egotism expressed in relation to property, of adjusting property rights so as to make possible the social use of material resources. To-day this function is of supreme importance. Will the law, backed and strengthened by changing social opinion, be able to carry out this work in time? On the answer to that question turns a large part of the future of civilisation.

Equally important questions arise in connexion with money and government. That our monetary arrangements are inadequate - to use the mildest language possible - needs no argument at the present time, when an unprecedented economic depression has thrown millions throughout the world into the shadow of deep want, created starvation amidst unparalleled plenty and paralysed the agencies whose sole use and purpose is to create wealth for mankind. The depression - which Mr Wells describes clearly and well - may not be entirely monetary in causation, it certainly is far more than monetary in its effects. But, coming as it does at the end of the post war period, many of the worst evils of which were heightened by the instability of currency, the present crisis repeats and underlines in unmistakable fashion the truth that we must achieve an adequate system of money and credit or perish.

For Mr Wells, it is an easy task to display the governmental institutions of mankind as a burlesque hash of clashing interests,

of confused and conflicting purpose. Many people will regard his account of the British parliamentary system in particular as rather unfair. Probably he does too. Similarly, much in his description of the League of Nations betrays exasperation and annoyance at its inadequacy, to the disregard—unjustified in my view, in spite of all the weaknesses and failings of the League—of difficulties to its creation so great that the wonder is, not that it works badly, but that it was born and works at all.

But when all this is said, the fundamental truth of Mr. Wells' indictment remains. The governments of the world are inadequate to the world's present needs. They administer territories which are usually historical accidents carved out with no thought or relation to economic necessities in a spirit of rampant nationalism only less immediately dangerous and destructive than armed conflict itself. International controls, the international administration of essential economic resources, services and activities, the sure pacific arbitrament of international disputes, all are lacking. And though checks and balances exist, though nationally and internationally the permanent official, one of the great contemporary types of the educated *personae*, tries to do his job effectively and quietly, nevertheless nationalism and armaments continually threaten to overwhelm civilisation with war.

In the smaller and more leisurely past these inadequacies of governments, monetary arrangements and ideas about property did not matter—or, at least, mattered much less than to-day. When States were far apart in time and space, when social organisation was amorphous and the bulk of mankind living for the most part as peasants, could exist if need be on what they produced themselves, no very serious calamity could ensue. Such was the rule; the collapse of the empire of Rome brought wider and deeper misery—but Rome was the exception which proved the rule. But to-day, as we have increasingly realised since the war, and as Mr. Wells proves unmistakably once again, we run vastly greater risks, not of utter destruction—the tenacity and adaptability of life precludes that as a genuine probability—but of seeing our civilisation fractured, mankind as a whole reduced again to the gross impoverishment of earlier cruder ages, above all, of having the hopes and present possibilities of truly better things for all human beings frustrated and broken in our hands. To-day this danger is the common knowledge of all educated people; and in repeating it and driving it home Mr. Wells, though saying nothing new, is urging us to seize our opportunities of reconstruction while there is yet time. For time presses. The loosening of beliefs which has followed the extension of science, the deep discontents of workers whom defective

economic arrangements have thrown into unemployment, growing disillusionment with the activities of government and the processes of law, all threaten to sap our civilisation from within at the very moment when the dangers of future war create a growing peril from without. Nor is any easy remedy at hand. The methods and beliefs of Communism are rejected by Mr. Wells in no unfriendly spirit towards the great Russian experiment as based on an analysis of social and economic facts largely false in itself and in any case inapplicable to the complex processes of Atlantic civilisation. And there is no other alleged panacea.

In this survey of the present scene Mr. Wells nevertheless finds no cause for despair. On the contrary he looks to the future, if not with certain confidence, at least with boundless faith and courage. The instrumentalities which he believes will seize upon our present institutions and ideas and remedy their defects, are two: what he calls 'open conspiracy,' and education. 'Open conspiracy,' to the present writer, has always been a term with unfortunately delivery overtones, an unhappy name for a great christener like Mr. Wells to bestow on an idea he values. What 'open conspiracy' really means is the conscious directed association of men and women of goodwill in all countries with the object of working out and instituting those changes in the economic and political machinery of the world which are essential first and foremost effectively to do away with war, and secondly, to create the planned controls required for the best disposition of the world's resources. Such activities are co-operation rather than conspiracy; they are open in that they are conscious in contradistinction to the unwitting co-operation of the myriads of men and women who in past eras first forged the ideas of social purpose and progress. Education to Mr. Wells, means the conscious general realisation by the majority of responsible adults of the moving forces, dynamic necessities and social objectives of our time - the triumph in a phrase, of the educated types of persons, disciplined to social service over the peasant and nomad types whose unruly egotisms know no purposive law. If as Mr. Wells hopes, that realisation and triumph can be assured if education can bring social purpose to bear in time on the economic, social and governmental activities of the world, then the potentialities of a rich and bright future are assured.

Such is the picture of human affairs as painted by Mr. Wells in *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*. Its elements are not new or unfamiliar. They could not be, the very measure

of Mr. Wells' success is the presence of common familiar factors, broadly known to every educated adult student of the world scene. The only things that can possibly be new are the appearance of all these diverse elements on the same canvas at one time, and the proportions which Mr. Wells assigns to them. If, on the one hand, he has omitted any vital factor, or, on the other hand, if he has fudged, overdrawn, or distorted their relations, then the picture is false and misleading. Whether it is false and misleading is a question every reader of the book must decide for himself. But it can scarcely be doubted that, on the most unfavourable appraisal, Mr. Wells' accomplishment will appear remarkable. He sets out to show the real foundations of human life at the present day, the true common background of human affairs, and he achieves a degree of success which is amazing. Experts, if they condescend to read the book through, will doubtless wrangle for a long time over the details. But in the end it will not be experts who decide as to the substantial truth of Mr. Wells' picture; on that question the court of final appeal will be the world of ordinary educated men.

The painting of a substantially true picture of contemporary human affairs is not, however, the full measure of Mr. Wells' achievement; he has done much more. But to see what this more is one must first draw back a little. Politicians are amongst the creatures Mr. Wells most dislikes. If he does not actually revile, he is certainly very hard on them. So far as many present-day politicians are concerned, this is perhaps fair enough. But it has not always been so. Go back no farther than the nineteenth century, and great men of action, statesmen in every sense of the word, walk the political stage. Whatever may be thought of the life and work of Gladstone and Disraeli, Bismarck and Cavour, they had stature and accomplishment. To assert that our own contemporaries are all pignies by comparison burkes at least one important issue - namely, why it was possible for men of an earlier age to swim to achievement whereas politicians to-day seem scarcely able to breast the tide. To this question there can, of course, be no simple answer. But one factor, in whatever explanation may be given, is surely this, that down to the outbreak of the war politicians were able to work on a widely accepted philosophy, the great nineteenth century belief in Liberalism, Nationalism, and Social Reform. The early career of Mr. Lloyd George up to 1914 provides an exceptional illustration of this thesis. Mr. Lloyd George was borne to success largely by his own immense abilities, it is true, but no less because he voiced effectively and intelligibly the prevalent philosophy of Radicalism and Reform.

Since the war all this has changed. The old beliefs have been

corroded by the acids of the new world. The old catch-phrases sound insincere on most lips and are ineffective on all. Present-day politicians can appeal to no accepted body of beliefs. They are voices shouting in the teeth of a gale which blows their words to the corners of the earth. They are men without a platform. 'Give me a lever long enough,' exulted Archimedes, 'and a fulcrum to rest it on, and I will move the world.' To-day weight, fulcrum, and force all are there—the crying needs of the world, a public opinion ready for any promising change, men of goodwill anxious to set to the task. But the lever, the essential lever of a political philosophy, a social belief, accepted by most and understood by all—that in recent years has been totally lacking. Instead, there has been confusion, scepticism, false shibboleths, paralysing doubts. In such a situation could even a youthful Lloyd George be effective? Or a Disraeli, a Gladstone, a Bismarck? In such circumstances—which are present circumstances—even in their attempts, they would one and all be overwhelmed.

It is against this background of nineteenth century political effectiveness, so harshly contrasting with political impotence to-day, that the true importance of Mr. Wells' present book emerges. In it he has given us, not merely a picture of the present world, but the foundations of a new political philosophy. Not a new philosophy entire and complete—that will no more emerge from a single brain to-day than the social philosophies of the past were born of an individual mind—but the foundations upon which such a philosophy can be built. For Mr. Wells expresses, with a vigour and forcefulness no other contemporary writer can equal, the essential elements of promise any new political philosophy must contain—the promise of release and realisation of a fuller and better life for all mankind by means of science working in a planned and disciplined world order. And he goes yet one step further—he shows the essential instrument for accomplishing these ends, the application to human affairs of the same technique of directed thought and scientific method which in the material world have already wrought miracles.

Further details of a very few of the tasks which he before mankind if present dangers are to be averted and the possible future of rich promise is to be attained may perhaps be briefly indicated.

In the first place, Mr. Wells' new and useful concept of the *persona* requires to be taken much further. What he writes is fascinating and largely convincing, but much more analysis still is needed. Take, for instance, the *peasant persona*. Do its roots really lie mainly in the lust for tangible property and the need to insure man to unremitting toil? Are not many more ingredients compounded in the product? Has not the *peasant persona* a

peculiar survival value? Surely the lessons to be drawn from its world-wide prevalence are sterner than Mr. Wells seems to think—and more fraught with menace. We must know far more about this peasant type before we can really understand him, let alone transform him for wider social purposes. Similar exploration awaits the educated types of *persona*. Are these inherently limited biological types? Can you take any basic human stuff of reasonable quality and convert it into the educated *persona*? Or are the Smart Alecs (and Smart Alexandras), whom Mr. Wells describes so shrewdly, more common and intractable—and dangerous—than we imagine? Such further exploration of *persona* requires to be supplemented by similar investigations into property as a motivating force and institution. How can we transform property from a cause of evil to a source of good? Mr. Wells adumbrates the idea of 'competent receivers' of different kinds of property and property rights. Much further inquiry is required into the many possible developments of this idea. In this field alone is material for a large company of lawyers, social psychologists, and anthropologists to work on for years.

Next, a sheaf of studies must be made into problems of industrial organisation. It is all very well to say that demand must be ordered and industrial operations planned as a whole, but just how are these things to be done? Masses of statistical information now non-existent must be compiled, a technique for reducing it to useable form and dimensions must be worked out, knowledge of the actual methods, processes, and problems faced by those who manage business must be collected and collated on a large scale before we shall have the technical equipment indispensable for effective planning. Luckily, the very pressing needs of modern industry are already driving this work forward to-day. University institutions such as the Harvard Business School in the United States and the new Department of Business Administration at the London School of Economics, associations of industrialists like the Management Research Groups in Great Britain, the American Management Association, the International Management Institute at Geneva, and similar bodies in France, Germany and elsewhere, are doing pioneering work in this field; and, since many of the fundamental problems of industrial organisation and operation are identical whether industry is privately owned or publicly controlled, the results obtained by such studies will be available for whatever purpose they may be needed.

Similar problems confront us in the fields of monetary policy and public works—the latter perhaps better called by Mr. Wells' name of 'communal spending'. Given reasonable agreement about the objective of monetary policy, the maintenance of a substantially stable purchasing power—and even this measure of

agreement is far from existing to-day,—precisely how is that objective to be attained? During recent years the private and central banking authorities have come in for their full share of criticism, and more. Granted that they have made mistakes, that their policy has often been wrong and sometimes wrongheaded, what ought they to have done instead? These authorities, many of them, are amongst the best of the educated type of persons which rightly wins Mr Wells' praise. Their errors have certainly not sprung from base motives or ill will. What they have lacked is a technique adapted to new and unforeseen circumstances. Such a technique has not existed. For the most part, so far as the public knows—pace many critics, theorists and cranks—it does not exist. It has still to be worked out. Similar considerations apply to communal spending. The desirability of devoting public resources to reconstructing the material equipment of the community was urged upon the British electorate by the Liberal Party in 1929. The effort failed, and it failed largely because no one then or since, in relation to Great Britain or to the world, had worked out in fully convincing detail the proportion of industrial resources which could safely be devoted to such ends, or the exact means of applying them. This task is still also awaiting accomplishment.

Yet a further mass of problems urgently requiring investigation relates to the processes and operation of modern government and the adaptation of present political organisations to new needs. Many of these problems are unprecedented. At their root probably lies the brute fact of sheer numbers. The population of the world increases at most by a sort of geometric progression—quite possibly at a slower rate. But the relations between human beings increase as it were factorially. In other words, when 20,000,000 people are added to the population, the threads that bind them to one another and to their predecessors are increased, not by 20,000,000, but by some vastly greater number. The problems thus imposed on governments by the sheer growth in the numbers of the human swarm, apart altogether from the greater complexity of their relationships in a scientific and technological civilisation, have been faced only when they dog the governmental machine, but have rarely, if ever, been studied in themselves. Closely allied to, and indeed arising out of, these problems are the difficulties which spring from the perampering of authority that has gone on increasingly in modern times. The number of important final decisions which the head of a contemporary government has to take quite probably grossly overstrains normal human powers. The way out—or, at least, the path of least resistance—lies through proliferating secretariats, to which the objections are obvious. Here indeed are a mass

of problems requiring the active thought and co-operation of able and experienced students. For unless these and cognate problems are solved, mankind will never be able to better its present governmental institutions. The task is not hopeless; but to suggest that solutions are just round the corner, waiting for some fertile contriver to stumble on, is to live, as anyone acquainted with machinery of modern governments knows only too well, in the airiest and emptiest of Cloud-cuckoo-lands.

In the process of abolishing war and establishing adequate international controls, no less complex and difficult problems will present themselves. Take nationalism. Have we really a full understanding of its psychology? Are not many more of the sources of its prevalence and power still waiting to have their secrets unlocked? Or take the steps to war and the psychology of war. In spite of our bitter meed of experience, do we really comprehend the true nature of the latter, the exact sequence of the former? Here, too, is a fertile field for devoted workers.


And so one could go on, listing questions and enumerating problems. The reform of education and the reconstruction of religion—in the long run the most important tasks of all—have not been touched on here. The field cannot be exhausted and many vital issues must remain for a future occasion. But to leave Mr. Wells' great accomplishment resting on the barren laurels of mere praise would be a poor return for his labours. The least due that can be paid his work is to attempt to take some of his ideas a stage further, to convert them from projects into blue prints, into the working drawings of a new world.

Can the task be accomplished? Will mankind succeed in escaping the perils which spring from the advancement of material powers far beyond the present growth of moral understanding or social discipline? Will we attain our future of promise, or will we founder on the way, brawling and destroying amidst visions of boundless hope? Who can say? Let the final word be with Mr. Wells.

The impenetrable clouds that bound our life at last in every direction may hide innumerable trials and dangers, but there are no conclusive limitations even in their deepest shadows and there are times and seasons, there are moods of exaltation—moments, as it were, of revelation—when the whole universe about us seems bright with the presence of as yet unimaginable things.

Faced by such a prospect, how can the faintest heart lack faith or courage?

JULES MENKEN.





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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXIII—May 1932

COME TO BRITAIN?

WHEN, a couple of years ago, I edited a book of mine, originally written in German and later translated into English, *England the Unknown Isle*, that title meant what it implies: for I consider that England is extraordinarily little known to foreign, particularly Continental, travellers, and consequently the English people are little understood or entirely misunderstood and misrepresented. It is quite extraordinary how very few foreigners visit England, apart from business men. Travel increased enormously in the after-war period (even if there is a temporary decrease just now). Paris and the Riviera, Italy and Switzerland, Spain and North Africa became crowded with sightseers, tourists, and even foreigners intending to settle down more or less permanently, but not so England. To some small extent my book drew people's attention to the possibilities of a voyage of exploration, if I am to judge by the number of people who have asked my advice on the matter or considered the question and asked for details. It is then that the difficulties begin.

It is easy enough for me to assure them that there are few

countries better worth visiting, which is what I think. It is less easy, but by no means impossible, to destroy some of their preconceived notions about England. These are indeed quite extraordinary. To begin with, there is the climate, which is thought of even by northerners as wet and cold, and especially as eternally fog-bound. The average Frenchman or German thinks of England as covered by a thick 'pea-soup' fog during the greater part of the year, varied or accompanied by cold showers. Still, he can be convinced that winter on the English south coast is really a good deal warmer than in Northern Europe, that the vegetation there is almost sub-tropical in parts, and that the climate of London, occasional fogs excepted, is not strikingly different from that of Paris. Next to the climate prejudice comes that which looks on England as if it were one large 'black country,' a place of factories, chimneys, furnaces, smoke and soot, with a very few exceptional 'beauty spots,' of which the most universally known are the Scottish Highlands and the Isle of Wight. This picture is a legacy of Victorian times, when England became industrialised about a generation earlier than its Continental neighbours. Well, one can tell them (and after all there are photographs and pamphlets) of Wales and the Lake District, and Ireland and Cornwall and Devon. It is unfortunately more difficult to give them an idea of the charm and character of the English countryside, which is really England's great attraction. It is that pastoral scenery with its lanes, fields, groups of trees, the cottages and little old churches, the heaths and the grazing cattle, which makes England unique, that beauty composed of quite simple and everyday elements, not the show places. Of the latter it has perhaps fewer outstanding ones than some other countries, though such comparisons are rather silly, but the English country is lovely almost everywhere, hardly ever dull and featureless like the vast plains of northern Germany and the greater part of central France. Moreover, it is easily visited, the roads are excellent, the railway service as good as anywhere, and with one great advantage (which I have never seen acknowledged anywhere), a far greater frequency of trains, a fact anyone can verify if he will compare time tables.

That London must be one of the most interesting cities to visit should be clear. There is no other capital which is at the same time the greatest port, the greatest trading and business centre, the Court residence, and the seat of government. Its sights and attractions, the Tower and Westminster Abbey, parks and museums, need no revelation. Less known, except to American tourists, are the other cities of England, with their ecclesiastical or secular treasures of architecture. It is true that the great cities compare unfavourably with those of Continental

countries, the reason being that (as great cities) they are mostly creations of the nineteenth century. It would be unwise to substitute for a tour embracing Dresden, Munich, Cologne, Nuremberg, Frankfurt, or perhaps Venice, Bologna, Florence, Milan, and Genoa, one of Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Bradford. But against that you may set cities unique in character like Oxford and Cambridge, typically English 'cathedral cities' like Wells, Canterbury or Durham, and many others. There are ancient, yet prosperously alive, cities like Chester or Shrewsbury, dreamy and remote from modern times like Rye, of specialised interest like Stratford or Bath. There are—one of England's greatest attractions—all the magnificent country seats, unparalleled anywhere. Knole and Chatsworth, Hatfield and Blenheim, and many others. And there is a great deal to see for a type of travellers, every day more numerous but as yet unrecognised by agencies and guide books, who care little about art, architecture, and scenery, but are interested in 'modern problems' of traffic, engineering, town planning and housing, or social conditions. For them there are the admirable omnibuses and tubes and trams of London, the Piccadilly Underground Station or the Liverpool High Level Railway, the Victoria and Albert Docks, Weymouth or the Hampstead Garden Suburb, and all kinds of institutions and institutions. And for all there is a pageantry not to be seen anywhere else in the present age (incidentally it is curious that so many English seek for the 'picturesque' abroad and quite fail to realise it at home)—the opening of Parliament or the Lord Mayor's Show, the changing of the Guard, or the ceremonial of Law and Church. Add the great sporting and spectacular shows, Horse Show, Military Tournament, Alderley, Epsom and Ascot, Henley and Cowes Boat Race and Eton and Harrow match, Wimbledon and Cup ties, and I think it is quite safe to say that no other country can show as large and as varied a selection of attractions. When people peruse such an account their curiosity must be great, their enthusiasm aroused. Large crowds of foreigners bent on enjoyment and learning should invade the British shores year in, year out. Then, why don't they?

There is another side to the picture of the English scene, one that people abroad are apt to hear much more about, and not the least from British visitors to their countries. For one Frenchman, or other Continental, who comes to England, one hundred Englishmen come to France or other Continental countries. It is not unnatural that the people of these countries should conclude that Englishmen think them preferable to their own, that France or Italy or Germany are better places to go to than England. The average Frenchman or Italian does not travel abroad, the

English, he thinks, do so because their own country is so awful. Conversation with them will generally confirm that suspicion. He will hear that you get so much more for your money abroad, that the food is incomparably better ('people simply cannot cook in England'), that the drink is better, and that you are free to take it when you like (here he will hear with incredulous surprise about the subtle rules of the licensing laws), that there are no casinos in England, and that there is no gambling. He will hear that the seaside places are 'too awful,' the hotels vile and expensive, the climate rotten. All of which will not inspire him with an ardent desire to take his next holiday in England.

It is really a rather farcical situation. It is the English who have 'made' almost every pleasure and holiday resort on the Continent, and they have made them all in their image (only quite lately Americans have joined in the game). They have invariably been followed by a cosmopolitan society eager to adopt English notions and fashions, from tea and toast to tennis and golf. In Monte Carlo or Juan les Pins, St. Moritz, Capri or Taormina, not to mention Cairo and other places further afield, the atmosphere (to which the English escape from England) is English. It is not the natives of these places and (except in cases of infection) their compatriots who gamble or sun-bathe or go in for winter sports or cures, but the English and their followers. In the eighteenth century English society still took its pleasures in England (Bath, for example); in the nineteenth the leisured classes decided that pleasure and amusement and health were to be obtained on the Continent only. Can you wonder that other people believed them? Who goes to an English seaside place or spa when he can go abroad? Paterfamilias and some other stodgy people. How many are more familiar with the National Gallery than with the Uffizi, how many know Cologne Cathedral but not Lincoln? How many think London too boring during the week-end, but a week-end in Paris heavenly?

That, then, is what the foreigner hears and believes. Nor is the tale entirely untrue, but the point is that it is true largely because all that class of English people who could make a place attractive according to their ideas, which have by now become those of the same class in all countries, choose to do this outside England, with the result that they then complain that English places are dull. Many reasons are given for this phenomenon, but most if not all are not its causes, but its consequences. There are more modern 'palaces' abroad, because there is a demand for them; but do not quite a number of them belong to British companies? If, as admitted, food is as good in the best London hotels and restaurants as in Paris, would it not be just as good in country or seaside hotels if the same people patronised both?

There is the climate, of course, but I am inclined to think that there is a fashion in that as well as in other things. The 'best climate' seems to be mobile; places like Ostend or Homburg have apparently lost it, while others like Le Touquet, Deauville or Venice have acquired it. The first real reason is fashion, and the herds following the leaders. The second is, I think, that these leaders own or stay in country houses when in England, and have less or no need of hotels or furnished villas. Also, for some subtle, psychological reason, they dislike mixing with the 'common herd' in their own country while not averse from this abroad. And, lastly, it is true that they find a liberty and absence of restrictions abroad which they do not find in England, though I doubt whether the atmosphere of 'Mrs Grundy' would have developed as it has done if English resorts had not been abandoned by the less puritan amongst the English.

All that side of English life is frankly unintelligible to every foreigner not intimately familiar with England. You may point out to him that all these restrictions and conventions are of little real importance, and that in all essentials there is very much more liberty in England than elsewhere, under Fascism and dictatorships, that very little is '*verboden*' that there is no '*taxe de séjour*' or bothersome officialdom, but that will not convince him. He may hate all these, but he sees some sort of sense in them—in the methods of his own country, at least. But he cannot see why he should not have a glass of sherry at 5 p.m. or of beer at midnight. Are the English such drunkards that the State must prevent them from drinking? You may perhaps convince him that there is something to be said for that legislation (though he will never understand about a law court deliberating whether or not a sandwich is a meal), but why do you have to have a licence to dance after a certain hour? And what has it to do with the town council what your bathing-dress looks like? And what concern is it of the lodging-house keeper whether your wife is temporary or permanent? And what is that strange night club business which is both legal and illegal? And why (you might have heard this from many lips at the French Exhibition) is an art show closed on Sundays while the cinemas are open? And having asked these and more questions, the bewildered foreigner shakes his head and decides that after all he had better spend his holiday at home or in some other country the usages of which he understands. And so we arrive at the situation that no Continental who need not do so spends his holiday in England and no Englishman who can spend them abroad stays in England. England for the English, and the Continent for the Continentals plus all the English who can leave England, was the state of affairs silently accepted as normal on both sides.

It was, but it no longer is, for there are two new and parallel developments: the English now stay at home, for all the well-known reasons, and there is a strong propaganda movement, 'Come to Britain.' The English know all there is to be known about the former, but they do not give much thought to the latter if not immediately concerned with it. On the other hand, foreigners do; this invitation is new to them: they are not used to such pressing calls from that quarter as they are used to those of others. 'The azure coast' and 'fjords and glaciers,' and 'Lovely Lucerne' and all the rest, have long been calling, but 'the golden sands' (of Brighton, etc.) have until recently found no voice to call in German, French, Italian or Czechoslovak. 'Come to Britain.' Why does it call? In times of economic stress it has awakened to the fact that the tourist traffic is a very considerable source of income to other nations and might be one to England. It stands for a good deal in the economy of France or Italy, not to mention Switzerland. It is really rather a paying proposition, as even the Soviets have discovered. That is perhaps not ethically the highest motive for extending a welcome to the stranger— a sincere desire for international friendship might be better— but it is possibly a move towards that. There is an excellent institution, the Travel Association of Great Britain and Ireland, which leads the movement. It propagates the idea abroad by pamphlets and lectures and films: it does all it can to attract tourists, supply information and facilitate matters for them. Lord Derby is its president, and the Prince of Wales has approved highly of its aims in a speech at its banquet. It is invaluable, and it can do and does a lot, but there is what it cannot do, and which no organisation could do. You have not only got to make the foreigner come to Britain, you have got to make him enjoy his stay there. Success depends on the reception he will meet with.

I think that this question has hardly worried English people unduly up to the present. The word 'foreigners' has a very different sound to the English ear than *les étrangers* or *die fremden* to the French or German. The reason is not far to seek: '*les étrangers*' are the foreign tourists the Continent is familiar with, good-sent people come to spend money— not only on a par with, but above and more lavishly than the natives. 'Foreigners,' on the other hand, has come to mean the Italian organ-grinder or ice-cream vendor, the French hairdresser, the German waiter, the Whitechapel Jew— the man who comes to make money and is tolerantly allowed to do so. Together with 'Come to Britain' you could read quite a lot in English papers lately about 'Keep out the foreigner,' and the two do not sound very well together. If the former is to succeed, the great British

public will have to awake to the fact that there are really quite considerable differences in foreigners, of class as well as of race, and that it must learn to distinguish between them. When an Englishman travels abroad or takes a house at Florence or Wiesbaden or on the Riviera he does not feel particularly 'grateful' for being allowed to do so, but feels, quite rightly, that he is paying for what he gets, bringing money into the country, and that it is a fair exchange. Some of lesser refinement have indeed been known to look on themselves rather as benefactors and therefore entitled to special consideration.

Strange to say, that vague person—the foreigner—feels just the same when proposing to travel or stay in England as the Englishman when doing that abroad. A baron from Bavaria, let us say, and his wife—who want to see the Highlands, a Parisian lawyer who likes golf and has heard of Sandwich or St. Andrews, or a Milan business-man who wants to spend his holiday with his family on some golden or silver sands of the English coast, will expect to find the same sort of welcome in England as English visitors would in his country. But I doubt whether he would get it. To begin with, he will almost well prepared, receive something of a shock when, inquiring 'Come to Britain' he was invited, and so he has come, he now finds himself segregated from the British travellers—not only his passport is examined, but his heart is watched. 'What have you come to England for?' he is asked. 'Ready for a holiday?' 'Can you prove it?' 'Have you any letters?' 'How long do you propose to stay?' 'What is your proposed address?' And so on. The official may be polite, he may be the reverse. He looks at a book—a black list. And in the end, if a subordinate official allows the baron, the lawyer, or the business-man to land—or else he does not. Nothing like this exists in any other European country, nothing like it existed in pre-war England. It is useless for keeping out political undesirable (a reason sometimes adduced), who would not be naïve enough to travel under their own names; it is unnecessary for keeping out people seeking employment, as they have to have (as elsewhere) a permit from the Ministry of Labour. It is nothing but a war-time relic, for in the first years after the war there was some such ceremony at every frontier, but they have all gone long ago. It most certainly is not likely to help the tourist traffic. What, I wonder, would an English matron say if asked at Calais, as an Austrian lady (very smart, by the way, and of very good social standing) was asked at Dover, when coming over for some days, chiefly to buy sport clothes. 'How do we know you will leave at the end of the time and have not come to take up a domestic situation?' Or how would the Englishman react if his progress was stopped, like that of a well-

known German writer, because the official considered it suspicious that, though German, he lived in Sweden? Can you see an English writer having to wire to French friends in Paris because they would not allow him to land at Calais as he lived in Holland? All of which may seem of no great importance, but there are many who, having once passed through this ordeal, do not care to repeat it, and many more, very many, who have heard about it and prefer to go elsewhere. Of course the officials can be no more blamed than Customs officers, they have an unpleasant job and do it as well as they can. In a thousand cases there is no friction, in one there is, and that one is enough to create a good deal of ill-feeling.

Well, in the end he who was invited to come is *allowed* to land, after which he will in pleasant contrast with some other countries, not be bothered again by officialdom. He is now free to enjoy his stay, but I cannot truthfully say that I have found many foreigners come for a short stay who have enjoyed it. I except Americans as not being in that sense foreigners. The difference is not only that they are English-speaking, but that they have come to be recognised for what they are—people who bring money into the country. People have learnt to look on them as that sacred figure '*le client*', whether they like them or not has come to be beside the point. Being less mercenary than the French, the English may not esteem the client quite as highly, but they do realise the fact that the man who pays the piper may occasionally expect to order the tune, and so they are neither astonished nor offended when Americans insist on having things done *à l'américaine*. They have in fact adopted a good many American customs or notions, at least in London, and sometimes it is rather humorous to see a certain type of American disappointed with England for not being sufficiently '*old-time*' and '*quaint*'—they would prefer candlelight in their bedrooms. But no concession is made to the taste of the others. Breakfast 2s. 6d.—a solid English meal, of course. He only wants coffee and rolls?—2s. 6d. all the same. He has to learn that his ways are wrong, that he must conform to those of the country. If he does not eat as do the English, dress as they do, behave as they do ('none of that southern exuberance'—protest the raised eyebrows), he will soon be made to feel that he is out of place. From the supercilious female in black at the reception office to the retired colonel and wife *droning* in armchairs, everyone will mutely imply—no open rudeness, of course—that he is a social ignoramus and outcast, tolerated only because he must be. He will find exceptions to this rule, but they will be exceptions. Unfortunately, he will not know that this attitude of disdain is not shown him because he is foreign, but is just as common

between the natives, that it is just part of the middle-class stamp English hotels and resorts have had impressed on them.

If the man from Milan or Munich should be naïve enough to expect to be understood in his own language he will very soon learn better, for, of course, the waiter or boots in an English hotel cannot be expected to speak foreign languages, just as a waiter would 'naturally' be expected to understand English in a Continental hotel. All of which simply comes to saying that, with a very few exceptions, English hotels are not prepared to satisfy foreign demands, which is quite an intelligible attitude on their part if they wish to discourage foreign visitors, but hardly so if they wish to encourage them. One may, of course, say that if enough foreigners come they will see to it that places are run according to their wishes, just as the English have done abroad, and that until then there is no need to worry. That is a possibility, but the possibility that reports of the few will discourage the many from coming is far greater. It is really, I think, more a question of manner than of matter. I do not think that the average English hotel is worse than an average Continental hotel of the same class—it is worse in some ways and better in others; but without doubt it is less friendly and accommodating. The extreme politeness of the *chef de réception* in Paris, the personal interest of the German hotel proprietor, or the engaging friendliness of the Italian chambermaid do not arise out of pure human kindness and neighbourly love—they are part of an intelligently conducted business, they are included in the price, but so, after all, are the haughtiness or cold indifference of the English hotel.

It is not only his hotel the average foreign tourist will find uncongenial, he will have rather a poor time altogether. That, however, is not because he is a foreigner (though it may easily strike him that way), but because he is an 'outsider' and that is a very unpleasant thing to be in England, because all that is best in England is somehow 'inside'. It is a question of national character, not of any policy. There is much less life in public in England than on the Continent, it is nearly all private or semi-private. That is what the English themselves prefer—at any rate, when in their own country, only they are all 'inside' something or other, and the tourist is not. Paris spends its leisure in cafés, and they are open to all, London in clubs, and they are not. Personally I think clubs on the whole preferable to cafés (the two never seem to flourish simultaneously), but that possible superiority is of no use to the foreign tourist 'come to Britain'. He may gaze at the façades of Pall Mall and St. James's Street, hear of the excellency of the wines in one, the library in the second, the swimming basin in the third, but that is as far as he will get. He will find the club even where he does not expect

it. Polo is played in clubs; Cro's (London) is not as Cro's (Paris)—it is 'for members only.' He may sit in the grandest stand at Auteuil or Longchamps, but at Ascot he will find an 'enclosure'; and while all this seems natural and normal to English people it surprises the foreigner and makes him feel he is excluded. This is true not only of smart places or society functions, but almost as true of any public-house in town or country he may chance to enter, where he will find an atmosphere of mute questioning: what does a stranger want here? The glamour of the London season may have lured him, but he will find that its functions are either closed to him, or that he is quite a back-number, and if he is not used to being a back-number in his own country he will not like this at all. If he is of the 'Ritz' variety he will compare his position as a 'Ritzier' in London to what he is used to as a Paris or Rome 'Ritzier,' and conclude that he was far better off on the Continent, and he will come to much the same conclusion if he belongs to the less wealthy. He will feel an outsider, instead of feeling, as he does and as English tourists do abroad, rather a privileged person. If Paris is almost too anxious to please him and play up to him, so that he ends by suspecting that he is only seeing a Paris got up for his benefit, London refuses to take any notice of him at all, it leaves him to fend for himself.

If this is not an exaggerated picture—and I honestly do not think it is—should one then, dissuade the foreign tourist from visiting England? I am a foreigner myself and I have spent a good deal of my life in England and hope to continue to do so. That is a convincing proof that I think it a very good place to be in, and, thinking this, I would like to convince all other foreigners of this truth, for is not everyone proud of his particular 'discovery'? But I qualify my recommendation in this manner: 'Come to Britain, by all means, but don't come to it as you would to any Continental country, for it is a different sort of place.' What I have observed is this: very few foreigners who pay England a short visit like it, very few foreigners who have lived in England any length of time ever wish to leave it. This may seem a paradox, but it is not, it is explained by the English character. No one is more exclusive towards the stranger they do not know than the English, but, on the other hand, no one is more 'inclusive' than they once they do know him. They are the most hospitable people in the world—social intercourse is easy: they do not defend their family life from all intruders like the Latin races; they are less formalist than the Germanic. Once you know one, you will know many, you will have access to their homes, and you will find their manner of life very charming.

They like children and animals and flowers; they are unpretentious and tolerant. You will meet with a great deal of politeness and kindness and, if needed, helpfulness from all classes of the population, not the least from the humble. People will be charming to you, once they have accepted you, and they are far less suspicious of foreigners than most Continentals. Paris may seem easy of access at first, but you will soon find a barrier, and that barrier remains there for ever; London is at first difficult, but you will find it opening its arms ever wider as time goes on. That is why there are so many foreigners who love living in England—often to the great surprise of English people, who, very naturally, take what they always have been used to for granted and cannot see what there is to rave about.

So I would say—come most certainly if you can live here for a time; and if you have at least one suitable introduction, you will love it. Come also if you just want to see the sights, for they are certainly well worth a visit. If you do not belong to either category, do not expect to find here what you are used to abroad. If apart from the necessarily few who can live here and from sightseers, England really wants to attract the great international tourist traffic like Continental countries have done, then it must realise that it must set out to please its customers, and not expect them to accept gratefully all that pleases the English and was made for them alone. That is beset with many difficulties, I know, of which licensing laws and the *petit bourgeois* notions of local boards are but a few, but they would vanish if the English themselves stayed at home more for what the international tourist traffic demands is exactly what the English themselves demand abroad, and have, as a matter of fact, implanted there. At any rate, a great deal can be done. The Travel Association has already done very good work, but more private effort is needed in a country where almost everything is achieved by private effort. There are probably a number of organisations already existing, but a centre is needed. Something in the nature of the *Maison de France* would be a great help, where people would find all necessary information and all facilities, so that they need not feel lost—a centre which would put them in touch with the people or institutions they want to know. There are all those people who want their children to be educated here, or an exchange of children during the holidays, who want to live in an English family or have somebody English in their family abroad, who want to take the summer course of a university. Those who would like to shoot in Scotland or hunt in Leicestershire or take a country house. Those who want to study all sorts of conditions and those who simply want to know which play to go to, what they should pay for lodgings, or where they can get

the food they are used to. Nearly all such people are at present quite lost. Some happen to have heard of, let us say, an institution for the exchange of students, the majority have not ; and newspaper advertisements are a most unsatisfactory method. So the majority simply desist. There should be a centre, if not a club, exclusively for the *service* of foreigners, which makes them welcome, looks after their interests, and gives them the feeling that ' Britain ' is *glad* they have come. I venture to prophesy that it would become a very paying concern in a very short time.

PAUL COHEN-PORTHEIM.

‘RECOVERY’

Why in a world in which the fund of goodwill and capacity and understanding far exceeds that of any previous epoch is the sense of individual and collective frustration so universal? Why has an era when man's power to compel Nature has grown beyond all recognition within a single generation culminated in a world-wide economic breakdown, arising, obviously, not out of natural calamities such as famine or pestilence, but out of a failure of human intelligence?

In less than a decade and a half since the Armistice humanity has seen the wheels of the Chariot of Peace slowly and painfully repaired and set in motion and coaxed back into the highway, and for a short period carrying us smoothly and swiftly forward, and then suddenly violently disrupted and plunged once again axle-deep and more in a treacherous morass. All around lie the smiling fields of plenty. Within sight, beyond the morass, lies the shining City of Recovered Prosperity. The presence of the morass on the direct line of the high road seems totally inexplicable, yet all our efforts to find our way through serve only to sink our chariot deeper and deeper in the bog.

Is there a way of escape? Sir Arthur Salter, in *Recovery—The Second Effort*,¹ makes a valiant attempt to suggest an answer to this question. Soberly, but with flashes of brilliance, Sir Arthur tells the story of the first post-war effort. We read of the gradual restoration of order in the fields of international relations from Versailles through the ‘pleasure resort conferences’ of Spa, Cannes, Genoa, to Locarno and the Kellogg Pact, and the recognition of Geneva and the League of Nations as the centres of world collaboration. We follow the history of Reparation and Inter-Allyed Debts, and of gold and currency through the first great financial achievement of the League in saving Austria from collapse, through the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan, and the League loans to Hungary and other countries, and the restoration or establishment of gold as monarch or tyrant everywhere, except in China, to the collapse of 1930 and 1931.

¹ *Recovery—The Second Effort*, by Sir Arthur Salter, K.C.B. (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd.)

In a chapter on 'Good Lending and Bad' emphasis is laid (perhaps undue emphasis) on what Sir Arthur styles the reckless borrowing of 1925-28, and its resultant evils. A chapter on tariffs and the League's efforts at the World Economic Conference of 1927, and at the 'Tariff Truce' Conference to foster the cause of freer trade, leads on to a discussion of the movement for creating the United States of Europe, and is specially relevant to the question of a Danubian agreement to-day. Indeed, every chapter of the book is of topical interest, since at the close of each, as well as in a couple of chapters at the end of the book, entitled 'A Programme of Action in Summary,' Sir Arthur tries to point the way of escape by making valuable suggestions as to present and future policy and action.

The book is certainly a fine achievement and will surely be read widely by the leaders of intelligent opinion, not only in the English-speaking countries but on the continent of Europe. It has already been dubbed 'The Statesman's Guide,' and the description is apt. It was no doubt meant to be complimentary, yet it suggests certain weaknesses. The writer of this review, who, like Sir Arthur, has had a long Civil Service apprenticeship, found himself, as he read with absorbed interest page after page of first class matter, asking himself once and again why a book which was obviously extremely good was not better, and why it seemed always to be promising and yet failing to be a really great book. The answer is that chapter after chapter offers the reader a series of brilliant memoranda by a highly-placed civil servant, such as any Minister would rejoice to receive and any Cabinet (if it could find the time, would study with avid interest. Only occasionally, however, does Sir Arthur allow the prophet in him—and Sir Arthur is truly a prophet—to break loose from the civil servant's leash and denounce the world and his fellows, who are his rulers, fiercely and firmly for their shortcomings and misdemeanours.

Sir Arthur is extraordinarily gentle to every statesman and politician whom his pen touches. Almost the only cruel utterance in this book, at the end of a very kindly picture of Sir Austen Chamberlain, is contained in the remark that he was 'inclined to think, especially after Locarno, that the British nation had not only given him, as it had, a large cheque on its confidence, but that it was a blank cheque, which it was not.' His pen pictures of 'the Big Three' at Versailles—of Stresemann, Briand, and Snowden—are vivid and accurate, except where they err through excess of kindness, and are among the most quotable passages in the book. President Wilson is his special hero, and is accorded a tribute of sympathetic and understanding praise. Sir Arthur's balanced judgment of Wilson's stature and of his place in history

is far nearer the truth than are the disparaging estimates which partisan malice has in some degree succeeded in popularising. In 'his successful fight for the inclusion of the Covenant of the League as the first chapter of the Peace Treaties' he fought almost alone. He won. He was right—abundantly right. . . . This was the greatest decision, the greatest achievement of Wilson's life. It would have been impossible for one who did not combine the vision of the idealist, the practical insight into the conditions of success of a realist, and an unshakable will. If the world does indeed prevent the recurrence of great wars, it will be to this great act of this great man that it will owe its salvation.

The figure of Wilson will tower in history above his lesser contemporaries and across the valley of intervening generations of lesser successors. This picture of a great man is fine and sincere and gives a needed answer to unworthy detractors. But Sir Arthur's gentle generosity oversteps the mark, and diminishes the value of his praise when he glosses over Wilson's greatest weakness, his inability to work with first-rate colleagues, in the remark that 'often at Washington he seemed to shun contact with strong personalities around him, as if to preserve the integrity and independence of his own thought'.

Whether he is analysing the characters of big figures on the political and diplomatic stage or studying national characteristics and viewpoints and the reasons for particular national measures and actions, Sir Arthur finds it impossible to be harsh or to condemn wholeheartedly. His aim is '*tout comprendre*,' and his conclusion is '*tout pardonner*'. He deals gently with the United States, even though it overthrows his hero Wilson, and throughout the period of his story impedes the progress of the League of Nations, the mistress he has loved and served so well. He is kind and gentle to France in her invasion of the Ruhr, in her intransigence over the questions of Reparation and Disarmament, in her political system of Central European alliances, so contrary to his own aspirations for the League of Nations, in her sacred egoism in the matter of gold hoarding, and in using financial power to secure political ends—now at long last reacting with fatal effect on her own economic well-being.

In dealing with Great Britain Sir Arthur loses none of his gentleness, but betrays some traces of the effects of long residence at Geneva. This has made him an acute and valuable observer from outside of truths which may be hidden from his countrymen at home, but, as is only natural, causes him here and there to miss the inwardness of what Britain was thinking and doing. It is curious that, as in dealing with persons his only unkind hit is directed at Sir Austen Chamberlain, so the one positive act which he condemns root and branch is a relatively

very unimportant British measure, 'one of the most foolish of new State development schemes which ever the post-war decade has witnessed,' the beet-sugar subsidy. This, however, is a small matter. Very important, and, to most readers, quite new, is the criticism of Great Britain's action, not of her motives, in two major efforts made by her since the war. Both the Balfour Note on the subject of Reparation and Inter-Ally Debts and the Locarno Pact were real efforts to help forward a solution of world problems. They were real 'contributions to world peace,' but, as Sir Arthur acutely observes, this very phrase on British lips is unconsciously revealing of Britain's attitude of aloofness. 'The idea of collective action (by and through the League of Nations), being an integral part of the scheme of her national defence, has never worked through into the body of British thought, or become a part of her actual policy.' Both the Locarno pledge and the Balfour Note 'would have been suitable elements in a plan accepted by others and fortified by equal contributions by them; they were given prematurely and unilaterally, remaining to hamper Britain's future bargaining power, giving an impression of an aloof, external, detached (and perhaps rather self-righteous) attitude, failing signally to achieve the desired results of conciliating others, or encouraging them to corresponding offers.'

This criticism of the Balfour Note is an interesting commentary on Mr. Lloyd George's claims for that document as one of his great achievements. Incidentally, he is making too high a claim when he says that the Balfour Note was universally approved in this connexion at the time of its issue and unless the recollection of many of those concerned is hopelessly at fault, Mr. Lloyd George's statement that he drafted the note himself is difficult to credit. The criticism of the Balfour Note and the Locarno pledge as premature and unilateral is also extraordinarily important, not only as a judgment of past policy, but as a lesson for present and future action by Great Britain in the international field. Has it not some bearing, for example, on the question of further financial assistance by this country to Central and Eastern European Governments, such as has recently been urged by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations? It is not altogether clear that Sir Arthur would agree in the conclusion from his premisses that such loans would at the moment involve a mistaken overstraining of Britain's resources, conceived of as a 'contribution to world peace,' and would not be 'suitable elements in a plan.'

Sir Arthur's gentleness and his hesitation to don the garb of the fearless prophet are nowhere more apparent than in his programme of action. His suggestions are put forward with

undue modesty, and in far too tentative a form. Every passage in the book containing proposals for the future is redolent of Sir Arthur's ingrained sense of high responsibility to his audience. He cannot help picturing his audience as a National Cabinet in Downing Street, or as the Council of the League, whose function it is to come to decisions, assisted indeed by their able Secretariat, but in the light of high reasons of policy with which the Secretariat does not presume to claim familiarity. If only Mr. J. M. Keynes could imbibe a little of Sir Arthur's serious sense of responsibility and inoculate him in exchange with some of his own love of mischief, what a masterpiece we should get!

Every one of Sir Arthur's suggestions is worthy of the closest attention by the authorities at home and abroad. Many of us would quarrel with his obstinate adherence to the view that Germany can and ought to pay some large sum annually—say £20,000,000—by way of reparation, subject to a moratorium of five years, and with his refusal to follow the strong tide of popular opinion in his own country in favour of complete cancellation. Most of his other proposals are directed to the need for conscious planning to replace the magic formula of *laissez-faire*. 'In the days of its greatest triumphs, and its scarcely challenged supremacy, no one realised how marvellous was the self-adjusting quality of this individualistic, competitive, free, unregulated, unplanned and unplanning system, and upon what a fortuitous combination of conditions, precarious and temporary, its success was dependent.' The whole of his analysis of the working of the system and of the change of 'environment, of social ambition and of industrial technique, so that 'reason alone can now correct what instinct has created, is admirable in form and convincing in content. Sir Arthur sees the urgent necessity, not merely of reform, but of radical reconstruction on the basis of a plan which must be all embracing and eventually world-wide, if our civilisation is to survive without the sacrifice of all that seems to us worth having in life. Unlike many of his faint-hearted contemporaries, Sir Arthur has no doubts that freedom is compatible with planning and planning with freedom. 'We cannot return to the unregulated competition of the last century . . . but we need not aim at a regulated world from which both individual competition and freedom of enterprise are excluded. To take either course is to fail in the specific task of this age. That task is not to find a middle way, but a new way, to fashion a system in which competition and individual enterprise on the one hand, and regulation and general planning on the other, will be so adjusted that the abuses of each will be avoided and the benefits of each retained.'

Can it be done? We are back at the question asked at the

beginning of this article, only the question has now been formulated in more definite words. The gradual collapse of *laissez-faire* has involved us in the horrors of the war, and in the frustration of the high hopes of the post-war decade. The final blow has been the fusing of the wires of the machinery of distribution, the failure, above all, of the financial machine, and the catastrophic fall in prices. Socialism flings out its challenge. What is the good of tinkering with the present system? Its hopeless maladjustments, its complete disequilibrium, make it useless as a means of producing and delivering at mankind's door anything but an inconsiderable portion of what Nature and science and modern methods make possible for us. Why not scrap the lot and give us Socialism in our time? Sir Arthur meets this challenge with courage and conviction. He does not hesitate to demand of finance that it shall come down from its tyrant's throne and become the servant of industry. Gold must be the constitutional monarch, or the sceptre must pass from it altogether. 'The fall of sterling in 1931 represents the victory of economic forces over monetary artifice. The goal of world monetary policy should obviously be a reasonable stability of the general world price level.' The alternative of an understanding tending to stable prices in the sterling area is examined and not dismissed, but not blessed. It is fully recognised, however, that stable money is impossible without strict regulation of the flow of capital and of external lending, and that as planning demands stable money, stable money requires conscious planning in the realm of agricultural and industrial production.

Sir Arthur's preface dismisses some at least of the critics. 'A slight book which yet aims at being comprehensive, analytic and narrative, must obviously have very definite limits. It can sketch only in the broadest outline.' He sees that 'a general conception of policy must dominate every specialised situation. The eye must range over many varying fields of effort and ambition—social and political no less than economic and financial.' In his closing chapter he says that 'action designed to affect the general world situation, the real theme of this book, is only a part of what needs to be done. To deal with national requirements would need as many books as there are countries.' It would be ungenerous indeed to complain in these circumstances that the solutions offered are somewhat lacking in detail and often vague in outline. Yet it may be that an outlook a little less world-wide might have made some of them more satisfying and more concrete. *Laissez-faire* is dead and ought to be buried; but we must not do injustice to the deceased. Nineteenth-century Britain was perhaps not conscious of having a plan, but the whole history of her development from 1815 to 1914 can best

be pictured as the steady working out of a national plan. British monetary policy was consistently directed to promoting and fostering British industry by the active development of countries of complementary trade. It opened up the United States, Canada, Australia, South America, by railways and other means of transport, for the benefit of British manufacturing enterprise. When the United States and other countries began to pass from the stage of primary producers and become competitive trading nations British capital sought new fields of action. It is only in the post-war decade that loans were made by this country and the United States to countries of competitive trade, which could pay interest and principal, if at all, only by underselling their creditors in their own markets. The association of nearly all the nations of the world through the gold standard in a single monetary system before the war was a highly artificial and unstable condition of affairs. Our effort to restore that uncontrolled association after the war and to maintain it by means of lending and borrowing between countries of competitive trade instead of between countries of complementary trade was perhaps foredoomed to failure. It may be that some of Sir Arthur's complaints regarding bad lending and borrowing after the war are justified on this ground rather than as he suggests on the ground of their escaping the net of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations. It was sterling rather than gold that formed the true international standard before the war. May we not be making a mistake in aiming at a world wide monetary system rather than at a British or sterling monetary system for the sterling area? May not the best and the quickest road to a world understanding on which to build peace and prosperity require a sober estimate of the sphere of action—financial, political and economic—of the individual nations or groups of nations of which the world is composed?

Again, in seeking for the answer to the challenge of Socialism and to the problem of reconciling freedom with planning, ought we not to begin by concentrating our attention rather more closely on the home front or at least on the area of the British political and economic empire within which our powers of effective co-operation are greatest? There are many problems going deeper than this book has been able to go which call for solution at home before stable money and planned production can be realised nationally. Sir Arthur does not mention, perhaps out of respect for the timidity of his audience of Ministers, such root difficulties as the planning of agriculture without making large inroads on the individual ownership of land by private landowners, the same problem which has arisen also in town and regional planning. There is a parallel problem in regard to the

separate ownership of particular units by production in the heavy industries. Here, too, it is not a middle way between nationalisation of land or industry and private ownership and operation which we have to seek, but a new way of reconciliation in some such form as chartered land trusts or chartered industrial corporations, co-ordinated under national industrial councils with large self-governing power, and under the guidance of a National Planning Commission. In the realm of central and local government, too, new forms and a new technique have to be worked and tried out, better adapted to the needs of the twentieth century and capable of setting Parliaments and Cabinets free to fulfil their proper function of giving guidance and directing policy from above.

These subjects inevitably suggest themselves to readers of *Recovery*. They are necessarily outside and beyond the scope of the book, but it is so comprehensive, and so provocative of thought, that their discussion is urgently needed to complete the task which Sir Arthur has set himself. Is it too much to ask that, having given us so much, he should give us more, and, this time boldly donning his prophet's robe, follow up his theme of *World Recovery* with a new work devoted more especially to the *Recovery of Britain*?

BASIL P. BLACKETT

TARIFF BARGAINING

IN the heat of the fiscal controversy which has now been waged in this country for three decades the utility of a British tariff as a weapon for forcing down other tariffs has been proclaimed from one camp and denied from the other camp with monotonous regularity. The controversy has raged around the principle of tariff bargaining, and very little attention has been paid to the mechanism or procedure of negotiation. Since powers have now been acquired by the Government to utilise our new tariff in this direction, and since His Majesty's Ministers have repeatedly emphasised the value of these powers, it has now become important to study the actual ways and means of tariff bargaining and to examine how the aforesaid powers can best be utilised, or whether it would not be better to keep them well in the background and not to use them for the time being.

A careful examination of the possibilities of the situation will readily show that the British Government will soon be faced with a problem which, in its difficulties and complexities, is more awkward than any which it has tackled hitherto. In dealing with these matters, it will be treating with autonomous sovereign Powers which may or may not see eye to eye with it. These will always be at liberty to differ and to take measures which can render it unprofitable for the British Government to stick rigidly to the policy which it may evolve and adopt in the near future. On the other hand, the British Government is free to be as obstinate as any other Government, and it will from the outset be assisted by two significant facts. The British market is a more important element in the export trade of most individual foreign countries than their markets are individually important to the British exporter. In the second place, the world economic and financial depression has created a state of uncertainty in international commercial policy. For the time being the old precedents bear very little meaning. It is now a world of temporary expedients. Bold and constructive experiments are likely to be welcomed in many quarters. As Sir Arthur Salter says in his new book, *Recovery*:

As the temporary factors pass away, tariff negotiations will be resumed on a new basis and in a new perspective. Conditions that seemed set

and unyielding are now fluid, obstacles that looked insuperable may soon prove less formidable. It may be that the time will soon come when a more permanent and general reform will be possible.

One handicap is that we are breaking ground with which we are not familiar. But there is nothing new in the use of a tariff for bargaining purposes, and we can delve for guidance into a century and a half of experiment, success and failure. English literature on the subject may be meagre, but there is not in the following lines a single conception which is not a commonplace in the Continental and American text-books on this subject.

As a preliminary step it is necessary to examine exactly what powers are available. Clause 7 of the Import Duties Act, 1932, empowers the Treasury, on the recommendation of the Board of Trade, to issue an order directing that goods consigned from grown or manufactured in a specified foreign country be admitted free of duty, or at some specified rate of duty less than the full rate. Further, the Board of Trade can issue regulations prescribing the formalities necessary for proving that the imports in question originate in the countries specified under these orders. Clause 12 of the Act empowers the Board of Trade to impose retaliatory duties not exceeding 100 per cent *ad valorem* (in addition to any other duties chargeable) on goods produced in a foreign country which discriminates in its commercial policy against goods from this country or from British Colonies, Protectorates or Mandated Territories. By this is obviously meant specific discrimination as between British goods and goods from any other foreign country. A further paragraph in this clause makes it clear that, in the event of these powers being utilised, certificates of origin or some similar proof will be generally required for all imports into Great Britain.

The intentions of the Cabinet, as declared by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and by the President of the Board of Trade, confirm the impression that these powers are likely to be used. Even the Home Secretary, in opposing the Bill, stated that he would not be indisposed to consider some combination of those countries in favour of tariff reduction in order to bring such economic pressure to bear upon the other countries as the necessities of the case might require.

A pledge has been given that no arrangements with foreign countries will be concluded until after the Ottawa Conference. This ought not to be interpreted as a pledge to postpone all consideration of our future policy with regard to foreign countries. It will be difficult to keep Empire commercial policy and foreign commercial policy in two watertight compartments. The treatment accorded by the Mandated Territories, for example, belongs to both sections, whilst a trifling concession might be made at

Ottawa which might seriously impede the application of the bargaining powers described above. The extent, value and form of the preferential duties granted within the British Empire will have a considerable bearing on the range of preferences which may perhaps be granted to countries standing outside the Empire. For the time being, however, no attempt is to be made to apply the bargaining and retaliatory clauses of the Import Duties Act. As far as can be ascertained at present, the clause granting powers to impose extra-Imperial preferences may well remain a dead letter. Even while it was still before Parliament, the British Government was declaring to the League of Nations its opposition to any encroachment on the most-favoured-nation principle:

It would cause conflict with the whole spirit of the most-favoured-nation clause if it were open to any countries to conclude arrangements with each other which they did not extend to other countries. Such minor exceptions to this principle as have been recognised in the past . . . do not in the opinion of H.M. Government constitute a justification for any group of countries to set up such arrangements in future whereby they would contract out of the most favoured nation clause at will.

Since then, however, much water has flown under the bridges, and it appears that at the London Four-Power Conference the British Government was, and probably still is, prepared to wink at a new 'Danubian clause'—as giving a right to regional preferences in the same way as the 'Baltic,' 'Scandinavian,' or 'Iberian' clauses. Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful if the Government was willing to recognise the right of any 'big Powers,' such as Germany or Italy, to participate in such a regional arrangement.

The most-favoured-nation clause therefore still remains a corner-stone of British commercial policy, and it is necessary to add that it is the unconditional and unlimited form of the clause which we always consider desirable. By virtue of this clause, the two contracting parties of a commercial treaty pledge themselves to grant each other every favour which they might grant or have granted to any third party. The unconditional form of the clause entails the extension of these privileges immediately, without condition and without request. The clause can be drafted in various ways—sometimes positively, sometimes negatively; and the Economic Organisation of the League of Nations has laid down what it considers to be the ideal formula. It may be noted in passing that Great Britain has in recent years always used the term 'to any other foreign country' when referring to the third party or parties concerned in the clause. The insertion of the word 'foreign' enables Imperial preferences to be granted without violating the clause, although it is not

unlikely that in future a more specific recognition of this exceptional treatment may be brought into our treaties.

Great Britain has long been the foremost champion of the unconditional and unlimited form of the clause. As long as it was a free trade country it could hardly have followed any other policy. Other countries have not been such convinced adherents. France has always disliked it, ever since it was imposed upon her by a victorious enemy in 1872. The United States of America endeavoured until after the Great War to maintain a conditional form of the clause, an example which was followed by most Central and South American States. In actual practice, however, the unconditional interpretation has made great progress in the post-war decade. The United States abandoned the conditional form in 1923, and has negotiated an entirely new system of commercial treaties on the unconditional basis (although virtually infringing on its pledges whenever it applies a countervailing duty). Since then that country has ranged itself with Great Britain in uncompromising promotion of the unconditional and unlimited character of the clause. This has brought about an unholy alliance between the super protectionist country which intended to give nothing away and the free trade country which had nothing to give away. This alliance reveals the fundamental weakness of the clause, but it has been sufficiently powerful to bring it into more general recognition, although complaints have, in fact, been more rife than ever before. The Franco-German Treaty of 1927 marked another great victory for the clause, whilst the World Economic Conference of 1927 resolved that

the mutual grant of unconditional most favoured nation treatment as regards Customs duties and conditions of trading is an essential condition of the free and healthy development of commerce between States and that it is highly desirable in the interests of stability and security for trade that this treatment should be guaranteed for a sufficient period by means of commercial treaties.

These examples could be multiplied, but enough has been said on the subject to bring out the fact that British policy is veering towards an abandonment of the unconditional clause at a time when, after lengthy experiments, most other countries have come to the conclusion that limitation in the form or interpretation of the clause was not a matter of practical politics.

The great virtue of the unconditional clause lies in its elimination of overt discrimination. Every foreign nation is treated alike—no better and no worse than all its neighbours. The mild exceptions, recognising the right of certain adjacent and closely allied countries to grant each other special concessions which are not made general, are unimportant, except as a precedent which may be extended into regional preferential groupings. As long

as it maintains this barrier to open discrimination the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause will continue to be a bulwark of international peace. It is unnecessary to stress this point, but the essential connexion between clause 7 and clause 12 of the Import Duties Act will bring it home to the British reader. The first of these clauses enables the Government to discriminate in its treatment of one foreign Power as against another. As soon as this is done, the powers conferred by clause 12 are necessary in order to counter any retaliation against the operation of clause 7. In other words, we are likely to have more than one tariff war on our hands.

A lesser but important advantage of the unconditional clause is to be found in its simplification of treaty-making procedure. The two contracting Powers need only negotiate concerning the rate of duty on those commodities which play an important part in their mutual trade. The remainder—and their name is legion under modern tariff classification—can be left to the mercies of the most-favoured-nation clause, each party knowing that it will enjoy every concession wrung out of the other by those countries to whom the items in the remainder of the tariff are more significant. A treaty negotiation during which every item in a modern industrial tariff had to be reviewed would be a truly formidable affair. To negotiate a complete set of modern treaties under such conditions would take many long years.

It is not necessary to depart from the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause in order to pursue a policy of tariff bargaining. Bargaining has in fact proceeded for decades in 'unconditional' circumstances. One of Britain's chief dissatisfactions with her previous fiscal policy arises from the fact that, although she did not discriminate against foreign goods even in favour of her own nationals, the only favours which she obtained from other countries were second-hand favours wrung from the conceding country by another more well-equipped bargainer, and as often as not referring to commodities which were only of minor interest to the British exporter. The weakness of the unconditional clause is speedily revealed, however, if it is regarded as an instrument for tariff reduction. It was not meant to serve this purpose. It really works out as an obstacle to tariff reduction, and often has done so in the past to the detriment of British trade. A country is often in a position to grant to another country a tariff reduction which would be highly valued by the receiving country, but the concession cannot be made because the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause would generalise it at once. The capacity of the receiving country to produce and export the commodity on which it desires a tariff reduction is known, and perhaps not feared, by the conceding

country. But the admission of similar goods from all countries might well create an unacceptable opening for foreign competition in the home market. Another reason why generalised tariff reductions are difficult to obtain lies in the diversity of tariff levels. The high and autonomous level of the United States tariff is here a much quoted obstacle. Many a low-tariff country would receive more favourable tariff treatment for its exports if the favours had not immediately and unconditionally to be extended to highly protectionist countries. For these two reasons chiefly, the British requests for tariff reductions in the spring of 1931 met with no response although several of the countries concerned were willing to grant us special concessions.

Another defect in the clause is traceable to the ease with which discrimination can be disguised. In these days of intricate tariff classification it is easy to grant discriminatory favours without giving the country discriminated against legitimate grounds for complaint. A single example will suffice. In 1928 a Franco-Swiss Commercial Treaty was concluded by which the Swiss recognised the recent changes in the French tariff and obtained very little in the way of a *quid pro quo*. At the same time they received several camouflaged concessions which escaped general notice. The French tariff on textile machinery was suddenly applied to the gross weight instead of the net weight of the goods. This meant that the Swiss manufacturer obtained a considerable preference as against his British competitor who was compelled to pack his goods for transhipment instead of loading them into a railway wagon for delivery at the door. Until August 1931 France continued to treat even railway containers as liable to duty under the 'gross weight' regulations.

The present lavish application of emergency measures, import prohibitions, import quotas, foreign exchange control, bilateral clearing treaties, etc. by means of which so many countries are trying to avoid a surplus of imports over exports, has driven a coach and four through the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause. Over a considerable portion of Europe the clause is meaningless for the time being, although lip service is still paid to it in an extensive network of commercial treaties. The time is certainly ripe for experiments in another direction. What are the alternatives?

The stereotyped alternative is, of course, the *conditional* most-favoured-nation clause, sometimes called the reciprocity clause. This form of the clause has a history which is almost as long as the unconditional form. One of its earliest appearances was in the first commercial treaty concluded by the United States of America—namely, that with France in 1778. From that date until 1922 the United States pledged itself to the unconditional

clause only when faced with untiring obstinacy on the part of the other contracting party. As already stated, the example was followed in Central and South America, and also by Japan and some European countries. In the early fifties of the last century Cavour used it successfully to beat down French tariffs on Sardinian products. Even Great Britain has been known to accept such pledges—whether by oversight or on account of the obstinacy of the other party is not very clear. The conditional clause is still incorporated in the British treaties with Holland, Costa Rica, and Liberia.

As formulated in our treaty with Holland in 1839, the clause runs as follows. The two sovereign powers bound each other

not to grant any favour, privilege or immunity in matters of commerce or navigation to the subjects of any other State which shall not be also and at the same time extended to the subjects of the other high contracting party gratuitously if the concession in favour of that other State shall have been gratuitous, and in giving as nearly as possible the same compensation or equivalent in case the concession shall have been conditional.

In other words, the most-favoured nation automatically enjoys every concession freely given to a third party, but if that party has paid a price in the shape of tariff reduction or otherwise the most-favoured nation must also pay for its favours in some equivalent but undefined form.

At first blush this type of clause opens up the obvious way for the application of clause 7 of our Imports Duties Act. But if so used it will soon reveal certain important disadvantages of its very own. The first of these is its lack of precision. Equivalency of concession is undefined and undefinable, and disputes as to the relative value of favours proffered can be prolonged without end. The second is tariff instability. If the conditional clause were universally adopted every commercial treaty signed would render innumerable tariffs unstable, and it is impossible to state that the instability would be mainly in a downward direction for retaliation would be rife. The general result would be the loss of the two great advantages conferred by the unconditional clause—namely, a substantial guarantee against overt discrimination, and a simplification in the procedure of treaty negotiation.

There exists, moreover, a still greater difficulty. The conditional clause is a jealous mistress and permits of no division of loyalty. One single treaty containing the unconditional clause is capable of upsetting a whole network of treaties containing the conditional clause. Unconditional treatment means the extension of every favour gratuitously and without compensation, and, once granted thus gratuitously in an unconditional treaty, every third

party becomes entitled to these favours gratuitously by virtue of their conditional clauses. (See the actual wording of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty quoted above.) It is thus useless for Great Britain to adopt the conditional clause as long as any single one of the present unconditional treaties remains extant. Professor Viner, of Chicago, a recognised authority in this field, has suggested that this difficulty might be overcome by formulating the pledge in a different way

which would permit of conditional practice towards some countries and unconditional practice towards others. The conditional pledge could provide for the extension freely and without compensation only of such concessions made to third countries as originally in the first instance of their being made, were granted without return compensation being received.

In spite of these defects, the conditional most-favoured-nation clause performs a function which is foreign to the unconditional form—namely, it encourages and facilitates tariff reduction. This is an advantage which outweighs many evils, and, as has been shown earlier in this article, the National Government has reserved powers to make drastic experiments. Besides, quite a powerful section of British public opinion is advocating the grant of special favours to countries like the Argentine and Denmark, with which we have close economic connexions. The editorial policy of the *Economist* has for the last nine months been devoted towards a breach with our present allegiance to unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment, whilst the British National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce declared as long ago as last September that

arrangements with different nations within or outside the British Empire or mutual concessions in regard to tariff rights should be welcomed, and there should be no hesitation in abandoning the most favoured nation clause after such intervals as were necessary for the denunciation of existing commercial treaties.

Any step in this direction, the grant of any preferential duty or quota or privilege to one single non-Empire country, would violate nearly all our existing commercial treaties. Whether we proceed by violation or more slowly by consent, a complete revolution will have been caused in British commercial policy and also in world commercial policy. Dr Richard Riedl, of Vienna, probably the greatest expert in these matters now living, recently declared to the writer that the mere prospect of Great Britain embarking on such an adventure was the most striking event in commercial policy since Cobden developed his programme of free trade and most-favoured-nation treaties.

It would therefore be useful to glance at the other complica-

tions which such a change would imply. A downright violation of existing treaties, thus throwing on to other countries the necessary recourse to denunciation, is, it may be assumed, foreign to British principles, besides providing an immediate incitement to savage retaliation. To what extent, then, are our hands tied by existing treaties? Exact details are difficult to summarise, since we have many treaties with States of minor importance, but even these treaties must not be ignored, as they can completely nullify a change-over from the unconditional to the conditional most-favoured-nation clause. About fourteen of our unconditional agreements can be terminated at short notice or in less than a year. About fifteen can be terminated at any time on twelve months' notice. Our treaties with about eight countries have a life which exceeds twelve months from now, being terminable at various dates ranging from 1934 to 1939, and then only on six or twelve months' notice. With seven countries our treaties contain no provision for termination. These are our so-called perpetual treaties with the Argentine, China, Denmark, and Venezuela. Three treaties at least—those with Holland, Liberia, and Costa Rica (the last two perpetual)—contain the conditional most-favoured-nation clause. Our arrangement with France is curious, since the most-favoured-nation treatment can on either side be cancelled by unilateral action.

Our liberty of action, which in this matter must be complete, is therefore limited. Fortunately, most of the perpetual treaties are with countries to which in the normal course of events we should be prepared to extend any exceptional favours which we might devise. The others, and also those countries with long-period treaties, would have to be persuaded. In view of the new British tariff, most important countries are actually desirous of negotiating new treaties with Britain. But when this obstacle is cleared other problems still remain. The negotiations of treaties may be expected to start as soon as possible after the Ottawa Conference. France is already pressing for preliminary conversations. In those cases where treaties have to be denounced some speedy settlement of a temporary *modus vivendi* would have to be made, or otherwise pending the actual conclusion of treaties, which is sometimes a lengthy process, British goods may often be subjected to general or maximum tariffs. These general tariffs often embody a severe degree of protectionism. They are meant to provide a deterrent to the denunciation of treaties and a forcing house for the conclusion of new treaties. Discrimination and retaliation can thus start at an early stage in the pursuit of this new policy. It may be taken for granted that to grant different rates of duty to many or all of the contracting States would not be practical politics. The new British tariff will tend sooner or

later to be stabilised along lines which must follow one or other of the existing precedents, although there is a multitude of refinements.

In bargaining for a series of tariff reductions and incorporating such reductions in a network of conditional most-favoured-nation treaties Great Britain would soon find itself with a three-column tariff—first, a *general* tariff to be applied to those countries which refuse to make the concessions which are accepted as equivalent in value to the concessions which the British Government is willing to make, secondly, a *conventional* tariff embodying these latter concessions, and thirdly, the Empire preferential tariff. But a *conventional* tariff introduces a new principle, for Great Britain has hitherto maintained *autonomy* in tariff matters, and if we retain the right to alter our concessions either upwards or downwards, the concessions made to us will certainly be less valuable. In parenthesis it may be necessary to emphasise the fact that a preference is often of more immediate value than a tariff reduction, and a *conventional* tariff with a conditional most-favoured-nation clause would not only prevent us from raising our duties, but also probably from returning to free trade.¹

Since British tariff policy must remain experimental for some time to come, the retention of *autonomy* appears desirable, despite the fact that it may inspire reluctance to grant us any substantial favours. In such circumstances the configuration of the British tariff would cover an Empire preferential tariff, a minimum autonomous tariff (with a conditional most-favoured-nation clause in one form or another) and a maximum tariff for those countries which are not willing to pay any price for favours in the British market. A further development would quickly take place. An intermediate tariff between the maximum and minimum would have to be introduced in order to embody the treatment of those countries, the concessions offered by which, although substantial in their own eyes, will not be sufficient in ours. In addition the maximum tariff would soon be superseded by retaliatory or fighting duties. At the outset, it would be simpler if each of these tariffs were delineated in percentages of one or the other.

The abandonment of the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause would therefore entail the establishment of at least a four-column tariff. Such a complication could certainly not be carried out within the limits of a 10 per cent revenue tariff. A wide

¹ A *general* tariff is the base tariff from which bargaining concessions are made. A *conventional* tariff embodies the concessions made by treaty generally stipulating the exact rates, but sometimes merely the percentage reductions from the general tariff. These concessions can be consolidated in a treaty, thus depriving the parties of their liberty to alter the duties named during the life of the treaty. An *autonomous* tariff can be altered at will without infringing any treaties.

range of duties would become essential, or otherwise a foreign country might not find the difference between one column and another worth bargaining for. A long period of years would also be necessary for the negotiation of treaties on this basis, a period during which much tariff instability will have been provoked all over the world.

However, since it is a time for bold experiments, there appears to be a chance to try two devices which might curtail the period of flux and instability. In the first place, the Government could start by defining its autonomous minimum tariff, placing all its cards on the table and saying, 'This, gentlemen, is the full limit of concessions which we can make. Grant us similar treatment, and your goods shall be admitted at these rates. Otherwise there is our maximum tariff which is $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. higher.' This is possibly what Mr. Runciman meant when on a recent public occasion he spoke of 'unilateral negotiation.'

In the second place, it ought to be possible to exploit the vital importance of the British market to numerous foreign countries. It is in order to grant special favours to these countries that British opinion is veering towards this revolutionary change. If some preliminary agreement could be contrived with some of them it ought to be possible to supersede bilateral tariff bargaining by multilateral tariff bargaining which would greatly increase the area in which favours have to be sought and therefore their desirability. A world drive for tariff reduction could thus be organised on a scale which has not hitherto been contemplated. New difficulties would have to be faced over and above the chapter of complications which is outlined in this article. The idea itself can only be expressed in the form of a query. But the prize is certainly worthy, and so no such reward is certainly necessary before the British Government would be justified in abandoning the well-worn paths which it can still continue to tread with or without a protective tariff.

OWEN JONES.

THE DANUBIAN PROBLEM

EUROPE is now facing the pretty kettle of fish which its own political preoccupations in 1919 have prepared for it. The centre of Europe is again the centre of the picture. If that central canvas is allowed to shrink economically any further, it will seriously distort, and possibly disrupt, the entire economic and political frame of Europe. The need for a solution which is more than a stopgap is paramount; we have had enough of stopgaps in Central Europe since 1919, and the present *impasse* seems to be their result. Only a profoundly searching and co-operative solution, arrived at by all those Powers who are willing to make economic sacrifices for the good of the European continent, can now serve. The London Conference has had one result, and one only: it abundantly demonstrated the insufficiency of partial remedies, politically conceived, which would only benefit certain European countries at the expense of others, the others being already economically the weakest brethren. The attitudes of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Italy stress the *general* aspects: the need for the inclusion of Bulgaria, and indeed Poland, and the ultimate economic soundness of any plan. The French attitude is maintained to assist the weaker two of the Little Entente—Rumania and Yugoslavia—by 'incorporating' Austria and Hungary at the same time; that is why Czechoslovakia will not give up its agrarian self-sufficiency, not even for France, and it is also the reason for Germany's opposition to this swollen French *entente* in Central Europe. Amid these conflicting interests Great Britain and the United States stand somewhat aloof—more objective, yet more gravely involved financially in the two 'dangerous' States, Austria and Hungary. Britain, moreover, has exports as well at stake, which a preferential system would cut off. To clarify some of the issues involved is the aim of this article.

If we study the course of international affairs in recent years, we cannot fail to see that the conflict between political considerations and what we may call 'economic imperatives' has become increasingly important. Although the aim of international politics should be 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number

of peoples,' considerations of practical foreign politics have always led to the endeavour to establish and to secure the predominance of some States over others, and this means the subjugation of some countries. On what is this predominance based? No doubt ultimately on economic forces, which ought to be dealt with on economic principles. But even prominent statesmen do not primarily consider these principles; rather, they seek to influence and direct economic forces for the exclusive furtherance of their own national political aims. This course may be successful for a certain period of time, but sooner or later the political predominance may be, and generally is, undermined by the adverse operation of economic forces. Only that policy can be successful, in the long run, which follows the right course in this respect and adapts itself to changing conditions.

The Peace Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly provide examples of international instruments of economic import in which political considerations have prevailed. Such considerations have dominated European politics ever since the Albes' Economic Council in Paris in 1916, and above all during the last twelve years. But it is interesting to note that the post-war prevalence of this policy was made possible only by the economic support given chiefly by Great Britain and the United States, who, by lending large amounts to the vanquished countries, enabled them to fulfil their Treaty obligations, as in the case of Germany or to readjust as far as possible their mutilated economic systems, as in the case of Austria and Hungary. The fundamental principle underlying this financial support on the part of England and America was the correction, by financial assistance, of the evident economic defects of the Peace Treaties, on the assumption that foreign credits would enable the countries concerned to achieve a complete economic reconstruction. As soon, however, as this outside support was withdrawn the conflict between political considerations and economic imperatives became acute and is now more serious than ever, since the economic basis established by the Peace Treaties has not proved to be sufficiently broad and solid to permit the construction of economic systems which could weather the storm of a world-wide economic crisis. Not only Austria and Hungary but all the other Danubian countries are struggling with difficulties. After careful investigation of the causes of these difficulties, it can be asserted that, apart from the world depression and from national sins of omission and commission, the crisis in the Danube valley is largely due to the economic consequences of the Peace Treaties, which have involved the breaking up of the great economic unit of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the failure to establish a new and effectively co-ordinated system. It seems, therefore, logical

to conclude that co-operation between the Succession States would lead to an improvement in their situation, since they are more or less complementary to one another. But, as the London Conference has shown, it is much easier to reach this theoretical conclusion than to realise it, since the whole issue itself is, as we shall see, of a more complicated character than might be supposed.

This conclusion certainly inspired the proposal of M Tardieu, which has just been discussed in London, for the creation of a basis of co-operation between the Succession States. The two extreme forms of such co-operation are, on the one hand, a preferential system of commercial treaties between the Succession States, and on the other the creation of a Danubian federation. M Tardieu's proposal was directed towards a preferential system, since the present situation of surplus productive capacities behind tariffs in all the Succession States is unsuitable for either the formation of a customs union or for that of a Danubian federation. It is still possible, however, in spite of the difficulties which have already shown themselves, that if a basis for a preference system can be found, this will be the first step towards a gradually closer co-operation between the Succession States, which can in time lead to a customs union and ultimately to the creation of a Danubian confederation—but for the time being this idea is as remote from realisation as that of the United States of Europe. Whatever form the scheme may take, we have to bear in mind the great and far-reaching international and domestic hindrances that stand in the way of its realisation. The difficulty, which is quite considerable—and this must be emphasised at the very beginning—is shown by the fact that, whereas the idea of a Danubian federation dates from as far back as 1850, when Kossuth and Ghica discussed it for the first time, and whereas since then it has appeared at intervals on the stage of European politics and after the war has been the topic of many discussions, it has never assumed any concrete form. The difficulty in the way of any practical arrangement is threefold: (1) the lack of agreement among the Great Powers, which was brought out plainly enough in the abortive discussions in London; (2) the foreign policies of Danubian countries in relation to one another; (3) the domestic party politics in these countries. Even if economic co-operation alone be envisaged, all these difficulties have to be met.

A glance at the map of Europe is sufficient to enable one to realise the political importance of the Danube valley. It is the field in which French, German and Italian, and, incidentally, Russian interests converge. French influence is at the present moment the strongest, exercised through the Little Entente, and

the element of further Slav combinations is within the purview of French diplomacy. Almost simultaneously with the French proposal, Italy took a significant step towards the solution of the Danubian crisis by the conclusion of trade treaties favourable to Austria and Hungary. The Italian comments on the French proposal were profoundly critical; they made it clear that Italian interests must be safeguarded. Italy will certainly resist any attempt to increase French and Slav influence. Germany considers Austria to be still morally and culturally German, notwithstanding the rejection of the customs union scheme. The recent step of the German Minister in Vienna and the attitude taken up by the German representative at the Four-Power Conference show the determination of Germany to maintain her own interests. Where, then, is the point among these more or less conflicting interests around which a process of co-ordination and crystallisation can develop? No doubt in Hungary, situated as it is in the very centre of the Danube valley and in the middle of the great German and Slav arena. But who can safeguard this process of co-ordination? Who can balance the more immediate interests of France, Germany, and Italy? None but Great Britain, which has at the same time to safeguard very considerable British financial and commercial interests and to act as attorney for America. It is chiefly British and American capital that has helped these countries during the last ten years, and hence the interests of British and American investors must be kept in view. It may be supposed, therefore, that the United States, or at least its financial organisations, will take the same line as England. One of the chief subjects of the discussions that will presumably continue under the auspices of the Great Powers must be the solution of the financial difficulties of these countries, including the 'transfer problem' (with which I deal more in detail later on).

The underlying political element in the French proposal is quite clearly the endeavour to solve the Anschluss problem once for all, but there is another point which seems to be left in the background for the moment - namely, the failure of Rumania to conclude a pact of non-aggression with Russia. This is nearly as important as, if not more important than, the Anschluss problem. There is only one European door open to the Russians at present - that is, Rumania. This door is open not only legally but also materially, for we may take it as a fact that in its present critical situation Rumania will be unable to offer effective resistance to Russia, or, more accurately, to Communism. I deliberately refrain from using the words 'Russian offensive,' because for the time being there is no acute danger of armed aggression on the part of Russia against Rumania, but I refer to social and political resist-

ance to the other and perhaps more dangerous army of Russia, represented by the Communist organisations for revolutionary agitation. It is clear that temporary support alone given to one or another country will not mend the situation. All the States in the Danube valley must be put on a more secure economic basis, in order that their prosperous and peaceful development may be assured. Only by these means can they become a sufficiently reliable defence of European capitalism, for the test of capitalism has always been, 'Does it pay?'

At the centre of foreign politics in the Succession States stands the problem of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. This problem could be solved by the revision of the unjust and uneconomical terms of the Treaty—which would at the same time enable these States to meet on an equal footing and would form the basis of permanent peaceful co-operation between them. On the other hand, it may very well for the time being be shelved. If we looked with impartial eyes at the present state of European politics, we must conclude that revision of the Peace Treaties cannot be realised quickly enough to save the situation. Hence it is proposed that a sort of political truce in the matter of Treaty revision shall be proclaimed, during which all the members of the Little Entente must nevertheless fulfil their Treaty obligations, especially in respect of minorities. One might perhaps be tempted to come to the very easy conclusion that, if the above premises may be taken for granted, the way is open to economic co-operation, to the exclusion of political questions. But unfortunately this facile conclusion is purely theoretical, because the economic issue itself is again bound up with the internal political situation of the countries concerned. Austria and Czechoslovakia have since the war considerably developed their agriculture, and have invested large amounts of capital in order to promote agricultural production, and behind their tariff walls they are able to maintain a wheat price twice or even three times as high as in Hungary or Rumania. It is quite clear that the Austrian and Czech agrarian parties, which have been able to secure these tariffs, will resist their reduction in favour of Danubian wheat. It is very doubtful if even the preferential system can open a way out of this deadlock, since Austria and Czechoslovakia would only make a reduction of their tariffs for those quantities of Danubian wheat which they cannot raise themselves, for only thus would the interests of Austrian and Czechoslovakian agrarians remain sufficiently safeguarded. That is only to stabilise the present situation. It was hoped (before the London Conference) that the respective parties could be brought to consent to such measures and would understand that co-operation with the other Danubian countries would secure for their industries export markets, which in turn

would reduce unemployment and increase the purchasing power of their customers, the industrial population. But the categorical position adopted by M. Benel in the Prague Parliament excluded even this possibility. The situation is just the opposite in Hungary; there it is the industrial interests which have to give way by allowing a reduction of industrial tariffs; and it is notable that the managing director of the Federation of Hungarian Industries, Dr. Fenyő, in a recent article in *La Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, quite openly declares that the Hungarian industrials are fully aware of the fact that they are dependent on the purchasing power of their own agrarian population, and hence they are ready to bear sacrifices which will ensure the disposal of Hungarian agricultural exports. From the side of Rumania and Jugoslavia practically no resistance need be expected, since their agrarians can only benefit by any arrangement involving preferential treatment, and their industries are not of so extensive a nature as to suffer under the system contemplated by the present proposals. The inclusion of Jugoslavia and Rumania in the scheme would meet with some resistance, however, on the part of Hungarian agrarians, who would more readily welcome an agreement with Austria and Czechoslovakia alone. In consequence of the difference in standards of living, and in costs of production, there is still a difference of price level between these southern and eastern countries, which would cause a fall of the price of wheat in Hungary if Jugoslavian and Rumanian wheat could move freely. But this difficulty might be overcome by allotting to each country separately preferential contingents.

Turning now to the economic side of the problem, we must give a short analysis of the tendencies in the economic structure of the Danubian countries. In doing this we must call attention to the fact that, notwithstanding the difference of economic character as between the several countries, the endeavour to arrive at self-supporting and self-sufficient systems within the new boundaries is common to all alike. The influx of foreign capital during the last ten years has made it appear that these countries could carry on their economic life more or less successfully. But the crisis proves that this was not the case, since economic principles of a fundamental kind have not been observed. It would appear evident that the consequences of this hard lesson should be recognised, the foundation of co-operation be laid, and a new period begun. But at the moment there seems no likelihood of this happening. The present situation in the Danubian countries exhibits an even stronger and more intensive effort than before to reach a state of self-sufficiency. Every country, in the interest of what amounts to self-defence, desires to reduce its imports, increase its exports, and protect its currency by all possible and

impossible restrictions ; and the measures taken practically mean a return to mediæval barter in trade with foreign countries. Everything has to be directed towards the goal of avoiding economic collapse, and of averting the serious social and political consequences which might ensue. This involves at the same time the growing control of the entire national economic life. This has also a much wider significance ; for it exemplifies what Mr. Graham Hutton, in his recently published book *Nations and the Economic Crisis*, describes as a coming phase of the development of economic life, in which practically all means at the disposal of sovereign States will be applied to the building up of national economic systems. It may be supposed that this is the way, however difficult it may be, by which each nation will, in the very long run, arrive at the level on which it can afford to live, and then will come to real terms of international co-ordination and co-operation. But there is no need for any further experience of its effects in the Danubian countries : the lesson of recent events has been hard enough to make it clear where we stand, and the opportunity is already given in those ill-fated countries to make a new approach – ‘an approach’ to use Mr. Hutton’s words, ‘to political security through economic co-operation and not, as hitherto, to economic insecurity through political sectionalism.’

The key to the solution of the crisis in the Danubian countries is the solution of the agrarian problem. The proposed system of preferential contingents will solve the agrarian problem only if Germany or Italy will consent to take the surplus of wheat still remaining over even if Czechoslovakia and Austria buy all the imported wheat they need from the other Danubian countries. This surplus is only a small one, being about 350,000 tons reckoned on an average (wheat and flour combined) of the last five years ; nevertheless, it is imperative to dispose of this surplus on some fixed system of preferential contingents, since otherwise the price level in the Danubian countries would still remain low, being subject as it is to the prices ruling in the export market. Such a wide proposal, however, meets all the objections connected with the most-favoured-nation clause, which were made to similar plans proposed during the last two years at the various agrarian conferences and at Geneva. The greatest opposition comes from the overseas wheat-exporting countries. Their opposition is quite justified in principle, but, if we consider the relatively small quantities involved, it may be expected that for the sake of the Danubian crisis an exception will be made, and the more so since this relatively small surplus, if it remains on the export market, will always represent that notorious item which can ruin any efforts for the stabilisation of prices. Indeed, Russia and Argen-

tina, the ultimate opponents to European preferences, have already waived their 'rights' in order that Germany can conclude an avowedly preferential treaty with Rumania. It must be added that preferential treatment is open to a much more serious objection—namely, that it will help to perpetuate an obsolete system of production. The answer to this objection is that in the Danubian wheat-growing countries practically nothing remains of the classic relation between prices and cost of production; it is simply a fact that under present conditions they can only produce at a loss, and it is either too late or too dangerous to resort to the drastic measure of scaling down the capital value of land. Still the necessity for efficient production remains, and none of the Danubian countries can expect any of its partners in the proposed preferential combine to go on buying at a price higher than that of other export markets. Therefore the preferential system can only be a temporary measure, and any concrete proposal for the definite solution of the crisis in the Danubian countries must include the complete reorganisation of their agricultural production. This would involve, among other things, the rationalisation of agriculture, the shifting of production to other branches in which the Danubian countries are more efficient, and the reduction of the export surplus so that the output might be disposed of within the given territory. It may be asked why this was not realised before. The answer may be found partly in the omissions and mistakes of the respective Governments in having failed rightly to direct production, and partly in the general causes of the world agricultural crisis. But it is clear that only with some sort of secured market is it possible to carry out this reorganisation under such complicated economic and social conditions as prevail in the Danubian countries.

Let us turn now to the question of trade and industry. It is interesting that the respective quotas of exports and imports between the Danubian countries are smaller than might be expected, in the light of the statements which are made to the effect that these countries are more or less complementary to one another. Czechoslovakia's industrial exports (including timber) to Hungary, Austria, Jugoslavia, and Rumania amount to 32 per cent of her total exports, and her imports from these countries represent only 20 per cent of her total imports, while her imports from and exports to Germany are 25 per cent and 18 per cent respectively.¹ From these figures we learn that the Danubian countries provide a larger market for Czechoslovakia than does

¹ The percentages given are the averages over the years 1928-30 and 1931, where available, and were computed from the publications of the League of Nations, the bulletins of the National Banks and Dr. Seckely's statistics on the customs rapprochement in Central Europe, and from the usual trade statistics.

Germany : but we may note also that Czechoslovakian trade with Yugoslavia and Rumania is quite small, being only 6 per cent. imports and 12 per cent. exports, notwithstanding the great political friendship between them. Czechoslovakia's trade with Hungary was last year reduced to about two-thirds as compared with that of 1930, in consequence of the denunciation of the commercial treaty. Prolonged negotiations have so far produced no final result, chiefly because of the opposition of Czech agrarians. Austria's imports from the Danubian countries, including Czechoslovakia, are 38 per cent. of her total imports, and 31 per cent. of her exports go to these countries. Austrian exports to Hungary do not exceed 7 to 9 per cent. of Hungarian imports, while Hungarian exports to Austria amount to 30 per cent. of Austria's total imports ; and this situation indicates the difficulties in the way of a closer economic understanding between the two countries, independently of the other Danubian States. In Hungary's export trade the Danubian countries receive the largest proportion, since 54 per cent. of her exports go to these countries and 47 per cent. of her imports come from them, while in the case of Yugoslavia the corresponding figures are 36 and 44 per cent. and in the case of Rumania 28 and 31 per cent. To complete these statistics it must be added that imports from Germany vary between 16 and 25 per cent., and exports to Germany between 10 and 18 per cent. ; while Italy's share in the foreign trade of the Succession States is roughly as follows. Czechoslovakia takes from Italy 2 per cent. of her total imports and sends to her 3 per cent. of her exports ; Austria takes from her 4 per cent. of her imports and sends to her 9 per cent. of her exports. Hungary's exports to Italy amount to 9 per cent. of her total exports. On the other hand, Yugoslavia takes from Italy 11 per cent. of her imports and sends to her no less than 25 per cent. of her exports, in spite of the political antagonism between these two States—an antagonism which seems to be eased by the preferential commercial negotiations recently initiated. If we combine these figures in order to see how much of the foreign trade of the Danubian countries falls to the Succession States, Germany, and Italy, we find that about 74 per cent. of Hungarian total foreign trade is with these countries, about 60 per cent. of Austrian, about 50 per cent. of Czechoslovakian, 71 per cent. of Yugoslavian, and 58 per cent. of Rumanian. The direct interest of Germany and Italy in the Danubian trade is represented by the following figures : Germany receives 9 per cent. of her total imports from the Danubian countries, and exports to them 10 per cent. ; while Italy obtains 20 per cent. of her imports from these countries and exports to them 8 per cent. of her total exports.

It has seemed necessary to quote these figures in order to

clarify the background of the various schemes which appear at various intervals. But we must not ignore the fact that these figures relate to the actual situation and do not indicate the *potentialities* of any proposed preferential system. Theoretically it might be supposed that it would be possible to come to an arrangement by which almost the entire trade of the Danubian countries could be confined to the Danube valley; but practically this is quite impossible, and it is useless to discuss it further. Agriculture alone rules it out. As we have seen, the trade of the Danubian countries among themselves and with Germany and Italy varies from 50 to 74 per cent of their total foreign trade. And by a preferential system this ratio may without much difficulty be considerably increased to 70 to 80 per cent or even more. If this be considered too optimistic an estimate, it is not an important objection, since the principal object of any scheme is not so much to increase percentages as to secure markets in which agricultural and industrial products can be sold at remunerative prices. Still, there is no doubt that even if a closer arrangement eventuates between the Danubian States their standards of living, public and private, will have to be scaled down, however great the hardship. This inevitable issue has to be faced, because otherwise there is no possibility of making both ends meet in order to pay external debt services, without remunerative exports. These sacrifices are a necessary condition of securing a better future, in which a new rise in the standard of living may come very soon. This, when it comes, will be on securer foundations than in the past, when there was not sufficient *intrinsic* economic strength to withstand 'the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune'.

Now that the London Conference has failed, and that the League seems powerless beyond recommending impossible loans or moratoria, it may be expected that the discussions of any proposed 'Danubian' system may occupy a considerable time, the more so because, until the reparation question is 'settled' at Lausanne and the Imperial Conference in Ottawa has been held, no continuous and concentrated attention can probably be given to Danubian affairs. But a beginning must be made as soon as possible to rescue these countries from the critical situation which has so often been described in the English Press as a deadlock. This description, however, is an exaggeration. The situation is serious, but not hopeless.

The most acute difficulty is the financial. Hungary has been compelled to declare an all but complete transfer-moratorium in respect of the payment of interest and amortisation of foreign loans, the service of which has gradually become heavier with the increasing incidence of the real burden of debts contracted in terms of gold. The heavy fall in prices of her export articles and

the narrowing of her export markets made this measure necessary. The total amount of interest and amortisation on Hungary's foreign debts, which amount to 4,094,000,000 pengő (about £147,000,000 at par), is 287,000,000 pengő (about £10,300,000 at par), of which about 205,000,000 fall under the transfer-moratorium, as long as the service of the Reconstruction Loan and of the other loans mentioned in the declaration of the National Bank are continued. Ultimately there are only two ways to secure the transfer: either the international price level rises and markets are found for a sufficiently large export surplus, which can be produced by Hungary; or else the interest charges have to be readjusted — i.e., the external debt has to be scaled down to the lower gold values.

It is interesting to note that before the war Hungary was able to employ productively much larger foreign loans, which in 1913 amounted to 5,500,000,000 pengő *as calculated on present territory*, while the service of this debt was less than the present requirements. It is only under the present unfavourable economic conditions that the amount of its debts can be considered too large, and even this service could be assured if the interest charges on post-war loans were normal, and if the world-wide economic depression and the Danubian crisis had not rendered it impossible to obtain a sufficient amount of foreign exchange to pay interest and amortisation in foreign currency.

It is probably merely a matter of time before Austria will find it necessary to take the same measures as Hungary and to declare a transfer-moratorium in order to avoid the collapse of her currency. Though there are no such complete statistics available for Austria's foreign indebtedness as there are for Hungary's, it can be computed from the items published by the Austrian National Bank and the Austrian Ministry of Finance, and from the various so-called stand-still agreements that have been concluded, that the total foreign indebtedness of Austria amounts to about 4,093,000,000* Austrian schillings (£118,000,000 at par), on which the interest and amortisation payments will not exceed about 300,000,000 schillings. The amount falling under the possible transfer-moratorium may be put at about 210,000,000 schillings (£6,000,000), since the service of the Austrian League of

* The amount was computed as follows: Non Government long term loans 730,000,000 schillings; short term credits of the National Bank, the Credit Anstalt and other banks about 900,000,000; other short-term credits of a commercial and industrial character, 500,000,000; while the foreign debts of the Government at the end of 1931 were given by the Austrian Ministry of Finance at 1,947,800,000, which contains, however, the pre-war loans only at 27 per cent and 32 per cent of their capital value, while the League of Nations computation of Hungary's debts gave these loans at 100 per cent of their capital value. Hence, if a comparison be made, the corresponding amount of 316,000,000 has to be added, thus making the total 4,093,000,000.

Nations loan guaranteed by foreign Governments will also presumably be exempted, and hence about 90,000,000 schillings must be deducted from the above amount. The total amounts affected by the Hungarian and the possible Austrian transfer-moratoria together represent about £13,300,000. By the terms of the Hungarian transfer-moratorium the amounts of interest and amortisation of foreign loans have to be paid into a 'blocked account' at the National Bank, which at once suggests the problem of the employment of this accumulating fund. To put it plainly, the continuous inflow of currency into the bank, as interest and amortisation fall due, would cause a deflation of exceptional dimensions, if we remember that the total currency circulation in Hungary is only 360,000,000 pengő, while the amount involved is over 200,000,000 pengő. To avoid this, a proportionate increase in the note circulation would be necessary; but this would mean an equally exceptional form of inflation. On the other hand, to re-lend the amount paid in would cause an undue increase in the bill portfolio, which is already much too high, amounting as it does to 370,000,000 pengő, and this, again, would ultimately involve inflation.

This seems a deadlock, but I venture to propose a way out. The amount affected by the transfer-moratoria could be granted as a loan to Yugoslavia and to Rumania, and they would order then from Austria and Hungary the industrial commodities they need to the corresponding amount. Or, alternatively, they might execute public works, such as railway building, electrification, etc., accepting the participation of Hungarian and Austrian firms jointly with English firms in these enterprises up to the amount advanced. Rumania and Yugoslavia are still importing industrial products from these countries, but their requirements are in excess of what they can afford, since there are no credit facilities under present conditions. It may be therefore assumed that they would be willing to accept such a proposal, which would certainly benefit them and would cause an increase of, say, £750,000 sterling in their annual foreign commitments (being 5½ per cent. of £13,300,000 sterling, the amount proposed to be lent). At present neither Yugoslavia nor Rumania has too heavy foreign obligations, their foreign debts are only nominally large, since the greater part consists of war debts, on which, under the terms of the Hoover moratorium, they are paying neither interest nor amortisation. The acceptance of this proposal would stimulate economic life in Yugoslavia and Rumania, as well as in Austria and Hungary, and at the same time it would solve the problem of the Hungarian and Austrian transfer funds. The practical realisation would not involve any new loan transaction, since the amounts paid into the National Banks of Austria and Hungary

could be credited directly to Rumania and Jugoslavia, and payments settled by a 'clearing' between the individual firms in the countries concerned in the transactions and the central organisation obtaining the loan. The formation of a central body for the joint representation of the present creditors is also needed. This, we understand, is already in process of formation. Fundamentally, by agreeing to such a scheme, the creditors would only be doing what was usually done by England in re-lending interest received on foreign loans; the only difference is that, whereas the usual English transaction was effected indirectly through the capital market in London, that which is now proposed would be a direct transaction on the part of the actual creditors. It must be recognised that this may be at the same time the beginning of a sounder organisation of international finance, since it implies direct contact between creditor and debtor, by which the repayment of debts could be better assured than at present. Direct financial contact is already in being, through clearing agreements recently concluded with the Danubian countries. However great may be the initial difficulties, these clearings will not only have a beneficial effect on the settlement of payments involved in trade transactions and on the establishment of equilibrium between imports and exports, which seems to be their tendency, but they will also form a basis for the settlement of international debts, in that through such clearing arrangements the creditor countries will be in a position to allow the import of goods and services from the debtor countries, and thus enable them to pay their debts.

It is quite clear that financial measures alone can have only a temporary effect, but none the less they are the means by which a first step can be taken towards recovery, and then the major causes of the general economic depression can be more effectively dealt with. The solution of the crisis in the Danubian countries is not an isolated or local problem. It is the interest of all Europe to secure stability in the Danube valley, since this has a general political, social, and economic importance. Co-operation between the Danubian countries and the opening out of larger areas for free commercial intercourse would improve the whole situation, and this in turn would increase the purchasing power of more than 60,000,000 people, living in a territory of over 330,000 square miles, in which there is wide scope for the erection of public works, electrification and so on, and numerous business enterprises which still offer considerable possibilities to British trade and industry.

KÁLMAN DE BUDAY.

'EDUCATING' THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

To inform the minds of the People and to follow their will, is the chief duty of those placed at their head

PRESIDENT JEFFERSON, 1801-9

WITH all the patience of a dry-fly man in a chalk stream, that massive angler, Herbert Hoover, is doing his best to teach America's masses—those 'composite and cosmopolitan people' who sent the luckless Woodrow Wilson to his death—the great principles and causes on which their happiness depends—the last citation is President Monroe's. Unluckily, Mr. Hoover is not well fitted, either by temperament or inclination, for a task in which Theodore Roosevelt excelled, the latter being a dynamic back-slapper, a man of tempestuous laughter, a born 'mixer' with the political crowd, and a 'rough rider' in very many senses of the term. On the other hand, Hoover has that Chopin shrinking from a mob, which is a severe handicap in the White House, where 6000 hands of greeting must needs be clasped in a single reception. Coming in on the high tide of Calvin Coolidge's prosperity, with its 'blue-sky' limit of America's Utopian soaring, Hoover was incautious enough to predict an end to poverty itself in that vast and singular land, and in his election speeches he outsang all his predecessors. Then came the stupendous gamble of 1929—a joyous frenzy which has no parallel in all history. And after that the deluge came—a tragic *katharsis* which laid low the sovereign people, and has since made a Congressional scapegoat of one of the ablest and most far-sighted Chief Executives which the United States has ever had.

Hoover has a fractious Parliament on his hands. Senators and Representatives return to the Capitol from their home towns imbued with the sour disillusion of constituencies as far apart as Glasgow is from Athens, and climates that vary from the White Sea's own to the date-groves of Malaga that look over to the African beaches. These people see the enormous sum of \$11,000,000,000 owing to them, exactly as if it were golden specie physically transferred to the war-chests of Europe in the desperate four years 1914-18, instead of being credits for goods and munitions bought at famine prices, chiefly in 1917. Then it was that André

Tardieu, as High Commissioner of France in the United States, surveyed the unimaginable chaos and confusion around him (with 600,000 tons of his purchases on the docks and no ships to carry them), and could mourn that the values put upon commodities—grain and copper and oil, 'the things to eat and things to fight with'—were 'certainly excessive.' But this is not the place in which to dissect those War Debts of destruction which, together with German reparations, tariff walls, and fantastic accumulations of gold, have fairly paralysed the economic system of our world.

Well advised at home as well as by his agents abroad, President Hoover tells his people that 'We cannot isolate ourselves from the world.' In a notable Message to Congress the President pictured the calamitous welter that was seething outside the *hortus inclusus* of the United States, together with the backwash of alien storms which smote and bewildered his own people.

Within two years there have been revolutions or acute social disorders in nineteen countries embracing more than half the population of the world. Ten countries have been unable to meet their external obligations. In fourteen countries embracing a quarter of the world's population—former monetary standards have been temporarily abandoned. In a number of countries there have been acute financial panics or compulsory restraints upon banking. These disturbances have many roots in the dislocations from the World War. *Every one of them has reacted upon us.*

Although some of the causes of our depression (Mr. Hoover pursued) are due to speculation inflation of securities and real estate, unsound foreign investments and mismanagement of financial institutions, yet our self-contained national economy with its matchless strength and resources, would have enabled us to recover long since, but for the continued dislocations shocks and setbacks from abroad.

The President followed this up by yet another Message on Foreign Affairs to both Houses of a wary and mistrustful Congress, and through them to the sovereign people—who would have none of it.

It is clear (Mr. Hoover announced) that a number of the Governments indebted to us will be unable to meet further payments to us in full, pending recovery in their economic life. It is useless to blind ourselves to an obvious fact. Therefore it will be necessary in some cases to make still further temporary adjustments.

He wound up by proposing 'the re-creation of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, with authority to examine such problems as may arise in connexion with these debts during the present emergency, and to report to the Congress its conclusions.' To this Mr. Hoover's Chancellor, the veteran Andrew Mellon (now United States Ambassador in London), added a gloss about Great Britain's enhanced payments due to currency changes, making the Administration's communication as fair and complete as the soundest counsel could make it.

Yet we all know how the United States Senate, under the leadership of Borah, of Idaho, and Hiram Johnson, of California, viewed any extension of the War-Debt moratorium, to say nothing of outright cancellation. Senator Dill, of Washington, wondered whether the Treasury Minister took the members of Congress for a 'bunch of boobs'? And from the deafening dissonance of Press comment throughout the continent I shall select a passage from the *St. Louis Star*, as stating the position as the American people see it to-day:

Europe, by refusing to set its house in order, by seeking all and giving nothing in return, by perpetuating the menace of war, by proving to us that our belief in a 'War for Democracy,' was monumental folly—has forfeited the right to ask for further favours. In terms of economic reality, President Hoover is right. In terms of emotional reality, Congress is right. And whenever there is a conflict between Economics and Emotion—Emotion carries the day. That is the case in Washington. And the fact that an American policy based on Emotion will be disastrous to ourselves will not prevent us from following it.

The whole story of American 'emotion' bears this out, from the gross abuse heaped upon President Washington himself for signing the Jay Treaty in 1795, to the delirious homage paid to the egregious Bryan in his fantastic campaigns of the 'nineties. Has modern history any such jest as the spectacle of that same buffoon as America's Foreign Minister during those desperate days of 1915, when German torpedoes consummated the most frightful crime in all the sea's annals? But Bryan found Wilson's *Lusitania* Note 'too strong' for his own queasy conscience, and so left the tragicomic scene to Robert Lansing, who found the State Department like the jumbled office of a derelict city company.

It is a mistake to suppose that there is no *élite* of thinkers in the United States well able to appraise the facts, and even to express them with merciless frankness. But such voices are at present lost in a stupendous empire of settlers which is in no respect a 'nation' in the European sense, and which can easily be churned into its primal ethnic elements, as we saw during the recent visit of Signor Dino Grandi, the Foreign Minister of Italy, and still more luridly during the formidable upheaval of German-Americans in the two and a half years before America entered the Great War. Our own Press writers ignore the immense area and climatic ranges of America, with its forty-eight huge States and as many Parliaments, all grinding out conflicting laws of quite fantastic diversity. California alone is three times the size of England; Texas is four and a half times as large. From Portland, Me., to Portland, Ore., is a longer road than from the Mersey clear across the Atlantic Ocean to New York Bay. The interests of Ireland are no more remote from those of Arabia than

are those of, say, Massachusetts from Nevada or New Mexico. What can the bleak Dakotas or wolf-haunted Wyoming have in common with Louisiana, the sub-tropic Gulf States or the endless forests of the far North-West with the self-conscious culture of Virginia and Maryland?

Scattered over an area as large as all Europe are 125,000,000 people of every known race and colour, solely intent upon Prosperity, and with a natural grudge against the Old World which denied them and their fathers a living, forcing them out overseas in a last dice-throw with Fortune which, by the way, has far more losers than we ever hear of among the hard pawns of a pink-thinking Success.

For this is surely the Land of Luck, surveyed from Independence Day clear up to the harvest of the Great War which found America's status magically changed from that of a debtor to the creditor of virtually all the leading nations. This point is lucidly brought out by James Harvey Rogers, Professor of Economics at Yale University, in the lively study which he calls *America Weighs Her Gold*. Here we have crude Federal and State governance exposed—the tariff obstacles which make debt-payments so hard, and other raw-amateur features which baffle the sober observer on this side. Professor Rogers shows how America was lifted into sudden primacy by the Great War, whilst failing entirely to appreciate her new situation. 'Never before,' this economist declares, 'had a people so completely lacking in international experience been thus thrown into a position of such importance.' And again, speaking for his heedless mixed millions, the Yale professor delivers an apologia as frank as the 'sheer ignorance' wherewith Dr Johnson once disarmed his censors. 'We are neither knaves nor care-free morons—but simply children. It is not a matter of shirking our international responsibilities; we do not even know that we have any.'

One cannot wonder at this as one reaches the 'heart of America,' which lies in the immense central plains west of the Mississippi River—a region well out of the usual ambit of visiting Pressmen and lecture-tourists. There is little or no contact with Europe in these endless flats, no going down to the sea in ships; folks in these parts have never seen the frontier of a foreign land, and never will. England and France, Germany, Italy and the rest—what are they but geographical symbols or schoolbook signs, haply with a news value in *Maff Street's* daily paper, when some fresh non-American devilry is toward, such as talk of repudiations and reparations, which make dismal hearing in a thin time of 'frozen assets and cold feet,' all the way from the Great Lakes down to the Mexican border? These provincials of the plains feel free from any risk of invasion. Armies and navies do

but convey to these remote people the sharp sense of iniquity which Thomas Jefferson felt in his second White House term—when the clouds of war were already lowering and the sacred Capitol itself to be set ablaze by a foreign foe!

These great plains, as well as all the other sectors of America, are gravely disturbed by the persistence of a depression more menacing than all the fifteen others which this enormous Utopia has suffered in the last 100 years. For now—apart from the war debts—some \$17,000,000,000 has been lent to Europe. And the local newspaper's editorial takes on a very different tone from that of the Press of the Atlantic tier of States—which is quite another world. 'Blood cannot be squeezed from a stone,' mourns the little *Courier-Post*.

The nations that owe us money cannot pay in gold because they have almost no gold left—three-fourths of all the gold in the world is in French and American vaults—Germany, England, Italy, Belgium and the others—how are they to pay us? Our tariff prevents them from selling us goods in payment. Our foreign policy precludes the use of military force to compel payment through seizure of capital resources in those nations. Just what are we to get? and how are we going to get it? Either we must find a way by which these Debts may be collected, or we shall force our debtors into repudiation and with it the disintegration of existing Governments. The House Committee of Ways and Means, by a heavy vote, has rejected the President's programme for restatement of the Debts. Then what is to be the subject-matter of our Congress? There will have to be new elections that will shake the nation.

Worse still, the masses appear to be starving on America's heap of gold, while the President faces a sullen Congress, so that his chances of reelection next November are more than doubtful. Already Mr. Hoover's Cabinet Family are appealing to the public in their chief's defence.

Never in our history, War Secretary Harley points out, has a President been called upon to direct the nation's commerce, industry and banking, to create jobs for millions, to raise funds for the care of the unemployed, and to fight the Great Depression, at the same time rallying the people and our economic resources for a general recovery.

It is a task beyond any man's capacity, in view of all the cross-pulling factions incidental to what Lord Durham, a century ago, called 'a merely Federal Government'. And here this means 125,000,000 people spread over 3,000,000 square miles and split up into forty-eight sovereign States, each with its own panoply of Government and peculiar interests.

Now, Mr. Hoover is an administrator of proven sagacity at home and abroad, whether in starving Russia or in Mississippi floods of oceanic range. He has been seven times round the world, and knows all the units of Britain's Empire from Africa to the Australian. Yet in this new economic 'war' he finds himself

blocked and baffled by these mixed millions' non-knowledge, just as President Wilson was amid the uproar and anguish of his long-drawn neutrality from 1914 to 1917. Our Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice—that devoted scapegoat of an evil day!—has left us an instructive note on his farewell audience at the White House when the distracted Wilson sought to explain those zigzags of policy and procrastination which had so shocked the Allies, although well understood by the German *Kriegsamt*, who saw the American titan 'talking daggers with a bodkin in his fist . . .'

He told me [Spring-Rice records of President Wilson] 'that his chief preoccupation was not external, but internal' . . . The country was divided into several groups which did not understand one another, which were of different origin, and might at any moment fly at each other's throats. . . . The nation was only nominally united . . . So the problem which an American President has to face was in the main a psychological one. He had to take the course which commended itself to the great majority of the American people whose interpreter he was bound to be . . . It was not so much a question as to what was the right thing to do, from the abstract point of view as what was the possible thing to do from the point of view of the popular conditions of mind. It was the President's duty to divine the moment when the country required action, and to take that action which the great majority demanded.

In other words, the leader was not to march ahead, but to follow behind the rank and file and take his orders from them. And yet that was not gruff Andrew Jackson's way in an early crisis of Secession—assuredly not Abraham Lincoln's way in the greatest crisis of all, when the entire Union fell asunder, and a ruthless dictatorship was called for in the best and most sweeping sense of the word. Yet a 'blanket' resolution of Congress covered all Lincoln's 'tsarist tyranny' when that strong steersman held his own course amid all the shrilling of his 'Copperheads' and peace-at-any-price abusers and counsellors. Theodore Roosevelt, too, never waited on the fickle *tropes* of the masses; he planned a bold stroke and achieved his aim (as in Panama in 1903) in the spirit of Virgil's compendious line: '*Possunt quia posse videntur*.' And how meekly both the Senate and the Lower House led from 'Teddy's' forceful hand! But, then, Roosevelt was a born jockey of men, the hilarious 'joller' and 'mixer,' a type whom America's politicians have always admired. Wilson used to assemble his Congress much as a dour schoolmaster does his unruly boys. Mr Hoover is no 'mixer' at all, his spiritual home is in the silence of those Virginia hills where the tumbling Rapidan eddies into trout-pools, and those eager 'How'dy' paws of greeting together with all the mindless slavery of the White House day, are no more than a tedious dream.

What is certain is that energetic leadership is now *the* demand

of the United States; and yet another Roosevelt—Franklin D., the present Governor of New York State and the Democrats' 'favourite son' for the Presidency in November—is responding to it vigorously. 'Let us face facts,' Mr. Roosevelt urges upon America. 'Not since the dark days of the 'sixties have our people faced problems so grave, a situation so difficult or suffering so severe.' So there must be 'new measures of value,' since those of old 'have been proven false.' And the public now ask for 'a new leadership' which will find a way out of the present slough and 'restore business and industry on a basis made more sound and firm by the lessons of the experience through which we are passing. Let us not only seek to restore, but at the same time to remodel, our institutions. To those millions who now starve we owe a duty as sacred as to those who died in France, to see to it that this misery shall not come again.'

One finds the same plea raised by the intellectuals. 'Our national need to-day' as Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, points out 'is the need of a great intelligence—a poet or a philosopher, who can win the hearts of the whole people as Emerson won those of a past generation.' Even the popular Press, after much 'debunking' of America's former heroes, sets out the Cavour ideal in its own vernacular:

This is no time for corner grocery strategists and smallbore statesmen. Government by 'politics' and precedent can no longer be tolerated. The weasels, the foxes and the moles of Party must be run to their holes. The boy-orators and the two bit office holders must double-quick to the rear. Half hearted, chicken hearted Americans, our two worst breeds of 'hyphenates'—no matter how moss grown in office or how strong with 'the gang back home'—cannot command the confidence of the country. Neither can those sincere and earnest souls who bring pop-gun minds to our forty-two centimetre problems.

It is clear that America will soon afford surprising headlines to our newspapers. Gone for ever is James Monroe's complacent note of 1820 on 'the simplicity and purity of our institutions,' and the Jeffersonian age of peace when the combined army and navy budget of the republic was less than £400,000! America is learning 'Our people are thinking their way through,' as the fallen Wilson noted, 'and reaching their own free decision.' The call for a leader began long ago, but it was no more than a pious wish in those years of isolation when the watchword was 'Friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.' Yet without the 'entanglement' with France independence could never have been won. And although Jefferson, in his preamble to the classic Declaration of Independence, lays it down as a 'self-evident truth' that 'all men are created equal,' that wily sage soon realised his absurdity. 'I agree with you,' he confesses

at last in a letter to John Adams (who was the very first occupant of the White House), 'that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. . . . May we not even say, that that form of rule is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural *aristoi* into the offices of Government?' Unfortunately, a democracy is all too apt to mistrust the *aristoi*, a fact which is cynically noted in the *Intimate Papers* of Colonel E. M. House, the little Texan boss who 'managed' President Wilson, and who came to be called 'the Power behind the Throne' when his hapless lay-figure--the fallen Messiah of 1920--was utterly repudiated by both Congress and people. Wilson's worship of Demos led him into the incredible quagmires of 1915-17, which were even more hopeless than those of his hero-exemplar, Thomas Jefferson, when he was caught between Napoleon and British sea-power in 1807. In America's 'Golden Year' of neutrality (1916) Wilson's personal 'shock-absorber' and secretary, the tireless Joe Lammity, started his famous 'Yellow Journal' for the guidance of his beloved 'Governor'. This was a private digest of some forty leading newspapers, with the cuttings pasted upon big sheets of yellow foolscap, provided with bold headings and with confidential and spicy personal notes sandwiched in between the whole loosely bound with pink tape. This unique Presidential journal enabled Wilson to feel the political pulse of his warring and disorientated people, and, according to the beat of it, the shepherd followed his sheep to the dire confusion of all. Both Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge continued this 'Yellow Journal', with the foreign items of it largely reduced, so as to conform with the reaction to 'normalcy' after the errant Wilson's lapse in Paris. Mr. Hoover uses this journal too, though with European, Far Eastern and Latin-American cables equalling if not exceeding in importance the domestic news and leading articles.

I have said that the United States cannot be considered a 'nation at all' as the word is commonly employed: it is altogether too vast in area, its population too mixed in race and colour, its huge commonwealths and legislatures too diverse in interests, climates and 'sovereign' rights. Political sagacity has always been wanting here, and even the early Fathers--Washington, Adams, Franklin, Madison and Monroe--deplored this fact and sought to remedy it. The first President thought the political enlightenment of his people a matter of 'primary importance'. Lincoln called it the most pressing of all civic duties. But just as America entered the World War quite helpless as a belligerent, so is she unable to adjust herself to to-day's universal crisis in the economic sphere. 'Public opinion' is many and various; tenets of policy common to all are very hard to establish in a land of continental

range and heterogeneous populations. Well may Sir Henry Strakosch, of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, deplore 'the vicious spiral' of deflation in commodity prices due to the abnormal accumulation of gold, mainly by the United States. Nor will any mere postponement of Reparations and War Debt payments, Sir Henry thinks, remedy this deadly evil. 'To establish confidence, which is essential for the restoration of credit and the resumption of normal intercourse in trade and finance, the world wants to be left in no doubt that the disturbances which have brought it to the verge of complete ruin, cannot in future be repeated.'

How long will it take for all the American 'people' to see that *they* are the chief stumbling block, not only of Europe's welfare, but of their own? President Hoover gave them a bold lead, and point was lent to it by his veteran Chancellor, Andrew Mellon. But that Rocky Mountain statesman Mr. William Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thought any revision of the war debts (our own at the time of funding reached nearly \$5,000,000,000) was 'as bold as Julius Caesar'. Mr. Borah, who is a historic apostle of the Bryan type, utters the current feeling of the American people who see us of Europe piling up armaments with their money. American bankers know the truth—men like Thomas Lamont of Morgan's, Mitchell, of the National City Bank, Otto Kahn of Kuhn Loeb's, and the rest. 'If it were possible,' said Mr. Kahn to the Senate Finance Committee, 'to find a way by which all these reparations and war debts, which hang round the world's neck like a millstone, could be taken out and sick at the sea, I for one would welcome it.'

But the American people look askance at these 'internationalists' and are even said to be looking for a new President 'who knows the boundaries of the United States'. Yet their political education goes fast in these days of 'anxiety-attack'. Nowhere else but in Washington is a non-commercial newspaper published solely to enlighten the masses in 'the facts of Government'. It is called the *United States Daily*, and among its shrewd founders were great Americans like Charles I. Hughes, Owen Young, John D. Davis, Colonel House, James W. Gerard, Robert Lansing, Bernard Baruch, and many more. 'Education is increasing,' this silent mentor declares. 'Our interests are broadening, we Americans are learning more about ourselves. But what do we know about our Government? Do we know what the Government specialists in every line in Washington and elsewhere in the world, are doing to further our interests?' And therewith over 300 United States bureaux, divisions, sections and units are dealt with in a daily 'service of facts,' without any comment or 'leaders,' and no advertisements at all. Of especial

interest is the record of America's Foreign Office, or Department of State, with its diplomatic and consular activities classified as Latin-American, Mexican, Western and Eastern European, together with the Near Eastern and Far Eastern sections. This last has been very busy since last autumn, by reason of the Manchurian dispute and the appeal to the Nine-Power Pact which affects the 'open door' in China; this last has been a cardinal tenet since John Hay's efforts of thirty years ago, and even the petty newspapers of 'Main Street' give it great space. '... Now there was Korea,' a local editor mourns. 'Japan seized that empire, and even changed its name to "Chosen" Let's hope Manchuria won't go the same way, and be re-labelled TAKEN!'

It is in foreign affairs that the American people are most backward, for the State Department was too long ranked with the Geodetic Survey as a bureau whose work was no concern of the ordinary citizen. The earliest 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs' lasted but two years, and the second one only fifty days, both the name and its implications were objected to. Thomas Jefferson strove in vain to get the Powers interested in the affairs of the infant republic—even offering free sites for Legations in Sixteenth Street, Washington. Even when the State Department took permanent form, it was the Government's general drudge, occupied with the census as well as with patents, copyrights and even weights and measures. To-day it takes precedence of all the other Ministries, and in the event of both the President and his 'Vice' dying in office, it is the State Secretary who would automatically occupy the White House as Chief Executive of the United States.

Long ago the lofty ideals of Woodrow Wilson were abandoned for the common sense of Calvin Coolidge, who, in a memorable speech, declared: 'Our first duty is to Ourselves.' It will take some time for the new ferment I have here described to make Americans 'internationally minded' and to convince them that the two hemispheres are really one in the vast complex of world-economics. But when that process is complete, the nightmare of Reparations and War Debts, which, as Sir Henry Strakosch has shown in his masterly survey, has affected 1,200,000,000 people all over the globe, will belong to the dismal past, which an instructed American democracy may well recall with wonder and regret.

WM GPO FITZ-GERALD.
(*Ignatius Phayre.*)

A YEAR OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC

THE Spanish Republic has not been a success. Greeted with goodwill alike by foreign Powers and by the optimistic mood of the Spanish people, who had been beguiled by their promises, the Republican leaders can lay the blame on no one but themselves. The moment for their experiment was ill-chosen, an economic crisis was upon the world, but Spain had hardly felt it. Provided that there was confidence and stability, such as there was until some months after the fall of Primo de Rivera, there was no reason why Spain should not continue to develop, she provided a promising field for foreign capital, a rapid change in the spirit of her people, and in the modes of living, had roused her from her backwardness. The threat of anarchy had been removed, in the banks there was a strong reserve of gold, and at the head of affairs, a guarantee of continuity, was the astute, enterprising and experienced sovereign, who at the beginning of 1931 had gathered round him the ablest men of the old parliamentary tradition.

Such was the situation at the beginning of April 1931. In a day's voting all was changed. Impressed by the intensive propaganda, and the alluring promises of a party who were still revolutionaries, reacting against the salutary discipline which had saved them from anarchy seven years before, a large number of people, especially in the towns, voted in the elections for local government against the supporters of the monarchy. That there was a majority in the whole country in their favour is far from likely. The most acute observers in Spain before the revolution were convinced that the monarchy was secure, but elections in Spain have always been corrupt, and there is every probability that in this case the conspirators had won the sympathies of those appointed to count the votes. The numbers of the voting as a whole have never been published, a fact which is sufficient evidence that the vote was predominantly monarchical. But wherever Monarchists were elected, the ballot was declared invalid, and the electors were ordered to vote again. In the meantime the vote in the big towns, aided by the yelling of excited mobs, had been accepted as decisive. The army and the civil guard had wavered in their allegiance, the King had pro-

visionally abrogated his powers, and the Republicans had taken charge. That is just over a year ago.

What has happened since? The parliamentary elections which were to have been held almost immediately were delayed. When they took place, the voting was almost all in favour of a mild socialism; hardly a single Monarchist was elected, and after a long discussion (it lasted four months) the Parliament passed a new constitution in accordance with the current ideas of socialism. Spain was declared a republic of workers, the Church was disestablished, the religious orders dissolved, meanwhile the provisional Government, assuming dictatorial powers, had passed very sweeping decrees. The King's property had been confiscated, the army was reduced by half, and a sweeping change was ordered in education. At last a sweeping change in the Civil Service was decreed. But in reality the administrative changes were slight, things went on very much the same as before in all Government departments. The change had been artificial, and was met by people who shrugged their shoulders. The ideas of general liberty were forgotten, and it was soon made clear that the one idea of the new régime was to 'save the republic' at any cost. The censorship of the Press was so rigid that any criticism of the Republican policy meant immediate suspension, prominent clergy, suspected of a power to give a moral lead to the people, were deported without trial. It was soon noticed that in a short time the provisional Government was the most absolute dictatorship Spain had known, and yet in spite of its arbitrary methods, it could not maintain order, even by firing on the people, as, in defiance of the standards set by the dictatorship, it did not scruple to do. The police and troops, however, under its orders were seen to stand idly by while a small mob, headed by foreign Communists, set fire not only to churches, but to free schools, to libraries, to historical manuscripts, and to a technical college, on the excuse that these institutions of charity and learning were under the control of priests or of nuns. Why the Government adopted this attitude we shall see later. At the revolution there were not only anti-clerical riots, there were general outbreaks of carnal immorality, strikes and disorder have spread through all parts of the country, and in their train, as is inevitable, there has been a rapid decline of every kind of business. The tourist trade was first hit—since the revolution few travellers have entered the country, and even those who remained fled at the riots and incendiarism of last May. The large numbers in Madrid who depended on either the King's bounty or the social life of the Court next felt the pinch. The book trade suffered next; then, by suspension, the leading newspapers. Then the lack of confidence, accentuated by the inevitable reactions of the poets to

riot and disorder, spread through the whole business world, and in a country where the masses have always lived in poverty work became scarcer than ever and privation acute. The cynicism, which fought with hope in the summer, spread a general feeling of bitterness in the winter, and of those who in the excess of their impatience voted against the monarchy last April two-thirds would undoubtedly go far to restore the monarchy to-day. The force behind the republic to day is a small minority whose leaders rule ruthlessly in defiance, not only of the national traditions, but of those ideals of liberty which are general in the Western world. Led by fanatical extremists, who are out of touch with business conditions, they are reducing Spain to the state of Russia by renewing in the interests of paganism the most contemptible tyrannies of the long-abandoned Inquisition.

Spain is undoubtedly unhappy; the Republicans are unequal to their task. But what is the alternative? Is there a way out? Such questions depend on two things: one is obviously the position of the monarchy; the other is the influence of the Church. For nowhere in Europe has the bond between Church and State been closer than it was under the monarchy in Spain. Many a Spaniard will tell you that Church and monarchy are the same thing. For centuries the sovereigns have taken strong steps to safeguard for the Spanish Church its privileges—privileges which until lately were exclusive and are still peculiar. It was not until 1925 that it was found possible to open an Anglican church in Madrid except in the grounds of the British Embassy. The Catholic Church alone was recognised by the State, which used its authority to enforce, not only religious teaching in the schools, but also church parades in the army, and to impede the worship, rare as that was, of other denominations. Even on civil servants, and among them university professors, the discipline pressed hard, and even until recent times a scientist might be in danger of losing his chair if his views on the Flood were to cause misgiving in a bishop. Civil and military governors were obliged officially to attend church services; religious orders were placed beyond the jurisdiction of the State, and exempted from taxation; and all secular priests were paid a small stipend by the Government. Such was the establishment that the kings were expected to maintain as the appanage of Catholic majesty. And it was believed that in return the clergy were all strong monarchists: the Catholic Church has, of course, no theoretical preference for monarchy, but her ethics do insist that her people are bound to respect order in civil society, and that order in more than one place in the New Testament is specifically associated with the name of the king.

The system has been by no means uncongenial to the traditional temper of the Spanish people, though the classes confer on

easy terms and know little of discipline. There was never any popular movement against the Inquisition, which was a public rather than an ecclesiastical institution. Its abolition as a result of the Bonaparte invasion was widely resented, and, though the abolition was ratified by the Cortes of Cadiz in 1812, more than a third voted in its favour. The Spanish king on his return to Madrid in 1814 was greeted with cries of 'Long live the Inquisition,' and he would doubtless have restored it but for the insistence of the British allies to whom he owed his throne. But meanwhile the doctrines of the French Revolution had been permeating Spain, and there was a rapid spread of freemasonry, the freemasonry of the Grand Orient which is independent of belief in a Supreme Being. Although, as far as can be ascertained, there is no absolute clash between the principles of the Grand Orient and those of the Catholic Church, the masons undoubtedly resented the exclusive doctrines and practice of the Church, and the Church has always forbidden her members to enter secret societies. From 1814 the leaders of the Liberal movement against absolute monarchy came out of the lodges and used them. In the Constitution of 1836 they insisted on the expulsion from Spain of all monks and nuns who were not engaged in teaching. Two years before, in a rising in Madrid, eighty friars were assassinated, some at the very altars. From 1836 to 1856 the religious orders were not recognised in Spain, and their properties were in the possession of the State. In 1856, however, the sale of their properties was forbidden. The Queen Mother exchanged visits with Pius IX. in Rome, and established the Concordat which is still in force. According to this the Church was fully confirmed by the State in its ancient privileges, but the only religious orders permitted to return were the Lazarists, who care for the poor, the Oratorians, whose work is educational and social, and in each diocese one other order. The final clause was a loophole through which all the orders, including the Jesuits, returned in full force, took possession of all their properties and acquired new ones. From that time on the Church increased, and has since maintained, its force. In Spain at the present time there are upwards of 10,000 friars and monks and 37,000 nuns, and the parochial clergy do not fall short of 30,000. These figures do not amount to more than 4 per cent. of the population.

All these, secular clergy and members of the orders, have of course come from the ordinary family life of the people. As Don Alejandro Lerroux, the free-thinking Foreign Minister, declared in August at Valladolid, Spain is still undoubtedly a country which Catholicism pervades. It is, in fact, beyond comparison the most clerical, and also the most religious, country in Europe. And there is no part of it which is not religious. In

Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville, where Communism is particularly strong, the great majority of the population attends church on Sunday as they do in hardly any other great city in Europe, and the churches are frequented on every day in the week. Before the more popular shrines, such as the Virgen de los Desamparados in Valencia, the floor is crowded all day. During the past year pilgrimages of 1000 at a time have been going up at the rate of three or four a week to the Benedictine monastery at Montserrat. In May people were passing on every holiday in a continual stream before the Sacred Pillar at Saragossa, and in Madrid on May 10, the day that seven religious houses and the great churches beside them were destroyed by an incendiary gang, the churches were all filled again and again, as they were filled to overflowing four days later for the Feast of the Ascension.

In the great city churches the worship has a baroque splendour which rivals, and in many cases outdoes, that of Rome itself. But, though the simple worship of the villages—in which the bulk of Spain's population still lives—is less striking as a spectacle, one cannot long remain in a village without seeing that practically every inhabitant is accustomed to go to church. I have on several occasions been told by the parish priest that his parishioners are all a happy family: that they all believe, and that not one ever marries except in church or dies without the last sacraments. I never found any argument against such contentions. And while the general acquiescence in religion marks off the majority from the habits of, say, France or Germany, there is also a large number whose devotion is obviously fervent. It is by no means uncommon for a party of men to spend the whole night in vigil once a month. Not only do large numbers receive day by day the Holy Communion, but they remain absorbed in a collected prayer which no one could possibly confuse with conventional attendance at a ritual act.

Then how explain the burning of churches, or anti-clerical legislation? For it will be recalled that during that time not only were the seven religious houses burnt in Madrid, but three in Valencia, three in Seville, one at El Ferrol, and that on one day every one of the thirty-two churches in Malaga, and also the bishop's palace with its archives, were destroyed by arson, and the bishop himself was forced to flee. For anyone who has watched Spanish history the contradiction is not incomprehensible. Between the masses of the people and the masonic intellectuals who are now in power in Spain, and who have always been associated with the Liberal development, a great gulf is fixed. Those intellectuals are not only in power at present. They also control most of the newspapers, they have long dominated the universities—where they have their pupils with them—

and they have combined in the Government with the Socialists. Furthermore, as we have seen, the present Government was, until a year ago, a body of conspirators whose object of revolution was opposed not only by the traditions but by the principles of the Spanish Church. And, taking help wherever they could find it, they made a temporary pact with the extremists, who were under the influence and took the pay of Moscow. It was these extremists who took advantage of an orderly Royalist demonstration on May 9 to riot. A small band of some fifty youths had been schooled by Communists in the work of arson; this band, carrying out a pre-arranged plan, accomplished the destructive work of the riot. They burnt not only churches, not only the body of St. Francis Borgia, not only the best collection of historical reviews in Spain, with the manuscripts of the last president of the Historical Academy embodying researches of twenty years, but also the biggest engineering college in Spain, and a large school in a poor quarter with the words 'Free Instruction' written over its door. Small as the body of rioters were, the Government did nothing to impede them, nor has it punished them since.

Why not? On this subject I have had the privilege of questioning the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Justice, and other high officials. The Foreign Minister answered that greater damage had been done to churches in Barcelona in 1909 than in Madrid in 1931, and expressed a hope that the Spaniards were, in spite of everything, more orderly than they used to be. He did not refer to Malaga. The Minister for Justice, when asked if the Government was not unfriendly to the rioters, answered that such a question was an insult to a member of a civilized Government. I then asked him how otherwise it would have been possible for such a small group to do so much harm in the presence of a strong force of police. He told me that I had been very ill-informed. But I was not ill-informed. Pablo Rada, the friend and mechanic of the revolutionary Franco, who was then Air Minister (though afterwards arrested), was active among the incendiaries. Indeed, the Home Minister in a speech a few days afterwards said that the Government had been predivided to act, and that he regretted that the Catholics had been so supine. Not one of them, in fact, raised a finger in defence of their schools or altars, and the week following in Barcelona nuns and friars, grotesquely disguised in lay clothes, scuttled from their convents, no one pursuing. Spain, who was once proud to call herself the standard-bearer of the Holy See, has no longer the discipline or daring of a Church militant.

One is told that this is a very good thing for the Church itself; that passions thus, after their ebullition, are calmed without succeeding bitterness; that on May 10 the Spaniards, who like

¹ In Spanish naturally

fireworks even in the daytime, had a superb bonfire; and that the anti-clericals relieved their feelings in a way that gave gratification to the urban masses. Señor Alomar, the Ambassador to the Vatican, pointed out to me that no lives were lost, and favourably compared the convent burning with an *auto-da-fé*. Don Salvador de Madariaga, on the other hand, arriving fresh from Oxford, facetiously regretted that the inmates of the convents had not been roasted alive inside. But Spaniards on both sides allow themselves rhetorical outbursts on what is known in Spain as the religious question. When Canalejas in 1911 worked out with the King a number of reasonable reforms, he was compared by the ladies of Seville to Diocletian, and the chapter of Toledo Cathedral accused Don Alfonso himself of 'shameless persecution of the Church of Christ'. The next year a Eucharistic Congress was held in Madrid. This was denounced by Don Melquídes Álvarez as 'a brutal outburst of the reactionary and fanatical force of clericalism.'

More significant than the burnings in Madrid were those in Malaga. There, with all the parish churches destroyed, no priest dare show himself on Ascension Day. The explanation of the Malaga outrage is that Van Duerckem, a Communist agent from Holland purporting to be a journalist, who had actually been expelled from Spain by the Berenguer Government, had returned to carry out his riot in connivance with the civil governor placed there by the revolution. The governor, who greeted the flames with cries of 'Viva la Republica', was rapidly removed by the Home Minister, Don Miguel Maura, as the philosopher Ortega Gasset was compelled to resign at Madrid after his refusal to take action in defence of Church property. The Government, after its one experiment in tolerating anti-clerical riot, certainly saw the foolishness of such a course. Señor Ferrerix said to me that that sort of thing would not occur again. Yet a few months later deputies shouted in the Cortes, amidst wild applause, that if they could not disband the religious orders they would burn every house they possessed. And all this time relations with the Holy See have been maintained. The Government never forgot the warning that Clemenceau gave to a Liberal premier in Spain that to break with the Vatican turned out to be a foolish plan for France.

The provisional Government's present plan, if it frees soldiers or civil servants from an intolerable formality, will do much good though on points where in other countries there could not be a moment of discussion the Spanish bishops united to protest. Parents, however, are still given a choice whether their children receive religious instruction, and the immense majority insist on having it. The State has declared that within two years it will cease to pay the parish priests their stipend of 1400 pesetas, or £28, a year; and, though the Jesuits are disbanded, the other

religious orders are going quietly on with their work. So many of these are engaged in teaching, or in the care of the sick poor, that to apply the rule generally was obviously absurd. But, even if they have no further justification than study or spiritual exercises, it is difficult to see how a Liberal Government, pledged to religious toleration, can forbid it, especially in view of the excellent work which priests have been doing in recent years on the Spanish classics. It is said by the opponents of the friars and nuns both that they compete unfairly with secular employment and that they do nothing. Both charges cannot be true, and it would be difficult to prove either. The place of religion in the heart of the Spanish people is the same as ever; what has changed is its militance. But while the spirit of Navarre and the Basque Provinces is as fervent as it is now, and their energy so enterprising, they would swiftly atone for any damage done by Communists to the life of the Church. In the obscure position of Spanish politics to-day, with the Conservatives organising and the provisional Government becoming daily more divided and more unpopular in the tightening economic strain, the Church is obviously not in danger. It is, on the other hand, a guarantee of social stability, for in their conflict with the Church the Republicans have undoubtedly weakened their position.

It is another point whether the monarchy is strengthened to the same extent. The economic situation has provoked a general feeling against the Government — for Governments always get the credit of the economic situation. Far from realising the promises with which they were beguiled, the people, as we saw, are facing penury. The masses therefore look back towards the monarchy, and especially the dictatorship, as a time when things went well. King Alfonso has become a symbol of better times — gone by and, as they hope, yet again to come. His position is strengthened by the fact that, though every possible effort has been made to bring a case against him, his adversaries have succeeded in proving nothing. In fact, it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain how King Alfonso lost his popularity. He certainly did not lose it by accepting Primo de Rivera, for that was what Spain wanted; and he did not lose it by letting Primo go, for as the crisis passed the Spaniards wanted a freer rein. Even at the time of the Revolution he did not lose the sympathy of the people as a whole. The plea that he was a tyrant was too fantastic for anyone who knew Spain to take seriously. A justest accusation, though it was never framed, would have been that he was an opportunist. He concentrated his prodigious skill in meeting situations as they arose. The consequence was that he beat the politicians at their own game, a thing they did not easily forgive; and another consequence, graver still, was that no one knew what his own policy

was, or what could be his principles. Everybody he met, from republicans to patricians, from atheists to cardinals, he seemed to meet on their own ground; it meant a temporary triumph, but as time went on he became distrusted by them all. They became linked together in one of the closest bonds men know—the bond of instinctive self-defence which men set up against something or someone they feel is too clever for them. A king and queen can make their unique position a bond of sympathy with their subjects; their heart becomes their people's heart; otherwise the crown is indeed a lonely splendour, and King Alfonso voyaged through seas of thought where no ship followed him.

It is said that he cut himself off from intellectuals, the accusation is untrue if it is meant that he did not meet intellectuals or invite them to the Court. He knew everyone of intellectual importance in every part of Spain. As years went on and he passed forty, he seemed, it is true, to be more at home with aristocrats and sportsmen than with thinkers, but in the formulas of kingly graciousness he never failed and no matter how far he might have lost the approval of professors or journalists, those who came most in contact with him were devoted to him, whether they were old-fashioned mountaineers, palace retainers, young politicians, or leaders of cosmopolitan culture like the Duke of Alba and Marquess Merry del Val.

The weakness of Don Alfonso's position was not a thing he could have conquered by all the skill in the world. It is inherent in the history of his country and his crown, as I have endeavoured to show elsewhere¹. It goes back to the Peninsular War. In that war England allied herself with the reactionary party, the party behind the Inquisition, in order to defeat the programme of ordered liberty which Napoleon designed for Spain. As a result of Wellington's campaigns a tyrant was placed upon the throne, and the supporters of the Inquisition were encouraged. But the nineteenth century was not an age for reactionaries. The idea of sacred authority had to give place to individual talent, and society found its instinctive craving for well-being and comfort identified with the Liberal activities of freemasonry in opposition to the ancient order supported by, and often identified with, the Catholic Church. It was the genius of Napoleon to combine the two; but the result of the Peninsular War was to rob Spain of the benefits Napoleon offered it. The result has been a tug of more than a hundred years between conservative catholicism, nourished to unusual vitality by the Oriental temper of the Spanish people, and those of anti-clerical democracy. The result has been that the universities, the newspapers, the professional men, the men

¹ *Spain's Uncertain Crown*, by Robert Sesscourt (Beas's London, April 1932. 212)

whose temperaments, or whose sexual inclinations, have brought them into conflict with the ritual and moral discipline associated by the Church with her doctrines of grace—all such men have been in conflict with the Church, with the army, and with every conservative tradition of the crown.

Added to this there has been not only a Labour movement, but a strong tendency towards violent anarchy at the same time as there has been throughout the country a social habit of personal equality, and a lack of co-ordinated discipline unknown except where the Spanish language is spoken. This it is which makes the Spanish at once so charming to meet and so hard to govern. It explains why the decrees of the republic—often, like those of the dictatorship, excellent—have been for the most part a dead letter. There is no cure but the long work of a training of disciplined education for the people, a cure which the present rulers would obviously be the very last to offer. Indeed, the year's history shows that in spite of the violence with which they have restrained both monarchy and Communism, they have little sense of the value of order. It was on the wave of anarchical speeches in the Cortes, the speeches which threatened again to set fire to the churches unless the Government deprived religion of liberty, that Don Miguel Maura was forced to resign, and Señor Alcalá Zamora gave way to Señor Azana. Señor Alcalá Zamora, though he had a stentorian voice, a warm heart and a genial presence, was a man of no particular ability, and in fact as a Liberal Minister had been forced to resign on account of his incompetence. His successor, who had received the education of the upper middle class, and was by profession a civil servant, has an endowment of volcanic force and a greater sense of efficiency, in fact, a certain power of uncompromising action, as is shown alike in his exile of Communists and his persecution of the Catholics in Navarre. But his temper is too much that of a tyrant, and, though his decrees are sane, he evidently lacks the force to work out and apply his schemes as a whole.

In these circumstances it is natural that many should turn for leadership to the shrewd veteran of republicanism, Lerroix. He has borne the burden and heat of the day, he is reasonable and experienced, and his instincts are more logically liberal. Although he did not offer to resign with Miguel Maura in defence of liberty for the Church, he is not, like Azana, a man who will apply the methods of inquisition in support of atheism. We may yet see the gratification of Lerroix's openly expressed ambition—to be President or Prime Minister of Spain. He would be a good one. While the country as a whole looks back with more and more sympathy to the King, there is no immediate chance for him to return. Madrid and the newspapers, when they criticise the

extreme left, talk rather of Lerroux. In the meantime, the republic is so obviously afraid of monarchism that it can afford to forego no tyranny. This policy, as long as it keeps with it (as for the present it must keep) the newspapers of the capital, lengthens the life of the republic.

Yet without the monarchy, what hope is there for Spain? It is in the long run, on the organisation of a sound monarchical tradition that the country must depend; but the chances are that it can attain to that only when its troubles have forced it to accept a new dictatorship. There is at present no sign of a possible dictator, and the army, like the civil guard, has not yet transferred its allegiance from the republic.

Can the Monarchists take the long view and use the time and resources available to organise? The question remains with the King. Although he never aimed at personal rule, and refrained from any attempt at usurping the functions of his Ministers, he is still the centre of the great movement towards reorganisation which Spain has made since his accession to power. Many of his old privileges are gone for ever, and whatever results, Spain, when she escapes from the constraint of the present régime, will long for freedom. The difficulty caused by parties which look upon one another not as alternatives but as revolutionaries is not one to be got over lightly, and the present holders of power, by concentrating their efforts, not on constitutional reform, but on revolution and on maintaining in power a form of government which broke with tradition and which has now become unpopular, have done a hurt to Spain which can be set right only by fresh upheavals. There is therefore little prospect of liberal government, with free expression of opinion, being possible in the country. Spain's only example is that now offered her by England, where not a single dominant personality, but a congress of opinions, has been given a free hand to meet emergencies as they arise. In a world of economic crisis, influenced by subversive propaganda, the parliamentary ideals of the nineteenth century, with their licence in experiment, are too cruel to the masses of Spain. The people no longer want republics as such; self-government no longer interests them. What they need is a strong and just efficiency to guarantee them work and maintenance. It is for King Alfonso and his supporters to prepare along such lines a new body of leaders who will give to his country the safeguard of her traditional virtues, and to capital and organisation an invitation to carry on in Spain the great work done there during Don Alfonso's twenty-nine years of rule—now foolishly interrupted by men who could agitate, but evidently cannot govern.

R. E. GORDON GEORGE.
(Robert Sencourt.)

FARMING ILLS AND COMPULSORY MARKETING

YEARS ago, in the opening stages of his tariff campaign, Mr. Chamberlain said to my friend Professor Hewins that he was confident that they would sweep the whole country. 'Possibly,' replied Hewins, 'with the exception of East Anglia.' 'Yes,' said Mr. Chamberlain, 'there it is necessary to convert every man separately.' Probably the most individualist of all East Anglians are the farmers, but this characteristic is not confined to East Anglian agriculturists; it is more or less common to all farmers. Just as agriculture has been the last of all the industries to be affected by science, not always through the farmers' fault, so has the idea of co-operative selling penetrated more slowly into agricultural circles than into those of other industries. Co-operative buying, indeed, has been fairly successful, but in England at least co-operative selling, as in the case of some bacon factories, has not infrequently been looked on by the farmers as a means of getting rid of the inferior or less saleable residue of his produce, with disastrous results to the factory concerned. But if the idea of voluntary co-operative selling has caught on slowly, the idea of compulsory marketing has encountered far greater opposition.

On no less than five occasions the executive of the National Farmers' Union have refused to have anything to do with the recent Agricultural Marketing Act, which is based on compulsion. Many of the rank and file, however, have suffered too seriously of recent years to maintain indefinitely this *laissez-faire* attitude. The comparative impotence of the central body in negotiating with certain of the sugar-beet factories, and especially with the milk-selling agencies, has brought home to them the insufficiency of collective bargaining, without the accompaniment of some sort of coercion to prevent 'breakaways' at critical moments. The most striking instance, however, of this weakness in voluntary bargaining has been in the hop industry. In this case, in spite of the help of an import duty on hops, the efforts of the original members of the pool, who at the outset numbered about 93 per cent. of the total producers, were nullified and finally ruined by

the unfair tactics of a small minority who represented at the start only 7 per cent. of the producers with an acreage of only 2300 acres.

It was with these object-lessons before them that at the last annual meeting of the Union the rank and file carried in the teeth of the executive a resolution to ask the Ministry of Agriculture to prepare a scheme for the compulsory marketing of milk under the Act of 1931. The struggle was a close one, ninety-seven voting in favour of the motion and ninety-four against. Curiously enough, the victory was incidentally due to the decision the week before of the Norfolk branch to send their proper contingent of delegates (seven). Those hard-bitten individualists had not only been converted to the idea of compulsory marketing, but had been so disgusted by the 'standpatting' attitude at headquarters that they had previously passed a resolution to boycott the meeting, and only at the last moment decided, after all, to send delegates who thus helped to turn the scale. The immediate result of the new departure in the policy of the National Farmers' Union was, to quote the words of the Under Secretary for Agriculture, Lord de la Warr, 'portentous'. He spoke of it, indeed, as the opportunity of a lifetime. It facilitated the task of formulating an agricultural policy on constructive lines by the organisation of milk supplies at home with the necessary corollary of the control of milk imports from abroad, a policy not contained in the Act, but one which the recent election had given the Government a free hand to adopt if they thought fit.

Quite apart from the very substantial minority who voted against the motion, it is probable, even with the majority, that failure to secure adequate terms for their milk supplies would by itself have been insufficient to win many of them over to compulsion, if their position, especially in the corn growing and stock-raising districts, had not already become more or less desperate. The vertiginous drop in the value of agricultural produce, coupled with the fact that wages have either remained stable or suffered only a slight decrease, puts the whole thing in a nutshell. In October 1929 the agricultural index number was 42 above pre-war prices, in 1930 (same date) it was 29, in October 1931 it was only 12 per cent. above, while wages, with a few small variations, have remained at 110 per cent. above their pre-war level.

For the arable farmers the wheat quota is a 'bull point,' though very far from being in the nature of a gold mine. The Cambridge statistics of the cost of wheat-growing give a figure of £8 10s. an acre, some critics, however, think that the amount is nearer £10. At the lower estimate the farmers will have to grow nearly four quarters an acre, and at the higher nearly four and a half, before they begin to make a profit. Moreover, as Mr. C. T. Joice has pointed out, the wheat that comes under the

scheme involves, what with the making the necessary manure, the sowing, harvesting, etc., the best part of two years before the crop can be sold for the farmer to see some of his money back, while he will have to wait practically another year before he receives the Government bonus, though advances may be made to growers at the end of 1932, by which time, and indeed long before, one fears many arable farmers will have ceased to exist. It is indeed a case, not of 'jam to-morrow,' but of the day after, and then of only a limited amount of jam as far as 1931-2 is concerned. The scheme was unfortunately brought in so late that the time for autumn sowing was practically over, and in many counties the sowing of spring wheat is such a gamble that, even with the quota, the great majority of farmers will not sow it. As last year the wheat area was only 1,246,721 acres and the crop about 4,500,000 quarters, there seems little probability that the 1932 crop will do more than reach last year's total. In any case, it will be far below the maximum of 6,000,000 quarters fixed by the quota.

Apart from this deferred windfall the arable farmer, strange as it may seem, is on the balance to-day actually worse off than when we went off the gold standard. It is true he is getting a little more for his wheat and oats and grinding barley (in the last two cases probably thanks to the import duty of 10 per cent.), but his malting barley has been largely unsalable owing to the large falling off in the consumption of beer. Again beef, mutton and pork, poultry and eggs are all lower, while the price he gets for his milk has once more slumped to 1s. a gallon, and is substantially below last year's level. On the other hand, the cost of his feeding-stuffs is up, and his artificial manures are more expensive. Even in such side-lines which the more enterprising farmers in search of a profit have developed of recent years, such as the growing of vegetables, many farmers have lost heavily. Here are some actual figures supplied me by one of the ablest farmers in Norfolk. He sent to London a truck of cabbages (18,000) which, deducting the cost of rail commission, cutting, carting, etc., brought in a net sum of £1 17s. 6d. or at the rate of a farthing a cabbage, the average retail price being at least fourpence. An even more striking case has been given me by one of the largest farmers in Norfolk who was an early pioneer in these matters. He sent 13,400 cabbages to London and received even less than my first informant, the price working out, not at four cabbages, but thirteen cabbages, a penny. On another occasion he sent 9000 which did not even clear the rail and commission charges.

The extreme gravity of the case can be brought home in another fashion by giving instances of actual losses made in farming. I recently came across the case of a farmer coming

of good farming stock who in 1921 was worth £18,000; he went out of the business at the end of last year with a deficit of £2500. Another farmer, again, belonging to a family of farmers, in occupation of some of the best land in Norfolk, who went in for high farming and liberal stock-keeping, on a mere 230 acres dropped £2700 in three years. Moreover, these are no isolated instances. A local accountant has given me the following figures for 1931: Of farms he has audited, on 110 farms totalling 65,233 acres there was a loss of £70,350; on ten farms totalling 5150 acres, a profit of £1179. In these figures there is no allowance for living expenses or interest on capital. Another accountant has furnished me with even worse figures: on ten farms totalling 3561 acres there was a loss of £6402. These results are borne out by an investigation recently published by the Cambridge University Department of Agriculture into the economic condition of nearly 1000 farmers in the eastern and south midland counties, which shows that the general price level of farm produce would have to have been 18 per cent. higher in order to provide occupiers with 5 per cent. on their capital and allow them 40s. a week (scarcely more than the wages of a railway porter) for their own managerial and manual work. As for overdrafts, I have heard of one bank alone in a county town in which overdrafts to farmers amounted to over £750,000.

These stupendous losses are easier to understand when one considers the numberless farmers who have dropped sums varying from £1 to £3 a head on the cost price of their cattle, or 5s. to even a £1 a head on the cost of their sheep, without reckoning anything for care or keep, which in the case of bullocks may mean anything from £5 to £10 a head. Pig keeping has proved still more disastrous. People are going right out of the business and sending their breeding sows by the score to market. Cases have been given me of men who have lost on their pigs alone from £500 up to even £1000, owing, no doubt, to the enormous imports of foreign bacon, which in three years have risen 34 per cent. from 8,278,000 cwt. in 1929 to 9,101,000 cwt. in 1930, reaching 11,133,000 in 1931. Most of this has come from Denmark, though, I understand, the Danish total is swollen by supplies originally despatched from Russia. Smallholders have been particularly hard hit. Formerly they looked to sugar-beet to make ends meet, when that became less productive they turned to barley, and as their little lots of barley, even when not ruined by the rust, have been very difficult to sell this year, they have pinned their hopes on the animal whom the Irishman described as the 'gentleman' who pays 'the runt,' and this year pigs, as I have pointed out, have been lower than they have been for years. In Norfolk arrears of rent are half as much again as this time last

year. Not a few smallholders, one fears, will be throwing up their holdings next Michaelmas, and yet there is no class in the country who is so deserving, or who works so hard and such long hours. Only the other day a smallholder told me he had been spreading all his manure by moonlight. It reminds one of the Italian emigrant in Argentina.

The shrunken rent rolls of landlords tell a similar tale. One of the largest landowners in the best parts of Lincolnshire told a friend of mine he had managed to keep all his tenants, but only by making an abatement of 60 per cent. Others are indeed glad to allow the tenant to remain on rent free. In that way the land is kept in cultivation and the landlord has not to take over the 'covenants'—the hay, roots, manure, etc., which means in the case of roots and manure a dead loss of hundreds of pounds if the farm remains unlet. Much of our light Norfolk land at present derelict, even if relet next autumn, will take years to bring back into full cultivation—one year's weeds, seven years' seeds! There are 17,000 acres to let in Norfolk alone; in Lincolnshire it is still worse. At a recent meeting of Lincolnshire land agents one agent on an estate of 4500 acres stated he had only received since Michaelmas £2 5s and had three farms of 687 acres to let. Another had 1700 acres to let and no prospect of getting tenants. Another had 940 acres still to let, having only let so far 65 acres. In a letter to the Press another agent wrote that he had received notice last Lady Day of sixteen farms, of which he has still eight to let, containing over 2400 acres with a rent roll of nearly £2000, while the tenant rights (covenants) probably come to £4000. Four of these vacant farms are in one parish—an appalling prospect for the workless labourer!

It is indeed the labourer who, unless he is in work, is possibly the hardest hit of all. He has no dole to fall back on, but only some form of public assistance, which in Norfolk has taken the form of three days' work on the road, for which he receives 18s. in place of the normal weekly wage of 30s. In the midst of all these political discussions it seems to me that his immediate plight has been largely lost sight of. Possibly things are not so bad elsewhere, but the figures for Norfolk are little short of appalling. In April 1930 the official numbers of unemployed were only thirty-seven; in April 1931 they were 2368, having been about 1700 in February. On February 27 of this year they were 2914, while on April 2 they were higher still (2948). Moreover, there is no doubt that many agricultural labourers, from a long-standing dislike of the Poor Law, have not applied for relief. Naturally, many farmers cannot pay their tithe, and the agitation against the Tithe Act of 1925 is growing. If things do not improve, or something is not done to relieve the tithepayer's burden, the

position of the Church itself in country districts will be imperilled. In fact, we seem threatened, at least in East Anglia, with a general breakdown of the whole structure of rural life. The increasing number of workless labourers seems to indicate that the Government proposals have so far produced no immediate amelioration of the situation. As far as I can ascertain, it has not rendered the letting of vacant farms any easier, though I am free to admit there is a distinctly better prospect for those of us who can outlast what may truthfully be called the farmer's *année terrible*.

What has brought agriculture to its present desperate condition? There are many factors, some predominantly international—mismanagement of the gold standard, world-wide over-production, high tariffs abroad, with their inevitable dumping, and the maldistribution of goods of all kinds. They naturally interlock, but I will only deal with the last two as being those the Government proposals seek to rectify.

England, which until last year was the only free trade country left in the world, has become the dumping ground of all the countries producing a surplus of wheat, barley, oats, meat, fruit and vegetables, that form the staple products of the land industry. It has been better for the foreigner to sell his surplus in our free market for what it would fetch than not to sell it at all. Moreover, the foreign producer has been often favoured by the lower standard of wages obtaining in this country, lighter rates and taxes, and cheaper transport rates. It costs more to send a ton of wheat from Northampton to London than to bring it to London from Buenos Aires. But this is not the worst: France and Germany have actually been giving a bounty on wheat and flour imported into this country, while Russia has deluged the market with cereals to be sold at any price. The English farmer has therefore been competing, not only against all other producers in the world, but in the case of Germany and France against farmers with the Government behind them, and in the case of Russia against the Government itself. The present wheat quota and the 20 per cent duties on barley and oats make at least a beginning towards reducing the balance in favour of the British farmer. Even if the quota seems to us a rather cumbersome and expensive way of giving us assistance, we are not going to look that particular gift-horse in the mouth. On the other hand, the refusal of the Government to tax imported meat is a serious omission. It affects not only the arable districts, which need manure for their corn, but also the grazing districts, and, in fact, stock-raising generally throughout the country, and in the last resort the breeding of pedigree cattle, in which England stands supreme. There seems little doubt that meat to the farmer, on the whole, is much more important than wheat.

The Cambridge report already quoted points out that a 10 per cent. rise in feeding-stuffs would cancel the effect of a 30 per cent. rise in wheat, while in such a matter so closely connected with meat as dairy produce a 10 per cent. rise in dairy produce would be worth to the farmer the equivalent of nearly a 50 per cent. rise in wheat. Personally, I believe that in the long run something will have to be done for beef and mutton, as, indeed, the Government have already suggested as feasible in the case of bacon. Possibly the Ottawa Conference may see my belief materialise.

The maldistribution of commodities is a phenomenon common to all countries. It has recently caused a 'buyers' strike' in France. Sir Daniel Hall has attributed it to the retailers' stranglehold on the market. He also stated that nothing affected agriculture more at the present time than the enormous power that the retail trade exercised over the prices the consumer had to pay and over the extent to which the producer is allowed to produce. The origin of the evil dates from, and is due to, the war. In order to run its rationing schemes, the Government brought together, and rightly brought together, the traders in meat, bread and vegetables for the purpose of organising the distribution of our food supply, which everyone must admit was very fairly done. Hitherto the individual members of these groups had been in active competition with one another. But through being compelled by the Government to work together in the distribution of the nation's food they have learnt the advantages to themselves of mutual co-operation over competition. Producer and consumer, on the other hand, are both suffering from the new condition of things - one is often getting too little for his stuff, while the other is often paying too much. How great is the toll thus exacted by the middleman from the two parties is clearly revealed by the wide gap between the world wholesale and retail prices, which the increase in the retailer's overhead charges only partly accounts for. When I last looked at these figures they were respectively 5 per cent. below and 45 per cent. above pre-war levels. What is still more serious is that, having discovered the standing advantage of retailing a limited amount of produce for which there is a more or less ascertainable demand all the year round, the shopkeepers have ceased to interest themselves in helping the producer to get rid of any increased production. In the olden days a bumper crop benefited producer and consumer alike. Now the simplest glut of the market, as we have seen in the case of vegetables quoted earlier, brings ruin to the producer. Formerly the retailer bought freely and cleared out his stock by marking down his prices. Now he buys a more or less fixed quantity regardless of the supply available, and

retails it more or less at fixed prices. A simple instance will put the thing in a nutshell. A year or two ago the wholesale price of potatoes fell to £1 a ton, yet the retail price worked out at £6 in the shops, even in Spalding, the centre of the potato country. The same disparity in prices appears in the case of other commodities—wheat, meat, fruit and the like. Lack of space prevents my going more fully into the matter, but to those who desire fuller details I may perhaps be allowed to refer to a pamphlet I published a year ago.¹ Probably many of us in the retailers' position would do likewise, but, as the Rural Reconstruction Association says,² the more intelligent middlemen are well aware of and profoundly dissatisfied with the present position, and, given the prospect of an increased turnover and assured sources of continuous supply, would desire to see things altered.

The same Association has also published some interesting figures in this connexion. They estimate the total wholesale price of the produce sold off the land at somewhere about £200,000,000 a year and the corresponding cost of its distribution and conversion into food at about £300,000,000, or at £280,000,000 if a conservative estimate is adopted. Were the distribution and conversion organised on a scientific basis, the cost should come to no more than £160,000,000. This leaves an available margin of £120,000,000, of which, it is estimated, two-thirds might go to the farmer and one-third to the retailer; the latter to be passed on to the consumer. The result would be a rise of price for the farmer of 40 per cent. and a reduction of 8 per cent. to the consumer. Incidentally this extra gain would allow the farmer to raise the labourers' wages from the present 30s. to £2 5s. or £2 10s. The whole thing hinges, however, on agricultural imports into the country being regulated and controlled. It is true the Marketing Act in itself does not do this, but the Government have already intimated, not only in respect to milk, as has been already indicated, but also to potatoes and bacon, that this necessary safeguard will accompany the working out of these particular schemes under the Marketing Act, though it is not clear whether they will apply it to all.

Even if the estimates of the Rural Reconstruction Association turn out to be less rosy than they appear on paper, and the schemes themselves fail to fulfil entirely the expectations of the Government, it does seem to me highly unpolitic for us farmers at the present time to do anything else than heartily co-operate with the Government in preparing and putting into force as speedily as possible schemes for all the main products of the industry. If we

¹ *The Agricultural Crisis and the Way Out.* (Jarrolds, Norwich.)

² *The Organisation of Marketing.* (Rural Reconstruction Association, 65, Belgrave Road, S.W.)

do not do this, the public may with every reason say that here is a real chance for organising agriculture on a scientific and paying basis, and the farmers are either turning it down or co-operating in a half-hearted fashion. Certainly the machinery of marketing is complicated—almost alarmingly complicated—to the average English mind. But goodwill and the determination to make things a success will carry us far, and even in the unlikely event of failure the blame cannot then be laid at our door.

That the business is a complicated one is to be seen from the simple fact that the Government have issued a handbook in which no less than fifty-five pages are devoted to an explanation of the Act, while the Act itself, with its schedules and appendices, occupies another thirty-two pages. The introduction is devoted to showing that the Act is the natural and logical conclusion of the Agricultural Produce Acts of 1928-31, which dealt with the legal prescription and definition of grading the various farm products—beef, eggs, and the like—in order to introduce a regular system of standardisation, not only in the quality of the produce and such incidental factors as colour, weight, or size, but also in respect to containers, method of sampling, testing, packing and labelling. The result has been the creation of the National Mark, which has already had considerable success in respect to eggs, beef, dressed poultry, canned fruits, vegetables, etc.

Up to this point the problem has been dealt with on voluntary lines, but it is now perfectly clear that compulsion, in the interest of the producer, distributor and consumer, can alone place marketing on a sound basis. The distributor is mainly interested in securing regular sources of supply on which he can arrange his business. The consumer is interested in making his purchases at a reasonable figure. The producer, however, is the most interested party of all, as only through a coherent marketing policy can he hope to get a stable and remunerative price for his produce. The failure, mentioned above, of the hop-growers, in spite of the vast majority of growers being members of the Central Selling Organisation, has shown that voluntary collective bargaining, however efficiently organised, is insufficient. On the other hand, the demand for compulsion must in the first instance come from the majority of the purchasers of any specific article of produce. It would be useless, in fact, to try and coerce them against their will, but, once the demand is made, the Government alone, through the legal sanction of the Agricultural Marketing Act, can translate the demand into an effective reality. The producers themselves may submit a scheme, as the hop-growers and potato-growers are now proposing to do, through the National Farmers' Union, or the Government may prepare one at the request of the producers, as in the case of milk, pigs, and

bacon, for which the Commissioners have not been appointed. The commodity organisation to be formed to carry out such schemes may be national or local, though, with the exception of such localised commodities like Stilton cheese, the great majority of schemes will probably be national. The 'constituency,' in any case, is to be the producing and not the consuming area; the regulation applies to the marketing of the produce supplied within the area of the scheme, and not to the sale of the same product if produced elsewhere. To take an instance: if a wool-growing scheme were produced for Kent only, a Kent farmer who had also a flock in Norfolk would be perfectly free to sell his Norfolk wool in Kent. The Act applies not only to all primary products, whether crops or stock, but also to all manufactured forms of human or animal foodstuffs or drink, but a scheme to deal with such manufactured products would have to be submitted, say, in the case of milk, not by the milk-producers as such, but by the cheese-makers (whether farmers or manufacturers).

Schemes, again, may deal with several products, like one dealing with apples and pears, or with a single variety of a single product—for instance, one dealing with Bramley's Seedling apples. This would not preclude a subsequent scheme for combining a single variety or commodity with other similar varieties or commodities, if a case can be made out for such a joint scheme. A scheme may be submitted, as we have seen, by producers, or a model scheme prepared at their request by a Reorganisation Commission created for work of this kind. In the latter case the scheme can be amended or entirely rejected, if the producers think fit. In any case, the scheme submitted must be 'substantially representative' in the opinion of the Minister before being brought before Parliament. The carrying out of a scheme involves, as will be seen, so much labour that the Minister will be very chary of accepting a scheme without a very strong initial backing. Once the Minister has accepted it, the scheme is duly launched, and financial ways and means are provided by the Government in the shape of a short-term loan to carry it over the transitional or suspensory period, which includes notification in the papers, consideration by the Minister of objections and representations, involving possibly a public inquiry, submission to Parliament, the preparation of an electoral roll of producers and the holding of a poll, in which the majority of two-thirds of those voting, both in terms of members and of output, is necessary—failing which, the scheme is to be dropped. Marketing schemes are to be administered by boards of directors, elected by registered producers, and these directors may receive salaries. In Scotland an existing organisation can take the place of a board. Schemes can be amended, and even revoked and others substituted. To

finance the working of the board, producers will be liable to the extent of not more than 1 per cent. of their sales for the year. Three types of board are envisaged—trading boards, purely regulatory boards, and boards comprising both functions. Trading boards may even go so far as to assist in the erection of a creamery or canning factory. Regulatory boards would deal with surpluses, the enforcement of regulations and gradings, and the prevention of over-production, and could serve as the necessary body to negotiate with manufacturers and distributors. The person who consumes his own produce or makes it into something else does not come under the consideration of the board, because the scheme regulates sales, and not production. A jam-maker who grows his own fruit, for instance, would not come under a fruit marketing scheme. Boards can also effect bulk purchases of agricultural requisites for their 'constituency,' but not of general supplies. They may assist education and research. One of their main functions will be to disseminate market intelligence, and for this they will have the right to obtain information from the producer. They can also borrow for long or short terms from a fund not exceeding £500,000 for England, and £125,000 for Scotland, on the recommendation of the agricultural trading facilities committees.

Producers are protected by only registered producers having the right to sell, unregistered producers continuing to sell after a period of grace being liable to prosecution. Boards can frame rules for exceptions from registration in certain cases—for export, for instance. In other cases the board must prosecute. Further, safeguards are given to aggrieved producers by the provision in the scheme for arbitration and impartial investigation by the committee of investigation, who report to the Minister. Boards may pay compensation where the scheme operates to the disadvantage of a producer. Powers are also given to boards to deal with the makers of evasive contracts, while safeguarding those of a *bond fide* nature during the suspensory interim. Consumers' interests are looked after by a consumers' committee, to which a single complainant can appeal. In fact, it will deal with domestic consumers, and not industrial, thus in the case of barley the complainant would not be the maltster, but the person who consumes 'malt products.' Above this committee is the committee of investigation, already alluded to, who will report to the Minister on the findings of the consumers' committee and on complaints from other sources—as from distributors, auctioneers or producers of some other agricultural produce.

Mention has been made of the preparatory work, done by Marketing Reorganisation Commissioners, of which there may be one or more for Great Britain, England, and Scotland, and even

more than one in each county, to deal with different products. Another very important side of their functions is to investigate cases where the operation of a scheme may be handicapped or frustrated by non-co-operation or organised opposition on the part of manufacturers or distributors, or by lack of proper facilities for the disposal of a product, with the view of finding some common ground of agreement or discovering better means of distribution. They may even inquire into the conduct of a manufacturing or distributing industry dealing with or disposing of a particular regulated product, with a view of suggesting possible reorganisation, and in this case can take evidence on oath, and indeed from anyone, subject to parliamentary consent. The Minister can take cognisance of these suggestions and bring them to the notice of the industry concerned, but he cannot go further. None the less, such inquiries may be very fruitful. As the introduction says, manufacturers, market authorities, auctioneers, distributors, both wholesale and retail, have much theoretical knowledge in their own respective fields, and in collaboration with producers can render invaluable service in building up a more rational marketing system for the agricultural industry of the country.

In conclusion, I would point out one supreme argument which I think should appeal to all farmers and even to those who, like myself, feel very sore at the Government's refusal to tide the industry over the terrible gap between now and the coming into operation of the quota and of the various marketing schemes, which will probably take still longer to materialise. When the organisation of the various branches of our industry is complete, those of us who survive will find ourselves thoroughly organised, not only for marketing but also, if unfortunately the necessity arises, for putting forward as one solid unit our claims to receive full justice from the nation as one of the most important and vital branches of national industry.

CLOUTISLY BRIEYTON

THE NEUTRON

A COSMOLOGICAL DISCOVERY

DR. JAMES CHADWICK, F R S, the Assistant-Director of Research in Radioactivity in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge, has discovered strong evidence for the existence of the 'neutron,' an ultimate particle of about the same mass as the nucleus of a hydrogen atom, and of negligible electric charge. The importance of this discovery will be evident from a consideration of the properties of the other known sorts of ultimate particles. All matter is made of atoms of oxygen, iron, carbon, and about ninety other elementary substances. These atoms, in turn, are made of groups of two kinds of particles, electrons and protons. Electrons and protons are the ultimate particles of negative and positive electricity respectively. As these particles are actual bits of electricity they are highly charged electrically. In dimensions they are extremely small, for even an atom of oxygen or any other element is large compared with them. The common atoms consist of a nucleus containing a compact group of protons and electrons. This little group has an excess of protons, so it has a positive electric charge. For instance, the nucleus of the carbon atom contains twelve protons and six electrons, so it has a net positive charge of six units. The heaviest atom is that of the slightly radioactive heavy metal uranium. Its nucleus contains an excess of ninety-two protons and therefore has a positive charge of ninety-two units. The high electric charge of the nucleus of the atom of a heavy element causes electrified particles which approach it to be deflected. No electrified particle could approach the nucleus of a heavy atom unless it had an enormous velocity, enormous even compared with that of the helium nuclei ejected from radioactive substances at one-fifteenth the velocity of light, or about 10,000 miles a second. The particles such as nuclei and electrons which constitute atoms are all much smaller than atoms and all electrified. The atoms of common substances are small regions of space dotted with electrified particles or electrified spots, with far more spaciousness than particulate content, similar to the solar system, in which

the planets revolve around the sun in relatively distant orbits, with immense interplanetary spaces. The hollowness of atoms, and hence of matter, was first demonstrated by Lenard, who showed that electrons could pass through thin sheets of aluminium without being deflected, which proved that they had passed through without hitting anything. As the number of layers of atoms in a thin sheet of aluminium is very large, the aluminium atom must be very spacious, or an electron would hit something or be deflected as it passed through a layer perhaps millions thick.

The very small electrons, protons and atomic nuclei are all electrically charged. The smallest unit without a net charge is the immensely larger atom. Besides being immensely larger, a normal atom, say, of carbon, is much less stable. The carbon atom has a nucleus of charge six units, and six electrons revolve around the nucleus at great distances from it. These outer electrons cause the atom to be bounded by the size of their orbits, and as they are relatively distant from the nucleus they are not very tightly held. Suppose a carbon atom is propelled at high speed towards a sheet of aluminium. Its size is similar to that of the aluminium atoms; it is far too large to be able to pass through, as the barrier is made of objects as big as itself. If the speed is increased so that it might force its way through, the carbon atom is too delicate to withstand the impact; in the collision with the atoms of the aluminium sheet it loses one or more of the electrons in its outer rings.

The normal atom is far too large and delicate to succeed in penetrating other atoms. The very small particles which constitute atoms are all electrically charged, and react electrically with any charged particles which impinge on them. Charged particles, and especially the nuclei of atoms, could be approached only by other charged particles. The smallest neutral particles, which, owing to their neutrality, would have no electrical interaction with atomic nuclei, are far too big and delicate to collide instructively with atomic nuclei. No neutral particle of size similar to that of the electrons, protons, and nuclei was known. Such a particle, being without sensible electric charge, would have remarkable properties in its interactions with electrons and protons and nuclei, because there would be no electrical factor in these interactions. These would be most important in collisions with heavy atomic nuclei. For instance, the uranium nucleus has an electric charge of ninety-two units, so it repels an approaching proton ninety-two times as powerfully as a single proton would repel the approaching proton. If the approaching proton could be divested of its charge, its ability to reach and penetrate the heavy nucleus would be greatly increased, but its charge

prevents it, and prevents knowledge of the structure of heavy nuclei from being obtained in this fashion. As the present theory of the structure of the atom was deduced from studies of the collisions of ultimate particles, the seriousness of this limitation is evident. Unless an uncharged particle of the same size and stability as electrons, protons, and nuclei is discovered, the structure of the larger atomic nuclei, such as those of iron, will prove very difficult, if not impossible, to investigate by collision methods. These methods, which have proved so powerful in establishing the modern conceptions of the atom, will not be available for investigating the structure of the nuclei of the atoms of many of those substances most useful in industry and civilisation.

This argument shows the value of a neutral particle of electronic size as an agent of investigation. Such a 'neutron' would have other qualities of equal importance and more direct philosophic interest. As the simplest sort of neutron would be conceived as a close combination of a proton and an electron whose electric charges neutralised each other, it would represent the first step in the building of the elements out of the fundamental constituents of matter, electrons, and protons. The neutron would have a cosmological interest of the first order. More will be said of the properties of the neutron presently. We will now consider the experiments which directly led to Dr Chadwick's hypothesis. In a sense, the whole of a branch of science is behind any particular advance in that branch, but, neglecting for a moment the general science of experimental atomic physics, we will start from the experiments of Professor Bothe, of Gießen. He was engaged in studying the nature of the rays excited in the metal beryllium when it is bombarded by particles ejected from the radioactive substance polonium. There is a large literature on this sort of experiment. It is interesting to recall that Dr Chadwick made very important discoveries in this field of research as early as 1912, when he was twenty-one years old and one of Lord Rutherford's research students at Manchester. He discovered that the nuclei of atoms, when struck by very fast electrons or alpha particles (the nuclei of helium atoms are named alpha particles), they are ejected at enormous speed when the nuclei of certain radioactive atoms disintegrate), emit wave-radiations. The nuclei behaved somewhat as if they resembled a bell, which when struck vibrates and starts a wave-radiation in the surrounding air. The wave-radiation emitted by struck atomic nuclei resembles X-rays, but is more penetrating. It is described as a gamma radiation because it resembles the wave-radiations emitted besides electrons and alpha particles in certain radioactive disintegrations. When

the radiations from radioactive substances were first elucidated they were found to be of three sorts, and consequently named alpha, beta, and gamma radiations. Subsequently the alpha rays proved to be nuclei of helium atoms, the beta rays were electrons, and the gamma rays resembled X-rays, but were more penetrating. When atomic nuclei are bombarded by alpha particles they may emit particles besides waves. This was the substance of Lord Rutherford's famous method of the artificial disintegration of atoms. He showed that the nuclei of the atoms of aluminium and other light elements emitted particles when struck by fast alpha particles, that they had been artificially disintegrated. He was unable to achieve similar results for the heavier elements for reasons already explained. The electric field around the nuclei of the heavier elements was too strong to allow the alpha particles to come within destructive range.

When nuclei are struck by alpha particles they disintegrate or vibrate and emit wave-radiation. A study of the wave-radiation emitted suggests the character of the vibrations which produced them, and hence of the structure which vibrated. Knowledge of the structure of the nucleus is to be learned from the nature of the wave-radiation or gamma radiation which it emits. Similarly, the nature of the particles emitted during disintegration reveals something of the nuclear structure. In 1930 Bothe and Becker found that the rays emitted by bombarded beryllium atoms, though weak in intensity, were more penetrating than the wave-radiation emitted during various ordinary radioactive disintegration. This was remarkable, because boron and nitrogen and other light elements emit particles, namely protons, when disintegrated by bombardment, and particles are very much less penetrative than gamma wave-radiations. The penetrating power of rays is determined by the rate at which they are absorbed in passing through sheets of metal of standard thickness. Mme. Curie-Joliot, the daughter of Mme. Curie, and her husband M. Joliot, started a careful study of the absorption of the radiation by matter, and Dr. Webster in England also worked at the problem. In these experiments a small disc bearing a quantity of polonium was used as the source of the alpha particles. Polonium (which was discovered by Mme. Curie and named by her after her native country) is specially suitable because it emits alpha particles only, and no electrons or gamma wave-radiations. Other radioactive substances emit more energetic alpha particles, but not in isolation, and the mixed rays produce effects much more difficult to elucidate.

Mme. Curie-Joliot and M. Joliot placed layers of material between the bombarded beryllium and an ionisation chamber, an apparatus which measures the intensity of the rays passing

into it by measuring the number of electrons loosed from the atoms of the gas in the chamber by the entering rays. They discovered that if the material contained hydrogen, as, for example, paraffin wax, protons were knocked out of it. These passed forward into the ionisation chamber and produced what appeared at first to be a paradoxical effect, for the ionisation in the chamber increased when the barrier was placed in front of it. One would have expected the barrier to have reduced the ionising effect of the rays passing through it. If the rays had retained their character during their passage this would have been true, but they had struck some of the nuclei in the hydrogen atoms in the wax and knocked them forward, and these dissipated their energy in ionisation more rapidly, so causing the apparent paradox.

The speed of the ejected protons was very high. They assumed that the radiation from beryllium (and a similar but weaker one from boron) was of a wave nature, and that these waves had ejected the protons from the paraffin wax. The laws of collisions between waves and matter are known, so if the speed, and hence the energy, of a struck particle are known, the energy of the waves which have struck it may be calculated. The calculation shows that if the beryllium rays are waves their energy is 50,000,000 electron-volts (i.e., the energy of an electron moving under an electrical field or pressure of 50,000,000 volts). This would be a uniquely energetic phenomenon for the most violent radioactive disintegration does not emit particles of energy more than 3,000,000 to 6,000,000 electron-volts, and the alpha particles from polonium have an energy of this order. Thus the beryllium appeared to be emitting rays ten times as energetic as those exciting them, if present theories of the interaction between waves and particles are to be accepted. Curie-Joliot and Joliot assumed that the radiation was of wave-character, and pointed out that its penetrating power placed it between the gamma rays from disintegrating atoms and the extremely penetrating cosmic rays investigated by Kolhörster and Millikan. This was an attractive hypothesis, because it appeared to reveal the existence of waves intermediate in wave-length between gamma rays and cosmic rays, and therefore might be an important advance towards the elucidation of the latter fascinating sort of radiation. If the assumption was correct, the laws which govern the interaction between ordinary wave-radiations, such as light and X-rays, and particles could not apply to the new radiations. These laws are ordinarily seen in operation in the Compton effect. When light strikes an object it exerts a pressure on it. Compton thought of looking for this phenomenon when occurring in atomic dimensions. He directed a stream of X-rays through a chamber which

would reveal the movements of any electrons set in rapid motion by the impinging rays. He calculated from the principles of the quantum theory the energy of the impinging X-rays, and then calculated from the magnitude of their movements the energy of the electrons which had recoiled after being struck. The difference was noted. Compton argued that the ray which passed on after the collision must be less energetic than the impinging ray by this measured difference.

According to the quantum theory, rays of less energy have a longer wave-length than rays of more energy, so the ray which passed on must have just sufficiently longer wave-length to account for the energy absorbed by the recoiling electron. Differences in wave-length are easily determined by optical or analogous methods. Compton searched for the ray of longer wave-length and less energy, and found it. The difference in wave-length was in agreement with the energy of the recoiling electrons. This great discovery showed light-waves behaving somewhat as if they were particles. Collisions between waves of light and particles such as electrons obeyed the same laws of exchange of energy and momentum as colliding billiard balls. The Compton effect is of immense importance, because it shows that the quantum theory may apply to the interactions of waves and matter without infringing the fundamental law of the conservation of energy.

When Curie-Joliot and Joliot found the supposed wave-radiation from beryllium was not obeying the Compton effect, or, if it was, it was caused by an interaction which departed from the laws of the conservation of energy, they first suggested that the experimental measurements of the rate of the absorption of the rays, which gave their energy, might be wrong, because they are very difficult to make. After making more measurements they concluded that there was no important error in quantities and considered that the results showed they had probably discovered 'un nouveau mode d'interaction du rayonnement et de la matiere'. In their later experiments they discovered some more remarkable effects. They noticed tracks in a Wilson chamber due to very high-speed electrons. They estimated the speed of these electrons by measuring the curvature of their path in a strong magnetic field. The speed was that of an electron moving under an electrical field of about 10,000,000 volts. The simultaneous appearance of protons and electrons in the chamber was remarkable, and reminded them of the photographs of Dr. Millikan and his colleagues, which showed forked tracks, apparently of a proton and an electron issuing simultaneously from the same point. These might perhaps have been due to a neutron splitting into its parts on striking an atomic obstacle.

It would agree with the hypothesis that cosmic rays are streams of neutrons.

These were the phenomena which required explanation. Curie-Joliot and Joliot, who had made such interesting new experiments, believed the beryllium radiation to be a wave-radiation. This entailed the hypothesis that a new mode of interaction between waves and matter existed, and that the fundamental laws of the conservation of energy and momentum did not hold for this new mode of interaction.

During this period Dr Chadwick had been investigating these phenomena. They were of a sort with which he had been familiar from the beginning of his career in scientific research. He found that the beryllium radiation ejected particles from helium, lithium, beryllium itself, carbon, air and argon, besides hydrogen. The speeds of the particles ejected from hydrogen measured up to one-tenth the velocity of light, and the particles appeared to be the struck nuclei of the hydrogen atoms. The particles ejected from the other substances proved to be the nuclei of their atoms which had recoiled after being struck by the radiation. Dr. Chadwick measured the energy of some recoiling nitrogen atom nuclei. He found that their energy was sufficient to produce 30,000 ions—i.e., to detach 30,000 electrons from neighbouring atoms. If the observed protons knocked out of hydrogen are ascribed to the impulse from a wave-radiation, the energy of the radiation must be about 50,000,000 electron volts. If the observed nitrogen recoil nuclei are ascribed to the impulse of a 50,000,000 electron volt wave-radiation, they should not produce more than about 10,000 ions. But they are observed to produce three times as many.

Dr Chadwick pointed out that this contradiction and others could be resolved if the hypothesis that the beryllium radiation is a wave-radiation is abandoned in favour of the neutron hypothesis. If the beryllium radiation should consist of neutrons of mass 1 and charge zero, the observed energy of the nitrogen recoil nuclei is of the correct order. Moreover, the nucleus of the beryllium atom is of a constitution which allows the emission of neutrons from it to be not unreasonable. It contains nine protons and five electrons. When it is struck by an alpha particle ejected from disintegrating polonium it may well absorb the alpha particle and emit a neutron. The alpha particle contains four protons and two electrons. Add these to those in the beryllium nucleus, and we have thirteen protons and seven electrons—i.e., twelve protons and six electrons plus a proton and an electron.

At the beginning of this article the carbon nucleus containing twelve protons and six electrons was mentioned. It is one of the most stable nuclei. We may easily suppose, then, that the

polonium alpha particle is captured by the beryllium nucleus, and a shuffling into the stable grouping of a carbon nucleus occurs, with the shedding of a proton and an electron simultaneously which may leave paired as a neutron. Dr. Chadwick gives a neat explanation of how the neutron comes to be liberated. He explains that the speed of a neutron produced in this fashion might well be about one-tenth the velocity of light. Some of the ejected protons, whose mass is also 1, are known to be moving at about one-tenth the velocity of light, which would be expected if they had been squarely struck by a neutron of similar mass and velocity. Dr. Chadwick has also observed that the protons ejected in the same direction as the original exciting alpha particles are much faster than those ejected in the reverse direction. If the protons had been ejected by a wave-radiation, this large difference would have been very difficult to explain. On the neutron hypothesis it is easily explained, because all of the effects are due to particles thrust in the direction in which the original alpha particles were moving.

Dr. Chadwick also noticed that the velocity of recoil of atomic nuclei struck by the radiation is less when the radiation has passed through increasing thicknesses of an absorbing material such as lead. This is not to be expected if the radiation consists of waves. The effect of a barrier on a wave-radiation is to reduce the number of rays, as it were, and not the individual strength of the rays. Such rays as pass through retain their original vigour. Particulate radiations do not behave in that way; the vigour of their constituent particles is dissipated as they thread their way through the material of the barrier. Dr. N. Feather and Dr. P. I. Dee have, in association with Dr. Chadwick, photographed these recoiling nuclei and particles with a Wilson apparatus. They find that electron tracks are shown occasionally. These have a maximum length which would correspond fairly exactly to the length of the track of an electron if it were struck by a neutron. Dee has observed several of these tracks which could not easily be explained in any other way.

Dr. Feather has obtained more than 100 photographs of recoiling nitrogen atomic nuclei. Most of these just show the track of the nitrogen nucleus as it bounces forward, but there are also some forked tracks, which appear to show a new form of the disintegration of the nitrogen atom. One branch of the fork is believed to be due to the recoiling nucleus and the other to a particle ejected from the nucleus. The nature of this particle is not yet known.

These photographs of Dr. Feather are some of the most extraordinary in the history of science. They show no track leading up to the fork or the point from which the nucleus recoils.

The neutron has shown no trace of its passage through matter up to the moment of collision; then it exerts its effect out of the void, as it were. Dr. Dee independently noticed high-speed electron tracks somewhat similar to the 10,000,000 volt tracks observed by Curie-Joliot and Jolot. Lord Rutherford mentions that these will require careful examination and elucidation. It is possible that the excited beryllium emits some wave-radiation besides neutrons. The latest continental results confirm this. Mme. Curie-Joliot and M. Jolot noticed that bombarded boron emitted rays weaker but similar to those from beryllium. Dr. Webster has evidence that neutrons may also be obtained from fluorine, as the difference in absorptibility of the excited rays in the forward and backward directions is similar to the difference noted with the beryllium rays which has already been mentioned.

The reader will now have some notion of the nature of the experimental evidence for the existence of the neutron. Something may now be said of the history of the idea of a neutron, the structure of the neutron, and its implications for physical science. Nearly thirty years ago Sir William Bragg propounded the idea of a neutral doublet to assist in the interpretation of the interaction between waves and particles, but the most remarkable foresight was that of Lord Rutherford in his famous Bakerian Lecture to the Royal Society in 1920. In the previous year he had triumphantly achieved the artificial disintegration of atoms. In his lecture he reviewed the contemporary knowledge of the structure of matter in the perspective of his recent experimental results. Besides summarising the existing knowledge of matter, he made some brilliant speculations on sorts of matter which might exist but at that time were unknown. He said:

The idea of the possible existence of an atom of mass 2 which has zero nucleus charge, is involved. Such an atomic structure seems by no means impossible. On present views the neutral hydrogen atom is regarded as a nucleus of unit charge with an electron attached at a distance, and the spectrum of hydrogen is ascribed to the movements of this distant electron. Under some conditions, however, it may be possible for an electron to combine much more closely with the hydrogen nucleus, and in consequence it should be able to move freely through matter. Its presence would probably be difficult to detect by the spectroscope, and it may be impossible to contain it in a sealed vessel. On the other hand, it should enter readily the structure of atoms, and may either unite with the nucleus or be disintegrated by its intense field, resulting possibly in the escape of a charged hydrogen atom, or an electron, or both.

What a thrilling passage this is for the physicist! Every sentence is prescient. The last sentence causes one to reflect in excitement on the proton and electron tracks observed by Millikan

and Anderson, Curie-Joliot and Joliot, and Dee. Have these observers seen the disintegration of neutrons into protons and electrons?

Lord Rutherford continued:

If the existence of such atoms be possible, it is to be expected that they may be produced, but probably only in very small numbers, in the electric discharge through hydrogen where both electrons and hydrogen nuclei are present in considerable numbers. It is the intention of the writer to make experiments to test whether any indication of the production of such atoms can be obtained under these conditions. The existence of such nuclei may not be confined to mass 1, but may be possible for masses 2, 3, 4, or more, depending on the possibility of combination between the doublets. The existence of such atoms seems almost necessary to explain the building up of the nuclei of heavy elements; for unless we suppose the production of charged particles of very high velocities it is difficult to see how any positively charged particle can reach the nucleus of a heavy atom against its intense repulsive field.

Lord Rutherford has foreseen the possibility not only of a neutron of mass 1, but also of a series. A neutron of mass 4 would be a very remarkable particle indeed. One may say, with due respect, that the passage might have been written by a 'cosmical patent agent'. So many of the ideas and applications are foreseen.

The possibility of producing neutrons by electrical discharges in hydrogen was investigated by Dr. Glasston and Dr. Roberts in the Cavendish Laboratory, according to Lord Rutherford's suggestion, but without successful results. Dr. Milikan's investigation of the rays described as cosmic rays which appear to come from the outer parts of cosmic space has stimulated some theoretical discussions of the possible properties of neutrons. In May 1931 Langer and Rosen, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published an interesting paper in the *Physical Review*. They discussed the mechanics of the neutron conceived as a special sort of hydrogen atom. The hydrogen atom consists of a proton with an electron revolving round it in a relatively distant orbit. According to the quantum theory there are a number of possible orbits corresponding to the amount of energy possessed by the atom. Langer and Rosen discussed a hypothetical case in which the hydrogen atom was conceived to be in a very low state of energy so that the revolving electron was very close to the nuclear proton. The electron and proton were supposed to be almost in contact, and resembled a spinning dumb-bell. Such an object would be of about the same size as an electron or proton. Its mass would be slightly less than that of a proton, because some energy would have been absorbed in order to form the close structure, and this would come from condensation

of mass. Its diameter might be from one billionth to one thousand-billionth of a centimetre. It would be small enough to penetrate any known material used as the walls of a containing vessel. On the surface of the earth neutrons could not form a gas pressure, or, in other words, they could not be bottled.

Given such a neutron, Langer and Rosen discussed its possible rôle in the evolution of matter. Before the neutron was discovered the smallest compound nuclear particle was the nucleus of the helium atom, the alpha particle. This contains four protons and two electrons—quite a complicated structure. How this could have been compounded in one jump out of protons and electrons was virtually impossible to conceive. The evolution of helium, which after hydrogen is the simplest of the elements, seemed to involve a step of a sort fundamentally different from the evolution of hydrogen atoms out of the primordial protons and electrons.

Langer and Rosen consider the possibility of the condensation of a hydrogen atom into a neutron. This is much easier to conceive than the creation of a helium nucleus by the chance simultaneous collision of six primordial particles. If this condensation may be effected, the further compounding of particles is more easily conceived, because the neutron has a negligible electric charge. There is no reason why a large group of neutrons should not become compressed together exceedingly compactly. This would be almost impossible with protons alone or electrons alone, or a mixture of protons and electrons because of mutual repulsions due to their electric charges. The compact group of neutrons might then be conceived to condense further by the occasional expulsion of an electron or a proton. As soon as the complete pairing of the protons and electrons was disturbed there might be rearrangements throughout the whole group, with the formation of sub-groups of the structure characteristic of the nuclei of any of the elements, such as oxygen, iron, etc. The neutron helps in the conception of the evolution of the nuclei of the heavy elements besides the light elements such as helium, and the heavier elements are as a rule more directly interesting to humanity, which dreams of hitherto unknown masteries over the common materials of Nature.

Langer and Rosen conceive the cosmic rays, not as streams of neutrons, but as wave-radiation emitted during the condensation of the group of neutrons into, for example, helium nuclei. They make some interesting suggestions concerning the constitution of the very heavy stars named 'white dwarfs'. These may be several hundred thousand times as dense as water. As neutrons have no charge they may easily pack together into extremely dense material. There is little difficulty in imagining a piece of material made of neutrons and having a density perhaps a thousand

million million times that of water. Such material could reasonably exist at low temperatures and pressures. If white dwarfs contained a core of neutrons, the extremely high temperatures presently credited to them might no longer be necessary hypothetically. In fact, much of astrophysics, and consequently modern theories of the nature and evolution of the stars and of the universe, may have to be considerably revised in the perspective of the existence of the neutron.

In October 1931 Carlson and Oppenheimer, of the University of California, stated that there is a good deal of evidence that there are peculiar radiations associated with cosmic rays which are not wave-radiations, and yet produce fewer ionisations than much slower electrons. They refer to unpublished work by Mott-Smith, in which cosmic rays are apparently shown to be accompanied by particles which produce tracks rather thinner than electron tracks. According to their calculations, the number of ions produced by a neutron is sensibly independent of its velocity. They refer also to unpublished work of Pauli in which he attempts to account for anomalies in the theory of the emission of electrons during radioactive disintegrations by postulating the emission of a neutron which carries off certain apparently lost energy. If I understand Carlson and Oppenheimer correctly, they suggest the cosmic rays might really be neutrons emitted by disintegrating atoms in the atmosphere. They suggest that the tracks of particles emitted during radioactive electron emissions should be compared with the tracks of particles associated with cosmic rays, to see whether their properties are similar.

Neutrons owe their extraordinary power of penetration to their lack of an electric field. They are not deflected when they pass near a charged particle unless they strike it directly. The sensible area of a sheet of atoms is much less to them than to an electron or proton, as they have no extensive electric fringe. They may have a range of upwards of one mile in air, or pass through yards of lead. Such penetrability is of the order shown by the so-called cosmic rays. These rays may, therefore, perhaps be neutrons released in the atmosphere by disintegrating atoms and not have an extra-terrestrial origin. C. T. R. Wilson suggested years ago that the cosmic rays were perhaps electrons moving under the intense electric fields generated during thunderstorms, which may rise to an intensity of about 1,000,000,000 volts.

The neutron may prove to be a valuable agent in the exploration of atomic nuclei. Owing to its small size and lack of electric charge it may be able to go into the nucleus, and perhaps right through. The way it behaves after it comes out on the other side would give interesting information on the structure of the nucleus.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRICAL MUSIC

If a musician were asked to state the *desiderata* for a perfect musical instrument, they would probably be somewhat as follows : (1) The organ's power of continuing a tone for an unlimited period, unbroken by breath- or bowing-pauses. (2) The ability of a stringed instrument to produce any note, not merely those of the modern scale, and to pass from one to another with or without the production of all those that lie between. (3) A range of volume from the practically inaudible to the literally deafening, without change of quality—at any rate, as far as the instrument itself is concerned, although the ear will probably notice some apparent change due to the conditions of sound propagation and to physiological and perhaps also psychological effects—but at any rate, the changes in quality as the volume is changes must be very slight compared to those associated, for instance, with a trumpet. (4) The ability to produce any shade of tone quality desired, not only those of all existing instruments, but also entirely new ones—and, if possible, also the ability to change the quality of a note without ceasing to sound it, and gradually, so that a trumpet seems by imperceptible degrees to become a violin, for example. (5) The use of any 'attack' desired the tone commencing delicately or harshly at the player's will. (6) A range of pitch from a note so low that the separate vibrations are heard to one so high that not all ears can appreciate it, with as little change of quality as possible—at any rate, entirely without such abrupt changes from one note to the next of the scale as exist, e.g., between the registers of a clarinet. (7) A reasonable degree of portability, comparable, say, to that of a grand piano at the worst. And, finally, (8) a reasonable facility of execution, even when a multiplicity of notes is to be sounded, and the player must bring hands and feet into use.

The list is rather overwhelming; nevertheless, electro-musical instruments already exist which do actually satisfy all these conditions, with the exception of the last—namely, facility of execution. Too much stress should not, however, be laid on this point, since instrumental technique takes a long time to develop, and what now appears almost impossible may be an elementary

exercise later, and also since, providing the principles of the instrument are sound, mechanical modifications tending to greater facility of playing can safely be left to develop little by little.

Generally speaking, the present position in this respect is that either the second or the last of our *desiderata* has been sacrificed. In the first case, the electric instrument is fitted with a keyboard, thus allowing of the very fully developed organ and piano technique being taken advantage of so that facility of playing is at once attained, but, on the other hand, only the notes of the present scales can be played and a true *glissando* is impossible. In the second case, no keyboard exists, so that playing is far more difficult and a new technique has to be developed, but there is no limitation as to the intervals that can be produced. Further, when we wish to sound several notes simultaneously, the keyboard type of instrument remains easy to play, the only new drawback being an increase in its bulk and weight, whereas the non-keyboard type becomes almost unplayable as far as present technique goes. Despite these drawbacks, however, it is the general consensus of opinion of musicians and inventors that it is the second type of instrument, the non-keyboard type, which presents the greater interest and the greater possibilities of development, even if it entails at present the limitation of 'one player, one note'—a limitation which, after all, is shared by the vast majority of existing orchestral instruments.

One feature common to all electro-musical instruments is that the sound is not heard as proceeding from the instrument itself, but from one or more loud-speakers. This has very considerable advantages for concert-hall performances, inasmuch as by proper placing and 'mixing' of these loud-speakers acoustic difficulties can be got over, but it has also a very great advantage for direct broadcasting, in that, since the loud-speaker is actuated by electrical impulses, these can be fed direct into the transmitter instead of being converted into sound by the loud-speaker and then back into electrical vibrations by the microphone.

One of the first electro-musical instruments dates back to 1900, when the 'Telharmonium' was produced in New York: this was a keyboard instrument, using one alternator for each of the 144 notes available. It satisfied few of the conditions stated, the bulk and weight can be imagined, and it is merely of historical interest. Development really began with the invention of the wireless valve, and the majority of modern instruments use this for the actual production of the sound. There are at least three ways in which this can be done, two of which are quite well known to the user of a simple wireless receiver. First of all, there is the note heard in the loud-speaker when too much reaction is used, the receiver being tuned to a wave-length closely

approximating to that of some transmitter, or when some other receiver in the neighbourhood is using too much reaction. As all wireless listeners know, if it is our own receiver that is 'oscillating,' the pitch of the note heard can be changed by changing the tuning; more technically, this note is produced by the interference of two oscillating valves (in this case our own and that of the transmitter), and the pitch can be altered by changing the tuning of either of them. But, secondly, if more and more reaction is used, there arrives a point where the receiver, at any rate if of the more old-fashioned type, will start to 'howl,' and the note now heard in the loud-speaker is independent of the presence of a second valve, as can be proved by disconnecting the aerial, when the howl will continue. In this case our valve is producing the sound entirely by itself, and changes of tuning will have little or no effect on the pitch; we can, however, control this by changing the components to which the valve is connected (e.g. the grid resistance or condenser). A third system of sound production is more difficult to explain, since it is not familiar to the wireless listener; briefly, an 'oscillating' valve (as in the case of a receiver with too much reaction) produces a certain number of electrical impulses per second, quite independent of the presence or absence of another oscillating valve in the neighbourhood. In the case quoted, these are far too rapid to be audible, although they pass through the loud-speaker, but if very much larger tuning-coils and condensers are used it is possible to slow them down so that they produce a sound in the loud-speaker, and the pitch can then be controlled by varying the size of the coils or the condensers. These simple details, though by no means technically accurate, will at any rate serve to make what follows clearer.

Applications of this third type can be dealt with briefly, since all instruments of this class are bulky, inconvenient, and must invariably be played from keyboards; hence the loss of two of our requirements, especially that of competing with stringed instruments as regards the production of notes and intervals other than those of the modern scales. A few have, however, been produced, such as Miller's 'Voice Chord' in America, and the Givélet-Coupleux electrical pianos and organs in France.

The vast majority of electro-musical instruments so far developed have been of the first or 'heterodyne' type, in which, as we have seen, two oscillators are needed. One of the first to attract attention was that of Theremin, some five years ago, this being more especially noteworthy in that it was the first attempt made on a large scale to convert musicians and the public at large to a realisation of the possibilities latent in the new

instruments; and there is no doubt that it was largely due to the concerts given by the inventor and his pupils that so much interest began to be shown by musicians and by technicians in these possibilities. For those who never saw this instrument, it may be added that the pitch was controlled by the distance between the player's hand and a vertical rod, this affecting the capacity, and hence the tuning, of one of the oscillator systems (Listeners who have experimented with the reception of the short waves will have noted a similar effect in many receivers) There is no doubt that the almost magical nature of this control of pitch without actual contact with the instrument had much to do with its success. The Theremin apparatus satisfied one of the most important of our requirements, in that all notes are playable on it. It had, however (at any rate, in its original form), serious disadvantages, the greatest being that it was impossible to pass from one note to another without sounding all those lying between, thus giving a very monotonous *glissando* or 'scoop' effect. Further, it was extremely difficult to play, although no doubt a technique would develop (and has already to a certain extent done so) as the interest taken by musicians in the instrument increased and as time permitted of the training of soloists.

An earlier inventor, Mager (1921), should be mentioned, though his 'Electrophone' and 'Spherophone' have never attracted much attention outside Germany and appear to have disappeared from the field altogether. They also work on this 'heterodyne' principle, some types having keyboards (with the loss of one of our requirements) and others a moving lever on a circular scale the position of the lever fixing the pitch. Gernsback in America (using a keyboard), Martenot in France (a particularly practical instrument), Hugoniot in France, and Quinet, also in France (a keyboard instrument), have also developed apparatus of this same type.

The musician, amateur or professional, will be interested to know what one of these instruments is like to play. Of course, any keyboard instrument is played in a similar manner to an organ, and is therefore not so interesting as a novelty. As an example of the other type where there is no keyboard, the Martenot instrument just referred to can be briefly described. It looks like a small portable harmonium, from which connexions run to one or more loud-speakers, and weighs about the same, or rather more—in any case, far less than a piano, even an upright. At first sight it also resembles a harmonium in having a keyboard. This is, however, a mere painted dummy, and serves merely to indicate to the player where to place his finger to obtain a given note: he is, of course, in no way limited to

the notes painted on it, as he can obtain quarter, eighth tones, etc., by putting his finger off the centre of the painted 'key,' or on the division line between one 'key' and the next. This finger (normally the forefinger of the right hand) is placed within a small celluloid ring and carries this with it: the movement of this ring, acting through an endless band on pulleys, controls the capacity (the condenser) of one of the oscillating circuits and thus the pitch. Here only one note can be played at a time, chords being impossible. The inventor has felt that it is preferable to develop the great possibilities latent in this simple form before elaborating it further, and it is probable that this policy is the correct one. The left hand controls the actual production of the note, and also its loudness, a small key when released giving complete silence and when fully depressed a *fff*. It will be noted that we have got rid of the 'scoop' effects of earlier instruments although, of course, such can be produced when desired, by holding down the key to the required extent and moving the playing finger. The left hand also controls three 'stops' (more could be added), which in combination give a choice of eight tone qualities, and one other which changes the 'attack,' the manner (abrupt or gradual) in which the tone commences. As will be appreciated, the whole instrument is very simple, and this is one of its great advantages, especially as compared with most of its competitors. Anyone already able to play the piano can make a fair showing on a Martenot after a few hours' practice.

To pass to the second type of instrument—the earliest patent on this dates back to 1915, and was granted to De Forest, it is remarkable how often this inventor has been so far ahead of his time that his patents have lapsed before they have been taken up. Quite recently the 'Hellertion' was produced in Germany, being exhibited at the Session for Electrical Music last year at Munich, where it attracted some attention. It uses a very similar idea—that of varying the grid bias of an oscillator. This 'Hellertion' is an all-interval instrument like the Martenot or the violin, and is normally best adapted to playing melodies only, although (as in the case of most non-keyboard instruments) chords can be played by elaborating the instrument and complicating the technique.

The technical classifications are, however, by no means exhausted. There are also those instruments which do not use a wireless valve for the actual production of the sound (they all use valves for the amplification of the sound once produced), and also those which are in reality mere attachments to existing instruments or to modifications of such. Both classes are extremely important, and it is as yet too soon to say whether

they will eventually dominate the field of electrical music, or yield to some representative of the types already described. At the moment, however, it seems fairly certain (to judge more especially by the demonstrations given at the Session for Electrical Music at Munich last year) that the 'Trautonium' is the most advanced example, not only of these two classes, but of all existing electro-musical instruments.

This uses an entirely different system from those hitherto described, a neon lamp, a baby brother of those used for luminous signs, being the source of the electrical impulses which eventually are heard as sounds in the loud-speaker. Such a lamp, if suitably connected with a source of current, a condenser, and a resistance, has the curious property of flashing at regular intervals, and if the currents resulting from these flashes be put through a loud-speaker each flash is heard as a click. The speed of flashing can be controlled by altering the condenser or the resistance. If speeded up sufficiently the clicks, of course, build up into a musical note in the loud-speaker, and further variations in the condenser or the resistance (the latter in the 'Trautonium') alter the pitch of this note. So far, the instrument is only novel as regards the means used to produce the sound, but Dr. Trautwein has developed a system of quality control which is very efficient from a musical point of view, but which can only be explained by a theory involving a complete break with the older (Helmholtz) theories of tone quality, and is therefore extremely interesting from this point of view also. As will be remembered, in the older theory the quality of a musical note is made to depend on the relative strength of the 'overtones' present in it, these being vibrations of frequencies which are multiples of the fundamental frequency on which the pitch of the note depends. Dr. Trautwein however, considers (and his instrument goes a long way to prove his contention) that the quality is conditioned by one or more 'tone-formers,' vibrations which, although of a higher frequency than that of the fundamental, are not necessarily multiples of this; and, incidentally, that when one does happen to be a multiple, unpleasant results are probable, such as the 'wolf'-tones of a violin. What he does is to introduce between the neon lamp and the loud-speaker one or more circuits tuned electrically to the frequencies of the 'tone-formers' which he wishes to produce. Any change in the tuning of these circuits changes the quality heard, the pitch of the note remaining unaltered, depending as it does on the flashing speed of the neon lamp. Hence, if the condenser in the tone-former circuit be altered, we have the impression that one instrument has replaced another. If, on the other hand, the pitch is altered, by changing the resistance associated with the neon lamp, but the tone-former

circuit is left unchanged, we hear apparently one and the same instrument playing a melody, without change of quality. This, incidentally, appears to demonstrate the correctness of the new theory, since, according to the older theory, any change in the frequency of the fundamental (neon lamp) would have to be accompanied by a change two, three, four, etc., times as great in the frequency of the 'quality' (tone-former) circuit, so that it might remain an overtone of the fundamental and its frequency still be a multiple of the frequency of this. However, this is a point that interests the scientist more than the musician: the really important fact is that in this instrument we have a definite means of controlling the quality at will. Further, unlike all previous instruments in which changes of tone quality are possible (including the organ as well as other electro-musical instruments), this does not restrict us to a definite number of 'stops' set in advance, but we have literally an unlimited number of tone colours available. The only limitation is, in fact, the ability of the ear to distinguish between one and another of these colours as the condenser of the tone-former circuit is altered. With one such circuit it is probable that the untrained ear can distinguish some 50 different tone qualities, and the addition of a second tone-former circuit should then give us, not 50 plus 50, but 50×50 , or 2500. And further, there is theoretically no limit to the number of tone-former circuits that may be added. In any case, the limit is set by the hearer, and not by the instrument, and it appears not unlikely that the faculty of distinguishing shades of tone coloration is one which will develop with practice, like most others. Another point: the quality in the 'Trautonium' (and in this as far up to the present) can be varied gradually, and not step by step, so that one can produce the extremely striking effect of a trumpet (for example) slowly changing to a violin or a flute; the result must be heard to be appreciated. Playing is quite simple, a wire being depressed by the performer's finger into contact with a plate below it, the position of the finger on the wire giving the pitch as in a violin, but with a far greater range of pitch, and without the other hand having to intervene: the mere contact of wire and plate producing the tone. Any transition from note to note is thus possible, from a *staccato* to a true *legato*, and by sliding the finger along the depressed wire *glissando* effects are also available when required. The degree of pressure of the finger on the wire controls the volume, a light pressure giving a *piano* and a heavy pressure *forte*. This is an improvement on earlier models where the volume was controlled by a foot pedal. Incidentally, it removes another of their defects—namely, the rather monotonously harsh and trumpet-like 'attack,' though, of course, this,

or in fact any other type of sound, cannot actually be obtained. Thus one finger sufficient to produce a note, it follows that, by placing several such wires parallel and close to each other, a multiplicity of notes can be simultaneously produced, one per finger, the limitation being here chiefly the abilities of the player.

One of the most interesting points regarding this instrument, and one which explains its high musical level, is that it is a product of the research laboratories attached to the Berlin Academy of Music, and as a result Dr. Trautwein has had the close co-operation of musicians in his work, including that of Hindemith, who has not only written specially for the 'Triantonum,' but has played it himself in public. Considerable space has been devoted to this instrument, because, in the writer's opinion, it is not only the most highly developed up to the present, but also possesses the greatest possibilities. It is little known outside Germany, though readers may possibly have heard it over the German Broadcast system, or as an item in a cinematograph news bulletin. The policy of the inventor has been to produce it very little in public, and then chiefly to audiences of musicians or technicians until it is considered to be absolutely perfected, and until a much slower matter—performers of soloist rank are available to demonstrate it. There can be little doubt that this is the proper procedure; in fact, much of the scepticism with which musicians tend to regard these instruments in general is due to the fact that some types have been put before the public for commercial reasons before they were in reality fully developed, and long before any players were really capable of demonstrating their possibilities in public performance.

The final group of instruments can be dealt with briefly. They all work on the principle of taking mechanical vibrations, however produced, converting them into electrical currents, and then dealing with these according to wireless technique. There is, for example, the Bureau Radiophone in France, where a violin string is mechanically bowed and the resultant vibrations actuate an apparatus resembling an electrical pick-up, or the Bechstein-Ernst electrical piano, in which the vibrations of the piano strings are somewhat similarly dealt with. Mention may perhaps also be made of the electrical cello suggested by the writer, in which the mechanical sounding-board of the normal cello is replaced by electrical amplification. Nothing has as yet, however, been very highly developed in this field—at any rate, so far as published information is concerned. There are also the interesting possibilities associated with the playing of any instrument to a microphone in a separate studio or sound-

1934 DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRICAL MUSIC 201

proof cabinet, and dealing electrically with the resultant currents before they are put out by a loud-speaker. Even so simple a system as this lends itself to many curious developments—e.g., the combination of *pianissimo* attack and bowing or breath with *fortissimo* volume, the change of volume without any change of bowing or breath, and the quite feasible transposition of instruments up or down the scale. And not only of instruments; it is perfectly possible to take, for example, a *coloratura* soprano and transpose the voice an octave or so higher!

These notes may serve to show what the possibilities of electro-musical instruments are, and what the progress has been up to the present. Development is bound to be slow, not so much on account of engineering difficulties, but because, before the new possibilities can be properly exploited, not only must players be trained to use them, but also composers must be found to understand and write for them, and (a vital point) an entirely new system of notation must be developed to indicate what these composers require, especially as regards tone qualities and their changes. Nevertheless, it seems certain that these instruments are destined to play an increasingly important part in modern music, not only (and perhaps for the moment not principally) as solo instruments, but as members of normal orchestras, supplying gaps that every composer and conductor regrets and replacing many existing instruments that are only too well known to be unsatisfactory.

R. RAVEN-HART.

SOME BRITISH BIRDS AND THEIR SMALL-TALK

IN attempting to write upon the small talk of birds we are at once confronted with difficulties of definition. The vocal sounds produced by the various species are many and diverse, but to say which of these may fairly be called 'small talk' is a matter upon which opinions will legitimately differ. Certainly, songs do not come within this category—they are rather lyrical outbursts. But what is song and what is not? It is like asking where poetry ends and prose begins, a question upon which many useless words have been spilt. Professor Newton wrote in his *Dictionary of Birds*: 'It is necessary in a scientific spirit to regard every sound made by a bird under the all-powerful influence of love or lust as a "Song"', but later observations, such as those of Mr. Eliot Howard, have shown that this definition is too narrow. Song may arise from almost any tone in the gamut of emotions, and of these sexual excitement is only one. Love's ecstasy may be mingled with arrogant assertion of territorial claims. Fear, joy, anger, combativeness, or even the pleasant satiety of a full crop, may pluck a bird's heart-strings into melody.

When I began to think about the subject of this article it seemed to me that any vocal bird sound which was not 'song' was 'small-talk'. But, considering the matter further, I came to the conclusion that it is impossible to frame an entirely satisfactory definition. True, it would be easy with the more accomplished minstrels, such as nightingale, woodlark, blackbird or songthrush, to distinguish their songs from their other notes, no one would confuse, for instance, the hoarse churr of an anxious nightingale, the raucous chatter of a frightened thrush or blackbird, or the *sotto voce* ruminations of a woodlark with the carols, plaintive, robustious or rhapsodic, of these songsters. But with those whose songs are more simple we are at once in doubt. Most ornithologists will admit that songs have been evolved from call-notes, and in some cases the musical phrase has not progressed beyond the repetition, perhaps only once or twice, of a single sound. To state dogmatically when such songs are indeed songs, or only tittle-tattle, is beyond my powers. I am con-

strained to follow my own instinct (or perhaps I should more properly call it 'caprice') and realise that such a course will almost certainly bring some of my readers into disagreement with me.

I can, of course, imagine someone questioning at once whether birds have any small-talk, or even denying that they are capable of conversation — of sustained conversation, such as that in which human beings sometimes engage. I admit at once they are incapable. The gull's conversation with Venus in *The Golden Asse* is only a pretty concert. As Professor J. Arthur Thomson has written, 'Parrots and starlings imitate sounds made by their fellows, and this is a distinct step towards language, yet these clever birds never utter a sentence or express a judgment of their own'. The starling's burlesques sound like buffoonery. But many, in fact most, species of birds are capable of producing sounds which certainly interpret definite emotions, such as anger, excitement, hunger or fear, and it is these interjections, often sustained over a considerable period, which may, I think, be called 'small-talk'. Some of them, perhaps, are almost worthy to be called 'words'.

To describe even cursorily the small-talk of all British birds in a few thousand words is impossible. I can only attempt to touch on the notes of a few talkative species with which I am more familiar.

One would expect the crow tribe, whose members are so full of brains and wickedness, to have a large vocabulary. The raven, who is perhaps the wisest and most mischievous of them all, is, indeed, very versatile in his language. I have written more fully elsewhere of some of his notes, so eloquent of his many-coloured moods; it will suffice here to say that he can proclaim anger, alarm, humour, pleasure, reguery, and even, by a kind of snort, disdain. Rooks are almost equally loquacious; they are credited with from thirty to forty different notes, and are even said to have evolved several 'words'. That they have a large and heterogeneous glossary anyone can testify who has listened to the extraordinary babel of sound which accompanies their going to roost and their nesting operations.

A single rook sometimes perches in an elm in our garden, and, bowing repeatedly, utters with open beak a subdued chatter, ending in a gentle, crooning caw; sometimes he replaces this chatter by a guttural chuckle. This performance is by some naturalists dignified with the name of 'song,' and it may be intended as a serenade to some invisible female of his species; but as it takes place so early as January it is quite as likely to be a post-prandial performance, a sort of corvine grace after meat, arising from the eupeptic disintegration of the corpse of a trapped mouse from one of my bird tables.

On fine winter mornings a horde of rooks and jackdaws flies over my house to the fields near the shore with an almost deafening babble of caws and 'chacks.' What all this pribble-prabble is about I can only conjecture, but I imagine it to mean joy in the sunlight and exuberant expectancy of the pleasures of breakfast. As for the carrion-crow, for a long time I thought it possessed no note except the grating croak, which is harsher than any rook or raven call; but in spring I have occasionally detected in its voice a more peevish tone which may be an expression of sexual passion. The harsher objurcation—for it always sounds like a curse—emphasised with bowing and tail spreading, seems to do duty for every other corvine emotion, or perhaps, as most of their ways are nasty, there is no need for a more comprehensive lingo.

The jackdaw's 'chack,' which, repeated vehemently and with emphasis, becomes a chatter, is cheery and humorous, he will have his joke, and seems to enjoy it. He is alleged to have a song, but as it has been described as 'a sort of little prattle,' it may well be called 'small-talk.' There is also a crowing note which I have heard when the birds are nesting.

The air-shattering shrieks of jays force themselves upon your attention; they are avian cat-calls or 'bird Hillinggate.' A flock of this species might be called 'a profanity of jays' on the analogy of Juliana Berners' 'an unkindness of ravens.' The low warbling or bubbling which may be heard in springtime is usually supposed to be their song, but as they make use of these sounds when in companies it seems possible that they are also gossipings. Listening in semi-concealment to the cries of four fledgling jays in a tree above my head I noticed that their scream, which I took to be a food call to their very anxious and expostulatory parents, was less harsh than the screech of the older birds. Perhaps one has to serve an apprenticeship in order to attain perfection even in cacophony. Jazz bands are not made in a day.

Many years ago in Brittany, where jays are, or were, tame and common as crows, as I sat under a hedge, one pitched on a bough above me and screamed, squirming from side to side on his perch. As I looked up, almost into his pink open mouth, I wondered, as I have often wondered since, that so ugly a noise should come from amid such delicately beautiful plumage.

The clattering alarm note of magpies is a common country sound; but there is also a furious crow-like croak which I have heard occasionally. The food-cry of the fledged young is a double call, clamorous, impatient and hungry.

Choughs are the gentlemen of the crow family; you can tell that by their graceful build and gentle manners. A gentleman has been defined as one who never unknowingly hurts the feeling

of another. Choughs seem by their conduct to possess this hallmark of good breeding. Their decrease is by some attributed to their want of pushfulness and inability to compete with the more aggressive jackdaws; but the insatiate egg stealer and bird fancier must also bear part of the blame. In their language, too, the same refinement is apparent. The 'ka-a-a' of a jackdaw the chough has softened into a somewhat plaintive 'cha-a-a'; perhaps he has less sense of humour. The alarm note, 'chée-eu,' is similarly a more mild sound, and even the nasal 'tchuff' from which the bird takes its name is a snort which is etherealised.

All the finches are vivacious little people, they live very full lives and enjoy every minute of them. Naturally they possess a pretty wide range of small-talk, in fact, after the tits, it is their notes which are most in evidence in wood and hedgerow during the winter months. One of the sprightliest of the clan is the chaffinch, he is full of spirits, and his emotions are spontaneous and for the most part cheerful!

The well-known 'spink' or 'pink' has a distinctly metallic twang. This note seems to serve them to communicate divers sentiments. Sometimes it betokens alarm, sometimes anger or pugnacity, sometimes pure *joie de vivre*. But there are other ejaculations. Regularly throughout the year I take food to the bird-table just outside our windows before breakfast. My appearance at once attracts two or three hungry chaffinches, but they greet me, not with 'spink,' but with a shorter, sharper note, which is more like 'wit'. Evidently this means hunger and excitement at the sight of food. If I stay near the bird-table after I have put seed and crumbs upon it a few of the more daring come down to the table and begin feeding. Usually one or more fly off after having taken a few beakfuls, as they depart they utter a note entirely different from the 'wit' with which they greeted me. I hear it as 'chip,' a staccato sound, and I take it to imply the release of nervous strain coupled with a sudden realisation of their rashness in venturing so near a human creature.

In spring one of the commonest sounds is the long-drawn 'tweet,' which the cock chaffinch reiterates with a persistence which sometimes becomes almost nerve-racking, though it may be praiseworthy, for it is evidently a sex call addressed to the hen. I have heard the hen give the same call just before the act of mating. There is also a dissyllabic note, 'ob-ee,' occasionally heard at this season, which, as it is made by the cock, probably has the same significance; and this applies to a low twittering sequence which I have only remarked in springtime. I have on several occasions seen the nuptial display of the cock which immediately precedes coition: more often the male is then silent, but twice I have heard him release his emotions in a low croon as

he advances, with head bowed low, depressed tail and drooping wings, towards the object of his desire; she greets him, her head strained backwards and upwards, with a soft clucking which voices her willingness to accept his advances.

Greenfinches are almost as garrulous as chaffinches. I suppose their most familiar note is the squeezed-out 'chee' (sometimes written 'dwee'), by which the bird announces its presence with a monotony that may become a bore. Some observers consider this wheeze to be its song, others write it down a call-note. The truth is that its song is a catalogue of its various moods and the notes which express them. There is the chattering that Whitchell described as 'did-it-it-titit'—symbols which serve well enough; another pleasant and musical stave is 'tell-tell-tell' (or 'yell-yell-yell,' according to Whitchell and others), and a very plaintive call, 'ty-be, or 'pee-wee,' which is employed, among other occasions, when the bird is in trouble—an injured greenfinch which I confined during convalescence in my fruit cage thus complained of his confinement, but the song delivered with wide-opened beak and head thrown back, consists of some or all of these different sounds strung together—a disorderedly but pleasant medley of small-talk of which the bell-like 'tell-tell-tell' is the sweetest, to my ears.

But there are others. I once heard a shrill, peevish cry emitted when a malevolent little owl was in too close proximity. Another is 'tchee-vo,' perhaps the same as Whitchell's 'zshweeroo,' though I cannot distinguish all those break-twisting consonants in it, if indeed the sound is the same. This, too, is sometimes tacked on to the song, though more often it is used by itself. When feeding greenfinches often keep up a mellifluous churring, betokening peace and plenty. But a hen greenfinch once expressed on my bird-table feelings in which love and greed were incongruously mingled by this portion of her vocabulary. A cock was on the table as well, but first he ignored her and flew away, however, he returned shortly after, and, advancing, fed her by regurgitation. I could see him insert his beak in hers and bring up the soft food from his crop; this happened two or three times.

The anxious food cry of the young greenfinch is very similar, but it is more peevish and infantile. I have once heard a youngster attempt the 'tell-tell' note, after chattering, but it was a very feeble effort. A greenfinch, after enjoying a drink, will twitter almost as musically as a goldfinch. Other less pleasing ebullitions of feeling are the hiss, almost a snarl, with which a trespasser on a greenfinch's patch on the bird-table is sometimes resented. And I have occasionally noticed a phrase in the song which resembled the tree-pipit's descending cadence. But this may have been a parrot-like imitation, not conversation.

The 'chee' of the greenfinch leads me naturally to the resonant 'cree' of the brambling, for the two are very alike. This sound for me is always associated with the bare flesh-smooth boles of beeches, whose fallen leaves laid a tawny carpet throughout a Cheshire wood. There in April I have heard the woodland ring with this clear call, chimed by some 500 throats; I might almost call the flock 'a charm of bramblings,' though the word is more usually applied to goldfinches' lovely twitterings, for indeed they cast a spell of beauty over the spring landscape. It is said that this 'cree' is a mating note, and it may well be, as it is heard most often in spring just before the birds are leaving us for their Scandinavian breeding haunts.

Earlier in the year, in January or February, I have watched bramblings feeding among the dead beech leaves—they run and scurry impetuously in search of the beech-mast, tossing the dry jetam over their chestnut shoulders with a rapid twist of head and neck, so that the leaves rustle and fly in the air as though a flurry of wind were spitting their corpses into reluctant life. The hoot of a passing car puts up the whole flock with a whirr of wings and a musical chipping of excitement and alarm, but in a few moments they settle again and resume their delightful games among the leafy litter.

The difficulty of describing bird voices accurately is well shown in the contradictory remarks of different observers concerning the other notes of the bramblings. Some consider the 'spink' or 'pink' softer, others sharper, than that of the chaffinch. And, to tell the truth, on consulting my own twenty odd years of notes, I find the same disconcerting conflict. But really I believe the explanation to be that there are at least two different notes, one a soft 'zip' or 'seep' which has affinities with the crossbill's and redwing's calls, and the other the 'pink,' which varies in timbre, being short and sharp in anxiety and more mellow when the excitement is less. And in addition there is a short 'cluck' (or 'tuk,' as Mr. Coward calls it), which is sometimes mingled with the chatter of the beech-leaf search and implies contentment and plenty.

On the language of goldfinches and linnets there is no need to enlarge—it delights the ear as much as their plumage charms the eye. The proverb says that speech is silver but silence is golden, but with them the epithets might be transposed. The flute-like call of foraging bullfinches makes me prick-eared for Pan's piping; though I have never caught the rogue at it, I feel he is there, lurking in the thorn-brake. And, indeed, this note is part of the true song, which seems to come from some ethereal hautboy. The hawfinch is to me a strong, silent, and somewhat sinister bird: the only remark I ever heard him pass was a

characteristically subdued squeak, which others describe as a click; a friend who knows these birds well likens it to the peevish note of an anxious or combative robin.

The buntings are not as a class very communicative outside their songs, though of these they never seem to tire, even when all other birds are silenced by climatic conditions. I was once sheltering under a hedge when a curl-bunting suddenly appeared and squeaked like a mouse as a kestrel flew over; this protest, which I attributed to fear, was continued when shortly after it was attacked by another of its own species. From its song you would put down this bunting as a bird of a phlegmatic temperament, but when a hen chaffinch attempted to share the bath which a cock curl was enjoying a yard or two from our windows the interloper was greeted with a venomous hiss. Even birds resent any interruption of the privacy of the bathroom.

The yellow-hammer has an ejaculation which approximates to 'pkick,' a nasal, and to me rather aggravating, sound, both reed and corn buntings have monosyllabic call-notes, which serve only to show how limited are their conversational powers.

All the tits are very conversational folk, as they travel about in flocks during the winter they prattle cheerfully to each other, presumably about the food supply or to show neighbourliness. The variety of their gossip is infinite. The 'tree-dee' of a school of long-tailed or bottle-tits is one of the commonest woodland sounds: no doubt it is a signal to keep the party in touch. But there is also another note, a slightly guttural 'cherr,' which I have heard both when the gang is breaking up into pairs in early spring, and also late on a winter's afternoon when they will soon be going to roost. Perhaps it then represents a discussion as to where are the most desirable sleeping quarters.

As for the great-tit, besides the well known 'saw' song there is a single, clear pipe, 'peet,' rather like a nut hatch's whistle, which is sometimes preceded by a guttural wooking. Early in June I once witnessed a curious performance on my bird table. Two great-tits were feeding there, when one of them, whom I took from her actions to be a female, began chattering like a hungry fledgling, and at the same time to flutter her wings. The other tit took no notice of her demonstration, but I have little doubt that this monologue had to do with courtship, though the date was rather late. I think the lady expected to be fed by her companion, but her hopes were unfulfilled.

The commonest note of the marsh-tit is one which sounds to me like 'tdrup', you hear it often while these birds are feeding, and it suggests that provender is plentiful and succulent. As to the rest of their conversation, it is difficult to say whether it is song or gossip. Probably the phrase which I render as 'ch-ch-

ch-ch-chae' is the song, for it more usually is heard in February or March. The cole-tit is not very loquacious. Except for his see-saw song, which is a faster and sharper form of the great-tit's, he seems to have little to say for himself. I know only one note of the bearded tit. (Why 'bearded' rather than 'whiskered'? We have a whiskered tern, and this quaint little bird's appendages recall those of the late lamented Dundreary.) It is a metallic 'ping,' such as comes from the clashing of fairy cymbals, and seems to denote excitement.

The waders are, as a family, very noisy. The redshank, in particular, seems to suffer from pernicious hysteria. So soon as your nose appears over the hedge or wall which forms your favourite concealment whence to spy out the visitors to marsh or sewage farm, he breaks out into paroxysms of fright, which as like as not put every other denizen of the feeding ground on the wing, perhaps to settle too far off for identification. But his exclamations are cheerful, and on that account may be pardoned. Redshanks never seem really at ease. Even when silent they are always bobbing their heads up and down in apprehension. Spotted redshanks, rare migrants from less inhabited countries than England, are often quite tame. I have watched one feeding at only a few yards distance. When it finally flew its call was 'cheeta-wéeta, chee-heet, chee-heet'. Most authorities ascribe to this bird a disyllabic or trisyllabic note which somewhat resembles my rendering. Probably my bird's volubility was due to unwonted alarm and excitement at being disturbed.

Greenshanks, when disturbed, rise with a shrill 'twee-rée,' but one, alarmed by the presence of a pair of sparrowhawks, circled at a great height calling loudly, a shrill piercing cry. The green sandpiper sometimes is mute when startled, its cry is more plaintive than the greenshank's.

The clamour of lapwings when their breeding grounds are invaded is so well known that it is unnecessary to describe it. The colloquies of these birds are heard at their best on a moonlit night in spring. Then from field or moor come, mingled with the lovely nuptial call, all manner of small sweet notes, now peevish, now plaintive, now anxious. An injured peewit which we confined in our garden for some months was always moved to soliloquise by a full moon. There is also a very beautiful low, sustained croon with which the female calls the male to her when she desires to mate.

Golden plovers' clear, piping calls I often hear in winter when they fly over my house at night. Heard thus they sound to me lonely; each traveller is anxious to keep in touch with his comrades. When I put them up on the moor the first call is a single alarm note, a very shrill 'ploee'; as they fly this becomes

'poo-ah,' the 'ah' being generally more so than the 'poo.' When they are at a safe distance this sound is followed by a quieter 'wee-wee.' Even more attractive is the gentle, whistling whistle which they utter when in flocks in March and April, a chorus almost as delightful as the 'charming' of a bevy of brown linnets and goldfinches. This must at this time be a prelude to love-making, but it sounds too intimate to be a song.

The cries uttered by a colony of breeding terns form a pleasant pandemonium. On your approach the air is filled with white wings which, silhouetted against blue sky, momentarily darken the sun's rays. If, as is often the case, the company consists of common and arctic terns, the protests are all very similar, 'ked-e-ah,' which sounds like, and is probably intended for, an imprecation, and 'kik,' which expresses alarm. Sandwich terns are larger birds, and their harsh 'kirk-ik' is more threatening. Perhaps, if you are lucky, you may distinguish the more guttural 'sarkh' of a pair of roseate terns among the universal commotion. Little terns have quieter voices, their alarm note is almost a squeak—'qweet.' But the most uncanny happening is the sudden and complete silence which at intervals replaces the deafening clamour. It is almost as embarrassing as the similar hiatus which often occurs in conversation at a human dinner-party. Whether it follows some unrecognised signal between the birds or is due to some telepathic sense of which we are ignorant I can only guess.

A reed bed is often chosen as a nesting place by swallows and starlings. At sundown on an evening in late summer you may see against a sky of lowering red the starlings fighting in myriad hordes. Their aerial evolutions are amazing. The flocks bunch together and thin out into line, prompted by some secret impulse. Time and again the swarm careers with a whiff of wings down over the reeds as though to settle, and then a moment after you see them a black mass silhouetted against the sunset. At length, as darkness gathers, they sweep to their roost, the reeds bend and quiver beneath their weight. And then begins a weird and wonderful chorus of bubbling, whistling, creaking and chipping until gradually it is stilled in sleep. I have heard the same chorus at dusk when these birds have gathered on the National Gallery; but it is more thrilling when heard in a reed bed or a thicket.

Swallows act differently. They sit and curvet in the air above the feathery reed heads, with quick, sharp cries; you can hear their bills snap as they capture their winged prey. But they dive into the green twilight of the reed bed in small parties or in twos and threes. There is a fluttering of pinions as they settle, and then follows that sleepy undertone of twittering which is so soft

and silence that you are left wondering whether it flows from the throats of birds or is born of the whisper of the wind amid the reed stems. As dusk deepens it declines to silence.

The nuthatch possesses, besides the sharp, trilling whistle which is its song, a variety of other ejaculations which proclaim its cheerful temperament. The most frequent of these is a cool, clear cry consisting of a single note repeated four or five times; it may be translated into human sound as 'cree, cree, cree, cree,' but to my ear 'tee' represents it more faithfully; there is something both guttural and liquid in it. It is uttered constantly, and in any attitude during the bird's arboreal gymnastics, for to a nuthatch it comes as easy to talk when hanging upside down as when upright. There is also a double call which Miss Turner has aptly rendered 'be quick' - to me it sounds like 'pipit'. This is said to be a mating signal, and it is certainly heard very often in the spring, but I have noticed it also in December when the wind was east and the air chilly with mist, conditions which would not seem to induce thoughts of love-making. And there is besides a staccato note, 'wet, wet, wet' which suggests hurry and hunger.

'Migrants,' as Dr. Eagle Clarke has written, 'have a travel-talk which is as yet an unknown tongue to most of us.' We hear the familiar whistle of curlew or titter of whimbrel as they pass over us in the darkness, and the typical calls of lapwing or golden plover are easy enough to distinguish in like circumstances. But every observer must only too often have heard cries which are strange to him in misty autumn or spring nights, and wondered what secrets of migratory movements his ignorance conceals from him. Probably there are on these occasions more birds in heaven than are dreamed of in our philosophy.

Considerations of space forbid my making more than a passing reference to the conversational powers of other families. The gulls and auks possess a wide range of vocal sounds. Watch the black-headed gulls being fed on the Round Pond in Kensington Gardens; you will hear at least three different notes, the harsh 'kra-a-a-a,' clamorous for food, a staccato 'chik-chik-chik' when they are squabbling for a tit-bit with a rival, and an angry, grating squeal like the creaking of an unoiled gate hinge. Visit their breeding places, and you will hear all these and many others combined in a clamorous confusion. Guillemots and razorbills on their cliff nesting ledges squeal and groan as though murder were on foot instead of courtship. Puffins express their disgust at your presence by an eloquent snort of contempt.

Of the notes of woodlarks I have written very fully in *The Love of Bird-Watching*. They are very talkative; the typical call-note 'too-loobie,' which sounds like a question, is almost invariably answered by 'wee-bu' - you hear this little dialogue

constantly when the birds are nesting; it may be interpreted as an anxious inquiry followed by a reassuring reply. When feeding together a pair keep up a low melodious twitter which is surely confidential conversation.

The interesting question arises whether the small talk of birds such as it is, is capable of gradual improvement—in fact, of evolving in the course of ages into speech and language. If birds trace their ancestry to the flying lizards, which seems to be generally admitted, then they must have enlarged their vocabulary enormously since the pterodactyl first grunted or squeaked. But has bird language—to give it that name for the moment—become stereotyped, or is it gradually gaining in scope and power of expression? Dean Inge says that the analogy of insect civilizations (such as those of termites, ants and bees) suggests that sooner or later our (i.e. the human) species will come to rest in a condition of stable equilibrium, though he admits that 'it is perhaps more likely that (our) social evolution will continue for an indefinite period. Do birds in respect of vocal power approximate more closely to the ants or to us?

I think it is impossible to answer the question. There is not enough material available. It is less than 200 years since Gilbert White began his pioneer observations on British bird life. The call-notes of even the commonest British species have still not been exhaustively examined or tabulated; in fact to translate them into written characters intelligible to others is so difficult as to be almost impossible—the cuckoo's call, the curlew's whistle, and such-like sounds can, of course, be reproduced vocally or in print but has anyone ever registered in symbols significant to a observers the divers calls of—for instance, the tits? You have only to consult half a dozen authorities to see what confusion results from the attempts of the several writers to note them down in words which convey meaning to anyone but themselves. Individuals not only interpret sounds diversely—they actually hear them differently, just as two persons seldom agree as to the exact shade of a particular colour. And vocal imitation of bird songs is, to me, at any rate, even more unsatisfactory. We have no syntax.

E. W. HENDY

WATERLOO BRIDGE

Whereas the said Bridge when completed will be a Work of great Stability and Magnificence and such Works are adapted to transmit to Posterity the Remembrance of great and glorious Achievements and whereas the said Company are desirous that a Designation shall be given to the said Bridge which shall be a lasting Record of the triumphant and decisive Victory achieved by His Majesty's Forces in comparison with those of His Allies, on the Eighteenth Day of June 1794 the thousand eight hundred and fifteen Be it therefore further enacted That from and after the passing of this Act the said Bridge shall be named and be denominated the *Waterloo Bridge*.

Act of 1816

The finest bridge in all the world

LORD RUSSELL, 1836

In Cunningham's Hall there is a model of the noblest bridge in the world, and it would be difficult to find a better.

W. R. LATHAM, 1918

I do not believe anywhere the sight of the beauty of Waterloo Bridge till before 1914. Very few people saw Waterloo Bridge because it is obstructed by the railway bridge at Charing Cross.

LORD PETER OF SUTHERLAND in House of Lords' debate, March 1, 1932

SUPPOSE that a would be benefactor of London offered to supply an addition to our public conveniences of one sort or another, in themselves desirable but so placed that they would be practically useless; our authorities would be unlikely one might think to accept the gift. Suppose, further, that the offer were coupled with the condition that a great and historic work of art, against which the donor had a prejudice should be destroyed, the nation would have a word to say. The offer, for example, might be of telephone boxes, to be grouped on Parliament Hill or in the middle of Hyde Park, and the work of art to be destroyed Turner's *Death of Nelson*, or Stevens's Wellington Monument, on the pretext that the donor felt 'cold' about those on æsthetic grounds, or as war memorials occupying useful space. There would be an instant revolt among all sensitive and educated people, and in the public generally at least an objection to interference with valuable national property, not to speak of derision over the 'facilities' offered. Parliament, even, might be moved to protest,

and might succeed in attracting the attention of those members of the Ministry who are trustees of the National Gallery.

When the national masterpiece is one of architecture no such sense of outrage can be reckoned on. If it were proposed to destroy Constable's picture, *The Opening of Waterloo Bridge* there would be a howl of execration, not from one or two newspapers, but from the whole Press, yet the bridge itself may disappear in an atmosphere of bored indifference. In this field the bribe of convenience is held to excuse any loss in beauty or history, and the form of convenience which for the present has a compelling power as of magical incantation is 'facility for traffic,' traffic at a railway-train speed and of an uncontrolled density that defeats itself. But if no challenge to this general idea is conceivable, there should at least be an obligation to inquire whether the particular 'facility' is really wanted, where it is wanted, and what width of road or bridge will meet immediate and prospective demands. All these questions are raised by the County Council's determination to replace the three line Waterloo Bridge with a six-line traffic structure and to these we shall return. But, first, at whatever risk of reiteration, let us try to measure the forfeit.

London has already devoured a terrible deal of its architectural past, and what survives of an older order and dignity in mansions, squares, and planted streets is being broken or abolished. Much of this is inevitable but not all and as against fragments here and there, unhappily islanded, there survives one connected and commanding group of monuments out of class in London. In the centre of our amorphous capital, rapidly being transformed into huge boxes of terra-concrete and the glass cages which, with singular confidence, the newspapers are beginning to adopt, this salvage remains from the age of noble and human building, forming as near a pictorial harmony as one can hope for in an accidental world. The mighty sweep of the Thames, viewed from Hungerford Bridge, on which, apparently, Lord Ponsonby has never stood, embraces St. Paul's, with some of its attendant City spires, and in middle distance Somerset House and the bridge, a triumph of adjustment. No great city can match this particular combination, in which three moments of architectural genius have found their account with the large natural curve of a tidal river.

The chief of these, and the focus of the picture, is St. Paul's. Christopher Wren's was the greatest creative force ever applied, in this country, to the arts of visible form—one of the greatest anywhere. Occupied, as he was, from boyhood with the geometries of the heavens, it was for him a lesser diversion of the constructive sense to turn suddenly to architecture; to improvise

a cathedral, and, as a byplay, to throw out designs for fifty churches and a palace here or there. If money and emergency had permitted, he would have replanned and rebuilt the whole City; but time and cost and English hugger-mugger prevailed against him. It prevailed also against another various but more impeded and dilatory genius, Alfred Stevens, when he plotted a radiation of roads and bridge at Charing Cross.

Our eighteenth century had no architectural creator of Wren's superlative rank, but the spirit of humane beauty and scale lived on in Sir William Chambers, and his Somerset House, rooted then in the river, supplied in the shapes and proportions of its front and the becoming modesty of its domelet, a worthy frontispiece to the prospect of the cathedral.

The early nineteenth century also, for a wonder, found its man. Like Wren a born and inventive constructor, he arrived, like Wren, at architecture by the way, and to so rare a degree that there has always been a whisper, Did some ghost, like Cockerell, come in to help him? There is no evidence to that effect; it seems to have been by unaided genius that Rennie, the Haddington engineer, contrived the geometrical division of nine arches, their grand elliptical space, and the strong downward Doric thrust at the piers of alignment, all in relation to his predecessors' work. Engineering and architecture were here at one. He built, as nearly as possible, for eternity, and it is no fault of his that the unforeseen scour set up by the Embankment has affected a part of his foundations. The aging of gravel was permitted to increase the mass but known to exist for forty years, but neglected by the guardians of the bridge. Finally Sir Joseph Bazalgette's embankment, based on Wren's intention and completed in 1870, did no disservice to its company, with its massive cyclopean forms and granite substance.

Such has been our good fortune; are we going to throw away that heritage? If the bridge goes, why not the rest? A larger cage for wills would be convenient in place of Somerset House, and St. Paul's, if not superseded by monster offices, bids fair to be overcrowded by them and wiped from the prospect. It is idle to argue that the new bridge, under the conditions laid down, can rival the old in beauty of form and fitness of scale. Sir Giles Scott, in other conditions, might be trusted to produce a worthy design; here, like Sir Edwin Lutyens at an earlier stage, he is called in to do the impossible, with five arches so flat that they must be in steel, to be covered by a pretence of stone.

Such is the case for preservation on the side of beauty and history. It is difficult to believe that in any other great capital it would be set aside; that in Rome or Paris means would not be found to preserve a monument of this majestic character.

French architects and American have already, to our shame, protested. In one of the younger capitals of Europe the question arose over a much less important case, the suspension bridge designed a hundred years ago by Rennie's assistant, Tiernay Clark. The bridge called for strengthening to meet a greater weight of traffic. This was done without material change in its appearance, because '*the citizens of Budapest have always regarded their bridge as far too important a feature of the landscape and of the city to allow of its destruction*'¹. But suppose that only in less enlightened foreign places can any respect be afforded for the achievements of British constructive genius, that traffic alone must decide whether they should survive or be abolished, is it not desirable to be at least so scrupulous as to examine the traffic argument on its merits? The Bridges Committee of the London County Council at an earlier stage of the discussion went further. They said in December 1923

If it had been possible to maintain by any means the existing structure we think the Council might still have been willing to sacrifice a valuable traffic improvement to the preservation of so beautiful and famous a bridge.

But that flicker went out—they have become. Mr Herbert Morrison tells us, 'could' about this beauty and fame. We have to deal with the traffic argument here and uncompromising and that is why, since 1924, we have said less about beauty.

Now in the smoke screen thrown up over this debate it is urged that 'traffic experts' are in favour of the County Council's scheme, as against a body of ignorant architects and other artists or amateurs with unpractical artistic tastes. The truth is heavily against this claim. Who are these mysterious but authoritative experts? The London County Council is in very limited degree concerned with traffic. It divides the building and care of London bridges with the City Corporation, but the 'highways' belong to local authorities. Of these, great and small, there are no less than 170 who nibble at the general problem. The Ministry of Transport is concerned with arterial roads throughout the country, and a consultative committee was formed in 1924 from representatives of the various interests, but central and general authority for cross-river traffic, its bridges, outlets and connexions, such as has been called for since 1835, there is none. If it existed we should expect to find a far-sighted general plan for the future of London traffic, into which a Waterloo Bridge solution would fit. Planning in that sense was undertaken for Washington of old, and resumed more lately; it has been undertaken, none too soon, on a gigantic scale, for New York. In London huffer-mugger and hand-to-mouth solutions

¹ See *Spectator* of March 26.

still rule, as in the days of Wren, and the Ministry of our day accepts without protest the scheme of the Council, throwing the responsibility on them as the *bridges* authority. Small wonder that the Council follows suit, and thinks of a bridge, and no further. The 'experts' are dumb on the disposal of traffic beyond the river.

In the absence of central direction and planning from the governing bodies of London and the nation there do exist two associations concerned with the general lay-out of our streets and bridges and associated problems. These are the Town Planning Institute and the London Society. Both of these bodies were represented on the 'Conference of Societies urging the Preservation of Waterloo Bridge' which protested against the County Council's scheme. Indeed, it may be said that outside of the Council that scheme has no friends among those qualified to speak.

All this being so, the ordinary citizen may be pardoned if he applies in this region reserved for non-existent or non-functioning authorities such light as common sense supplies. Such an inquirer will discover, in the first place, that up to the time when the weakness of certain piers declared itself there had been no complaints about the sufficiency of the bridge. It was doing its work satisfactorily, with a margin to spare, subject only to the block at the Strand crossing which choked the issue and prevented the traffic from clearing away. For this and other reasons cross-river traffic showed a tendency to avoid Waterloo Bridge and go westward, in spite of the absence of a bridge at the natural crossing place, Charing Cross. The case put forward on behalf of the Council before the Royal Commission for congestion on the bridge was subjected to very damaging criticism in a memorandum by Mr. J. S. Wilson, the eminent engineer. He demonstrated:

1. That the statistics on which the growth of traffic across Waterloo Bridge (stated to be 13.5 per cent. since 1914) is based are such that no appreciable increase in the number of vehicles can be proved by them.

2. That the traffic at present carried, said to represent the 'saturation point' beyond which an increase cannot be made, really represents a moderate use of the capacity of the bridge.

3. That, there being no appreciable change in the traffic, provision of any alternative cross-river communication would tend to reduce the traffic over Waterloo Bridge to a lower figure.

Mr. Wilson further argued, as I had done in a letter to *The Times*, that if four instead of the existing three lines were desired, they could be obtained by widening the wheel-way at the expense of the footways, without other change.

There is another consideration which appeals to common

sense, but not to the *expertise* of our rulers. Suppose that in the approaches to a bridge ample six-line trafficways exist, what is the equivalent required on the bridge itself? Evidently, at the outside, not more than four. On a street two lines are impeded by stoppages in front of shops and houses; on a bridge there are no such obstructions. On a street, moreover, turnings to right and left set up the obstruction of cross-traffic and reduce its rate of progress; on a bridge there is no such check to the flow. And Dr. Raymond Unwin, our chief expert in town-planning, has laid it down that a four-way bridge is equivalent to an *eight-way* street, and would more than suffice for what the future will require of Waterloo Bridge.

That bridge, then, already sufficient for the work demanded of it, will be widened, if the Council has its way, to a superfluous and extravagant extent. And if it did attract a volume of traffic equal to its new capacity, this mass discharged into the Strand, would completely block a thoroughfare already over-strained.

How did so preposterous a scheme come to be adopted? Originally it arose from the desire of a party in the Council to extend the tramway system over a bridge at this point, and somehow link it up with the over river system. The tramway system is obsolescent, a danger and a nuisance in our thoroughfares, and a heavy burden on the rates. Its advantage is that it furnishes cheap transport for working men which might be more elastically provided. But how was the linking up to be effected? In the original scheme by a subway tunnelling under the Strand. This has been rendered nebulous by practical difficulties, but the ghost of it still rules the policy of the Council. There have been disclaimers of any intention to carry out a truncated scheme, but it is not clear that if the six line bridge were constructed it would not be revived to the extent of bringing trams across the river. To do this would sterilise two of the six lines for other traffic, reducing the bridge's general capacity to four.

Such appears to have been the origin of the scheme, but whatever the motives, first and last, which have influenced the Council's decisions, we have been faced with the determination of two very tenacious and influential men among the leaders of that body, Sir Percy Simmons and Mr Herbert Morrison. If Waterloo Bridge is destroyed we shall owe it to a fixed idea, impervious to argument, and only hardened, after deflection, by the passage of time.

That deflection took place when the twelfth hour might be said to have struck. The Bridges Conference had vainly argued that Charing Cross was the right place for a new wide bridge. Waterloo Bridge the wrong one; the advocates of the wrong site had pressed their scheme to the point of a vote by the House of

Commons in their favour sanctioning a money loan. The battle seemed to be lost, but a national protest, signed by Mr Ramsay MacDonald, Lord Oxford and Asquith, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. John Burns, Sir John Simon, Commander Hilton Young, and other statesmen, as well as leading people in every line of life, induced the Government to reverse that decision, till the whole problem of London traffic over bridges had been examined.

Then followed the appointment and sittings of the Royal Commission. In Lord Lee of Fareham it had a chairman of remarkable driving and directing power, under pressure from both Council and Government it reported in record time. With longer deliberation some of its decisions might have been modified, but the general result was clear and abundantly justified by evidence—namely, that there was no case for the demolition of Waterloo Bridge, but a pressing necessity for constructing a new one at Charing Cross. That conclusion was reaffirmed five years later by the Consultative Committee appointed by the Council itself.

Such were the main decisions. On two subsidiary points the Commission arrived at a compromise. The first of these had to do with the method to be adopted for strengthening Waterloo Bridge. The advisers of the Council argued that it would have to be taken down and rebuilt. On the other side five leading engineers, supported by fourteen others, had reported to the Bridges Conference in favour of underpinning the weakened piers. In particular Mr Dalrymple Hay, relying on his experience of under-water methods by compressed air, carried out for years with safety, put forward a scheme for underpinning by shafts sunk through the piers, thus avoiding obstruction of traffic, not only above but also below, by avoiding the necessity for cofferdams in the stream. For this much less costly scheme responsible contractors had furnished an estimate. Now the Bridges Committee of the Council, in its more reasonable days, had moved for a 'technical commission' to be set up by the Government to inquire whether underpinning could be safely undertaken and in what way. The Royal Commission was not 'technical,' and therefore was timid in recommending a method which seemed to them over-daring. They brought in as a kind of arbitrator Sir Alexander Gibb, who has been responsible for an immense amount of work all over the world, but, in the words of an excellent article in the April number of the *Architectural Review*, this was 'like selecting an eminent ear specialist to perform an operation on the kidneys.' His half-and-half recommendations, adopted by the Commission, increased greatly the necessary cost of the operation, and to that extent prejudice the present debate.

The second compromise was to increase the roadway of the

bridge by corbelling-out over the arches and between the pier projections. This would give a four-line instead of a three-line course for traffic ; and that, as we have seen, is ample for present and future. Admirers of Rennie's design cannot contemplate any modification without great reluctance—a second bridge at the Temple would be the better solution ; but if that is ruled out, and we must pay some price to the supposed needs of traffic, an alteration in detail must be carefully weighed against complete loss. It so happens that these modifications can be very exactly realised by going no further than London Bridge. That bridge, a good but less notable work carried out by Rennie's sons, has been treated after the manner proposed, and except in very close and sharp perspective the overhang is barely perceptible. Moreover, the bold projections of Waterloo Bridge over the piers give it a great advantage—the parapets would not be brought flush with those advances, the projections would still tell, and in a broadside view there would be little effect upon the design as a whole and none in its main features.

It is now between five and six years since the Commission's Report was issued. If the condition of Waterloo Bridge had really been so precarious as the Council had urged, it was their obvious duty to take steps at once for its restoration. Nothing of the sort was done. But the Government accepted in principle the Charing Cross project and made itself jointly responsible for it with the County Council in negotiation with the railway company, which would be affected by any dealing with their own Hungerford Bridge and station. Into the confused history of the plans and negotiations that followed I will not here enter, all the more that they were summarised and illustrated in Mr A. D. R. Caroe's article contributed to this Review.¹

It may be frankly admitted that some, if not all, of this time and discussion was necessary to clarify the subject. Questions of high-level or low-level, double-decker road-and-railway bridge with station on the near side, or road bridge only with station on the far side, had to be fought out. In justice to the Council it must be acknowledged that the scheme improvised by the Commission was unsatisfactory, and equally so the successive official schemes. The last of these was defeated in Committee of the House of Commons because of hopelessly bad planning on the further bank, where the future of a central quarter of London was condemned to lasting squalor, the consultative committee,

¹ 'Charing Cross Bridge—a Time for Reflection,' February 1932, p. 204. Mr W. D. Caroe, the father of the writer of the article, along with his architectural colleague Mr D. B. Niven, the well-known engineer Mr William Muschend, and others, was responsible for a very attractive and symmetrical scheme, involving a station on the far side and a plan for the lay-out of the Lambeth quarter.

which attempted to patch that scheme, was not successful; the Government subsidy was withdrawn, and in the financial crisis which supervened the whole project was for the present dropped. Unfortunately, the most feasible and economical alternative did not get a hearing. Sir Reginald Blenheim had consistently argued for a bridge independent of the railway and leaving Hungerford Bridge and the station for the present untouched; but his suspension bridge would have introduced a discordant note, however good in itself. He was ready, however, to waive this in favour of a scheme whose details were worked out by the genius of Mr. Dalrymple Hay. This was for a permanent road bridge in the place proposed for a temporary one in the official project, close to Hungerford Bridge. That bridge and the station would be left as they are, until such time as the railway finds it necessary to replace the former. When that time comes the proper course will be to put an electrically-run railway under water, served by an underground station on the present site. The convenience of passengers would be served, out of the contending triangle of forces (Council, Government, railway company) the last would be eliminated, and with it the greater part of the huge estimate of £15,000,000 for demolition, reconstruction and compensation. On the ingenious device by which Mr. Hay would have constructed his foundations with no river obstruction I will not here delay. Enough that a six-line bridge could be put up for a little over £2,000,000, including approach work and other contingencies.

Let there be no mistake about the urgent necessity of such a bridge, whatever for the moment may be our difficulties. In view of that necessity, the action of the County Council in reviving the scare about the stability of Waterloo Bridge and the scheme for demolishing and replacing it is a wanton extravagance, an expenditure of money badly wanted for the suspended project. In this extravagance the Ministry of Transport has made itself a partner, transferring to the discredited scheme the subsidy promised for Charing Cross, diminished by 15 per cent. Since the money comes out of the Road Fund and the Council has a considerable sum in hand, the Money Bill required may the more easily slip through the House of Commons. We are back again at the twelfth hour.

The protest of June 1926 has been repeated in a letter addressed to one of its signatories, the present Prime Minister, and published in *The Times*. How immensely the list of representative names might be increased is illustrated by the separate list of over 250 signatures, obtained without personal canvass in a day or two, from leading members of Cambridge University. If such indications of deep and widespread feeling are to be ignored, there

remains a potent argument—namely, the ludicrously insufficient estimate put forward by the County Council for the operations involved. If, as an examination by independent engineering experts goes to show, this estimate may be exceeded by £750,000, the Government, pledged to find more than half the total on the vague calculation submitted to them, may be induced to withdraw from an acquiescence which seems to arise rather from an impatient tedium than from any process of reason. Lord Plymouth, indeed, speaking for the Government in the House of Lords debate initiated by Lord Charnwood, said that 'if there were any considerable variation in the estimate of £1,300,000, that would give rise to a new situation and the Government would have to reconsider its decision.

The arguments for a stay of execution and a very different handling of the whole problem have been convincingly and clearly stated by Lord Mayo in a letter to *The Times* of April 9. The writer is himself an eminent engineer with experience of large undertakings like the Forth Bridge and Manchester Ship Canal. He cannot, therefore, be put aside as mere artist or amateur, and he supports the plan which I put forward in *The Times* of May 15, 1931, for a road bridge at Charing Cross, as worked out by Mr Dalrymple Hay, leaving the railway question in abeyance. But along with this he sets out a balance sheet with on one side the probable cost of the County Council's ineffective scheme, and on the other that of such a road bridge combined with a reconstructed Waterloo Bridge. He reckons that for an additional £700,000 we should have not one wrong bridge, but two right ones. It is bad economy of years not less than money, as well as bad traffic-planning and Philistine destructiveness, to persist in the present scheme. Throughout a sorry history there has been an absence of first-rate directing intelligence, a persistence in second-rate obstinacy. For the order, which should have been traffic-study, large scale architectural planning, engineering construction with architectural design, has been substituted engineering makeshift with architectural titivation to follow.

At Oxford there is a Tolly bridge. If the County Council has its way that title will supersede the historic 'Waterloo' with the names of its sponsors attached. Is it too late to appeal to Government and Council both to avoid that fate, at whatever sacrifice of present *amours propres*?

* As this article goes to press it is announced that the County Council is recommended to prejudice what two Governments have declared to be a matter of 'national urgency' the provision of a Charing Cross Bridge, by permitting building development on the areas reserved either side of the river.

WALTER PATER

A REVELATION

MORE than a generation has passed since Pater's death in 1894. A widely-read author he never was and can never be; nevertheless, it is not easy to say why there are no signs of a revival of interest in him as a writer or as a man. A study of his writings begets a curiosity about the writer which his biographers do not satisfy. The late Master of Magdalene undertook him, with great conscientiousness, for the *English Men of Letters* series. Mr. A. C. Benson certainly had one attribute in common with his subject: they were both dons. But whereas Pater was a don accidentally, Mr. Benson was one essentially, and was otherwise disqualified for appreciating and portraying what was most distinctive in Pater. Of another biography, furnished forth in two volumes and with a large array of wonderfully irrelevant illustrations, the less said the better. For sheer silliness it stands unmatched.

It is unfortunate, and rather surprising, that we have no full-length portrait of him from someone who knew him well, even though there would have been little external incident for a biographer to record. Pater led the quietest of lives, alternating between his rooms in Brasenose and a house, mostly in Oxford but for a time in London, which he shared with his two sisters. There was, from all accounts, nothing in the house or in its occupant to recall *The Renaissance*. However much of himself Pater may have chosen to disclose to his few intimates, ordinary acquaintances were chiefly struck by the timed precision of his manners, the correctness of his attire, and the bland persistence with which he talked of the weather. He thus concealed an inner life which was, to say the least of it, highly unusual, under a mask of the strictest conventionality. It was out of such surroundings, in the ordinary quality of which he patiently acquiesced, that he escaped into 'strange reverses and exquisite passions'; art for him seems to have been a veritable 'mode of escape'. In Oxford he was imperfectly appreciated. He had nothing to say to the undergraduates, and they were in the same

predicament as regards him ; since his personal appearance was unprepossessing, they called him ' Judas.' The authorities suspected his writings, and seem mildly to have suspected his character ; the blameless rectitude of his private life, the exacting quality of his artistic conscience, did not serve to dissociate him from the ' æsthètes.' But, in truth, Pater had about as little essential connexion with Oscar Wilde, of whom he disapproved, as he had with the Oxford of his own day.

An exceedingly interesting vignette of Pater made its appearance some years ago in the form of a review of Mr. Benson's book by Mr. Frank Harris, who revealed the implications of Mr. Rothenstein's portrait of Pater as seen through a temperament widely removed from his own—the mysterious mask-like face, the thick moustache suggesting the heavy lips underneath, the dome-like forehead—the grey-green lifeless compelling eyes, with their occasional naked stare, the strong restraining jaw. The dominant impression is that of self-restraint ; and this, Mr. Harris considers, was due to physical causes. Pater's circulation was languid and he died of heart failure at fifty-five after the most careful of lives—had he had a more generous allowance of blood, he might have been—anything. ' He seemed at times half to realise his own deficiency.' " Had I So and so's courage and hardihood," he cried once, " I'd have ——" Suddenly the mood changed, the light in the eyes died out, the head drooped forward again, and with a half smile he added, " I might have been a criminal—be he " and he moved with little careful steps across the room to his chair and sat down.

One remarkable thing about Pater is the unusually early age at which—for a prose writer—he attained maturity. His essay on *Leonardo da Vinci*—which many critics hold to be his masterpiece—is dated 1869, when he was thirty, and several other of his most characteristic essays had already been written. The epilogue to *The Renaissance* is already implicit in the strange character-study called *Diaphanité* written when he was twenty-five, and the fruit, no doubt, of much undergraduate musing. The style is compressed and rather difficult. Pater was not yet quite at home with the instrument which he was to master so quickly, but the purport is not obscure. *Diaphanité* is a character of blended unworldliness and receptivity, which the world mistakenly calls indifferentist. It has no desire to influence the world, but rather to understand and value its experiences ; it feels the attraction of various modes of the higher life, but preserves its inner detachment and will surrender itself absolutely to none ; it expresses itself especially in the domains of intellect and culture, in its beautiful manner of handling everything that appeals to the senses and the intellect.

To this ideal of his youth Pater remained absolutely faithful. There cannot be many instances of so early a self-dedication, so consistent a devotion, to so peculiar a form of the contemplative life. He was, as his writings show, far from indifferent to religion and philosophy—from one point of view. Otherwise, his attitude to religion (as the term is generally understood), to philosophy (as implying the possibility of attaining to objective truth), was one of radical scepticism. 'The service of philosophy, of speculative culture,' he says in *The Renaissance*, 'towards the human spirit is to rouse, to startle it into sharp and eager observation. Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face, some tone on the hills or the sea is clearer than the rest.' From art itself, unlike some other of his eminent contemporaries, he resolutely excluded any ethical or social implications, such things meant nothing whatever to him. No other interest was allowed to divert him from his chosen and solitary path of pure æsthetic appreciation. It would be the interest misunderstanding to suppose that it was a primitive-path of passive and voluptuous sensation, or that it did not require the exercise of a close intellectual application and an exacting artistic conscience. He pursued it, indeed, with the highest sense of vocation, a sense more usually found associated with the religious life.

He has expounded the method of 'æsthetic criticism' in the preface to *The Renaissance*. There are three stages in the process: 'to see the object distinctly; to make clear to yourself the degree and the quality of the pleasure which it gives you; and, when this pleasure-giving quality or 'virtue' has been disengaged, to express it for the benefit of others.' To this end he was endowed with a sensuous organization of the greatest delicacy, including a special susceptibility to visual impressions. But—and herein lies his distinction—the sensuousness of his temperament was controlled by an intellect of the strictest integrity, an intellect which demanded the keenest analysis of the elements which contributed to each mode of æsthetic pleasure. And, though he does not seem to have been a learned man in the technical sense, he had a scholarly conscience which required that his expression of such artistic masterpieces as attracted him should rest upon a firm basis of fact. He seldom lets himself go; it would be against his principles. He feels the thrill in the presence of beauty, but must ask himself all the time, 'How is my nature modified by its presence?' His emotion must be restrained, tested, approved, accounted for to himself and, in his capacity as critic, to others. His intellect congeals the warm sensuous jet of feeling, and fixes it in definite form.

Insist though he may on the need for dry light and transparent receptivity in 'æsthetic criticism,' he can no more help

seeing things through his own mind than any other critic. And Pater's mind was a highly individual one, and his temperament, though not vigorous, by no means colourless. This lack of robustness was no doubt part of the price he had to pay for the exquisite fineness of his perceptions, but it issues occasionally in a sickliness of sentiment which repels us. It shows itself also in the marked eclecticism of his taste; though this was indeed also a deliberately adopted attitude, a necessary consequence of his lifelong quest for beauty wherever he could find it. He ranges from Ancient through Mediæval to Renaissance art, appreciating and expressing the peculiar virtues of each, and occasionally devising imaginary combinations of their several qualities. His character studies, again, are of an abnormally introspective type, with none of the broader attributes of humanity; Marius the Epicurean is an eclectic being, standing at the meeting-point of two different cultures 'perplexed' between two worlds. And there is much in Pater himself to suggest a nature divided against itself, as well as out of harmony with its surroundings. There appears to have been something in him that was at war with the 'serenity' and 'equilibrium' of 'perfect culture.' His imagination wanders occasionally into strange and exotic bypaths; in strong contrast to the cool grey tones, the tranquil movement, of the bulk of his writings, we find a few pieces of a bizarre colour and a hectic, if suppressed, excitement. The early essay on *Æsthetic Poetry*, which he allowed to appear only in the first edition of *Appreciations*, is resplendent of 'scarlet robes,' 'the sorcerer's moon,' and 'frail androgynous beings'; the later *Demys L'Auvergne* and *Apollin in Picardy* both contain a strong element of the *macabre*. It is accordingly not surprising that he was taken for their prophet by the 'libes and languor' school, who seized upon what they could caricature in him, and no more. No book has more powerfully affected the course of English criticism than *The Renaissance*. Otherwise, he cannot be said to typify any particular tendency of the Victorian era. He simply stood outside it.

He has attempted, in *Marius the Epicurean* and elsewhere, to apply his philosophy to regions beyond art and literature—to the conduct of life itself; the hero was intended by his creator at any rate to represent *Diaphanéité* in action. *Marius* certainly shows that Pater could obtain a genuine æsthetic satisfaction from the contemplation of character and motive. But it would be unreasonable to consider *The New Cyrenaicism* as though it could provide a creed for any but the very few. It evidently excludes too much of human life and hope. The point rather is, how little Pater had to exclude from his own particular point of view. Religion, philosophy—he studied them for his own pur-

pose, and valued in so far as they could provide him with the same species of æsthetic satisfaction as he could derive from a work of art. The sensuous embodiment of religion—religion as ritual—attracts him enormously. It is instructive to contrast his description of Marius's first attendance at the Eucharist with Newman's description, at the end of *Loss and Gain*, of the convert's first attendance at Mass; it is a world-wide difference. A philosophical system could be 'musical' to him. He wrote on Plato with an intense appreciation of the beauties, if not of the problems, of Platonism; the most characteristic part of the book is the description of the military monasticism of Lacedæmon. And, when he comes to subjects which are more directly susceptible of æsthetic treatment, his range is extraordinarily wide—Greek sculpture, Renaissance painting, writers such as Wordsworth, Lamb and Prosper Mérimée. These exceedingly diverse subjects are submitted to the threefold process above described, the quality of the satisfaction which they afford him is delicately translated into language. In his few literary essays he shows himself the greatest critic in this mode since Coleridge; his masterpiece is his appreciation of Lamb. There were some affinities of taste, though assuredly not of disposition, between the two men. Both had a contemplative nature and an eye for subtleties, an affection for old buildings, books and pictures, and a patient care for words and style.

Art moved Pater more deeply than literature, and his fine-art pieces are less objective, more coloured by his own personality. He takes toll of all the resources of words in conveying the precise æsthetic effect which the subjects of his choice exert upon him, in registering the finest shades of impression and sentiment, in threading the borderland region which lies between images and thoughts. It is herein that he has most notably enriched English prose. A striking instance is afforded by the passage on Michelangelo's tombs in the sarcophy of San Lorenzo, in which he contrasts Michelangelo's doubting attitude towards death with Dante's firm assurance.

And of all that range of sentiment he is the poet, a poet still alive, and in possession of our innermost thoughts. Lamb inquires over the relapse after death into the formlessness which preceded life, the change the result from that change, then the correcting, hallowing, consuming rush of pity, at last far off, thin and vague, yet not more vague than the most definite thoughts men have had through three centuries on a matter that has been so near their hearts, the new birth, a passing light, a more intangible, external effect, over those too rigid or too formless faces, a foam that lingers a moment, vibrating in the dawn incomplete aimless helplessness, a thing with faint hearing faint memory faint power of touch, a breath, a flame in the doorway, a feather in the wind.

While he abounds in the suggestiveness of a brooding imagina-

tion and a rich culture, he only occasionally surrendered himself to the full tide of ideas and imagery which a touch of his stirs in him, as in the famous instance of the *Stone Lion*. The subtle evidence have the quality of an incantation, and the whole passage induces the effect of a dream. The thing is, indeed, a dream in the literal sense; it is only in a dream that contradictions can happen, and the same person typify both the mother of Holofernes and the mother of Mary.

In another class of his works, the *Imaginary Portraits*, he frees himself altogether from the limitations of a prescribed subject-matter. He allows his ideas to crystallise freely round an imaginary person, or follows a train of reverie prompted by some object, often a work of art, which he has encountered in the course of his annual pilgrimage to France or Italy. The most elaborate of these imaginary portraits is, of course, that of Marius the Epicurean; the more attractive Gaston de Latour is only a fragment, though none the worse for that. Marius, unfortunately, does not fully repay the three or four years of labour that were expended on him. If we may employ a comparison which would have jarred its author painfully, he resembles the famous horse, who had every possible good point, and only one defect—he was dead. Pater had no genius for creating character or conducting a narrative, even when he has to describe movement he contrives to render it static; we are not very interested in the story of Marius's sensations and ideas, because we are not very interested in Marius. His spiritual journey from Epicureanism through various stages up to the threshold of Christianity is embodied in a series of tableaux. Marius in his youthful home—and a beautiful picture it is of the old Roman religion of the homestead. Marius at the temple of Aesculapius. Marius journeying to Rome. Marius's sensation on the death of his friend Flavian. Marius at the banquet with the pagan Apuleius. his introduction to the Christian household of Cornelia. his subsequent heroism and death as *anima naturaliter Christiana*. The exhibits are perfect in themselves, and carefully arranged for our contemplation; the gallery is thickly carpeted and rather close; our conductor has an air of hushed solemnity—we suddenly feel stifled, and make a dash for the open air.

But his shorter studies are another matter; he can hold us there. It is worth remarking that he himself considered *Imaginary Portraits* to be 'his best because his most natural work'. He has a wonderful command of atmosphere—as in the idyllic beauty of *The Child in the House*, the eerie twilight of *Apollo in Picardy*, and the riotous colour of *Duys L'Anzérois*. The last two, though in different volumes, are companion pieces, and deal with a subject that always attracted Pater's eclectic mind, the re-

appearance of a pagan god in the Middle Ages. His imagination is really living itself up in these pieces; of the two, *Damys* is the more striking, and is indeed Pater's masterpiece as a prose artist. A few notes of travel in the Yonne valley (it is interesting to note that an ecclesiastic judge considered Auxerre to be the most beautiful town in France), the discovery in an old curiosity shop of a piece of stained glass with a strange figure in it, form the matter-of-fact foundations of an astonishing fantasy on the theme of the reincarnation of Dionysus in mediæval Auxerre. *Damys's* first appearance in the cathedral on Easter day; the Bacchic frenzy into which he throws the populace, the alternations in his fortunes and those of the city, the contradictions of his character, combining gentleness and cruelty, courage and fear in the manner of the legendary Dionysus, his entry into a monastery; his terrible end at the hands of an angry mob—the effect of the whole is heightened by artful contrasts of scene, and strengthened by intervals of quiet narrative and careful historical reconstruction. One particularly striking vignette is that of the exhumation of the body of a saint from the cathedral.

The placement of the chest removed amid a surging sea of lugubrious chants and persons fasting, discovered as if it had been a battlefield of mouldering human remains. There follows the placing alone the plentiful candles of incense, such as was used in the king's private chapel. The seat is for the Saint himself continued in vain all day and far into the night. At last from a little narrow chest, into which the remains had been almost crushed together, the bishop's religious hands drew the beautiful body shrouded in venerable, but still with every feature of the face the same in a soft, red, or ray of ghastly dawn.

His own essay on *Style* must be nearly the last word that can be said on that subject. He lays down that whatever incidental virtues style may have its cardinal virtue must be that of expressiveness, of a strict adaptation to its subject-matter. From this point of view, he holds Scott's facility and Flaubert's intense carefulness are equally good art. It is sound doctrine. Pater's style is certainly expressive of himself, of the refinement of his intuitions, the richness of much of his subject-matter, and the rigorous demands of his artistic conscience. It has been called 'voluptuous' and even 'sugared', but it is neither, at least in essential texture. It is far too much of a hard intellectual creation, and recalls rather the craft of the worker in gems. Such calculated art, such 'deeply pondered evocation' of every word, every phrase, every paragraph, could only have been achieved at a price. It is not surprising that in a literary life of thirty years, he produced so little, or that each essay, as it was written, seemed to himself to be in a special sense a triumph over refractory material. He himself wanted English to be written more as a

'learned' language; Mr. Max Beerbohm wittily applied 'learned' to 'dead' and applied it to Pater himself. It is true enough, for an epigram. His prose has indeed none of the virtues of spontaneity; the garment fits so closely as to preclude ease of movement; and emotion seldom quickens it to a natural rhythm. Rhythmic quality it certainly has, and of a subtle kind; each paragraph is a rhythmic unity, and—since an emphatic ending would savour of rhetoric and is to be avoided—dies away on a musical cadence. In his paragraph-structure he is as careful in appealing to the eye as to the ear: the sentences on cardboard and the trial proofs in which he worked were directed to this end; each paragraph is accordingly a pattern as well as a harmony. No English writer has at any rate surpassed Pater in conscious prose artistry.

The result has won universal commendation, but it is cold commendation. We admire Pater's style immensely, but we do not quite like it. This faint dislike may be partly of the same sort as we always experience when we see a familiar thing put to unnatural uses—poetry, we feel, should never altogether forget its prosaic origin. But there is more in our feeling than this. Sir Thomas Browne, Sterne and Lamb were, perhaps, as deliberate artists in prose as Pater, and we take them to our hearts. It is rather that, after all, *le style est l'homme même*. Pater has no humanity; we cannot warm to him. But his *luna labor* has its reward. He has won a double immortality: as a critic where criticism is often creative, and as a writer who has revealed new capacities of subtlety and suggestiveness in English prose. And so we may picture him in the Elysian Fields, shrinking perhaps from the vulgar robustness of some of their inhabitants, but consoled by visions of a rarer beauty than were ever vouchsafed him on earth.

BERTRAM NEWMAN

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C. 2

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

CITY OF ENCOUNTERS

"A London Divertissement" by the author

What is your attitude towards the City of London? Is it the seat of power and wealth, or is it a city of encounters? The City of London is a city of encounters. It is a city where the rich and the poor meet, where the powerful and the powerless meet, where the good and the bad meet. It is a city where the world is made, where the world is won, where the world is lost. It is a city where the future is born, where the future is made, where the future is won. It is a city where the world is made, where the world is won, where the world is lost. It is a city where the future is born, where the future is made, where the future is won.

The Equitable Life Assurance Society

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*



No. DCLXIV — JUNE 1952

OTTAWA AND BRITISH FOREIGN TRADE

With the approach of the Ottawa Conference, and the full knowledge that, as soon as it is over, foreign Governments will be tripping over one another in eagerness to obtain the most favourable terms possible for trade with this country, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of appreciating the issues at stake in their true perspective, and of gauging accurately the most advantageous relationship in commerce between Britain's kinsmen of the Dominions and Colonies and her friends of long standing overseas. While Ottawa is full of far reaching possibilities and hopes for the future, it is not without a host of dangerous pitfalls, and this great British Imperial gathering can only be turned to the best account if the questions at issue are, after thorough preparation, dealt with on the broadest possible basis, and realities, pleasant and unpleasant, are taken fully into account. Although the primary object of the Conference is to find some means of securing effective economic co-operation between the component parts of the British Commonwealth, for the individual benefit of each and the common benefit of all, it would be a grave mistake to under-

estimate the powerful influence on world trade generally of revival of prosperity in a group of nations comprising a quarter of the whole population of the world ; or, conversely, to lose sight of the serious reaction on an economic situation, serious enough already, of a failure to find a satisfactory basis for British Imperial development. But not only in this light is it necessary to view Ottawa in its relation to nations with which we trade outside the British Commonwealth ; for, whatever arrangements may be reached with the Dominions for reciprocal preferences, co-operation, rationalisation, and other methods of turning to the best account within the Empire the maximum of our Imperial resources, the fact remains that it would only be with the greatest difficulty involving high prices and other serious material disadvantage that the ideal of a self-contained economic unit could be realised. There are those who so manipulate the Press as to produce attractive-looking pictures of a British Imperial Utopia, which they have designed for the gratification of their readers and the benefit of their circulations, but the trumpeting of newspaper-mongers will neither bamboozle the British Government nor the people of this country into the belief that England can afford to ignore her foreign trade, or that by so doing they would be furthering British economic interests. The tables overleaf show our trade relationship with foreign European countries, foreign non-European countries, and British countries respectively, and from them it is clear that, in present circumstances, much less than one-third of our imports come from within the Empire, while less than half our exports go to Empire countries.¹

Although, with a view to the future, our trade within the Empire is of primary importance to us, we cannot depend entirely on Empire products, many of which come thousands of miles across the sea, and as Dominion industries develop, these markets will undergo considerable change not necessarily to our advantage. We must, therefore, supplement our Empire imports by certain foreign imports, and extend our foreign export markets giving preferential terms on a reciprocal basis to those with whom it is in our interests to improve our trading relations, and the Dominions must be in a position to do likewise. We cannot afford to ignore foreign markets such as Argentina, with her vast British capital investments, whose best customers we are--or Scandinavia, which, as the result of recent developments, may easily become a very profitable economic *Nice* for our export trade.

In this article I propose, therefore, to take these two examples of the importance of our foreign trade, and endeavour to show the necessity of fitting them into our overseas trade system on

¹ The figures are taken from the *Economist*.

TRADE WITH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
(000's omitted)

	Imports from				British Exports to			
	1921	1922	1923	1924	1921	1922	1923	1924
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Rumania	40,471	20,487	34,435	31,179	16,103	3,743	6,772	7,181
Finland	-	14,945	12,634	11,627	-	3,393	2,415	1,608
Estonia	-	8,497	1,962	1,418	-	474	588	215
Latvia	-	5,402	4,745	2,532	-	1,496	1,152	991
Sweden	14,413	13,729	24,571	17,347	6,320	10,546	10,068	7,744
Norway	7,417	14,149	11,127	6,745	6,147	4,848	12,031	7,539
Denmark	24,053	57,111	54,113	46,715	7,163	12,679	10,266	8,638
Poland	-	6,928	7,942	8,723	-	4,574	3,594	2,801
Germany	37,926	64,814	63,422	54,137	41,307	37,077	26,809	18,473
Netherlands*	27,413	60,391	42,473	43,349	22,594	11,344	25,651	17,309
Belgium*	13,427	40,227	52,317	53,441	12,525	21,173	15,603	10,464
France*	27,426	61,474	54,747	44,231	12,307	15,754	15,728	26,843
Switzerland	11,170	13,741	12,741	12,575	4,722	1,424	5,187	4,143
Portugal*	3,805	5,829	4,720	4,164	7,155	2,145	7,481	3,690
Spain*	15,476	12,273	16,421	11,941	5,712	14,813	11,810	6,542
Italy*	4,131	10,877	12,166	14,755	14,142	17,123	13,117	9,976
Austria	-	12,742	1,547	2,701	-	2,122	2,040	1,318
Hungary	-	1,240	1,107	1,551	-	1,046	739	514
Czechoslovakia	-	6,676	7,405	7,711	-	1,161	1,731	1,337
Greece and Levant	2,002	2,744	2,767	2,175	2,517	4,947	3,749	3,185
Rumania	2,757	2,265	4,717	1,477	7,041	4,117	1,947	1,353
Turkey in Europe	1,105	641	747	477	2,414	2,167	1,373	1,429
Other European countries	70	2,154	1,843	1,301	368	1,477	1,705	1,130
Total	321,073	472,546	431,406	34,554	245,155	231,503	201,225	146,153

* 1921-22, 1923-24, 1924-25, 1925-26, 1926-27, 1927-28, 1928-29, 1929-30, 1930-31, 1931-32, 1932-33, 1933-34, 1934-35, 1935-36, 1936-37, 1937-38, 1938-39, 1939-40, 1940-41, 1941-42, 1942-43, 1943-44, 1944-45, 1945-46, 1946-47, 1947-48, 1948-49, 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52, 1952-53, 1953-54, 1954-55, 1955-56, 1956-57, 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61, 1961-62, 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65, 1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-00, 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20, 2020-21, 2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24, 2024-25, 2025-26, 2026-27, 2027-28, 2028-29, 2029-30, 2030-31, 2031-32, 2032-33, 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TRADE WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EUROPE

(000's omitted)

	Imports from				British Exports to			
	1901	1906	1910	1911	1901	1906	1910	1911
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Turkey in Asia	4,251	1,441	2,214	1,010	5,401	6,921	2,961	2,841
Egypt	11,303	23,143	13,000	10,417	9,605	12,170	9,800	6,090
Iraq	-	1,070	1,131	215	-	4,176	1,602	1,043
Persia	430	0,168	0,770	5,777	745	2,451	2,045	727
China	4,074	14,157	0,880	7,751	14,841	14,000	8,374	7,000
Japan	4,180	0,151	7,821	7,102	14,783	13,670	8,374	6,215
United States*	141,654	198,177	155,472	101,761	31,475	45,503	20,481	17,680
Cuba	3,775	7,231	0,574	4,162	2,314	2,017	1,183	696
Mexico	1,561	2,760	2,877	2,102	2,331	2,519	2,411	643
Colombia	1,063	2,100	1,127	777	1,001	3,241	1,553	1,511
Peru	1,175	6,474	4,474	5,513	1,484	2,007	1,443	604
Chile	5,102	10,015	7,274	4,715	2,017	0,100	5,075	1,071
Brazil	10,719	7,203	5,111	5,715	12,054	11,343	7,970	4,004
Uruguay	4,712	5,111	7,187	5,203	4,014	5,713	3,578	1,001
Argentina	42,471	51,447	50,705	51,704	11,041	2,077	15,134	14,700
Other foreign countries (non-European)	9,510	11,121	12,773	11,547	7,211	11,554	4,711	5,311
Total	257,150	325,517	307,277	222,257	167,844	204,320	110,184	74,401

* Including Japan in 1901.

TRADE WITH BRITISH COUNTRIES

(000's omitted)

	Imports from				Exports to			
	1901	1906	1910	1911	1901	1906	1910	1911
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Irish Free State	-	45,147	42,457	37,111	-	10,719	10,497	30,014
West Africa	5,174	11,146	5,150	4,477	4,707	12,110	10,790	6,321
South Africa	18,075	20,370	27,441	11,110	22,141	32,530	20,400	11,400
India and Ceylon	55,118	77,005	64,127	48,737	74,454	84,167	50,943	31,707
Strait Settlements	15,850	14,173	9,127	5,385	5,036	22,173	7,404	4,811
Australia and Papua	58,005	51,603	46,497	41,849	14,070	24,175	11,754	14,018
New Zealand	20,119	47,727	64,872	17,111	10,114	27,903	17,007	11,100
Canada	31,444	45,410	34,146	32,416	14,795	21,000	20,138	20,100
West Indies	2,116	5,127	5,134	4,707	2,330	1,041	4,800	4,000
Other possessions	10,742	10,741	14,144	17,000	11,755	11,043	23,000	21,001
Total	221,514	351,442	309,274	242,063	245,707	340,431	148,345	170,407

the coffin of our world economic system. Attractive and inspiring as is the ideal of Empire unity, we must see to it that such unity is not framed on a narrow basis, intended only for the benefit of the British Commonwealth. Such a policy would not be British

in the greatest sense of the term. We must rather ensure that the system evolved is elastic enough to be turned to substantial benefit by trade throughout the world; for only by such means can British trade really benefit in the long run. On Ottawa will be focussed the eyes of the greater part of the civilised world, and in it will be wrapped up the hopes and fears of nations. When decisions of such world-wide importance have to be taken, delegates will have to realise that they are morally responsible, not only to the people of this country or of the Dominions which they represent, but in a very considerable sense to the world in general. Ottawa may well be a turning point in the system of tariff barriers, and the principles emanating from the forthcoming Conference of British statesmen from all over the world may guide economic policies in the direction of world free trade, the ultimate goal to which protective tariffs should only be regarded as a stepping-stone. It is therefore imperative that at Ottawa and in the negotiations which follow, all recognised economic principles and theories should be subordinated to clear-sighted objectivity in a world sense, just as in this country party politics have been subordinated to the fundamental interests of the nation. It is only with the development of Empire trade as a part of world trade that the component parts of the British Commonwealth can hope therefrom to derive substantial and lasting benefit.

Let us now turn to the two special spheres of commerce to which I have already referred. The Argentine Republic, occupying as she does a special position in relation to Great Britain for which no exact parallel exists outside the Empire, will call for our closest and well-deserved attention, when the time comes to engage in discussions with foreign Governments on future trade relations. Economically, Great Britain and Argentina are complementary to one another, and there exists a strong basis of mutual sympathy in the fact that neither can enjoy self-sufficiency and foreign trade is vital to the prosperity of both. The need of each country for the other as a market is greater at present than ever before, and it is due to the growth of these special economic ties that at no time has the sympathetic feeling between the two countries been more strongly in evidence, or been demonstrated to more practical purpose, than it has been since the Prince of Wales opened the British Trade Exhibition in Buenos Aires a year ago. In spite of the absence of any political or racial bonds so singularly attached economically are the two countries to one another that the principle of reciprocity in their mutual dealings should be a precious possession on both sides, and, in the words of Lord D'Abernon's Report, 'it is to the common and joint interest that both should take measures to give practical execution to this conception, and avoid taking any measures incompatible with its

full development.' It is, however, inadvisable to pursue this matter further without giving some idea of the relative position of Argentina in the South American continent. In 1925 Argentina, with an area of 16 per cent. and a population also of 16 per cent. of the whole of South America, transacted exactly half the total trade of this great sub-continent, held 43 per cent. of the railway mileage (which carried 60 per cent. of the goods and 57 per cent. of the passengers), possessed 45 per cent. of the telephones, 58 per cent. of the motor cars, 60 per cent. in each case of the postal and telegraph traffic, held over 72 per cent. of the gold, and accounted annually for well over half the printing paper consumed in South America. The Argentines can therefore claim that, with a much smaller area and population, they represent over one-half of South American activity, although they openly and gratefully admit that their remarkable progress has been largely due to the help of foreign nations, notably Great Britain.

In the complementary relations constituting Anglo-Argentine economic interdependence there are two outstanding features. The first is the dependence of Argentina—absolute in the case of meat and considerable in the case of her other products—on the British consumer and his purchasing power, while the second, though less urgent, feature is the British need for Argentine food and raw materials which could only be modified by a revolutionary development of Empire resources. During the Great War this country depended largely on Argentina for her daily bread. Australia, with her abundance, was too distant to provide us with food, and the same applied in less degree to India, but Argentina was comparatively near at hand, and the speed of transport was rapid. Hence, Argentine beef and wheat played an important part in winning the war for the Allies. Few of the many hungry millions who devoured 'Fray Bentos' with varying degrees of satisfaction during the years 1914-18 realised the origin of this excellent but much maligned item of diet; indeed, it was not until 1920, when I visited Argentina and beheld the 'bully beef' headquarters with my own eyes, that I knew the whereabouts of that famous supply depot. The second feature is to be found in the investment of British capital in public loans, railways and other public services, shipping, land development, banking and insurance, freezing plants, cattle-breeding establishments, and local manufacturing industries. The amount of British capital involved has been estimated at between £500,000,000 and £600,000,000, compared with an estimated investment of £46,010,000 in Canada, £280,000,000 in the United States, and £300,000,000 in Brazil; and this has been going on for over a century with substantial profits to British investors. To-day there are almost as many miles of British owned and controlled

railways in Argentina as there are in Great Britain, carrying over £150,000,000 of British capital. Of the great shipping fleet, with a total tonnage of some 11,000,000 tons, annually entering Argentine ports on the River Plate, nearly one-half is under the British flag; the river services plying on the vast inland waterways and communicating with Uruguay and Paraguay are financed by British capital, and the tramway and subway system of Buenos Aires, carrying some 700,000,000 passengers per annum, is 74 per cent. British. Before the war all the foreign loans needed by the Argentine Government were floated in London, but since the war the United States have absorbed over \$400,000,000 of Argentine loans, a considerable proportion of which has been employed for the purchase of American goods. The consequent loss to this country was all the more regrettable in view of the fact that a considerable proportion of the loans was subscribed by British trust and insurance companies through the New York banks.

In 1928 Great Britain imported Argentine products to the value of £76,758,517 which exceeded the value of our imports from any other country except the United States, and it may be accepted that on the average 40 per cent. of our beef is of Argentine origin. Also, although we make large purchases of wheat from nearer sources of supply, yet in 1928 we obtained 24 per cent. of our wheat, 84.7 per cent. of our linseed, 74.6 per cent. of our maize, and 22.1 per cent. of our oats from Argentina. In 1930 Argentina stood fourth on the export list of foreign countries with which we trade most, and third on the import list, but there is every year a large excess of British imports over exports which calls for some explanation. This excess is to a considerable extent covered by invisible British exports, of which the largest item is the interest on British capital. The second invisible export lies in the earnings of British shipping, not only in the direct trade between the two countries, but also in that part of Argentine trade with the rest of the world which is carried in British ships. In spite of the large tonnage movement involved in Argentine trade, there is no Argentine sea-going shipping, and a very high percentage of the tonnage gives employment to British labour. It is also important to remember, with regard to the meat export trade, that a great many Argentine *estancieros* are British born, and many of the establishments are owned by important British companies. The animals, after leaving the 'camps,' pass through a series of processes until the arrival of the meat in England, in all of which only British capital intervenes. The intermediary companies represented, such as railways, freezing plants, banks, insurance and shipping companies, all have their headquarters in London, employing a large amount of British

labour and at the same time paying income tax to the British Government. Indeed, as the *estancieros* are either British by birth or resident in the United Kingdom, most of the profits arising out of the businesses connected with the meat trade gravitate to this country, the Argentine share being mainly confined to small amounts such as local taxation and wages. Hence, the adverse trade balance in the case of Argentina is rather deceptive at first sight. But there is much room for expansion of our export trade to Argentina, and this is fully acknowledged by the Argentines themselves. Taken as a whole, they would welcome an extension of their purchases from this country, and many cattle-breeders and agriculturists have adopted the slogan, 'Buy from those who buy from us'. Not only do they realize that if the impression that Argentina was not taking enough of our goods in return for her vast quantities of meat were allowed to grow in this country it might be injurious to their trade, but they are fully aware that our new fiscal system will only permit favourable trading relations with those foreign nations which buy adequately from us.

It can be said without exaggeration that in few parts of the world does there exist a greater feeling of friendship towards the British nation than in Argentina. The British stamp on an article has always been accepted as a guarantee of quality, and British goods do actually merit consideration and preference. But the Economic Mission under Lord D'Abernon, as well as other economists who have recently visited Argentina, have been almost unanimous in their surprise at the small interest displayed by British industry. If the balance of trade has not been as it should be it has not been the fault of the Argentines, who have demanded British goods for preference, but have had to choose those of other origin when British goods were unobtainable. It is a well-known fact that in many cases manufacturers have refused to consider the introduction of modifications desired by their clients, and that representatives of important British firms in Argentina have even travelled to England in an unsuccessful attempt to arrange personally for alterations. The impression created is that this country is not interested in supplying Argentine requirements, but the extent to which goods from elsewhere have been purchased has been due, not to a matter of preference, nor of price in many cases, but simply to the fact that British goods have not been obtainable or have been inaccessible to the consumer. Yet the Argentines are convinced that an efficient organisation for the sale of British products, with proper means of advertising, could lead to a large demand for our goods in all parts of the country, and this view is strongly supported by the Report of Lord D'Abernon's Economic Mission.

Although there has been a slow improvement in recent years, there is still a good deal too much of the 'take it or leave it' attitude—an attitude which has got to disappear completely if Britain is going to have any chance whatever of rebuilding her export trade. Among the principal criticisms of British commercial practice are our apparent incapacity to accommodate ourselves to local circumstances: we are reproached with inadaptability and with persistent adherence to what Britain thinks good to the exclusion of what the Argentine wants. Typical examples of this are the motor trade, agricultural machinery, and road-making plant. In the first half of 1929 Argentina imported 51,067 motor vehicles valued at well over £5,000,000, while her requirements of agricultural machinery were on the same scale. Our failure to capture even a small proportion of these trades may be attributed to inability to produce on a sufficiently large scale, insufficient finance, high prices, unsuitability to Argentine needs, and defective salesmanship including inadequacy of advertisements, service, showrooms and ranges of choice—and it is further contended with reason that British traders are notably behind their competitors, because they fail to lay out enough capital or to prepare the ground for future sales unless immediate results are dangling before their eyes. We grumble and take no steps to correct what is unsatisfactory. Meanwhile the cable rates between London and Buenos Aires remain 20 to 30 per cent. higher than between New York and the Argentine capital, it is still cheaper to telephone to Argentina from Paris or Berlin than it is from London—our mail steamship services are a few knots slower than the latest Italian and German ships—and the cost of shipping merchandise from the Continent is in many cases a good deal cheaper than from British ports.

While in 1913 about one-third of the total imports into Argentina came from this country and less than one-sixth from the United States, in 1929 the proportion of imports from Great Britain had dropped to a little over one-sixth, and the United States percentage had almost doubled. The actual total of Argentine imports had greatly increased. But while imports from this country had remained almost stationary, those from the United States had almost tripled, and North America was pushing us out of the South American market. Between the two sub-continent there is no sentiment which can be held responsible for this. It was the direct result of British apathy, the rather belated realisation of which led to the Exhibition of last year. On the understanding that the object of the Exhibition was to provide a starting-point for sustained effort rather than a medium of immediate sales, results have been significant, as shown by the following examples given by a correspondent in *The Times*:

Cutlery manufacturers who sent out show-cases unaccompanied by a salesman, and containing cutlery much of which was of a size not commonly used in Argentina, could scarcely expect to do much business: but a well-known motor firm sent out one of its partners, who remained throughout the six weeks of the Exhibition, registered an Argentine company, and took permanent premises in Buenos Aires. It would be surprising if this latter firm has not laid the foundations of a very profitable business. Although British motor cars (other than lorries) were almost unknown in Argentina before the Exhibition, and although Argentine imports of cars have for the time almost ceased, this firm has already shipped out 100 cars and confidently expects to capture for Great Britain a substantial share of the motor car trade as soon as the Argentines are again ready to buy. As Argentina imported 65,000 cars from the United States in 1920, the money spent by this firm has been well invested and the work devoted to this object well worth while. Possibly the outlay necessary for this method of advance is beyond the means of many individual firms, but there is reason to believe that by means of combined action the difficulties of overcoming such costs as those of preliminary study, propaganda, sales organisations, carrying of stocks, provision of service, granting of credits, etc., could be overcome. Lord D'Abernon's Mission was certainly of this opinion, and forms of combined selling have actually been tested by British traders in a small number of trades with conspicuous success. In any case, the Argentine market provides a potential source of wealth to British manufacturers and merchants if they choose to make the best use of it, and the general atmosphere has never been more favourable to British manufacturers than it is to-day. The Argentines want our goods in preference to others, and, being fully conscious that we are their best customers, they fear lest insufficient purchases on their side will affect them under a régime of increased Imperial Preference: yet they feel that the British manufacturer is not 'pulling his weight' in the combined effort to establish an increased trade between the two countries. Surely a situation such as I have described, together with the fact that the trade in Argentine beef cannot for technical reasons be diverted into Empire channels, is sufficient to validate the long-established claims of Argentina to a trading position next door to our Dominions and Colonies.

The significance of the Scandinavian markets from the point of view of British trade lies chiefly in their proximity, the vast quantity of timber and wood products, dairy produce and other foodstuffs of everyday use which they supply to us, and the con-

stant demand of these countries for coal, iron and steel, machinery and textiles which we supply to them, and can continue to supply in increasing quantities; for in this direction there is a most favourable opportunity for the expansion of our export trade. Sweden, at present the most prosperous country in Europe, if not in the world, sends about 25 per cent of her total exports to this country, and used to buy over 90 per cent of her coal from England until the Poles adopted their system of underselling at a loss in the Baltic. As, however, our purchases of Russian timber have hit the Swedes in much the same way as their purchases of Polish coal have hit us, there seems to be good reason for an arrangement whereby Swedish timber would receive preference on the British market in return for a preferential treatment of British coal on the Swedish market. If this country could regain her pre-war position in regard to coal on the Swedish market, Sweden would buy another 3,000,000 tons from us annually, giving employment to some 25,000 miners. But, as Great Britain also purchases great quantities of timber and wood products from Finland and Norway, any reciprocal arrangement with Sweden would have to be extended in some form to these countries as well. Nearly half of Finland's wood products come to British ports, while in 1927 85 per cent by weight of our pulp imports came from Norway, Sweden and Finland, in contrast to 9 per cent from Canada. The answer to the contention that we should direct our timber trade into Empire channels is briefly this. In all the forests of the Empire, except those of Canada and Newfoundland, hard woods predominate and, although Canada possesses about one sixth of the soft-wood supplies of the world, the heavy demand of the neighbouring market in the United States compels Great Britain and other countries of the Empire to rely on foreign imports as far as soft-wood timber is concerned. Also, Baltic timber, owing to the long-established method by which it is shipped, arrives so marked as to enable buyers to purchase on specification, and meets the exact demands of the British market, whereas Canadian timber, cut largely for the American market, differs in size from the British standards, is of less suitable quality, and is neither so accurately cut nor so carefully finished and graded owing to the speed of output in the Canadian lumber industry. Moreover, if British imports of soft-wood timber were diverted into Canadian channels, any benefit accruing to Canada would be neutralised by the appearance of Scandinavian competitors in the American market; and it is fully realised by the leaders of the pulp and paper industry in Canada that their true interests lie in the absorption by Britain of as large a volume of Scandinavian timber products as possible, thereby keeping them off the American

market. Hence, everything points to an increased purchase of British commodities by the timber-producing countries in return for consolidation of their timber trade with this country, and to the continued concentration of Canada on the neighbouring market in the United States. Norway is among the very few countries with which our trade balance is favourable, and, although the whole Norwegian market is not large, the per capita consumption of British goods is remarkably high, even excluding the repair of Norwegian ships in British yards, the purchase of second-hand vessels, or payments made for bunker coal. Trade relations with Norway have always been satisfactory, but now that both countries are off the gold standard, while some of our competitors remain on it, there are even further opportunities of improving our position in a country where, other things being equal, British goods are preferred. Our trade relations with Denmark, on the other hand, cannot be called satisfactory, with imports in 1930 at £54,118,000 as against exports valued at £10,249,000, but recent tariffs imposed by other countries have gone far to strengthen the position of those who are now insisting that Danish purchases in England should be increased. First, there was the 15 per cent. French compensating exchange tax, which virtually closed the French market to Danish goods inasmuch as about 4 per cent. of Danish imports originate in France, while only 14 per cent. of Danish exports go to France, this left the Danish Government in a very strong position to retaliate, which was done promptly and without hesitation. Between the middle of October and the end of last year the Danish market for French wines, spirits and liqueurs was entirely closed, and after January 1, 1932, French exporters were allowed to ship only 50 per cent. of their 1930 quantities to Denmark. But, as the decree was so worded as to include only products of the grape, whisky escaped to the advantage of British exporters. Then, when the German tariff decree was passed, as a result of which Danish butter was practically excluded from the German market, an influential body of opinion wanted the trade treaty with Germany denounced, and the Government was urged to prepare a discriminatory tariff which would penalise German exports, but which would not interfere with British exports to Denmark. Many individuals and semi-official bodies are now diverting to this country such purchases as they might have made in Germany. The Danish Government, as well as Danish business men, are anxious to see the trade balance rectified, and, in view of the British policy of Empire Preference, such bodies as the Danish Import Union in Copenhagen have been formed with the express purpose of encouraging the consumption of British goods. Although Denmark will undoubtedly have a

strong competition in New Zealand butter and other Empire products, her proximity to the home of 'bacon and eggs' will always stand in her advantage, provided that her people can make a sufficient increase in their purchases of British goods.

Generally speaking, the introduction of British tariffs has aroused in the Scandinavian countries (which include Finland) a strong wish to 'buy British,' and a keen desire to level up as much as possible trade balances with this country, with a view to preferential trading relations on a reciprocal basis after the Ottawa Conference, and, as this turn of events is partly due to a genuine desire of the northern countries to draw closer to Great Britain and partly to hardship arising out of Germany's attitude to certain of her commercial obligations this country now has a great opportunity of capturing some valuable markets hitherto neglected. As in the case of Denmark the new situation, favourable to British trade, has received an important stimulus in Finland owing to the German Government's decision to raise the import duty on butter while Norway and Sweden have other economic grievances against Germany. In Finland the fact that the increased duty was to include butter for which last year's German-Finnish Trade Agreement guaranteed an unalterable duty caused widespread indignation especially among the Agrarians who are the most influential domestic party in the country and would have been the chief sufferers, and this has now resulted in a general movement to buy all classes of goods from Great Britain, including even the purchases of small individual traders in the towns. As Finnish imports from Germany amount to about £7,000,000 sterling, including about half Finland's total imports of metal goods and machinery, as well as a large part of her textiles, and as the other Scandinavian countries together buy from Germany nearly ten times as much, it is easy to realise how important even a proportion of this trade would be to this country.

Although the total import and export figures usually quoted show that we buy from such countries as Finland and Denmark much more than they buy from us, the position is in some cases actually reversed when the total values per head of the populations are compared. In 1930 our imports from Finland were valued at £12,634,000, as against £2,414,000 of British exports to Finland, yet the Finns imported British goods last year to the extent of 12s 9d per head of the population, whereas we in this country only spent 4s 4d per head on Finnish imports. Nevertheless, both Finland and Denmark are at present busy arranging British Trade Exhibitions at Helsinki and Copenhagen respectively, with the object of increasing their British imports, and it is to be hoped that British manufacturers will apply the lessons

learnt at Buenos Aires, realising that there is a vast difference between an exhibition and a trade fair. But, if we are now going to make up for lost opportunities in the past, our manufacturers and merchants must meet the people of the Scandinavian countries half-way. They must be ready to provide exactly the type of goods needed in each of these particular countries, and cease trying to persuade customers that what they have in stock is more suitable. They must also greatly increase the number and suitability of their representatives, while the heads of firms must visit the countries concerned in order to carry out personally the preliminary study which is essential. Hitherto German commercial representatives have been much more numerous and energetic than their British colleagues, and German firms have been ready to supply every demand, even to the smallest details, at the shortest notice. Yet the people of these countries prefer British goods, if they can obtain what they want at a reasonable price. At present these northern markets are ours for the asking, if our manufacturers will only adopt the methods of trade practised by every other nation.

Owing to the nature of our trade with the various Scandinavian countries, and the mutual arrangements which may be necessary in order to frame a series of trade agreements satisfactory to all, it is quite possible that Scandinavia may become an important economic bloc as far as our export trade is concerned. In any case, these are markets which we cannot afford to ignore. Norway actually bought from us last year more than we bought from her; our total trade with Denmark is greater than that with New Zealand and almost as large as that with Canada; our trade with Finland, one of the very few countries which can show to-day an increasing surplus of exports over imports, is nearly as extensive as that with China, Japan or Brazil, and greater than that with Chile, and our Swedish trade almost equals that with South Africa. But when the Scandinavian countries are taken together, it is surprising to see that our trade with them is little short of that with the United States, and surpasses that with British India, which heads the Dominion list. In these circumstances it is difficult to overestimate the value of good trading relations with a group of progressive countries so near home, with similar interests in the Baltic, especially as there are no disturbing factors. With the English language well known in the Scandinavian countries, and a great deal of mutual understanding, there is every reason why we should join hands with these northern peoples in an honest deal to our mutual advantage, when once we have agreed with the Dominions and Colonies as to the framework of our future Imperial trade policy. As in Argentina, so in Scandinavia there are extensive markets of considerable value

waiting for the attention of British enterprise and offering substantial contributions to the rectification of our balance of trade; and efforts to put these markets to the best use by means of reciprocal trade agreements with the Governments concerned, adaptable to the Ottawa decisions, can only be regarded as in the true interests of Empire and world trade.

Although the construction of a satisfactory framework for reciprocal trade within the Empire will call for the adherence to certain fairly rigid principles both on our side and that of the Dominions, the foreign trade factor will necessitate some degree of elasticity in their application. For foreign trade relations no hard-and-fast rules can be laid down. Each case should be dealt with on its merits, in close consultation with the Dominion Governments immediately concerned in particular lines of commerce, foreign preferences being given on a reciprocal basis where foreign goods do not clash with Empire products, and varying, where competition does exist, according to the nature and degree of competition. Where factors of proximity, convenience, or suitability intervene, use could be made of the reciprocal principle with the Dominion concerned. Thus special provisions could cover cases where foreign imports from neighbouring countries clash with Empire products of a similar nature though less suitable to the importer. As for example the United States provides the nearest and most suitable market for Canadian timber, while Great Britain occupies a similar position with regard to Scandinavian timber, there seems no reason why there should not be a working arrangement setting the one off against the other. Similarly as India, the largest Empire producer of raw cotton, exports chiefly to Japan a quality suitable for use in the Japanese mills though unsuitable for the mills of Lancashire, Great Britain, the largest Empire consumer of raw cotton, is practically dependent on the United States for the supply of the raw material for the medium and coarser qualities of cotton fabrics. Hence it would be useless to use Imperial Preference for the purpose of stimulating the production of cotton within the Empire, for with the bulk of our cotton imports coming from a foreign country, the duty imposed would certainly lead to a rise in price almost equal to the amount of the duty, as the supply of untaxed Empire cotton would be insufficiently competitive to force the American producers to cut prices in an effort to retain the market. Then there is the case of Australia, which imports from the United States certain classes of goods which are not features of British industry, such as special types of agricultural machinery suitable for the conditions found both in Australia and in America but in few other parts of the world. In many ways the demands of Australia are more akin to those

of the American market than those of the British market, and it is useless to ask the Australians to give preference to types of goods which they do not want, the solution lying rather in the development of Dominion industries. Such are a few of the numerous cases of varying complexity that will call for the closest attention of delegates to Ottawa and of Ministers later on.

Although His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have rightly refused to discuss trade terms with any foreign Government before the Ottawa Conference, and it is presumed that His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions are following similar courses, there might be wisdom in opening such conversations as soon as the main Ottawa principles have been agreed, and before any detailed arrangements are made, thereby providing a better opportunity for dovetailing Imperial and foreign arrangements into one another. The adjustment of foreign trade relations to the framework of an Empire scheme will call for the utmost ingenuity on the part of all concerned, and it will probably involve the drafting of a complete new set of trade treaties in which the future of the most-favoured nation clause will be at stake. But, whatever means may be used to reconcile foreign trade interests to Imperial unity, it is hoped that a desire for simplicity and a determination to work for the benefit of world trade in general will dominate the deliberations. The world looks to Britain. Let the British nations show what they can do to help the world (including themselves) in its distress.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN

FRANCE AFTER THE ELECTIONS

THE last general election in Great Britain revealed that an overwhelming majority of the population did not want a Labour Government. The recent Presidential elections as well as the elections to the Prussian Diet in Germany show that roughly one half of the voters did not want Hitler or Communism, and that the other half did not want the continuation of the present régime. Finally, the French elections have just proved that the majority of the country did not want M. Laval and the coalition represented by him. What did they want? It is significant that in all three countries the poll was exceptionally heavy (at the second ballot also both in Germany and France) so that the voters were obviously taking their vote very seriously and were fully aware of the importance of their decisions.

The dramatic character of these elections has not brought about the last general election in this country. In even those who do not normally take an interest in politics there is the significance of the issue at stake. And the result was the confirmation of a new departure in the country's political life, namely the National Government. Again, the issue of the German Presidential elections was not who was to be elected a head of the State, but whether the State was to survive at all in its present form. The struggle for power was continued in the Prussian elections and it still goes on. But what was the issue in France? There was none and that is the first of the many peculiar things about this election. It simply took place owing to the effect of time. The extremists of the Right and of the Left are quite insignificant in France, and therefore there was no cause to fear or to expect any violent changes in the political structure of the country. Nor was there any kind of national emergency calling for extraordinary measures of any sort which would require an appeal to the country, notwithstanding the fact that there is certainly an international emergency calling for immediate steps. All that had happened was that the powers of the Old Chamber of Deputies had come to an end, and that it had to be renewed. Perhaps the realisation of this absence of any dramatic political or economic issue was one of the reasons why the election campaign was

completely devoid of anything spectacular or emotional. But the heaviness of the poll proves that this was by no means due to national apathy.

The very way that the campaign was conducted was most unusual. It was like a great talking tournament—in fact never had so much talk been lavished on the general public. Great use was made of broadcasting, despite the fact that in 1925 M. Poincaré explicitly forbade the transmission of election speeches over the wireless. Even in the remotest little towns and villages voters could listen in to innumerable speeches pronounced at the other end of France. But while the Government supporters and the followers of M. Herrriot enjoyed the services of wireless, the Socialists were denied that privilege. The Prime Minister, M. Tardieu, opened the campaign at Boulogne in Paris, where he pronounced a brilliant and very long speech in defence of the past Administration. M. Herrriot, leader of the Radical Socialist Party, replied from Lyons. His speech, constitutionally with an equally long and brilliant speech in which he defended the record of 1924 and passed severe criticism on the Tardieu Administration. Yet despite a certain amount of mutual criticism and serious attack the leader of the Government and the leader of the Opposition both seemed to be anxious to leave the door open for possible collaboration in the future. The former was also criticised for invitation to join forces against the Socialists who in he labelled as the common enemy, whereas the latter appeared determined not to support the rightist political ideas either on the Right or on the Left. Each leader had thus taken up a strategic position. This however was followed by a violent attack against the Cartel by M. Paul Reynaud, Deputy Prime Minister, to which M. Herrriot made a better reply a few days later. The fight had begun. Meanwhile at Lyons again M. Tardieu had made another long speech in which he not only once again attacked the Socialists and defended his own Administration, but also put forward a definite constructive programme for the next Chamber. Other members of the Government and leading representatives of the various groups and parties also spoke and answered one another profusely, and M. Léon Blum, the Socialist leader, delivered two striking and incisive speeches—first at Narbonne, then at Pertuis. Even during the week's interval between the first and second ballots M. Tardieu and M. Herrriot made passionate appeals to the electorate.

So much for the leaders. As for the rank and file of candidates and their supporters, the number of speeches and counter-speeches was simply prodigious. But like the posters, placards and leaflets, and like the articles in the Press, they were all somewhat colourless and left one cold. Particularly striking and unusual was the

almost complete absence of invective. No one made the habitual allegations of all sorts of 'moral turpitude' against the rival candidate, or if they were made, they were certainly on a very much reduced scale. The picturesque references to the depraved sexual life of an opponent or to that of his wife, the charming suggestion that he might have a brother 'doing time' or a sister keeping a house of ill repute, such terms of endearment as '*mon beau-père*' or '*mon frère*,' or just '*fraternel*,' all of which formed a commonplace part of previous elections, seemed to have been very largely, if not completely, relegated to the past. It was the quietest, most orderly and sober election imaginable in which both candidates and voters appeared determined to take themselves very seriously. This sobriety of mind was not even perturbed by the ghastly assassination of the President of the Republic which took place in the short interval between the second ballot and the first. It is indeed a curious fact that this unprecedented episode in the history of an elected President has been referred without any influence on the voters' behaviour to the election. M. L. Bendaïm rightly emphasised in his funeral oration the fact that the safety which France had discovered in the election of 1931 was not destroyed.

France has again elected in May 1932 her Deputies in the 1931-32 session and again in May 1932 the House of the State fell a victim to the 'fourth session' of May. In the first round a second ballot completed the election of a new Chamber of Deputies and this vote overthrew the majority of the centre. Two days later in calmness and serenity the National Assembly elected M. Albert Lebrun to the Presidency of the Republic. In these times of confusion and of instability both of things and of minds there is an example of order that cannot be surpassed.

It must also be added that the pose displayed by the French throughout the election campaign, but particularly throughout this dramatic first week in May, which will not soon be forgotten, is a curious comment on the superficiality of the generally accepted ideas about national characteristics. Furthermore, the results of this election are a striking proof of the fact that certain preconceived ideas about France, very prevalent outside that country, are extraordinarily misleading.

But before attempting to analyse the meaning of the last elections, and the effects to be expected of them, certain general observations are essential. It is a well known fact that the party system in France is a most imperfect one. The so-called Right and the Centre consist of an ever-changing number of groups, some of which exist only in the Chamber. Most of them have no definite political programme, no party discipline, and no party

organisation. From time to time they combine under the leadership of some strong personality and form a psychologically solid *Bloc*; technically, however, they preserve their independence. This was true of M. Tardieu's Government majority in the last Chamber. Only on the Left do we find parties, in the proper meaning of the word, possessing all the advantages and disadvantages implied by party discipline and organisation. Yet some of the parties of the Left have frequently participated in Governments composed of groups of the Centre and of the Right. Thus there is no rigidity even on the Left Wing. The multiplicity of groups and parties, the frequent absence of definite programmes, and the frequent collaboration of outwardly antagonistic political formations make it somewhat difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between Right and Left. This division, however, exists and finds its expression not so much in dogmas and in theories as in minds and temperaments. Speaking very generally, the Right can be described as clerical, militarist, nationalist, and also representative of large vested interests. The Left, on the other hand is anti-clerical (though not necessarily anti-religious), pacifist, and represents the interests of the salaried classes and of the *petite bourgeoisie*. From this it will be seen that the division is not between those who have and those who have not, but rather between large landowners and small ones, proprietors of large factories and of small ones, organised capital and small holders, the heavy industrialists and the consumers, the big and the small taxpayers, the new rich and the new poor. Finally there is also the conflict between traditional order and the equally traditional craving for new ideas, a new order of things, which becomes particularly accentuated in a period of general dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs like the present.

In the history of the Third Republic the electoral struggles between the Right and the Left have almost invariably ended in the victory of the latter. 'Right' elections form an exception rather than the rule, and the victory of the reactionary 'National Bloc' in 1919 was an unique achievement, due to very special circumstances. In spite, however, of the fact that most of the sixteen elections that have taken place since the Third Republic was established resulted in Left majorities, the actual distribution of power in Parliament has often presented a very different picture. Continuous re-grouping within the Chamber has usually brought about the result that a Left majority is rapidly transformed into a Centre coalition with leanings towards the Left, then into a purely Centre Government, and finally into a coalition of the Centre with the Right, with the former Left majority split up and in opposition. And at the following election the pendulum

once again swings to the Left. This is only a very general description of the evolutionary process that continuously repeats itself in French political life, and the electoral history of France is, of course, more complicated than that. Yet there is no doubt that, on the whole, the Frenchman votes Left, and prefers to be governed by the Centre or even by the Right. The political Radicalism of the Left is more congenial to him; on the other hand, the administrative capacity of the Right and the Centre appears as greater and more reliable. It has often been said that the ideal Government would be that in which political portfolios would be in the hands of the Left, and the financial and administrative portfolios in the hands of the Right. This is the basis on which M. Poincaré built his Government in 1926, although in his particular case any coalition would have become acceptable because of the unique and unqualified confidence with which he inspires his compatriots. I forget who it was who said that Poincaré was the only man that could be trusted with the keys both to the *régime* and to the Treasury. Strange though it may appear, the question of maintaining the Republican and the Democratic *régime* is still of paramount importance in French politics.

The last French elections were deliberately adjourned by the Tardieu Government till May so that the voters should know the results of the elections in Prussia. It was feared that President Hindenburg's victory over Hitler might find too favourable an interpretation in France, that it might be held for the triumph of democracy over Fascism (although there is little or nothing democratic about the present *régime* in Germany), and that the chances of the Left in France would be greatly increased by this consideration. In order to show the French electorate the terrifying growth of reaction and Hitlerism in Germany (and this was a foregone conclusion), it had been decided to wait till after Prussia had voted. The Hitler argument was used a great deal in the French elections that followed almost immediately after the Prussian, yet it failed to achieve the desired object. Not that the dangers of Hitlerism are minimised by the French in any way. The full repercussions of the triumph of reaction in Germany will be seen in France's foreign policy, whoever forms the next Government. But the attempt to use the wave of madness that is sweeping over Germany, or in fact over the rest of the world, as a bogey in the domestic politics of France failed most lamentably.

In spite of the threatening international political situation, in spite of the alarming growth of reaction in Central Europe, in spite of the progress of the economic crisis and of unemployment, the mass of French electors not only refused to be stampeded into Chauvinistic and dangerous would-be solutions, but exercised

restraint and judgment. In this respect the figures of the first ballot are even more characteristic of the spirit that animated the electors than those of the second. For in that first ballot each party acted independently and each elector voted freely. The result was a definite swing to the Left. A week later it took the shape of a landslide. This was not due to the fact that in the short period that had elapsed between May 1 and May 8 the Left had suddenly found millions of new adherents. Nor did it take place under the influence of the President's assassination, and it must be said in justice to the struggling political parties that none of them endeavoured to make party capital out of this unexpected tragedy. The enormous gains of the Left in the second ballot were entirely the result of the application by the former allies of the Cartel of 1924 of 'Republican discipline'. Radicals, Socialists, and in certain cases even Communists did not contest each other's seats, but supported each other's candidates to 'keep out the Reactionary'. The result was a brilliant victory for the Left. If after the first ballot M. Lardieu could claim with a certain amount of justification that in spite of a move to the Left the Government had managed to maintain its majority, after the second ballot the complete defeat of his coalition revealed itself in a striking fashion. Each of the groups belonging to it lost heavily, the total number of seats lost approximating to eighty. On the other hand, the gains of the Radicals and the Socialists surpassed their own most optimistic expectations. The victory was even greater than in 1924, and never have the Socialists been as strongly represented as they are now. This collapse of the old majority and the triumph of the Left is due far more to certain fundamental instincts or requirements of the race than to clear political thinking. In a choice between various dangers instinct made the French prefer the Left to the Right. They did not quite know how peace could best be secured, but they had a feeling that the armaments race can only lead to new catastrophes. Therefore, in expressing their will for peace, they voted for the Left. They also voted against the dark powers that appeared to use the State for their own purposes and to the detriment of the community. They voted for the State against those who threatened the State. They voted for the interests of the masses against the interests of the minority. Finally, they voted against the Right and the Centre because these had failed in their primary function—the maintenance of prosperity and sound finance. In fact, they somewhat unjustly put the blame on the old Government for not having been able to solve the crisis. And they gave their vote to those groups who, in their opinion, offer a better chance of saving from chaos and destruction that which can still be saved. In doing so they were actuated by purely conservative

and not by revolutionary motives, which is all the more striking in this post-war world so full of revolutionary tendencies.

Unlike most other countries, France to-day is still ruled by the same people who have ruled her for many years before and after the war. Of course, there is a crop of newcomers, of whom Herriot, Tardieu, and Laval are typical representatives. But when all is said and done, France is still governed by Briand and Poincaré—by the one from his grave and by the other from his place of retirement. This election is the defeat of Poincaré and the triumph of Briand. Aristide Briand died in May 1931, when he failed to be elected President of the French Republic. His body was buried with great pomp in March 1932. But his spirit continues to live and has just reasserted itself in an unquestionable manner. Such is the irony of fate, that some of his bitterest opponents found themselves compelled to assure the public that they had no intention to depart from the lines laid down by him for France's foreign policy. With pathetic disregard for people's memories, the enemies of the late statesman, even those who had been actively concerned with removing him from office, claimed to have been his friends and gave assurances of their spiritual affinity to the Man of Peace. So great was the influence of the dead man that people tried to use his ghost to get themselves re-elected. How he would have laughed if he had seen this pitiful picture! But after all, had not the Right, in spite of its distrust and almost animal hatred of him, invariably sanctioned all his most important measures? The fact remains that it is Briand who has won the French election, and the question now arises how this will affect France's foreign policy.

Security is the principal if not the only consideration of French policy. All the other issues are quite immaterial compared to it. Whether this is justified or whether it is a kind of national psychosis, may be a matter of opinion, but the fact remains and must be reckoned with. Yet it has so frequently been ignored or misconstrued by other countries that it has engendered a series of international misunderstandings, which have acquired most dangerous proportions. The French are not by nature interested in foreign politics, but since 1914 these have become a fundamental part of their very life. The truth of the matter is that they cannot or will not forget the German invasion, and they never stop fearing its repetition. It is an ignominious lie to say that the French want war: they are scared to death of it. They are neither militarist nor aggressive: they are frightened. And that is why, above all, they want security, some tangible assurance that Germany is made incapable of invading them again. In this respect Versailles was frankly disappointing to them, and Clemenceau fell from his pedestal because he had "lost the

Peace.' They felt that they had been let down by their Allies, that England and the United States had not played the game. They felt suddenly isolated, not only in Europe, but in a world that would not see their point of view and would not play up to it. And they felt that they could not rely on anybody but themselves, and that therefore they should take their own precautionary measures.

Here is a typical instance. As an instrument of defence they created the Little Entente, but overlooked the fact that this was destructive to Germany's capacity to pay. Normal trade intercourse between Germany and all these countries has become quite impossible because they suffer from acute economic nationalism which has also proved most damaging to themselves, and therefore France has had to come to their financial rescue. The Little Entente will cost France as much as Russia or more. But then France, thrifty and hard-working, is accustomed to lose from time to time large blocks of the accumulated national wealth owing to unwound political lending or through her own unscrupulous financiers. The result is that the French are not unnaturally suspicious of everybody and everything and that they feel more and more threatened on every side by potential invaders or potential borrowers. Therefore, they cling to what security or what means of self-protection they have got—not excluding treaties or armaments—and nobody or nothing can induce them to part with these. After all, from the French point of view it is a perfectly normal and natural thing. But they are truly and honestly prepared to make sacrifices in the common good, as long as it does not threaten their own national interests. Thus to them Locarno was the utmost limit of sacrifice to which they could persuade themselves to go, whereas to the rest of the world it was only the first step towards rectifying a series of political and economic blunders committed at Versailles. The evacuation of the Rhineland and the adoption of the Young Plan appealed to the French as supreme gestures of international conciliation. By the rest of the world the same acts were considered, not merely as an inevitable recognition of facts, but also as relatively inadequate.

It was Briand's great merit that he tried to find a formula for furthering the cause of peace. Furthermore, his enthusiasm and self-sacrificing devotion to that sacred cause were beyond doubt. He therefore exercised a soothing influence on the intercourse between nations. Yet, while many in his own country attacked him for going too far along the road of compromise, abroad it was felt that when he said 'Europe' he meant 'France,' and that when he said 'Peace' he meant 'Security.' In substance, if not in form, he was pursuing the policy of Clemenceau and Poincaré.

In spite of the allegation of his detractors to the contrary, and of the many formulae and phrases, the guiding principle of Briand's policy was to ensure the security of France. Now, how this security could be achieved short of wiping out all the Germans is not quite clear; but it is obvious that France desires, not only some means of control or power over Germany, but also the political and economic stability of the rest of the world. She does not seem to realise that these things are incompatible, and looks with dismay and apprehension on the process of transformation that has taken place elsewhere during the last few years. Germany, driven to exasperation by post-war conditions, turns to Hitler or even to the Communists. At any rate, the mobilisation of the masses has so far progressed there that no Government could survive that would yield anything to foreign pressure. England is developing a strong anti-European feeling and is fully occupied and pre-occupied with her domestic and Imperial affairs. In the United States the 'ressentiment' against Europe is also growing, and the country has more than enough of her own troubles. And Mussolini in Italy and Stalin in Soviet Russia do not contribute to making international relations easier.

Partly owing to her conservatively static national character, partly thanks to very fortunate economic conditions, France has not been affected by this all-powerful process of transformation in the same degree as other countries. As a consequence, she sees in the world crisis, not the most far-reaching and almost elemental aspect of these processes, but only a series of mistakes committed by other countries. She feels that, whereas she has been careful, thrifty, hard-working and altogether sound, the others have been prodigate, short-sighted, egotistic and even disloyal. Yet France has a genuine desire to get the rest of the world on its feet again, despite all its faults. But by her own methods, of course. Unlike other countries, she has not lost the ground under her feet; however, she has not moved with the times. The last elections prove it. They are more reminiscent of France in 1910 or 1924 than of Europe in 1932. As in pre-war days, the non-Socialist Left will occupy the seats in the centre of the new Chamber: that is where the 148 Radical deputies will sit. On their right will be sixty-one independent Radicals and on their left thirty-four independent Socialists. These three groups of the Centre represent together a bloc of only 253, and therefore cannot form a majority in a House of 615 members. Two majorities in this Chamber appear possible at the present time: a majority of the Left, or the Cartel, including the independent Socialists, the Socialists and even some of the Communists (this would, roughly, mean 320 or 340 votes); or else a majority of the so-called Concentration, excluding the Socialists on the Left and the Marin

group on the Right. Such a majority would depend on 120 to 130 votes—about the same numerical strength as the Cartel. But the anti-Cartel majority, while more elastic, would also be more unstable in view of its heterogeneity, and might easily come to grief on a number of vital issues.

Since the Radical Party is the largest in the new Chamber, its leader, M. Herriot, will soon find himself in the difficult position of having to start negotiations with a view to forming the next Government. M. Tardieu and his colleagues give up office on June 1. The particularly large gain of the Socialists in this election has rather upset all prognostications with regard to the future. Cartel, or Concentration?—this is the question everybody is discussing in France to-day. M. Herriot has definitely stated that in no circumstances will he repeat the experiment of 1924, and that he will not form a Government of the Left with the support, but without the participation, of the Socialists. If these continue to pursue their old tactics of refusing to participate in a Cabinet with the representatives of the bourgeois parties, the Radicals will have no alternative but Concentration. If, on the other hand, the Socialists agree to participate in the Government of the Left—a Cartel Government—they will have to elaborate with the Radicals a joint programme acceptable to both groups. And there are many vital issues on which they will find it difficult to agree. At the present moment the Socialist Party appears divided on the subject of participation. Thanks to their strategic position the Radicals should be able to arbitrate between Right and Left—but M. Herriot's difficulty will be the uncompromising attitude of both these groups towards each other. An attempt will be made to drive him to the choice between Socialism and all it stands for, and the Right and all that this implies. If he had pluck he could disregard such an effort to force his hand, and attempt to form a Government of Concentration on a very much wider basis—in fact, on that of Briand's greatly enlarged old majority. But can he and will he do it? He appears greatly harassed by his task even before he has attempted it. The memories of the old Cartel are painful. And he knows that all the future financial or internal difficulties which may arise owing to the progress of the world crisis will be attributed to the Left. Equally well does he know that all international complications which may arise would be attributed to the Government of Concentration if he were compelled to form one. The multiplicity of groups and parties and the prospects of certain regroupings in this Parliament within a very short time make it impossible to forecast whether it will be M. Herriot who will preside over the next Government. It may be some other Radical leader, or again a man like M. Poincaré, or even

M. Paul-Boncour, both of whom are considered more statesmen than political figures. But the Lanneme Conference is meeting on June 16, and the Ministry, under whomever it may be constituted, must meet the Chamber before then and get an approval of its programme. There is therefore little time to be lost.

It is said that the participation of the Socialists in a Cartel Government would be impossible because M. Léon Blum would demand the complete reversal of French foreign policy. I do not believe it. Of course, he holds strong views on most subjects which are not those of the other parties. He may be uncompromising on questions of internal social and fiscal policy. He may demand the nationalisation of railways and insurance companies. He may press for a speedier solution of the Disarmament and Reparations questions, and his way of tackling the latter problem would naturally be different from that of a Marin or a Tardieu. But I very much doubt whether even he would completely give up the French thesis that, whatever the form, in substance security is the axis upon which French foreign policy must revolve. I will even go so far as to say that I do not think that this would be abandoned if a purely Socialist Government were formed in France. The bearing of the last election on the internal affairs in France is outside the scope of this article. But the world crisis, which until recently was felt there much less than in most other countries, is now also beginning to swamp France. This may result in unexpected developments. A new Administration, whatever majority is responsible for the Government, will naturally bring about considerable changes in the personnel of the various Ministries, and particularly at the Foreign Office. One thing, however, is certain. Cartel or Concentration, the continuity of French foreign policy is not likely to be broken. The tone with which France talks to the world may change, with the occupant of the palatial building in the Quai d'Orsay; there may also be a string of new ambassadors, but the pursuit of security will remain. *'Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.'*

GEORGE SOLOVEYTSNIK.

THE AMERICAN SCENE

By her wealth and potential resources the United States is the predominant partner in the Anglo-Saxon world. Whereas the importance of Britain depends on her control of vast territories in Africa and Asia, the area between the Rio Grande and the Canadian border contains the greatest concentration of the white race under one system of government, with the single exception of Russia. Britain, deprived of her overseas Empire, is a small, over-populated island off the coast of Europe, with only one raw material, coal, in abundance. The United States, ten times her area and with three times her population, has a superabundance of every kind of substance and product needed by modern industry, with the exception of rubber and a few metals and ores. With ample gold and high tariffs, America, the world's great creditor, is passing through the deliriums of an acute monetary and economic crisis. The cause and future course of this depression are of vital interest to every other nation in the world, for reasons to be stated presently.

In viewing the American scene to-day it is necessary to survey it from a height. Panic may afflict Wall Street and result in hundreds of thousands of investors in the United States and elsewhere losing their savings; private banks may fail by the thousand—and, indeed, one-third in number of all the private banks in the United States failed in the year 1931 alone—unemployment figures may mount, and the budget remain unbalanced, but over and above these effects of the world slump and the collapse of the speculative American boom of 1920, the great potential wealth of the Union remains ready to be exploited by an army of engineers and other technicians supported by 120,000,000 people who, in enterprise and energy, are second to none.

The matters about which most is heard in Europe—crime, graft, bootlegging, the love of luxury and pleasure—are excrescences on the surface. The Americans can, and no doubt will, reform their system of government, especially their local government, suppress their criminals, purge the police, rid themselves of the farce of Prohibition, and return to a more simple system of society where material rewards come from industry and

enterprise rather than from gambling, racketeering, and exploitation. These are matters of the spirit, depending on the Americans themselves and their leaders. Without moral leadership at this time, matters may well become worse before recovery begins; yet without American recovery there can be no economic renaissance of the world. America is such a tremendous producer of steel, wheat, corn, cotton, meat, oil, and manufactured goods of all kinds that a continuance of the slump in the United States and the weak selling that accompanies it will keep world prices depressed and therefore retard general recovery.

In the Budget debates in the House of Commons this spring speaker after speaker, irrespective of party, harked back to the principal recommendation of the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry—namely, that credits and currency must be so expanded as to reduce the price of gold in terms of commodities, in other words, that wholesale prices must be raised; but any unilateral action of this kind taken by our own country, even in conjunction with the British Empire and the other countries off the gold basis, for the purpose of raising commodity prices and so restoring business enterprise and commerce will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without a simultaneous or corresponding revival on the other side of the Atlantic.

British business men, politicians, economists, and the like would be well advised. I suggest to look below the surface of conditions in the United States. Instead of judging the other great English-speaking community by its films, gang outrages, kidnappings and beauty parlours, let us seek to discover the cause of the present depression and the possibilities of recovery. The economic history of the United States divides itself into three parts, or rather three cycles. These were first, the period from the Civil War to 1893; secondly, the period from 1896 to 1928; and, thirdly, the present period. Business booms and slumps alternated during these periods, the causes being various, but principally the banking and financial policy pursued. In normal times the price level corresponded accurately to the ratio between credit and currency expansion and the rate of increase of production. Prices, on which depended normal booms and slumps, were more or less deliberately regulated by the National banks. At the end of each of the first two periods conditions became out of hand and consequently abnormal. The National banks lost control.

After the Civil War, ending in the sixties of last century, from which our survey can begin, there was a long period of recovery, expansion and development. The Middle West was opened out, the great trunk railways constructed, electrical development played a great part, the eastern and northern States became industrialised, coal and iron were exploited, and the population

increased rapidly. During this period the United States borrowed freely from Europe, principally from the United Kingdom, and became the great debtor country. Americans themselves were confident, even arrogant. Huge fortunes were amassed, the standard of living, especially in the cities, rose sharply and stock exchange values became inflated. 1892 was a boom year, but in the following spring one of the great slides in values was started by the failure of the Philadelphia and Reading Railway. Not only was there a spectacular fall in stock exchange securities, but ugly rumours were prevalent to the effect that certain of the leading New York banking institutions were heavily involved. A general run on all the banks followed, which spread from one end of the country to the other. In that year 155 State banks suspended business, 415 private banks and trust companies failed, and over 900 large companies and corporations were in difficulties, their shares becoming practically unsaleable. By July the discount rates for twelve months bills in New York had risen to 75 per cent. £2,000,000 in gold was rushed from London, but by August it became known that the gold reserves in the New York banks were \$14,000,000 below the legal limit. The bankruptcies and failures in this year accounted for a loss of over \$340,000,000. There was heavy unemployment accompanied by bread riots in the cities. Crop failures, adding to the general troubles, ruined thousands of farmers. Railway companies owning 22,000 miles of track declared themselves bankrupt and were taken over temporarily by the Federal authorities. It took two years for the United States to begin to recover from the panic and consequent slump. This depression was abnormal and the economic situation out of control.

By 1896 the iron and steel industries entered on a period of great activity and prosperity, public confidence gradually returned, good harvests aided the process, and a mild boom followed, with rising prices and a restarting of every form of business. Nor were the lessons of the great crash of 1893 altogether lost. Business men became more conservative in their policy, banks built up adequate reserves and avoided investment in speculative stocks, the 'get-rich-quick' mood evaporated, and the vast country settled down once more to steady industry and development. This second period of expansion lasted up till the Great War, with another great increase in production and the development of several new industries on a gigantic scale, of which the petroleum industry is perhaps the most important. Furthermore, the United States became an imperialist power with overseas protectorates. Nor did the Spanish War and the campaigns in Cuba and the Philippines cause more than temporary setbacks. There were minor slumps and booms during the second period, but, generally

speaking, the development of the United States went steadily ahead. Her more adventurous financial began to invest overseas. The Panama Canal was cut.

The European War had two main effects. It turned the United States from the greatest debtor country into the greatest creditor country. Instead of exporting to pay interest on the capital invested in railways, mines, oilfields and factories, the United States found herself in what should have been the happy position of receiving tribute in the form of goods to pay the interest on her enormous governmental and private loans to foreign countries. To the Treasury loans, made on Allied account during the war, were added the heavy investments on private account all over the world, but principally in Central Europe and South America in the years 1921 to 1928. The other effect was to stimulate every form of production. First, the Allied needs, then the requirements of the tremendous forces mobilised by the United States after her entry into the war, led to a great expansion of iron, steel, coal, agriculture, oil production, and every form of manufacturing activity. The high tariffs imposed as if to prevent the import of goods in payment of interest on the debts referred to above, still further stimulated home production.

The United States, therefore, emerged from the World War with every means of production increased, her transport and electrical equipment improved, a great mercantile marine, and with immense sums owing from the victorious Allies, the credit of the principal debtor, Great Britain, being seemingly as safe and sound as could be desired. The governors of the Federal Reserve system felt some apprehension about the future of industry and agriculture, and particularly about the feasibility of disposing of the immense production now possible. The decision, therefore, was taken to deflate drastically and to reduce prices and wages to something like the corresponding pre-war figures. The gold standard, never departed from in theory, was restored in practice by means of high money rates and restriction of bank credits; but the fall in the price level was too sudden. Between May 1920 and April 1921 the United States wholesale commodity price level had fallen by 43½ per cent. The result was severe unemployment and a fairly deep slump. The Federal Reserve banks, becoming alarmed, reversed the deflationary process, made money rates easier, increased bank credits, and advised an easier loan policy for the member banks. The result was a mild boom which, with only slight setbacks, gradually increased in a crescendo to the fortissimo of 1928. The speculative boom had then reached such heights that the brake had to be applied, resulting in the crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression with which we are all too familiar.

As the first period ended with a catastrophic slump, so has the second period ended with another—a 'slide,' as it is called on the other side of the Atlantic, but of longer duration and with even more severe effects. Many well-informed economists, bankers and business men in the United States consider that the present depression, especially as it is part of a world depression, differs in many respects from anything experienced in the past; and the more pessimistic of these students and observers believe it to be chronic. It is generally accepted that matters will get worse before they improve. The most reasonable argument why still further troubles should be anticipated is that the present depression did not fall simultaneously upon the whole of the sub-continent. Beginning in the eastern States, and particularly in New York, it spread slowly across the continent and took nearly two years to reach the west and south-west, and, as the effects of depression are always cumulative, the fall in prices will probably continue with forced sales and bankruptcies in the regions only recently affected. On the other hand, the measures now being taken by Government, Congress, and the Federal Reserve Board should have the effect of raising wholesale prices and so should commence the restoration of public confidence, which, in its turn, will lead to a business revival.

Space will not permit a survey of the great basic industries, but it will be convenient here to refer briefly to the affairs of the United States Steel Corporation. This huge combine may, for many reasons, be taken as an index of American prosperity. At this time of writing its shares, formerly looked upon as practically gilt-edged, and as suitable for a trustee stock as any industrial share could be, are priced at about one tenth of the figures they stood at on the New York Stock Exchange in the summer of 1929. At that period buyers of the shares might reasonably expect a return of about 2 per cent. on their money! It is said that this warning of steel stocks finally convinced the financial authorities that, at all costs, the speculative boom must be checked. This gave the 'bears' the cue for which they had been waiting, and the rest we know. The two great steel corporations, United and Bethlehem, were not to be so easily defeated. They were, on the industrial side, at the height of their prosperity when the great slump began. They immediately announced quarterly earnings only exceeded by those of the previous quarter; while their monthly earnings announced for August 1929 were greater than for those of any month except the previous May. Indeed, taking the whole of 1929, the net profits of the leading steel companies were 66 per cent. higher than for 1928. The Executive Government, headed by President Hoover, supported this attempted

rally of the steel industry by declaring that the slump was only temporary, that great construction and maintenance works would be undertaken, and that future demand for steel would be practically as great as in previous years; but, in spite of these gallant efforts and the forced draught of public works utilising steel, the output has steadily decreased ever since.

At the beginning of 1930 the steel industry as a whole was working at 80 per cent. of its full capacity; but in July of that year United States Steel, the largest corporation of all, which, as I have indicated, may be taken practically as a barometer, was only working at 64 per cent. of its capacity as compared with 100 per cent. at the height of the boom. By the autumn of 1931 only half of the 312 blast furnaces in America were in operation; and in November 1931 the industry was estimated as working at only 30 per cent. of its capacity, with only sixty-nine blast furnaces alight. In that month United States Steel reported the smallest monthly earnings in its history. In April of the present year the steel industry, as a whole, was working at only 23 per cent. of its capacity. Nor is the reason far to seek. The builders are now only taking one-sixth of this reduced output and the motor industry and the railroads less than one-sixth each; and their demand is falling. Thus, the railroads are in great difficulties, the ratio of the freight carried on them to the population having fallen to 50 per cent. of that carried in 1929. The figures are six tons of freight per head carried now as against twelve tons carried in 1929 at the height of the boom. The only bright spot in the steel market is the new programme of the Ford Motor Company, with its newly designed eight-cylinder cars, each containing about 1600 lb. of steel. The Ford programme will require 250,000 tons of steel to complete, but, apart from this one redeeming feature, the steel industry can only look to a recovery of the real estate market and therefore the beginnings of a new building boom (practically all new buildings now being steel-framed), a revival of shipbuilding, and a general recovery of engineering activity.

Why was it that during the years between, say, 1923 and 1929 the immense productive capacity of the United States found an outlet? There were four principal causes: Certain of the American loans made to South America and other countries led to orders for goods. Public optimism led to the erection of new buildings, plant and capital equipment generally on a generous scale. High-power salesmanship, including the great extension of radio advertising, helped to break down the buyers' resistance and force an increase of consumption. Cheap credit facilities for the general public helped sales all along the line. In England we have been familiarised with the hire-purchase system as developed

in America. All classes of the community, except the richest, for whom there is no need, are encouraged to mortgage their future earnings for the sake of present purchases. The purchase not only of automobiles and household equipment like wireless instruments, gramophones, ice-making machines and the like, but also of clothing and personal jewellery, is stimulated. There is, in addition, a very highly developed loaning system on personal security operated by well-organised finance companies with large capital. They advance loans to the heads of households who wish to start a grown-up son in business, or to purchase a business themselves, and occupy a position somewhere between the moneylenders or pawnbrokers and the banks in England. This provision of easy credit for consumers has acted as a forced draught enabling a proportion of the goods produced by modern methods, and especially mass production, to be disposed of.

All might have been well but for the speculative boom. This was aided by money from Europe either seeking security from countries where the currency was considered unstable, as in the case of France, or seeking profitable investment from countries where there was already a trade depression, as in England—in either case, flooding the New York Stock Market with funds. The speculative boom was also assisted by a psychological factor. The younger generation of Americans began to speculate and made money 'playing the markets'. The older generation, remembering the slump of 1907 and more especially the terrible depression of 1893 already referred to, shook their heads at first and kept their money in bonds and other safe, low-interest yielding securities, but, as the boom continued and the younger people flaunted their easily acquired wealth, the older generation, with more money, as is usually the case, also caught the speculative fever. Furthermore, the circle of speculation widened, clerks, lift-boys, stenographers, shop-assistants, waiters in the cities being followed by the small tradesmen and farmers in the country districts. To give the leaders of American finance, and especially the governors of the Federal Reserve system, their due, they knew that this speculative expansion was unhealthy and would have checked it by restricting credits in 1927, but 1928 was a Presidential Election year, and great pressure was brought upon them by the Republican chiefs not to check the prosperity wave in order that the Republican President Coolidge, with his great prestige due to the good times of his régime, should be followed by the Republican Mr. Hoover to the White House. Action was deferred, therefore, till the beginning of 1929; and then, as has so often happened in American economic history, the slide was as violent and rapid as the previous boom.

Prior to this there had been the collapse of another speculative boom which many in America regarded as the beginning of the present trouble. I refer to the land boom in Florida. This was the greatest speculative ramp the world has seen since the South Sea Bubble, and its extent can only be grasped by viewing the aftermath. Florida is blessed with probably the most beautiful climate in the world, because of the proximity of the Gulf Stream, which keeps the temperature even. The land speculators apparently thought every family in the United States would buy a plot and build a home in Florida where they would spend their holidays, and where the older generation would eventually retire to live out their remaining years. They actually laid out twice as many plots and sites as there are families in the United States. If every head of a household, actual or prospective, had bought a site in Florida only half the land so prepared would have been taken up; and most of the land offered for sale, and eagerly purchased, was artificially pumped up from the sea. A new city to accommodate 1,000,000 people—Hollywood, Florida—was laid out, on the plan of Washington, with the broad avenues running out like the spokes of a wheel, the hub being the great central square, with its municipal buildings, concert-halls, banks, stores, and blocks of offices. There are miles of concrete streets on which a motor car has never driven, thousands of street lamps that have never been lighted, half a dozen parks, in which nothing grows, complete with ornamental lakes, fountains and bandstands; and living to-day, in this skeleton of a city, are about 150 poverty-stricken people, some of them eking out an existence by growing vegetables on the plots of land they bought and with which they were left stranded.

Land was sold that was still at the bottom of the sea. For here it was intended to enclose a space, as has been done in the case of thousands of acres all along the Florida shore, and to force the sand from the sea bottom by suction pumps in order to make an artificial island and then enclose the whole by a surrounding concrete wall. At Fort Lauderdale, a colony laid out in imitation of Venice, and as large, the artificial islands are still joined to each other by 200 beautiful concrete bridges looking like marble and modelled on the Rialto at a cost of \$2000 each. The islands are there, and so are the bridges, but the roads have never been constructed nor the houses built. Not only can much land in Florida be had for nothing, but the unfortunate owners will pay a premium to anyone who will take it over, together with its liability in rates and State taxes. The collapse of the great Florida land boom in 1926 was to the observant the first sign of the coming storm. It is to be feared

that the storm has not yet spent its force. The immediate outlook, therefore, is dark.

The United States is, nevertheless, at the beginning of a new period of development, the third since the industrial revolution following on the Civil War. If this third period is to be fruitful, and one of real recovery, certain changes must take place. Some are changes in mentality, others in method. The crime epidemic is more than a nuisance; it is a menace. In a new and rapidly developing country, which attracts adventurous spirits from all parts of the world, a considerable criminal population is inevitable; but the disquieting feature about American crime is not so much that it is committed, but that it is so rarely punished. The existence of an unholy alliance between the criminals and the local politicians disturbs every decent citizen in the United States. The Federal Government is no better and no worse than the central Governments of many European countries. In the past there have been serious scandals that have reached up to the very steps of the White House, but these are not taken as a matter of course. It is when we come to the Governments of some of the individual States, and, still more, of the cities and other smaller units, that conditions are so appalling. Here graft, bribery and corruption are rampant. Indeed, in certain areas of local government the definition of an honest man is one who when he is bribed will remain bribed. Thus the kidnapping of Colonel Lindbergh's child, even before it became known that the baby had been brutally murdered, created a tremendous sensation because of the prominence of the parents and the romantic circumstances that surround the Lindbergh *ménage*; but last year there were more than 2000 kidnappings reported to the police, including the abduction of the children of other prominent persons. In very few cases were the offenders discovered, or, if discovered, arrested. These cases attracted little public attention outside the immediate locality concerned.

Robbery with violence, 'racketeering,' blackmail, kidnapping, are so prevalent as hardly to attract attention, and it is taken for granted that the local politicians in many parts of the country are in league with the criminals. The growth of crime of all kinds in the last ten years is undoubtedly largely due to the attempt to enforce Prohibition. In about half the country, and that the most thickly populated and wealthy, the Prohibition law has no public sanction behind it. Nearly everyone breaks the Prohibition law, either by buying liquor from a bootlegger or by manufacturing alcoholic drink in the home. The bootlegging industry is understood to rank third in importance in America, the first and second being automobiles and beauty parlours. It employs an immense criminal, or semi-criminal, personnel. Up till the end

of the boom, when money was plentiful, the illicit liquor traders and their allies earned an easy living; but now that hard times have come their sales have fallen off, while their ranks have been recruited from persons whose businesses have failed, or who are out of work, bringing increased competition. Failing to thrive on bootlegging, many of the more desperate criminals commit violent offences; hence the growth in the number of robberies, blackmailings, and racketeerings. Racketeering is the name given to the process of levying toll upon business men and shopkeepers in exchange for alleged protection, and it is only blackmail commercialised on a large scale. This crime epidemic is undoubtedly injuring the whole social structure and actually making a business recovery more difficult. Here decent Americans have the remedy in their own hands if they like to apply it. There must, first of all, be a greater readiness to assist the authorities and to give evidence against criminals; in other words, there must be a growth both of civic courage and of a sense of civic duty. Secondly, decent Americans must rid themselves of the idea that all politics is a dirty game in which no gentleman can engage. That members of the best and most respected families in the United States engage in State and Federal politics is perfectly true, but more honest Americans must do their duty in local and State politics and not leave the field to those who are simply in public life for what they can make out of it. Most important of all, the farce of attempting to enforce the Prohibition laws must be abandoned. The effort to make America 'dry' by law has failed and is continuing to fail, and has resulted in great evil. There are constitutional difficulties in repealing an amendment to the Constitution; but it would not be impossible to pass a law fixing the alcoholic content of illegal liquors much higher so as to legalise wines and beer at least.

Another reform urgently needed is in the banking system: 3029 banks failed in 1931; most of these were small and weak concerns which should never have existed at all. It is generally admitted that the banking laws are far too lax both in permitting men of straw to found banks and in allowing all sorts of irregularities in their conduct. There is a Bill now before Congress to enable the larger banks to establish branches beyond the borders of their own States. This prohibition has prevented strong banking organisations from establishing branches throughout the Union; and the weakness of the multiplicity of little banking establishments up and down the country has been proved once more, as in 1893. The new Bill also tightens up the control of the Federal Reserve banks over their member banks. Apart from these weaknesses in the American banking system, which

Congress will perhaps now remove, and which must be removed if prosperity is to return, there is need of improvement in the banking customs of the country. The reason for the failure of many of the banks has been the restriction of credits during the deflationary period from 1928 to 1931. This has been a deliberate policy which the Federal Reserve Board is now tardily trying to reverse; but this has not been the only cause of the trouble. Far too many bank presidents and directors have sought to 'get rich quick' by advancing loans to their personal friends and granting credits or overdrafts to speculative and unsound businesses in the hope of quick and large returns. Here, as in politics, a change will come from a higher sense of public morality.

Another evil from which the United States suffers is the reluctance of the second and third generations of immigrants to engage in manual toil or work on the land. The sons and daughters of artisans and farmers all want to be lawyers, doctors, 'realtors,' salesmen, advertisers, or members of other blackcoated professions. There are 20,000 lawyers in New York city alone, and it is impossible for at least half of these to make an honest living at their own profession. The universities turn out over 120,000 students a year. The total university student strength in the year 1927-1928 was 563,244 men and 356,137 women. The bulk of these will be absorbed in the teaching profession, especially the women, for the State educational authorities are insisting more and more on the school teachers being university graduates, but the teaching profession cannot take them all and the other callings already mentioned are overcrowded. At present more and more of the manual work is being done by coloured or imported labour—negroes, Mexicans, Philipinos, Hawaiians—and less and less by the white European stocks. Here the lesson must be learnt that a superior education is not necessarily a bar to productive work.

Another factor, that can be overcome in the future, is the under-population of the United States. There are many million acres of suitable land unsettled and uncultivated. There is now a back-to-the-land movement, but, as might be expected, it is being exploited by the real estate salesmen. Their new sales campaign takes the form of pointing out that 100 years ago very few men owned two pairs of boots and that to-day very few families own two houses. They are trying to sell land outside the cities by suggesting that families should have two houses, one in the town for winter use and one in the country for summer use. This, however, is not the type of land settlement that the United States requires. More families are needed on the land who will make a career on the land, live on the land and live by the land, consuming the products of the cities. It is realized, at last,

that a mistake was made in checking immigration; and now, when the immigrants are needed, it is not so certain that they will come. True, agriculture is suffering possibly a worse depression than any other industry. Thousands of homestead farms in the New England States have been out of cultivation for years; the houses are either unoccupied or utilised for making an uncertain income out of boarders or summer holiday-makers. The farms themselves are covered by an undergrowth of secondary scrub which will probably never be cleared; but in the hitherto prosperous dry farming districts of California and in the great wheat-growing areas of the Middle West there is depression also. Even the great multiple farms, cultivated by mechanical means, with every possible labour-saving device, are not paying. The only farming that is holding its own is where an Italian, or other recently arrived immigrant, cultivates a holding by overworking himself and his family. This depression is caused by the rise in gold values and the fall in commodity prices, principally wheat, cotton, and corn. The farmer who could pay the interest on his mortgage with 300 bushels of wheat must now provide 1000 bushels of wheat to meet the charges. There is a movement in the United States, corresponding to the similar agitation in Britain, to raise prices to the pre-slump level. I refer here to the prices of primary products. When this is done—as it must be done if there is not to be an economic disaster of the greatest magnitude, Congress will be wise to remove restrictions on immigration and to encourage in every other possible way the closer settlement of the land.

This brings me to the greatest of the American problems: how to escape from the effects of deflation. The Glass-Steagall Bill, which received the Presidential approval last March, enables the Federal Reserve banks to issue currency against Government bonds instead of only against gold or the eligible paper of the member banks—representing gold—under the original Federal Reserve Board Act. It removes the danger of a run on the American gold engineered from Paris, Amsterdam or anywhere else, and enables the Federal Reserve Board to expand currency and credits. This is being done by open market operations on a substantial scale. The Federal Reserve Board is now buying securities at the rate of \$100,000,000,000 to \$150,000,000,000 a week. New currency to this amount is being pumped into the financial system. Pressure is being brought to bear on Congress for a very substantial additional measure of reflation. This pressure comes, especially, from the Middle Western farmers, who are in revolt, in some districts with rifles in their hands, against the alleged machinations of Wall Street and the evils of speculation. Thus, on May 2, 1932, the House of Representatives

passed the Goldborough-Fletcher Stabilization Bill by 289 votes to 59. The Bill directs the Federal Reserve Board to re-establish the purchasing power of the dollar at the average level of the period 1921 to 1929, and, to this end, authorizes an increase of the currency up to \$9,000,000,000. The dollar at the date of the passage of this Bill, which, at the time of writing, has not received the Presidential sanction and is not likely to, buys \$1.60 worth of goods as compared with its average purchasing power during the years 1921 to 1929.

Whatever President Hoover does, some such measure of reflation is needed if the price of primary products is to recover, and without this recovery there can be no end to the slump. In any case, the reflation by open market operations on the part of the Federal Reserve banks, through the purchase of bonds, is likely to continue, but the results depend on a number of factors. For example, the still solvent private banks have been so frightened that their boards intend to keep their reserves liquid for some time. In theory every \$1,000,000 of new deposits in the member banks arising from the purchase of bonds in the open market should lead to the loan of at least \$10,000,000 of credit to industry and commerce. So far the private banks have not responded. The very bonds which the Federal Reserve Board are purchasing are the particular type of investment which the private banks are trying to hold. For they are earning assets and yet liquid, in that they can be sold at any time. If the open market operations continue long enough the commercial banks will find themselves denuded of Government bonds and other gilt-edged securities, their debts paid off, and with heavy cash deposits earning no revenue. The private banks will then have two alternatives. One is to return their money to their depositors and shareholders and retire from business, the other to use their now too liquid reserves in accordance with banking practice—in other words, to lend it to industry. What is in process now is a forcing by the Federal Reserve Board of their member banks once more to begin lending to *entrepreneurs* against non-liquid security, and if the governors of the Federal Reserve Board have the nerve and the persistence to break down the fear-resistance of their member banks, industry will begin to revive. Prices will then rise, enterprise be encouraged, and the beginnings of the end of this catastrophic slump be in sight.

I took a delight when recently in the United States in reminding my American friends that all their losses were on paper. This infuriated some of them, but it is true. The vast country remains, with its tremendous natural resources, almost entirely independent of raw materials or goods from abroad, and with a vast industrial and agricultural equipment. Its people have

suffered from too much luxury, too easy wealth, and they still suffer, as regards large unassimilated sections of the population, from lack of character and backbone and a tendency to give way to despair too quickly when hard times come ; but the depression has taught even more valuable lessons than the slump which ended the first great period of expansion in 1893.

J M KENWORTHY

LEGISLATION BY WHITEHALL

THE *New Despotism*, as conceived by the Lord Chief Justice and expounded by him in a book bearing that title, is vested in certain administrative departments, and falls under two main headings—first, the exercise of powers of a kind belonging properly to courts of law, and, secondly, the exercise of powers of a kind belonging properly to Parliament. The former of these two subjects has been better treated by Mr. William A. Robson, who, in a book published in 1928—*Justice and Administrative Law*—has collected the relevant facts with industry and set them out with a clearness and judicial calm which Lord Hewart's book does not attain.

The present article is concerned exclusively with the second of the two headings mentioned above—namely, the possession and exercise by departments of certain legislative or dispensing powers which have (improperly in Lord Hewart's opinion) been conferred upon them by Parliament. These powers have been conferred, not by obscure clauses in little-known Acts, but in express terms and for specific purposes, in Government measures of the first rank on nine different occasions during the last forty-four years. Parliament has been alive to the possible dangers arising from the delegation of some of its powers, and has hedged them round with safeguards intended to confine them to what is necessary in order to bring into operation the statutes of which they form a part. I will endeavour in this article to give a dispassionate account of the nature and extent of these powers, their parliamentary history, and the uses to which they have been applied.

The merits or demerits of the large measures of social legislation which have been brought into operation with the help of these powers lie entirely outside the scope of the present argument. For instance, the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 may in its general conception and purpose have been a good or a bad measure; its merits are not under discussion here. But, quite apart from its merits, a totally different question arises as to the means adopted for bringing it into operation. Was the Government of that time justified in carrying, with the

aid of the vote of the Attorney-General (Sir Gordon Howard), a measure which conferred upon a department of State a power to make orders modifying the provisions of the Act itself for the purpose of bringing the Act into operation? Or are they to be censured for having thereby done violence to the Constitution? That is the issue to which the present argument is addressed; and while suggesting that that Government and its Attorney-General should be acquitted on that issue, I will so state the case as to afford material on which every reader can form his own judgment.

Henry VIII., in the thirty-first year of his reign, obtained from Parliament a statute enacting that, subject to some important restrictions and exceptions, the proclamations made by the King and Council should have the force of statutes. It is from this circumstance that a clause which, with variations suitable to the subject-matter, has been contained in sundry Acts of Parliament since the year 1558, empowering the Minister or Commissioners in charge of a department to make Orders supplying the deficiencies in an Act, or even (under strictly defined limitations) modifying the provisions of the Act, has come to be known as the Henry VIII. clause. The enactment of this clause, which is, if not in substance, at any rate in appearance, an infringement of the principle that legislation is the exclusive privilege of Parliament has not passed without misgivings, and has been challenged on more than one occasion. It was criticised in the House of Commons in the year 1911 on its inclusion in the National Insurance Act; and in the year 1929, on its inclusion in the Local Government Act, it was subjected to a close scrutiny in some most interesting debates in Parliament, and was in consequence amended in the House of Commons and then further amended in the House of Lords.

Before referring in further detail to its parliamentary history, which has been briefly outlined above, it is convenient at the outset to remark that the Henry VIII. clause is quite distinct from the ordinary rule-making clause that appears in many Acts of Parliament. It is common to find in Acts of Parliament sections or sub-sections empowering departments of State to make rules for giving effect in greater detail to the purposes of the Act. For instance, Parliament directs that teachers' pensions shall be based, according to a certain formula, upon various factors, of which the length of their full-time service is one; and also directs that the Board of Education shall prescribe by rules to what extent and under what conditions absence on sick leave may be included in the reckoning of pensionable service. This is the more necessary inasmuch as the teachers are not in the employ of the department, but in that of several

hundreds of local bodies, who grant sick leave at their own discretion. The department then, with the consent of the Treasury, formulates rules, relating to absence on sick leave, publishes them in draft, and receives criticisms and suggestions from all concerned, after which the rules are made and laid before Parliament.

The system of rule-making which is here described extends to many topics, and is probably an indispensable part of modern methods for the transaction of public business. It stands midway between the legislative and the administrative function, being on the line where the one merges into the other. Is rule-making a legislative function? If so, the department is exercising, under safeguards, a delegated power of legislation. Or are the rules to be regarded as generalised statements of the lines on which the department will administer? If so, the arrangement is one whereby Parliament not only legislates, but is advised of the main principles to be followed in administration. There is no great difficulty in establishing a distinction between those matters which by their importance or their generality, or their permanence, are suitable for embodiment in the text of an Act and those which may properly be dealt with in statutory rules. The practice of directing departments to make statutory rules should be regarded as a limitation on the powers of the departments: for if Parliament stopped short at what is capable of being laid down in the text of an Act, the rest would be left to the unfettered discretion of the department in administration, but as it is, the departments are commissioned to design their own letters in the form of rules. The rules are a protection to the individual members of the public affected by the Act, who are thereby assured of the course which administration will take. They are also a protection to a department from having to fight a battle on each individual case that might, but for the rule, be open to question.

Now all this is common knowledge among those who are conversant with public affairs, but we begin to approach much more controversial ground when we pass from the consideration of the ordinary rule-making power to the power to make orders for removing difficulties in bringing an Act into operation, and modifying, if necessary, the provisions of the Act for that purpose.

Such a clause first appeared in the Local Government Act, 1888 (section 108)

If . . . any difficulty arises as respects the holding of the first election of county councillors, or as to the first meeting of a provisional council, the Local Government Board may by order appoint a returning officer or other officer, and do any matter or thing which appears to them necessary for the proper holding of the first election.

Any such order may modify the provisions of this Act so far as may appear to the Board necessary.

There is nothing out of the way in allowing a central department to intervene at the initial stage in order to get the institution started, if the local machinery fails to function; but the latter part of this clause, enabling the department to modify the provisions of the Act itself if necessary in order to get it going, has, not unnaturally, attracted criticism. The clause, it will be observed, was here applicable only to difficulties arising as respects the holding of the first election or as to the first meeting of the council, and it was repeated with a similar limitation (to the holding of the first parish meeting) in the Local Government Act, 1894. It was also repeated in the Irish Local Government Act, 1898. A wider extension was given to the occasions on which recourse might be had to these exceptional powers in the National Insurance Act, 1911 (section 78). There was no department of State specially charged, before this Act was introduced, with the duty of supervising health insurance, and, although the ground was surveyed so far as practicable for the purpose of drafting this measure, it was certain that the Commissioners who were entrusted with its administration would encounter many difficulties that could not be precisely foreseen and provided for in the Bill. The clause ran

If any difficulty arises in bringing into operation this part of this Act, the Insurance Commissioners may by Order make any appointment and do anything which appears to them necessary or expedient for bringing this part of this Act into operation and any such Order may modify the provisions of this Act so far as may appear necessary or expedient for carrying the Order into effect.

When the Commissioners came to work the Act they found it necessary to fill up some holes in it by Orders passed under this section.

The clause was repeated in the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920 (administered by the Ministry of Labour). This Act was passed by the Government in which Sir Gordon Hewart was Attorney-General, and he voted for the third reading of the Bill, but never spoke upon it.

The clause was again repeated in the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1925, and in the Rating and Valuation Act, 1925.

Here we may pause to remark that this clause was not the property of any one political party, but had been fathered in turn by Liberal, Conservative, and Coalition Governments.

The form in which it stood in the Local Government Bill, 1929, before amendment, was :

If any difficulty arises in connection with the application of this Act to any exceptional area, or in bringing into operation any of the provisions of this Act, the Minister may by order remove the difficulty, or make any appointment, or do any other thing, which appears to him necessary or expedient for bringing the said provisions into operation.

Any such Order may modify the provisions of this Act so far as may appear to the Minister necessary or expedient for carrying the Order into effect.

There were further words fixing a limit of time (December 31, 1930) after which the Minister might not exercise these powers (although any Order made before that date would continue in force after it), and another sub-section indicating what was meant by exceptional areas.

Any Order made under this or other sections of the Act was to be laid before Parliament, which reserved power to annul it.

In February and March 1929 the House of Commons debated the constitutional issue raised by this clause, and the practical need for it. The criticisms, which were not merely negative, came from all quarters of the House but chiefly from the Conservative benches. They were moderate in their tone and helpful in their intention. The following extract may be quoted as typical.

Sir Alfred Hopkinson, a Conservative member for the English Universities, whose suggestions were adopted by the Minister as the basis for some amendment of the clause, said.

There are certain points on which we are all agreed. The first is that some clause of this kind is necessary. We have the assurance of the Minister that difficulties may arise and may have to be met in some such way as is proposed. The second point is that there are precedents, almost word for word, for such a clause as this. On the other hand, looking at this matter not pedantically but from the point of view which I think all lawyers ought to take, that they are to some extent the guardians of the old constitutional principles, we ought not to outrage those principles more than is necessary in order to deal with a practical difficulty.

In the result, the Commons amended the clause by condensing and modifying it so that the main part of it ran as follows:

If any difficulty arises in connection with the application of this Act to any exceptional area, or in bringing into operation any of the provisions of this Act, the Minister may make such Order for removing the difficulty as he may judge to be necessary for that purpose, and any such Order may modify the provisions of this Act so far as may appear to the Minister necessary for carrying the Order into effect.

The rest of the clause retained the time limit for the exercise of these powers (December 31, 1930), and required that any Order made under them should be laid promptly before Parliament.

The House of Lords, in its turn, introduced an important further amendment, by which any Order made under this section takes effect at once, but ceases to take effect at the end of three months, unless within that time it has been approved by a resolution passed by each House of Parliament; in this period of three months any time during which Parliament is not sitting is not to be counted. This amendment provided a happy solution, which was approved by the House of Commons, after various members who had taken part in previous debates had expressed their satisfaction.

It is to be observed that Parliament, in making this settlement of the matter, left with the Minister, but under increased restrictions, a power of modifying the provisions of an Act of Parliament. Under the clause in its previous form he had that power, but was obliged promptly to lay before Parliament any Order having that effect, and Parliament could disallow if it thought fit. Under the clause as it was passed the Minister has the power, but his exercise of it in any instance will last only for three months unless both Houses of Parliament pass a resolution affirming it.

It is further to be observed that the clause which Parliament passed with expressions of approval does not attempt the almost impossible task of defining what sort of difficulties will, if they arise, justify the exercise of these exceptional powers.

One member asked whether the clause meant that the Minister could modify the Act if he found it to be unpopular, and the Attorney-General (Sir Thomas Inskip) repudiated such a construction, saying:

The difficulty that is aimed at in the section is what may be called a physical difficulty, that the Minister finds that the intention of Parliament as expressed in the provision of the Act cannot be put into operation because there is some actual difficulty in the state of the law or the legal organisation of some district for instance.

Evidently this was about as far as anyone could go in describing what sort of difficulties, impossible to foresee, might arise and justify recourse to the section.

Although it may have been impossible in drafting the Henry VIII. clause to lay down very closely the nature of the difficulties which would justify a Minister in modifying the provisions of an Act of Parliament, it is quite possible to take a retrospective view of the matter, and to see on what occasions a Minister, charged with the duty of bringing into operation any of the Acts containing this clause, did in fact use it for modifying any of the provisions of the Act. Such a retrospect, which might now be extended over forty-four years of administrative history, will have no attractions for a popular orator.

It is very dull and disappointing to search through the Orders made under the Rating VIII. clause in the hope of finding scandals and to find none. Not one of them has ever been annulled by Parliament, before which they have all been laid as soon as might be after having been made.

The safer ground, for those who desire to remain hostile, is to decline to listen to any recital of facts. If the principle of the clause is wrong, why inquire whether any damage has ensued? If the powers have not been misused in the past they may be misused in the future, and the damage may go too far before Parliament can intervene and put an end to it.

There are, however, so few issues in public affairs that are capable of being decided by appeal to pure theory alone that most men who desire to judge the merits of the clause will ask 'How does it work?' and will listen to the answer.

Mr. Chamberlain gave some instances in the House of Commons debate in February 1910. Orders were made under the Rating and Valuation Act declaring (1) that the parish of Folkestone-next-Sandgate, which for certain purposes is rated as part of Folkestone but for other purposes as part of Sandgate, was for the purposes of the Act in the rating area of Sandgate; (2) that the parish of Dudley Castle Hill, which is held on lease by the borough of Dudley and has never had a district council of its own, was for the purposes of the Act in the rating area of Dudley borough; (3) that the new valuation list, which elsewhere came into force on April 1, should come into force on May 1 in Manchester, since that city alone has a rate year ending April 30; (4) that in Haverfordwest two justices instead of five should be a quorum for hearing rating appeals, in consequence of there not being enough qualified justices in this place.

He gave an instance also of an Order made under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920, to prevent certain seamen and soldiers discharged after July 31, 1920, from being disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit by reason of having received payment from public funds after November 5. They did receive payment up to November 30 by reason of a coal strike existing on November 5, and the Order extended from November 5 to 30 the period within which such payments might be received without disqualification.

Major Hills, the Conservative member for one of the divisions of the West Riding, speaking soon after Mr. Chamberlain, pointed out how inevitable it was that unforeseen snags like this should occur in the working out of a complex Act, and urged the advantages of enabling the Minister to put them right without having to come back to Parliament for a series of amending Acts.

In the House of Lords the Lord Chancellor (Lord Haldane), in proposing the amendment which Parliament gladly accepted as terminating the dispute, remarked, 'I have here a whole list of cases under the Rating and Valuation Act, in which the power has had to be exercised, sometimes in regard to a particular area, sometimes in regard to a general condition of affairs which could not have been foreseen at the time when the Act was originally passed,' but he did not quote them in detail because, as he remarked, he thought that the general necessity for some such powers as those contained in the clause was fully recognised in that House.

This specimen list of Orders made by the departments under powers conferred by the Henry VIII. clause does not go very far to satisfy the appetite for thrills that may have been aroused by the title of Lord Hewart's book. The plain man will ask whether this is a true sample of the uses to which these powers have been put; and when he has reassured himself on that point he will be in possession of the whole material for a decision. He will reflect that these powers were conferred by Parliament itself; that all instances of their exercise have been promptly reported to Parliament; that Parliament, after receiving these reports, has proceeded again and again to confer them afresh; and that this has been going on for forty-four years. In these circumstances he will probably be rather hard put to it to discover either where is the novelty, or where is the despotism; and his verdict upon the whole case will probably be that the Law Officer of the Crown who gave a silent vote in 1920 for one of the Acts in which these powers were conferred did not thereby fall short of the duty of lawyers, as expressed by Sir Alfred Hopkinson: to be to some extent the guardian of the old constitutional principles, and not to outrage them more than is necessary in order to deal with a practical difficulty.

Some readers may feel a mild surprise that matters such as those with which the Orders deal should be unable to be adjusted except under a dispensing power to modify the provisions of an Act of Parliament. Need statutes be drawn with so much particularity as to require that five justices in Haverfordwest should form a quorum, or to prescribe the date for certain qualifying payments for unemployment insurance? Might not Acts be drawn in more general terms, with discretion left to the Minister to arrange minor details of dates and procedure? The answer to this question is, that undoubtedly it would be possible, as a question of drafting, to construct Bills on broader lines, but that, as a question of politics, a Minister is wise who errs on the side of submitting too much, rather than too little, of the working details of his plan to Parliament. For many weighty

reasons, which need not be set out here, it is part of the tradition of parliamentary government in this country that any important Bill laid before Parliament should contain a fairly full scheme of administrative procedure for carrying it into effect. Parliament itself prefers this course, and so do the public departments, and so do the local authorities; it is the course which suits best the general interest of smooth government. The question may then arise whether Acts might not be drafted with powers for exceptions and variations expressly provided in every clause in which their exercise may be necessary, and not in the form of a generalised power to modify the provisions of the Act in order to meet difficulties. The answer to this question is, that in some Acts of Parliament the power to make exceptions is attached to particular clauses; but that when large measures of social or administrative reconstruction are taken in hand, and a detailed scheme for their operation is to be prescribed in the text of an Act, the points at which unforeseen difficulties may occur are too numerous to be conveniently treated *seriatim* by a proviso to each separate clause. The Local Government Act, 1929, contains 138 clauses and twelve schedules, which together occupy 183 pages of print. When legislation is to be undertaken on that scale the inclusion of some general dispensing power for meeting the needs of exceptional areas, or unexpected difficulties in bringing the Acts into operation, appears to be almost unavoidable. At any rate, as will be seen from the foregoing narrative, the members of both Houses of Parliament, after considerable discussion, took that view of the necessities of the case.

The subject has now been taken a stage further by the recently published report of Lord Donoughmore's Committee on Ministers' Powers. This Committee was appointed in October 1929 by the Lord Chancellor after consultation with the Prime Minister, and was instructed to consider the powers exercised by or under the direction of Ministers of the Crown by way of (a) delegated legislation and (b) judicial or quasi-judicial decision, and to report what safeguards are desirable or necessary to secure the constitutional principles of the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of the Law. So far as concerns the subject to which the present article is limited—namely, the powers exercised under the direction of Ministers by way of delegated legislation—the Committee have done their work in masterly fashion. They have brought under review a great mass of material, and have with great skill and judgment succeeded in exhibiting the whole in its true proportions and perspective. Consequently their Report, which achieves the feat of rendering intelligible to the ordinary reader a highly technical and complicated subject,

will be an important contribution to the literature descriptive of English political developments.

The Committee decline to condemn the practice of delegating legislative powers to Ministers; they regard it as inevitable and legitimate and constitutionally desirable for certain purposes, within certain limits and under certain safeguards. They see in it certain dangers, and consider that it is liable to abuse, and that safeguards are required. Its defects, in their opinion, are the inevitable consequence of its haphazard evolution. The dangers for the most part are potential rather than actual. They find no ground for a belief that our constitutional machinery is developing in directions which are fundamentally wrong.

The Committee's reasons for thinking delegated legislation to be both legitimate and constitutionally desirable are: the great pressure upon parliamentary time and the consequent need for relieving Parliament from the discussion of matters of minor importance; the technical nature of some of the subject-matter of modern legislation; the difficulty or impossibility of foreseeing all the contingencies and local conditions to which a statute will apply, and of working out beforehand the whole of the administrative machinery for applying it; the need for enabling the law to be adapted to unknown future conditions without the necessity of coming back to Parliament with an amending Bill; the opportunities which such a practice offers of proceeding tentatively and profiting by the lessons of experience; and, on exceptional occasions, the vital necessity of empowering the Government to take swift measures to meet emergencies.

The Committee's views as to the risks of abuse incidental to the practice of delegated legislation are to be inferred from the safeguards which they recommend. The proposed safeguards, which are enumerated by the Committee under fifteen headings extending over six pages, may conveniently be summarised here under the following headings:

(1) The language to be used in the statutes which delegate legislative powers;

(2) Limits ordinarily to be observed in delegating powers;

(3) Parliamentary procedure with regard to the statutes delegating powers;

(4) The preparation of the rules and regulations made by Departments under the powers so delegated;

(5) The publication of those rules;

(6) Parliamentary procedure for taking cognisance of those rules.

As regards the language to be used in statutes which delegate legislative powers, the Committee lay down a proposition which will command immediate assent—namely, that the limits of the

powers conferred, or the discretion conferred, should be expressly defined in clear language. The Committee also desire to establish uniform terminology in statutory references to the modes by which delegated legislative powers may be exercised. At present the picturesque variety of the English language has relieved our statutes of all monotony in that respect, so that one Minister is 'making' a 'regulation' while another is 'prescribing,' 'approving,' 'appointing' or 'fixing,' and the thing so made, prescribed, approved, etc., may be some elegant synonym for regulations—e.g., 'rules,' 'Orders,' 'warrants,' 'minutes,' 'schemes,' 'bye-laws,' etc. It may at first sight seem strange that the Committee should profess bewilderment at this wealth of our English official vocabulary, and should wish to prune the exuberance of the *gradus ad Parnassum* to which draftsmen may have recourse when turning out their little gems of composition in 'Whitehallese.' But the reason probably is that it is the Committee's desire to enable Parliament to delegate legislative powers with an easy mind, knowing that no exercise of a legislative power will masquerade under another name and thereby escape the subsequent procedure of publication and presentation to Parliament.

It is impossible, however, to feel very confident that the positive recommendations of the Committee under this heading will find universal acceptance, for they propose that all exercises of the legislative power delegated to departments should be designated either as 'regulations' or as 'rules'—'regulations' if they make substantive law, 'rules' if they make law about procedure. The expression 'Order' is to mean something quite different from an exercise of delegated legislative power, and in future when 'Orders in Council' are made under delegated statutory powers they are to become 'Regulations in Council,' whereas when based on the prerogative they will still be Orders in Council.

As regards the proposed distinction between 'regulation' and 'rule' (the purpose of which is probably to enable a classification readily to be applied, for parliamentary purposes, between documents of substance and documents of procedure), it must be remarked that the distinction between substance and procedure is not perfect nor absolute. Very many documents which are entitled rules or regulations relate both to substance and to procedure, and it would be most inconvenient if they had to be split into those two component parts. Further, can we admit the argument of this Committee that the natural connotation of 'regulation' is that it relates to substance, and of 'rule' that it relates to procedure? If so, had we not better push a little further our reforms of terminology, and in future speak no more of the 'golden rule' of conduct, but of the 'golden regulation'? The correct official usage at present of the word 'rule' is that

which I have adopted in an earlier part of this article ; "rule" is a generic term which includes rules, regulations, and byelaws. This is the sense given to it by the definition clause of the Rules Publication Act.

The proposals of the Committee as to the limits ordinarily to be observed in delegating powers relate to the Henry VIII. clause and clauses shutting out the jurisdiction of the courts. As regards the Henry VIII. clause they say, in effect, what used to be the motto wherewith the headmaster in a famous school granted a half-holiday : *Commendat rarior usus*. They consider that the clause is a political instrument which must occasionally be used. 'It should be abandoned in all but the most exceptional cases.' The Committee do not leave Henry VIII. in undisputed possession of his clause, for they have brought to light an instance of an enactment from the reign of Richard II. whereby the Lord Chancellor was authorised to vary the provisions of an earlier Act which had laid down where assizes should be held. Apparently the Lord Chancellor exercised these powers under the statute of Richard II. until 1833, and still exercises them under modern Acts which replaced that statute. The Committee quote the nine instances in which the Henry VIII. clause has been enacted in the last forty-four years, and they recommend that it should never be used except for the sole purpose of bringing an Act into operation, and that it should be subject to a time limit of one year from the passing of the Act. No department is likely to raise objections to these conditions.

The courts of law do not interfere with the exercise by a Minister of discretion conferred upon him by law, but if he steps outside those powers, or if he does not proceed in the prescribed way or arrives improperly at his decision, the courts may be invoked to set aside his action. Occasionally clauses conferring upon Ministers powers to make regulations or Orders are framed in such a way as to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts. The Committee recommend that the use of such clauses should be abandoned in all but the most exceptional cases ; and when those exceptional cases occur, there should nevertheless be an initial period of three, or preferably six, months during which the regulation or Order may be challenged in the courts. When immunity from challenge is to be granted it should be granted in clear language ; and when it is not granted the statute should not contain any language suggesting a doubt as to the right and duty of the courts to decide in any particular case whether the Minister has acted within his powers.

With the two exceptions here named (the Henry VIII. clause and clauses shutting out jurisdiction) the Committee offer no advice as to the limits of the powers which the Executive should

seek or Parliament should grant by way of delegation. In the earlier and historical part of their Report the Committee give some instances to illustrate the subject-matter to which the delegated powers extend. There is considerable difference, as might be expected, between one statute and another in this respect. For instance, discipline in the Army is governed by articles made by the Crown under Sign Manual, in virtue of powers given by the Mutiny Act of 1717 and its successors; but in the Navy the Articles of War have been specifically enacted by Parliament ever since 1661. Midshipman Easy, when ordered by Captain Wilson to the masthead, took with him for perusal the Articles of War, in which he found a remarkable omission to mention mastheads as a means of discipline. What he took with him was an Act of Parliament. Had he been transferred to the Army any authorised pains and penalties inflicted on him (not extending to life or limb in this country) would have rested on delegated legislation, and so they would now if he were in the Air Force. The Committee after pointing out discrepancies such as this, do not revert to the topic later. So far as their recommendations go, any powers, however extensive, may be conferred on a Minister by Parliament, provided that their precise limits are expressly defined in clear language by the statute which confers them.

Upon the introduction into either House of a Bill conferring legislative powers the Committee recommend that it should be examined by a Standing Committee charged with the duty of reporting, *inter alia*, whether the language defining the limits of the powers is clear, whether the Bill contains a Henry VIII. clause or one shutting out the jurisdiction of the courts, whether any power to legislate on any matter of principle or to impose a tax is involved, and whether there appears to be anything otherwise exceptional about the proposal. The Committee would be aided in these duties by a memorandum from the Minister. It is said that the duty of the Committee will be to 'consider the form only and not the merits' of the Bill, but it must be evident that a consideration of the subject-matter of the Bill as well as its form would by some conscientious workers be held indispensable to the construction of a helpful report on the points here italicised.

In preparing the rules and regulations to be made under their delegated powers, the Committee think that the departments require more assistance from skilled draftsmen than is at present available, and departments are also recommended to extend the practices (a) of consulting the interests specially affected by their regulations and (b) of appending explanatory notes to them. The amendment of the Rules Publication Act so as to widen its scope and require antecedent publication of all rules or regulations

that are to be laid before Parliament is recommended, together with other amendments of a more technical character ; and all regulations laid before Parliament should be open to annulment by either House within twenty-eight sitting days.

The same Standing Committee of each House which is to examine the Bills that delegate legislative powers is also to examine the rules or regulations made under those powers when laid before the House, with the assistance and co-operation of the department concerned, and is to report to the House within fourteen days. In no case is the Committee to 'go into the merits' of the regulation, but it is nevertheless to report not only whether the regulation imposes a tax and whether it is challengeable (*i.e.*, does not profess to shut out the jurisdiction of the courts), which a mere perusal of the text should readily reveal, but also whether any matter of principle is involved (a question of opinion, if ever there was one), whether there is any special feature of the regulation meriting the attention of the House, and whether there are any circumstances connected with the making of the regulation meriting such attention. It can hardly be said that Parliament will be exercising more than a formal control over the mass of rules and regulations if it only receives reports upon them from Committees debarred from considering their merits ; and the probable alternatives appear to be that, if this plan is to be efficacious, either the prohibition preventing the Committee from dealing with the merits must disappear, or the Committee will have to find some fiction or formula to enable them to report on the subject-matter and its character, but not professedly upon its merits.

If these Standing Committees are able to function within the limitations proposed, a very difficult problem will have been solved—namely, how Parliament may delegate sufficiently to relieve itself of detail, and at the same time may retain so much supervision over the exercise of the delegated powers as will ensure not merely that they are not abused, but that their freedom from abuse is apparent to all men.

H. W. ORANGE.

THE LEAGUE ASSEMBLY AND THE FAR EAST

THE League of Nations Assembly, which met on March 3 to deal with the Sino-Japanese dispute, is still in session. It may prove the turning-point in this prolonged crisis. More, it may be the beginning of the practice of organised peace, on whose theory the League has worked for ten years. If it fails, as is very possible, the Eastern crisis will have an end evil in itself, and fraught with the contagion of war. And the League will wither away.

It seems exaggerated to attribute crucial importance to a conference which has passed almost unnoticed in England. But there have been reasons for that scant publicity. The Assembly throughout has been a mobilisation of the smaller States in defence of the Covenant. They united, at the outset, in criticising the Great Powers, or the turn of events which the Great Powers had allowed. At the same time they appealed to them for action. The delegates of the Great Powers cannot have relished being told repeatedly that they had been 'an impotent voice crying in the wilderness'. They may have liked the call to action even less. It would be unnatural to expect them to advertise the Assembly. The newspapers, too, have reported it poorly. The bulk of the dailies are pro-Japanese in this dispute, and they dislike the League. The Assembly has been first-class 'news,' but it has been stifled by editorial policy. None the less, it has been both dramatic and important, and the hull and armistice at Shanghai provide an occasion to assess it.

The Assembly, summoned by China, met in an atmosphere of crisis. The conversations on board the *Kant* had resulted on March 28 in an arrangement for truce and mutual withdrawal. Despite this, the Japanese immediately launched a violent attack, and, although the cessation of hostilities was formally announced, on March 3 they advanced on a wide front till March 5 and at certain points for several days after. The advance established them in a line commanding the city and the mouth of the Yangtze. A precarious truce then set in.

The conquest of North Shanghai had, however, proved very

expensive, and seemed likely to afford small advantage to Japan. It had also, at last, roused the Powers to an attitude which seemed serious. Their local nationals, constituting that irrational phenomenon the 'Shanghai mind,' had exulted in contemplation of aggression and bombardment in Manchuria but revolted mildly at the spectacle of burning Chapel. The United States since January had taken a firm line, and on February 24 Mr. Stimson wrote to Mr. Borah stating that the United States would not recognise any situation resulting from the violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact, and that if other States took the same view it would result in the final restoration to China of the rights of which she had been deprived. This was regarded as a lead to Geneva deliberately designed to facilitate a strong Assembly policy, since it removed the argument used by the European Powers that they dared not move without assurance of American support. On the other hand, the appeal to the Assembly was China's last and desperate throw. From the first day she had submitted the case absolutely to the Council, and accepted all its recommendations. The Council, as Finland said, had pursued the line of least resistance. That line was certainly favourable to the aggressor, who completed the conquest of Manchuria and invaded Shanghai entirely unimpeded, and replied to the vain Council appeals with refusal of increasing insolence. In summoning the Assembly China was calling in the small Powers to redress the balance of the great. With her fate, theirs and that of the League were at stake, for all realised that if the Assembly failed the meaning and power of collective treaties would be destroyed.

The transition from the Council to the Assembly was clearly marked by the convoking speech of M. Paul Boncour, the Council President, and the opening of M. Hymans, the Assembly President. M. Boncour made a lifeless speech defending the Council procedure and finding excuses for Japan. M. Hymans briefly said that the task of the Assembly was to settle the dispute once for all. The statements of China and Japan were such as they had made many times before the Council: on China's side, the tale of the invasions, the accusation against Japan of violating the Covenant, Kellogg Pact and Nine-Power Treaty, and waging an 'undeclared war' on China; on Japan's, the plea of self-defence. China's formal appeal was important; Dr. Yen seized the Assembly of the whole dispute, to be settled according to the Covenant, and begged for cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the invaders followed by peaceful settlement. No measure touching Shanghai or Manchuria encroaching upon China's sovereign rights, contradictory to international law, or infringing China's obligations to third parties, could be regarded as a settlement. He asked for

recognition that the Covenant had been broken, and that China bore no responsibility for the situation.

The Assembly then went into general committee, which is League of Nations jargon for getting to business. And observers used to the usual League firmness realised instantly that this Assembly meant business. The bureau forthwith produced a resolution on the immediate situation, inviting cessation of hostilities, asking the neutral Settlement Powers at Shanghai to inform the Assembly on the conditions of cessation, and recommending negotiations between China and Japan with the aid of the neutral authorities, aimed at 'the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.' The Assembly also asked the Settlement Powers to keep it informed of developments. M. Sato, the Japanese representative, proposed to add to the third clause 'regulate the methods and conditions of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.' M. Hymans, the President, told him that this might imply political conditions, and was not what the Assembly meant. A dead silence fell; after a minute M. Hymans cried, 'Il faut que l'Assemblée parle!' M. Motta, of Switzerland, rose and reminded Japan plainly that the Assembly, summoned under Article XV of the Covenant, could vote without the disputants. M. Benck, of Czechoslovakia, supported him. Japan gave way, and the resolution was voted unamended, and constituted a formal pledge binding both China and Japan.

The interval before the general discussion was filled with speculation and rumour among the Press and unofficial public. Would the non-Council States have the courage of their convictions? Had they any convictions? Would they move the Great Powers from their determination not to fulfil the Covenant? France, in any case, was hopeless—consider Boncour's speech of the day before. Britain was the Power that mattered, and Britain was double-crossing. To the League Council she said the United States would not back the Covenant, to the United States that the League was unwilling to act. Both, in fact, were ready and willing, if Britain would only offer a lead. But in the circumstances nobody could lead save Britain. More, this 'little England' British Government was willing to barter the evacuation of Shanghai, where it had interests and which Japan was anxious to relinquish, against Manchuria, which was far more important to China than any single city, but which the Powers would let Japan keep. In fact, it was borne in upon the observer, not for the first time, how vitally important all foreign opinion holds British policy. To her power, still at its fullest stretch unequalled, Britain has added an intermittent

support of League principles for their own sake. When, therefore, the world believes her to be playing the selfishly empirical game normal to Great Powers, its disappointment and anger are intense. This is why British prestige is so peculiarly unstable; general international opinion considers it ought to be the highest in the world, and any appearance of cowardice or disloyalty casts it down below the lowest. Ministers and diplomats may have remained blissfully unaware of what this Assembly was saying in the *couloirs*, for nobody tells the truth to delegations. But the unofficial British citizen was left in no doubt: journalists and delegates were at pains to let him know that, next to Japan, Britain was held chiefly responsible for the Council failure, and so for the shambles in China.

The Assembly met for the general debate in an extraordinary breathless silence. Delegates and Press sat taut, waiting. Norway opened with a short, grave statement that the whole resources of the Covenant must be used, if need be, to settle the dispute. There was a storm of clapping. The applause throughout was worth watching, for it was confined to the delegations and expressed official opinion. China received much, Japan none, the Great Powers a little—from each other. Strong speeches such as those of Sweden, Roumania, and South Africa were clapped for minutes. The atmosphere of intensity persisted; and the feeling of gravity and determination was heightened by the fact that almost all the speeches were read, showing that they were considered statements of policy. There was little rhetoric, and less diplomatic affability. State after State spoke plainly both about China—calling events here by their real names of war and invasion—and about Japan's violation of the League Covenant. This formed a marked contrast to the language of the Council, which, China excepted, had sedulously avoided telling the truth about both topics for six months.

The crux was the fulfilment of the Covenant. Would the League stop short at the mediation which Japan had consistently flouted, or would it go on to act as judge, as it should under Article XV., par. 4, if conciliation fails? Upon this clause, as Switzerland said, stretches the shadow of Article XVI., the 'sanctions' provision for economic blockade of a State which refuses Covenant settlement. Here came the great Assembly division. Japan entered a caveat against Article XV., which she had no legal right to do. The Powers were for mediation only, despite its proved futility in this war, for the natural reason that the execution of sanctions would fall upon them. They found few supporters; even their own groups split away. Britain was supported by India, but Australia and New Zealand were silent, and Canada, Ireland, and South Africa came down definitely

for the Integral Covenant. The South African speech was one of the strongest of the Assembly. France was followed by Poland, and dubiously by Czechoslovakia and Greece, though both of these made proposals much stronger than the Great Power policy. But Yugoslavia and Roumania were on the non-Council side—Roumania very strongly. The Scandinavian and Baltic States, as usual, were in the van together; the Latin-Americans solid with a clearly defined doctrine of non-intervention and inviolability of territory. The most significant non-Council speech was that of Holland, which declared politely but firmly for the Covenant, and which is a Great Power in the Pacific, running precisely the same risks as the others. In the thirty-five speeches other points occurred repeatedly. Most speakers emphasised that the fate of the League, and so of world peace, was at stake. If the League failed in this first serious dispute to secure peace and justice, the collective organisation of the world must be abandoned. Twenty-two States declared that the Covenant had been broken, ten adding the Kellogg Pact. Of those, seventeen accused Japan directly on grounds of refusal to arbitrate, invasion, and conquest. Other recurrent themes were the need for honesty in facing facts and the view that neither the right of self-defence, nor treaty grievances, justified the landing of large armies, the detachment of Manchuria, and the invasion of Shanghai. It was affirmed that aggression can take place without a formal declaration of war.

The same broad consensus of opinion was apparent on principles of settlement. There was indeed the division, already described, between States advocating conciliation only and those urging the mobilisation of the whole Covenant if need be. Many members pleaded for complete and lasting cessation of hostilities: nine out of nineteen added that Japan must evacuate before negotiations—a settlement under military pressure could not be considered. Fourteen were careful to say that the whole dispute was submitted to the League. Some mentioned Manchuria as well as Shanghai, in answer to the repeated refusal of Japan to allow League intervention in negotiations regarding Manchuria. Britain was among the thirteen declaring that no infringement of the sovereignty or integrity of a member State could be allowed in the settlement. Nine States denied the Japanese doctrine that the Covenant does not apply to a disorganised country. Neither internal division nor geographical distance diluted the Covenant. Four bold Governments said that if conciliation and League recommendation under Article XV. failed, the League must proceed to use all its resources—that is, sanctions. Three members, including Japan, stipulated for the safety of Japanese nationals in the evacuation. Denmark

suggested that the treaty disputes in Manchuria should be submitted to judicial settlement. Many of the smaller States said that their fate and future policy depended upon the effectiveness of League settlement in this case. Among them six appealed directly to the Great Powers, with whom power and responsibility lay equally. As South Africa said, 'We at this great crisis in our affairs are looking for wise leadership from the Great Powers, above all, for strong leadership—leadership which can be interpreted in terms of action and not in terms of words. Are the Great Powers satisfied that they have pointed the way ?'

The upshot of this debate was an Assembly resolution on March 11 which practically promised the fulfilment of the Chinese demand. It was intended as a statement of the guiding policy which would be followed in the settlement, and contains the following points :

I

The Assembly, considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the present dispute, more particularly as regards

- (1) Respect for treaties ;
- (2) The obligation of League States to respect and preserve against aggression the integrity and independence of their fellow-members ;
- (3) Their obligation to submit disputes to peaceful settlement,

and considering that the Pact of Paris harmonises with these principles,
'Declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris'

II

The Assembly affirms that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure, recalls the previous pledges of withdrawal of the Japanese forces, notes the willingness to assist of the neutral Powers at Shanghai, and asks them to help to maintain order in the evacuated zone.

III

'Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it,' the Assembly decides to set up a committee of nineteen members—the Assembly President, the twelve Council States, and six others elected by ballot. This committee is to

- (1) Report on cessation of hostilities and 'the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.'
- (2) To follow the execution of the Japanese pledges to withdraw to the military zone in Manchuria.
- (3) To attempt to settle the dispute by conciliation (Article XV, par. 3).

- (4) To prepare, if need be, a request to the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion.
- (5) To report, if need be, under Article XV., par. 4-4a., to report without the disputants.
- (6) To propose any urgent measure necessary

The resolution was adopted unanimously save for the disputants. China welcomed it as soon as it had been cabled to Nanking. Japan abstained from voting on grounds of her refusal to accept Article XV. The resolution, it may be noted, marked a victory of the small Powers over the Great Powers. For one thing, the Great Powers, and especially Britain, had excused their inaction by repeating to the Press the Japanese doctrine that the Covenant did not apply to China; and thus the resolution repudiated. Again, the Powers, who had tried to prevent the summoning of the Assembly, wanted to set up a committee composed of the Council and three Pacific States. This would have re-established the ascendancy of their own policy of *laissez faire*. In the event, the Assembly elected Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Portugal, Hungary, and Sweden. On the day of the resolution Mr. Stimson announced his satisfaction with it, the chief American delegate at Geneva emphasising his Government's pleasure at the principle of non-recognition of a situation created by force.

The test of the Assembly, the translation of its words into deeds, then began. For two months from March 14 negotiations for an armistice were carried on at Shanghai under the chairmanship of Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister. Twice they jammed, and were referred back by China to the Assembly. On the first occasion Japan was holding out for a preliminary Chinese agreement to suppress the boycott. The committee of nineteen refused to hear of this condition being added to the pledge of withdrawal. Later Japan was determined to be her own judge of the date when normal conditions should be restored and the retreat to the Settlement area begin. The Assembly proposed that a joint committee of Chinese, Japanese and neutrals, already proposed at Shanghai, should decide the date by majority. Finally, when Sir Miles Lampson had once more produced a 'formula' which seemed likely to be accepted, the Assembly passed a still resolution insisting on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the Settlement as before January 28 in the near future—approving of the joint commission proposed, with powers to call attention to any neglect in carrying out the agreement, and pointing out that, unless a conclusion were reached in accordance with its former decisions, the question would come up again before the Assembly.

At last on May 5 the armistice was signed on the Lampson

formula. It had been delayed by the bombing of the Japanese military and diplomatic chiefs by a Korean. According to the agreement, hostile acts were to cease, the Chinese troops to remain 22 miles from Shanghai, the Japanese to withdraw, beginning at once, to positions mainly in the Settlement and Hongkew area. A joint commission of twelve (four disputants and eight neutrals) was to decide matters of procedure by a majority and to collaborate in the handing over from the Japanese forces to the Chinese police. The scene is thus being shifted to a set for the Round Table Conference on issues between China and Japan at Shanghai. So far, not so bad. A very great debt is owing to Sir Miles Lampson, whose patience and understanding found face-saving language to cover the Japanese retreat—a great debt, probably, to the Assembly, if there is any connexion between that retreat and the line of policy which the Assembly, backed by the United States, imposed upon the Powers. The tragedy of Shanghai remains—in death, devastation, hatred. The 'door of China' bears from end to end a tally against Japan for which the Chinese people will exact the uttermost farthing. History may see the whole episode as a Japanese 'try on' abandoned in face of Chinese and world opposition. Indeed, the Japanese would like some such conclusion, and would cheerfully sacrifice their admirals to it. The latest piece of their tireless propaganda, 'Japan Speaks' (by Mr. K. K. Kawakami, sponsored by Mr. Inukai himself), says airily that Shanghai was a great blunder which the navalists would not have committed if they had not been 'made the catpaw of the die-hard foreigners.'

Mr. Sato, the Japanese representative at Geneva, has stated to the Press that in ten years Japan will have established order and prosperity in Manchuria—fitting commentaries upon which are provided by the Japanese warning to the Lytton Commission of Inquiry that it will be safe only under Japanese armed guard in the railway zone, and the Commission's own first report of the constant conflicts waged by the Japanese troops and those of the puppet Government the Manchukuo against Chinese loyalists. 'The result is loss of life, destruction of property, and general sense of insecurity': so the Commission sums up the benefits bestowed by Japanese occupation upon the most orderly and prosperous provinces of China, till last September. For there is not the slightest doubt that Manchuria is, as it has been from the first, the crux of this dispute. If the League means to fulfil its own pledges since September 30, the Japanese must withdraw to the railway zone and take their agents of anarchy, the 'advisers,' with them. A Government united to and in sympathy with China inside the Wall must be restored in Manchuria, possibly with neutral help, to bridge the transition

and safeguard Japanese life. Counsels of perfection may be added, as that the treaties regarding Manchuria had much best be sent to the Permanent Court for an opinion on their validity and applicability, and that compensation for damage to life and property must be assessed by the League.

Obviously such a solution will take months, if it is reached at all. For Japan will stoutly refuse any of it. Her own statements to the League and the United States prove her past all reason, as she is dead in honour. At the same time Manchuria is not proving an easy paradise to cultivate. It has to be continually watered with Japanese bombs. The writ of the puppet Government runs a very short way: no decent Chinese will serve under the Manchukuo, its own troops mutiny sooner than kill their countrymen. Russia is stirring, roused by the harrying of Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway by White Russians under Japanese encouragement. Japan herself is in a bad state.

The outcome is uncertain, and the responsibility for influencing it remains chiefly British. American support is pledged, there is no likelihood of slackening in the smaller League States. The European Powers are still the weak link. Sir John Simon's Assembly speech, reiterating the benefits of mediation, could not but produce an effect of unceremoniousness in a conference acutely aware of the lamentable history of Council mediation in this case. It was, in fact, received with a cold mistrust, deepened by his speech in Parliament on March 22, which conveyed a disposition to abandon Manchuria to Japan. British prestige is at present deplorably low; it is more loyal to face than to gloss over this unpleasant fact. Prestige of course, matters little, save as the gauge of honour, which matters greatly. Our good name and our active influence in the restoration of international justice rise and fall together. Besides, the stability and integrity of China are vital British interests. Shanghai stagnant, the 'open door' in Manchuria, always half-shut by Japan, but now slammed to, are the price we pay for the Japanese invasions.

The League's opportunity will come when the Lytton Commission reports and Japan refuses, as she will, to restore Manchuria to China. Our opportunity, too; for if we came into the open as the whole-hearted defender of the Covenant we should instantly be restored to our lately lost position of world leadership. There are a number of things the League, in conjunction with the United States, can do, and do with little of that risk of war with Japan of which the flighty-minded talk. Japan may be frenzied, but she is too busy in China, and too near bankruptcy and revolution at home, to declare war on the whole world, however she may threaten and bluff the timid

Chancelleries. We could urge League States to withdraw ambassadors, to refuse loans, to prohibit the export to Japan of munitions and material of war, especially cotton. This should have been done months ago, and we should have called upon the League and the United States to do it. No State, in face of public opinion, could have continued to sell arms to an aggressor against the Covenant. As a last resort we could close the ports of the world against Japanese ships; and it should be recalled that the United States and India are Japan's chief customers.

These measures would demand courage, though they are our precise obligations under the Covenant. But what is the alternative? If international justice collapses in the Far East, the results, humanly speaking, must be deadly. Japan will be left in control of 30,000,000 Chinese inspired by hatred and increasing nationalism. A Japanese régime or puppet Government in Manchuria will not be likely to be more popular than its counterpart in Korea. The revolts now being crushed by Japanese armies will be but the first of an unending series. This will serve to maintain the army as essential and supreme in Japan—probably the motive of the whole adventure; but the world can scarcely be expected to think this desirable. Japan, under military dominance, will have a huge land frontier with Russia, and will rule the country through which runs a Russian railway. War there in the future must be a mathematical certainty. Nobody with the least sense of reality can contemplate a Japanese protectorate of Manchuria without horror. More important still, the faith of nations will vanish. The League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, arbitration treaties, general disarmament—all the construction of the post-war period depends utterly upon belief in the fulfilment of the great collective pledges to keep the peace. If the Powers abet one of themselves in violation of the law, the law becomes worthless. The world, as almost every Government said at the Assembly, will disintegrate; the States will return to the old fatal alliance system. The peace organisation once destroyed by its builders, the state of the world will be worse than in 1918 before it was founded. Yet the smaller States are staunch; and they have both the facts and the law in their favour. The dispute is a gilt-edged Covenant case. If the Powers could but realise that courage and safety coincide here, that their honour and their interest alike demand the vindication of justice, the Far East might find peace, and a new era of confidence would begin to transform the dealings between nations.

FREDA WHITE.

OUR CRIMSON HIGHWAYS

Why, worthy theme, you do unfold your noble strength to think
So busily of things. Go, get some water,
And wash this filthy witness from your hand . . .
The sleeping and the dead are but as pictures.

(*Macbeth*, II 2)

Whoever contemplates the statistics of death and injury from road accidents must realize that legislative measures have failed to establish even an approach to conditions of safety. To be fair to those who within the last few years have striven earnestly to stamp out such accidents by new statutes, it must be conceded that it is too early to condemn legislation in its present form. It may yet fulfil a purpose. The truth is, however, there is no time to wait for modifications of the law. The facts and figures cry out that legislation, even though it may be necessary, is not sufficient to cope with the disasters of the road. Overruling humanity insists upon an alternative to existing principles of road government and usage.

To combat the conditions, the natural impulse was and still is towards greater severity of punishment of persons convicted of road-traffic misdemeanours or of road-traffic crimes. The new statutes themselves reflect this method of attack; but penalties more severe have not reduced the evil. One potent reason for this is that whereas heavy penalties are reserved for maliciously reckless drivers, such drivers are comparatively few. Death and injury are to be attributed in the main to the preponderance of inefficient but otherwise well-meaning drivers, whose meekness in the courts disarms justice and slays the law. If penalties are ever to be prescribed with intent to be of sufficient strength to be effective against these persons, inefficiency must be treated as a crime as remorseless and culpable as reckless murder. The intent, nevertheless, would be to little purpose. Accidents would continue; for against such persons the penalties would have no counterpart in convictions.

Corresponding to the two types of delinquent, the Road Traffic Act, 1930 (no 21 Geo. 5), contains, respectively, section 21, which makes provision for reckless and dangerous driving.

and section 12, which takes cognizance of the comparatively new offence, *careless driving*.

According to section 11, if any person drives a motor vehicle on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition, and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time (or which might reasonably be expected to be) on the road, he becomes liable

- (a) On summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £50 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four months, and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction either to a fine not exceeding £100 or to such imprisonment as aforesaid, or to both such fine and imprisonment.
- (b) On conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine, or to both such imprisonment and fine

Particulars of any such convictions are to be endorsed on any licence held by the person convicted. Moreover, on a second or subsequent conviction the offender is disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence, unless the court thinks fit, for a special reason, to order otherwise.

According to section 12, if any person drives a motor vehicle on a road without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road, he becomes guilty of an offence. A first or second conviction for an offence under this section, however, does not render the offender liable to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence.

In any case, if the circumstances are such that a magistrate considers the offence to exceed a misdemeanour and to be a felony, the charge may become manslaughter or even murder. Thus it appears that the character of the intention of the driver determines the charge from the mildest to the most grave offence, in either of the two categories.

In general, penalties act too late. Only rarely does the dread of them deter a reckless or an inefficient driver from his purpose. From penalties, therefore, the investigator turns to other means of restraint, and takes next into account the speed of the vehicles. He discovers that the number of casualties bears no definite relationship to the speed except in so far as speed, when very high, may be associated with loss of control, and with difficulties arising from undue stresses and vibration along the highway. He observes that recent legislation, when faced with this problem, introduced further complexity; for, rightly or wrongly, while removing the speed limit for luxury cars, it imposed a speed limit for heavy traffic. Neither penalties nor speed limits have sufficed

for safety. From this wilderness of facts, however, a helpful principle emerges. It is that there are but two modes of approach to conditions of safety: (1) by establishing rigid rules and signs; (2) by inculcating the precept that every driver and pedestrian is the guardian of the safety of the public. Action in accordance with the first is necessary, but is utterly insufficient. Action in accordance with the second, which requires knowledge and self-discipline, constitutes with the first the true solution.

The ancient principle that the law is the voice of the people here assumes a curious shape. for in this matter the people are now drivers, now occupants of cars, now pedestrians, each by turns, sometimes in more or less continuous rotation, swayed by the opinion of the moment according to the parts they play and whether they ride or sit in the curru, or fall in the dust. Intolerance and selfishness thus alternate with passion and tenderness.

It is impossible to set a scale to human sacrifice. The facts reveal that the degree of horror with which men and women to-day shudder at ill news is not in proportion to what is told of numbers hurt or slain, but in accordance with the quality of the drama presented by the circumstances. To the world in the lump, the death of a child amidst scenes of horror may evoke more righteous sympathy, and may create a stronger desire for retribution, than the death of myriads of ordinary wayfarers on commonplace roads. To the world in detail, through the centuries, death and suffering within the home circle call both tender and generous feelings without diminution. but it is units not millions that to-day matter to individuals. This is the basic cause of the traffic trouble and of much else that is wrong with mass-discipline and democracy. Conditions during the present generation have blunted our feelings towards our neighbours. There is no reason, however, for perpetuating the indifference.

To emphasize the rapidity of growth of callousness towards bulk death and misery within human memory it suffices to compare what was once the attitude of the public towards railway accidents with the quiet acceptance of the lethal conditions of road transport now too frequently manifested. A leading article in the *Illustrated London News* of February 4, 1865, contained the tidings that Her Majesty Queen Victoria had been pleased through Sir Charles Phipps, to call the attention of the directors of the several railways which had their centre in London to the increasing number of railway accidents, and to express the warmest hope that the directors would carefully consider every means of guarding against these misfortunes which Her Majesty observed were 'not at all necessary accompaniments of railway travelling.'

Her Majesty has not been moved to take this step by regard for her own safety, because she is aware that extraordinary precautions are taken when she travels ; but, on account of her family, of those travelling upon her service, and of her people generally. She wishes that the same security may be ensured for all as is so carefully provided for herself. The Queen hopes it is unnecessary for her to recall to the recollection of the railway directors the heavy responsibility which they have assumed since they have succeeded in securing the monopoly of the means of travelling of almost the entire population of the country.

There had been many serious railway accidents. Most of them were from preventable causes. It was nevertheless the fact that the number of lives lost in comparison with the numbers of passengers was small—only one in several millions. The numerical estimate was, however, no measure of the value of human lives ; the fact grasped by Her gracious Majesty was that by organisation the deaths, one or many, could have been avoided—and thus the greatest moral influence of the time was concentrated upon safety in railway travelling. Moral influence offers once more the most powerful means to the desired end. The essential requirement is that there should be general acceptance of the belief that by a slight sacrifice on the part of all road-users the toll of death, pain, and misery could at once be substantially reduced, with hope of continuous further diminution.

To remind ourselves of the magnitude of the slaughter, it will suffice to summarise in the briefest possible form the toll of death and injury from street accidents as follows:

ENGLAND, WALES, AND SCOTLAND

Whole Year	Killed	Injured	Total
1927	5,129	148,575	153,704
1928	6,138	164,835	170,973
1929	6,766	170,917	177,683
1930	7,105	177,845	185,200

A rough but highly instructive indication of the growth of annual casualties in vehicular traffic during the preceding epoch can be obtained by examining the early Returns for the Metropolitan Police District when motor traffic began to be alarming.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DISTRICT

Whole Year	Type of Vehicle	Killed	Injured	Total
1910	Power-driven	214	7,652	7,866
	Horse-drawn	157	9,902	10,059
	Total	371	17,554	17,925

Whole Year.	Type of Vehicle.	Killed.	Injured.	Total.
1911	Power-driven	284	9,388	9,672
	Horse-drawn	135	9,356	9,491
	Total	419	18,744	19,163
1912	Power-driven	257	8,050	8,307
	Horse-drawn	137	7,576	7,713
	Total	394	15,626	16,020

These figures for 1910-1912 are to be accepted with the reservation that the term horse-drawn includes horse-drawn vehicles, horses ridden or led, and cycles other than motor cycles, by which persons were injured in the streets. Moreover, the figures for 1912 are for the incomplete period, January 1, to September 30 of that year.

In subsequent years the statistics for the Metropolitan Police District gradually became more determinate. The Returns for 1925 distinguished the persons killed into pedestrians, occupants and drivers of vehicles other than pedal cycles and solo motor cycles, pedal cyclists and motor cyclists, with the following totals, for the respective ages of the victims:

METROPOLITAN POLICE DISTRICT

Persons Killed by Vehicles

Whole Year	Under Fifteen Years	From Fifteen Years	Over Fifteen Years	Total
1925	45	214	978	1,237

During 1929 the number of pedestrians killed within the London Police District increased to 891. It fell slightly in 1930 to 885. At that time there were great expectations of reduced casualties, for the police were being assiduously trained for traffic supervision, and the Traffic Act (1930) was being ushered in with hope, even if there were misgivings. It is therefore with profound sorrow that the public now find that, notwithstanding the courage and skill of the police and the powers conferred upon magistrates by the Traffic Act, the number of pedestrians killed within the London Police District advanced in the year 1931 to 906.

As the present purpose is to state the facts with reference to total numbers killed in street accidents, including pedestrians, occupants and drivers of vehicles, pedal cyclists and motor cyclists, it is necessary to direct attention to the following summary :

METROPOLITAN POLICE DISTRICT

All Persons in Street Accidents

Whole Years	Killed	Injured
1929	1,362	55,645
1930	1,398	55,827
1931	1,326	54,430

Pedestrians in Street Accidents

(included in the above figures)

Whole Years	Killed	Injured
1929	892	Not known
1930	885	Not known
1931	1,000	Not known

This analysis reveals a slight *diminution* in the total numbers killed and injured during last year, but it also exhibits an *increase* in the numbers of pedestrians killed, and *absence of information* concerning the proportionate numbers of pedestrians injured. While police supervision and other precautions during 1931 rendered the roads somewhat less destructive to the life of drivers and occupants of vehicles, they entirely failed to stem the tide of death to pedestrians.

The latest evidence is yet more serious. As it relates only to the *first three months* of 1932 it is instructive to tabulate it with corresponding data for the same months of the previous two years. The opportunity may also be taken to exhibit the proportion between pedestrians and others *killed*, and to express the results as percentages (see table on p. 712).

There is this year rapid retrogression from safety, the slaughter preponderates heavily against pedestrians, with corresponding insufficiency of restraint to drivers. It would be useful if the proportion of pedestrians to others amongst the *injured*, as well as amongst the *killed*, could be derived from public returns.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DISTRICT

*All Persons in Street Accidents (First Three Months of the Years
1930-1932)*

January, February and March	Killed		Injured
	Pedestrians	Others—i.e. drivers, occupants, pedal cyclists, and motor cyclists	
1930	223 (= 62.7 per cent)	97 (= 30.3 per cent)	11,441
1931	216 (= 74.7	73 (= 25.3	9,643
1932	224 (= 71.3	90 (= 28.7	10,505

To compare this attrition with disaster in another form, it may be recalled that during the war in South Africa, which began on October 9, 1900 and continued until May 31, 1902, the total losses from all causes on the British side were 52,156. The duration of hostilities was 2 6/10 years.

The official *History of the War in South Africa* written by Captain Maurice Harold Grant, vol. iv, p. 697, supplies data from which may be summarised:

SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

Killed, or died of wounds

Officers	719
Warrant, N.C.O.'s and men	6,263
	7,582

Died of disease

Officers	408	Total British
Warrant, N.C.O.'s and men	13,733	
	13,139	

Wounded.

Officers	1,758
Warrant, N.C.O.'s and men	19,399
	21,157

Captured by the enemy :

Officers	290
Warrant, N.C.O.'s and men	8,135
	<hr/> 8,425 <hr/>

Missing :

Officers	36	
Warrant, N.C.O.'s and men	1,817	Losses by other Causes than Death
	<hr/> 1,853 <hr/>	31,435

Total losses from all causes

Officers	3,209
Warrant, N.C.O.'s and men	48,947
	<hr/> 52,156 <hr/>

From these particulars the *average annual losses* throughout that war may be calculated, the results are

BRITISH, IN SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

Killed	7,860 per annum
Other casualties	11,024 per annum
	<hr/>
Total casualties	19, 84 per annum

In England, Wales, and Scotland the corresponding figures for street accidents in the year 1930, were :

GREAT BRITAIN, STREET ACCIDENTS DURING 1930

Killed	7,305
Injured	177,895
	<hr/>
Total casualties	185,200

The recorded number (7305) of deaths in 1930 from street accidents therefore approached to the number (7860) killed in a average year during the South African War, the number (177,895) of injured in 1930 was nearly fifteen times the yearly loss of wounded, captured and missing during that lamentable military struggle ; and the total casualties from street accident in Great Britain in 1930 were more than nine times the annual casualties from all causes in the South African campaign. The rate of attrition from street accidents since 1930 has considerable

increased. That it should continue is a burning disgrace to us. The tendency is towards further converts to the Swedish worship of Juggernaut. Are there also to swell the train of the grim procession to the chambers of forgetfulness, where crushed and broken bodies in pain, misery, and death are shrouded?

In justice to those responsible for the design and construction of motor vehicles for road traffic, it must be emphasised that they have done everything possible to ensure safety. There are (1929-1931) no deaths to be attributed to faulty steering-gear or to broken axles. Last year there was one death recorded against defective brakes, and four against burst tyres, but there is insufficient evidence to enable these to be assigned to defective design or construction.

With regard to roads, the task of the engineer has been indeed difficult. He began by solving the problem of dust that seemed insuperable but now is forgotten, so complete was his victory. In 1903 the Motor Car Act was passed, followed in 1909 by the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act, which led to the establishment of the Road Board. By 1910 the question of providing the right kind of surface for our highways was under earnest consideration. In 1929 Sir Henry Maybury was able to report that of the 178,914 miles of road in Great Britain, 95,878 miles were classified, which meant that they were either prepared or in course of preparation for the use of mechanically propelled vehicles. The total expenditure upon these roads between 1919 and 1929 was about £318,000,000.

There are still differences of opinion concerning the best surface for safety, and this matter is rendered more complex by consideration of the variety of foundations and materials of the road—wood-blocks, concrete, tar, bitumen, masticrubber. Finality in this direction has by no means been reached. Care is being bestowed upon the correct shape for the profiles and super-elevations of roads, taking into account the endless conditions that present themselves, and excellent work is being done in shaping the entrance and exit curves to bends on the highways. All these efforts are in the direction of greater safety to vehicles. The moderation of speed to prevent skidding when a road is wet, however, is a matter that the constructional engineer is obliged to leave to the drivers, and it constitutes one of the most serious responsibilities entrusted to drivers. Further, there is great scope for efforts towards safety in the abolition of blind corners—a result to be brought about by organised and, if possible, friendly co-ordination of ideas between local police, local municipal authorities, and local owners and users of property.

The straggling pedestrian in the country may by negligence contribute to accidents, but the dynamics of the problem of

impact renders it improbable that he ceases, otherwise than objectively, great increase in the death-roll. Rather he is to-day

Like one that on a lonesome road
Doth walk in fear and dread,
And having once turned round, walks on
And turns no more his head,
Because he knows a frightful fiend
Doth close behind him tread.

(*The Ancient Mariner*, Pt VI.)

Nevertheless, pedestrians ought to express their willingness to conform to any reasonable measure of discipline to secure the wished-for cessation of accidents

In his address at the National Safety Congress in London on May 4 1932, Mr H Alker Tripp, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, observed that the immediate reason for the appointment of police patrols was the abolition of the general speed limit of 20 miles an hour. Parliament was at that time assured that the efforts of the police to deal with dangerous driving would be redoubled. The object of the police in this sphere of action is to prevent accidents and to promote free circulation of traffic. Obstruction and slow traffic on the crown of the road are matters to which they are giving attention. He added

The general speeding up of traffic has brought the casualties to a very high figure. In 1931 well over 200,000 persons were killed or injured as a result of street accidents on the roads of Great Britain. It is computed that about one-third of the fatal accidents are due to human failure on the part of motor drivers. The number of fatalities was 6691. . . . It is not so much out-and-out bad driving as incautious driving that accounts for the majority of the casualties. The accidents are caused by inattention on the part of thousands and thousands of drivers. What is wanted, in order to bring down the casualties, is not spectacular captures of so-called 'reckless' drivers by the police but an all-round improvement of standards and habits of driving.

From the traffic standpoint, the required result is freedom of movement, with absence of contact between vehicles, combined with safety to pedestrians. This is sought in police organisation; but effective police organisation can only be initiated and maintained by control. Owing to the great stretches of road to be supervised, police control and supervision are necessarily incomplete. It is possible that by the extension of police supervision sufficiently to ensure strict observation of the Highway Code by drivers and by pedestrians, advance might be made in the direction of safety. Such extension is, however, ruled out by the cost of maintaining a vast army of police and scouts for the purpose. If, by common consent, the Highway Code is accepted as the best

available guide to safety, the drivers throughout England, Scotland, and Wales who realise the beneficent character of the object to be attained would under proper guidance require no further supervision or restraint than that of their own consciences.

The evidence taken by the Royal Commission on Transport in April 1929 made it clear that a prime cause of disaster on the roads is the competitive spirit which finds expression in racing, cutting-in, and other malpractices. This spirit can surely be bent in the direction of the exercise of restraint. There has been in recent years a great accession of courtesy upon the road. Something more is now needed. Not merely give-and-take but giving way to others, and a full measure of forbearance. Overtaking should in general be limited to cases of necessity such as arise between vehicles of different classes. On the open road the aim should be towards a steady succession of well-spaced cars at even speed. The official opinion expressed to the Royal Commission was that in course of time a moderate standardised speed would present itself as a solution of the London traffic problem. There is, however, the difficulty attending horse traffic, bicycles and heavy motor buses. What else than conscientious driving and the deep sense of guardianship of one another can prevail in such an arena against death and destruction.

ROLLO APPLEBY

SIDE-LIGHTS ON PORTMAN SQUARE

LONDON squares have a charm of their own. They are not to be seen elsewhere. You cannot find anything remotely resembling them in Paris or Berlin or Vienna. Nor are they common, if not unknown, in the great provincial cities of England. Wherein lies their charm? In part at least in the sense they convey of something set apart, exclusive, finite, complete a *hortus inclusus*, with their bright green like that of an oasis in a wilderness of bricks and mortar, refreshing to the eye, inviting rest and suggesting shade and relief from noise and traffic. The suggestion, indeed, often belies the truth, for the imperious needs of modern life have shown but little mercy to the most select and old-fashioned of them. Nor can they even depend upon maintaining whatever aristocratic character they may have originally possessed. The religiously residential is giving way everywhere to business premises: the bank and the shop. Even the symmetry and the original design, observed with more or less strictness in the lay-out a century or more ago, may be swept away as huge blocks of flats offer to the ground landlord a financial return no longer to be extracted from the private house.

The history of the squares of London has been fully told and illustrated in Mr. Beresford Chancellor's delightful volume, that of Portman Square in particular, in his *Wanderings in Marylebone*, and need not be retold here. Were this history fully and faithfully preserved it would be a microcosm of the social life of its day. Unfortunately this is seldom the case. The custom of commemorative tablets on the houses of the good and great is comparatively modern, and much history has perished with those who made it. But here and there a side-light is thrown, and this light illumines at least some of the problems of our immediate ancestors and shows these problems to have been—very much like our own. Such a side-light is thrown upon Portman Square by the minute-books of the meetings of the trustees of the square, in the custody of the writer as treasurer and chairman of that body. Though the bare records of mere annual business meetings, they are not without entries of unconscious humour and at the same time serve to remind how great are the changes in some

aspects of life even in the 150 years since the foundation of the square in its modern form.

According to Mr. Chancellor, the building of the square was begun about 1764, but was not completed for some twenty years, with a resulting want of uniformity in the houses. The brothers Adam were largely interested in the original plots, and the square contains more than one masterpiece of Adam design and decoration. At one time at least it was famous, for in 1806 it was known as 'one of the largest and handsomest in the Metropolis,' and Mrs. Montagu, the owner of what is now Portman House, called it for its health-giving character 'the Montpelier of England.'

The constitution of the square rests upon a private Act of Parliament of 1782 (*anno regni Georgii III. Regis octavo secundo*). In this Act it was recorded that leases had been granted by Henry William Portman, the longest of which would expire in 1803, and that 'it would be of great benefit and convenience to the inhabitants of the Square if the ground, then enclosed with iron rails was laid out with proper walks and otherwise embellished as a garden or pleasure ground for the use of the inhabitants and a more effectual provision made for preventing nuisances and annoyances therein.' The inhabitants of the various houses were thereby appointed trustees, and in them was vested the maintenance and upkeep of the square, the power to levy a rate upon each house and ancillary rights and powers. This Act was supplemented in 1821 by a further Act enlarging its powers and provisions.

The first meeting of trustees under the Act of 1782 was held at Stratford Place Coffee House, in the parish of St. Marylebone, in the county of Middlesex, on July 4, 1782. Those present were Viscount Maynard, John Elwes, and the Honourable Charles Francis Greville, who presided. At this meeting it was resolved 'that two plans be prepared for the next Meeting with gravel walks delineated thereon, viz. on one plan a walk round the enclosure 9 or 10 feet broad and the cross walks 12 feet and the centre marked by a double row of trees and on the other plan walks and shrubs.' At a subsequent meeting a rate of 6d. in the pound was ordered in pursuance of the powers in the Act, and at a further meeting in the same year the trustees recorded their opinion that 'the enclosure would be improved if properly kept and planted with evergreens and the cross walks kept in grass. The work was promptly taken in hand, and in the following year it is recorded that 'the Mason's bill, the Smith's bill, the Pavior's bill and the Lumpdiggers bill be ordered to be paid.' The services of Peter Thomas, a well-digger, were secured 'to dig the walks wanted in Portman Square,' while 'Robert Maken was hired

on tryal at 12 shillings a week for the sweeping and looking after the Square and to water the pavement to prevent nuisances,' 'provided,' it is cautiously added, 'that there is a fund sufficient to pay him.' In those far-off Georgian days it was not deemed seemly, at least in Portman Square and where public money was concerned, to exceed your income.

The meetings during these first years were comparatively frequent, all of them at the Stratford Place Coffee House. The attendance does not appear to have been very good, for seldom more than half a dozen trustees attended, and on one occasion only one appeared on the scene and 'none other of the Trustees attending no business was done.' On other regrettable occasions it is solemnly recorded that 'none of the Trustees attended.'

The lay-out of the garden appears to have proceeded steadily. A pump was installed, an iron roller purchased, and even at that early stage it was necessary to replace the locks on the gates and supply new keys. On March 2, 1784, an important question was thus early raised and decided for it was 'ordered unanimously that no dogs be permitted to go into the garden on any account whatever and the gardener is strictly ordered to turn out all such as may get in.'

The earliest inhabitants of the square are not without interest. At a meeting in 1784 a list was submitted, prepared by the gardener, with the numbers of their houses. It includes William Beckford (the millionaire collector and author of *Vathek*), the Earl of Middleton (who acted as chairman), the Earl of Tankerville, Lady Home, Lord Maynard, Lady Tollemache, Mrs. Beckford, Erle Drax, Lady Egmont, Sir Peter Parker (the admiral and early patron of Nelson), Admiral Lord Rodney, the Earl of Ducie, and Samuel Whitbread (the friend of Fox, the antagonist of Pitt, the unflinching champion in the House of Commons of the unfortunate Queen Caroline and the individual mainly responsible for the rebuilding of Drury Lane).

The accounts at this time were beautifully and elaborately kept and entered in full in the minute-book. Some slips, however, occurred and were honestly and meticulously recorded: 'by wrong calculation of rate for house S. Seales Esq. 5/7½.'

Difficulties, too, seem to have arisen in regard to unauthorised persons making use of the square. In 1786 it was ordered that 'no person be permitted to walk in the Garden unless they be admitted by the key of some of the inhabitants and that the Gardener do take all false keys,' and the gardener reported that he had 'spoke to several persons walking in the Garden who, he apprehended, had no right to walk there and he had informed them that they must not come again and that he had not seen any of them there since.' Great were the powers of gardeners

in those spacious times. The trustees were then of opinion that 'it would be proper to take up the Furze which is planted round the rails of the Garden and plant Quick round the same instead thereof.' At the same time the wooden roller then in use was to be cased with lead. It was also ordered that no livery servant be permitted to walk in the garden.

In 1793 one of the trustees 'reported to the Meeting that a dog having strong symptoms of canine madness had got into the Garden and bit a child and snapt at several others. He, therefore, recommended it to the consideration of the Board to take such steps for the prevention of dogs getting into the Garden in future as should appear to be most expedient for that purpose.' 'It was thereupon taken into consideration and resolved that the gates being guarded in like manner as those in Bedford Square would be the best and most effectual means of preventing dogs from getting into the Garden in future,' and it was 'ordered that a small board be put up in the Garden with an inscription "Ordered that no dogs be admitted."

In 1794. 'The lamps being much neglected the person who was employed to light the lamps attended and was acquainted thereof and ordered to be discharged at Lady-day next and that four watchmen in the Square be paid Two guineas per annum for looking after and reporting from time to time the lighting of the lamps in general in the Square. But worse was to follow, for 'It being reported that people got over the gates into the Garden and take the flowers and plants ordered that the Smith do place spikes at the Garden gates in such manner as will best prevent persons getting over in future. Even youth was undisciplined in those rough times. It appearing to the Board that some of the children admitted into the Garden have cut down plucked and destroyed several of the plants flowers and also that they have made use of bows and arrows and bats and balls and thrown stones to the annoyance of gentlemen and ladies walking in the Garden and done other damage therein it is therefore ordered that the Gardiner do in future prevent the same and for that purpose that he reports the behaviour of such children of the inhabitants of the Square as transgress to their parents and as to the children of such persons who are not inhabitants as transgress in any of the above particulars that he turn them out of the Garden and not permit them to come in.'

In 1796 'The Gardiner reports that there are great numbers of false keys to the locks upon the gates of the Garden in the Square,' and 'that many improper people are frequently in the Garden, ordered that a board be painted and placed over each gate with the following inscription. "Ordered that the Gardiner turn out all improper persons." 'The Gardiner also reporting

that many people are frequently in the Garden in the night time, ordered that four padlocks and chains be purchased and that the gates be locked up every night as from Lady-day to Michaelmas at the hour of 10 and unlocked in the morning at the hour of 6 at the latest.'

But perhaps the most terrible state of things is disclosed at the meeting of July 26, 1797 'The Gardener reporting that a great number of improper Persons got admittted by false Keys into the Garden and of late to such an Extent as to become a great Annoyance to many of the Ladies Inhabitants of the Square who have repeatedly complained to him of the same and represented that they cannot walk therein without the Danger of being insulted nor can they permit their Children to walk therein lest they should catch some Disorder And the Gardener also reporting that many Children of Strangers are frequently walking in the Garden who have just had the Small Pox and that great Boys and Men are almost daily playing in the Garden with Bats and Balls and destroying the Turf and Gravel Walks, that the Shrubs are continually broke and the Flowers taken and various other Depredations are daily committed, such Report was taken into Consideration when it appeared therefrom as well as from the Personal observation of the Trustees that it is impossible to get rid of the Nuisance otherwise than by having other Locks the keys of which are not so easily made—Resolved and ordered that Brammah's Patent Locks be put upon the Gates and that one key be made for each House encompassing or abutting upon the Square and paying the Square rate and one key for the Gardener at the expense of this Trust' It was further ordered 'that no trap-ball, crickett or other games are to be allowed in the Garden' In the following year 'The Collector reports that the Turkish Ambassador has made application to him for leave to put a wooden seat about six feet long in the Garden at his own expense Ordered that His Excellency have liberty accordingly'

On April 23, 1802, the trustees evidently received warning of trouble that might arise, no longer from the war, but from the conclusion of peace by the Treaty of Amiens: 'At this Meeting especially convened for the purpose of taking into Consideration the propriety of procuring a Guard of able Men to protect and preserve the Garden from Depredations on the Night or Nights of the intended Illuminations on Account of Peace And of locking up the Gates of the same with Padlocks and Chains on those Nights in Order to keep out all Persons but such only as may be so appointed to protect the same and to make such Order therein as may be deemed necessary Resolved unanimously that it will be expedient to procure a Guard of able Men

for the purpose aforesaid (to consist of some of the Beadles of this Parish and who are Constables), the Gardener and his Man, and as many others as will amount to thirty two in the whole And that they come upon Duty at Seven o'clock and continue to patrol the Garden and protect the same from Depredations so long during the Night as any Throng or Mob of People are assembled in the Square or Streets adjoining and likely to commit any Depredations in the Garden Resolved and Ordered unanimously that such Guard be accordingly procured, and that the Beadles and Gardener be paid Three Shillings and Sixpence each per Night for such their Attendance, and that the others be paid Two shillings and Sixpence each per Night for their Attendance' A subsequent meeting records with satisfaction that such 'guard' effectively prevented all depredations, 'which from the great concourse of people there was every reason to expect would have taken place without it' Thus was 'Mafficking' dealt with in 1802

In the same year the prices of commodities were rising, and 'A Letter from John Burton, Lamplighter, was produced and read stating that he had lighted the Lamps round the Garden ever since the same had been inclosed at the very low Rate of One Guinea per Annum each Lamp and owing to the very great Advance in Oil that he has sustained a very considerable loss, therefore requesting that he might have the same per Lamp as the Parish Lamps are now lighted for, Ordered that the Lamps for the next year be paid for as before at one Guinea per Lamp being equal to what the Parish Lamps were offered to be lighted for.' The resolution leaves it undetermined whether the lamplighter's contention as to the lighting of the parish lamps was untrue. But on the whole it would appear to have been a try-on on his part, for 'The lamplighter subsequently attended and again represented that he was, from the rise in materials in consequence of the war, a loser thereby, but again without satisfaction' It was evidently a hard world for lamplighters

On the other hand, gardeners were in favour In 1805, 'It being found indispensably necessary that some distinction should be made in the dress of the Gardener in order better to enable him to keep out improper persons Ordered that he have a laced hat to be worn by him at all times when he is attending in the Garden' What became of that laced hat and when the time-honoured bullycock was again resumed this chronicle does not relate.

A minute of May 20, 1806, contains a formal record in regard to the financing of the square which sets out that 'at that Time the Trustees had expended on laying out the Garden, enclosing it with iron rails, furnishing it with plants, gravelling the walks,

paving foot and carriage way and other matters £3715.19.0 and that the annual expenses for the last 23 years had averaged £290 per annum.'

The problem of keeping out 'improper persons' seems to have been perennial. In 1808 it was 'Resolved that notice be given to the Locksmiths living near Portman Square that they will be prosecuted if they make false keys to the Garden locks,' and in the same year 'Ordered that it be the Gardener's duty when any person enters the Garden to examine their key and call for the name of the person holding it and if the same shall not agree with the registry of keys the Gardener is hereby ordered to take the key away and turn out such person,' and 'that such order be inserted three times in the *Morning Post*.'

At the meeting of June 14, 1813, the gardener reported 'the very improper conduct of the children of Mrs. St. Quinton of Gloucester Place and Sir Robert Chambers of Upper Seymour Street in the Garden of the Square,' and it was 'ordered that letters be wrote to the parents of such children acquainting them of the same.'

The replanting of the square proceeded with due care. In 1814 it was 'Ordered that twelve forest trees be planted in the Square at the proper season,' and in 1819 'that the Gardener be directed to plant at the proper season four pink thorns at the four angles of the Square Garden.'

Those attending the meetings at the end of the eighteenth century and early part of the nineteenth century or recorded as living in the square included a number of well-known names, among them the Hon. F. Greville (who sat for his portrait to Romney and was the 'Protector' of Emma Hart, afterwards Lady Hamilton), the Earl of Strafford, the first Lord Dorchester, the Earl Nelson (elder brother of the great Admiral), John Elwes (miser and sportsman, a notorious character in his day), Lord Kenyon, the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Clifford, the first Lord Teignmouth (a Governor-General of India), Spencer Perceval (the son of the assassinated Prime Minister), the Duke of Hamilton (who married Beckford's only daughter), Lord Garvagh (owner of the *Raphael Garvagh Madonna*, now in the National Gallery), and Earl Manvers, who presided as chairman for many years. His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester (the second Duke and a field-marshal) is recorded as applying for a key for his equerry, Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins.

The question of the water supply seems to have given trouble over a long period. In 1806, 'The watering of the Square by a Cart and Horse being found inadequate to do it effectually, and it being conceived that if it was watered by Scoops and the Water conducted through Leathern Pipes it would answer the

purpose. Ordered, that one or more Leather Pipes be provided of such Lengths as may be found necessary; and that the Gardener do water the Square with Scoops accordingly.' In 1865 the gardener applied for an increase of salary 'on account of the expense of additional water required in consequence of the carriage way of the Square being Macadamized,' and the following year the water supply from the existing well appears to have become insufficient, for an estimate was obtained from a 'well digger and borer' for another well 'to effect the object of a copious supply of water.' It was not until 1871 that the question of 'laying on water from the main and fixing a sufficient number of hydrants to preserve the flowers, shrubs and grass during the Summer months' was raised. Hitherto wells, pump and water-cart had been the method adopted. The proposal was raised again in 1873 by Sir James Hamilton. So revolutionary a plan was, of course, opposed by certain trustees but the reformers had their way. The question of hydrants from which the water could be used still seemed, however, too expensive and 'a capacious cistern with a constant supply from the main' was installed in 1874 in connexion with a water-barrow. Only in 1880 were the necessary hydrants installed.

In 1857 occurred one of those unfortunate incidents which mar even the most spotless records of businesslike efficiency. 'On an investigation of the accounts of the Treasurer Mr. E. B. Holman it appears that the sum of Four hundred and one Pounds 3/10 is in his hands and now due to the Trustees of the Square & that he has quitted England in consequence of pecuniary embarrassment, it is therefore resolved that Mr. E. B. Holman be dismissed from the office of Treasurer to the Trustees of Portman Square. Resolved That Sir Alex. Spearman do take any steps in his power to ascertain the real pecuniary state of Mr. Holman's affairs, & and the probable chance of the Trustees being able to recover any part of the balance due to them.' The trustees' savings of years were thereby blotted out, and the fate of the defaulting treasurer is veiled in obscurity—perhaps for the best.

About the middle of the nineteenth century the records of the trustees present included Sir George Abercromby, Hart, Lytton Bulwer (afterwards Lord Bulwer, the diplomatist), Lord Cranworth (Lord Chancellor), Lord Trilogar, Sir J. J. Hamilton, Sir Garnet Wolsey, Lord Thorne, and Mr. Maxwell Lyte.

The perils and annoyances to which users of the square garden in the eighteenth century were subject have already been set down. As the nineteenth drew towards its close others are recorded. In 1878 it is ordered 'that complaint having been made of the introduction of the game of Cricket thereby rendering

those who frequent the Square liable to accidents, that the same be immediately discontinued, and the Residents requested to co-operate in carrying out this Resolution, especially those who have Sons.' The very next year Lady Sarah Lindsay explained to the meeting that the practice of playing lawn tennis in the several open portions of the square was 'rather objectionable,' and it was decided to prohibit playing of the game on a certain portion of the lawn. Objection was also taken to the playing of lawn tennis on the ground that 'the game had proved to be detrimental and injurious to the lawns,' and in May of 1884 the game was prohibited. This resolution was promptly reversed, but it was agreed that in future 'only one net' be permitted.

The subsequent chronicles of the square are regrettably uneventful. According to the minute-book the meetings pursue the even tenor of their way, and beyond the demolition of the east side and a portion of the south and their replacement by the new blocks of flats there is nothing to record. The evergreens and laurels, so beloved by our ancestors, but so dull and dingy to modern eyes, have made way for flowering trees and shrubs as well as for the ginkgo, the fig, the tulip tree, and the magnolia, and it is claimed that at no time in its history has the garden of Portman Square received more care or looked more beautiful and distinguished.

ROBERT WITT.

THE JIZO OF MONKEY-HILL.

AN EXCURSION INTO THE BYWAYS OF JAPANESE LIFE

PROBABLY, had not the late Japanese Government sought for and something more, with certain Western Governments, a campaign against Communist propaganda, I should not have this excursion. But several of my students in a State educational institution were so unfortunate as to become suspect of 'dangerous thoughts,' because they had somewhat too openly read and discuss some modern sociological works which excluded from the Japanese educational scheme, and on the day when they should have graduated, with all their examinations just completed, they were expelled. This meant that academic career was ruined and any of the higher grade positions definitely closed to them. To one of these students happened to express the sympathy which I hope any English would feel, and, although I know he regards me as hopeless the bourgeoisie, he seems to have been so far gratified as to enlighten me on the motives which led him and those of other students to harbour what are called 'dangerous thoughts.' Either that, or else, knowing my sympathetic interest in all everything Japanese, he thought he would show me something essentially Japanese indeed, but very different from what I hitherto seen.

'Do you know Sabane Jizo?' he asked me. I told him not; and then he informed me that the Sabane Jizo lay only twenty miles away to the north, and was one of the ninety-five places of pilgrimage amongst the Japanese Buddhists. In conglomerate Buddhist pantheon Jizo is the patron saint of children, his main function being to protect those helpless ones who have departed this life before their parents. Inevitably, the help of so kindly a guardian is invoked on behalf of sick and feeble children on earth. But Jizo's origins, like those of many another highly respected deity, are so dubious as to be of great anthropological interest, smacking, as they do, of phallism and I know not what besides. I was at the time engaged in researches into these origins, and so, hoping to find the Sai

Jizo anthropologically interesting, readily agreed to be led thither by my student friend.

Even had the Jizo of Sabane been nothing but an ordinary stock or stone, the pilgrimage would yet have been worth while. For the Jizo stands on the summit of a richly wooded hill, whence, looking across the valley of the Mogami river, the eye could pass pleasantly over range after range of mountains to come to serene rest on the pure white summit of Chokai, fitly called the Fuji of the north. The image of Jizo itself might have stood for nothing more than the conventional idea, judging from its multitudinous adornment with the petitionary and thank offerings of many mothers, which took the form of innumerable bright articles of children's clothing. But from the priest of the small attached temple we learnt that the peculiar fame of this Jizo is as the *Genius* of—well, first he said 'knowledge,' and then he said 'love.' The hill on which it stood has no particular name, the name 'Sabane' belonging to a neighbouring hill, almost a mountain in height and extent, and I was told that 'Sabane' meant 'Monkey-hill.' Not without a malign appropriateness, as I was to find out, was the Jizo of Monkey-hill famed as the *Genius* of love.

Behind that large hill lay the village called Monkey-hill village, which my companion insisted on my visiting. The beautiful beginning of the three or four miles we had to cover was like a promise of Paradise. The sky was the soft blue of autumnal contentment and the air crisp with the stimulus of winter. Our way was by the side of the wide rocky bed of the river along a pass on the slope of Monkey-hill, which, at its highest, reached over 1000 feet. For long stretches the pines and sags formed enchanting avenues through which we could glimpse the bright reds and golds of the hillside foliage, whilst, far below us on our right, the river at times checked its shallow sparkling speed to dwell reflectively, like a Claude Lorraine landscape, in the shadow of deep cliffs of shining yellow, crested with sombre green. I felt my companion broke the silence appropriately when he remarked that this district was famous for its beautiful girls. Then unfortunately for what I was becoming convinced was the idyllic purpose of our excursion, he went on to add, 'Yes, they are so beautiful that they are sold to Tokyo and other great cities to become *joro* or *geisha*.'

Here was a desolating thought crudely spat out at the benign beauty of the scene! It is at this point, therefore, that we must pause in our intended rural excursion to enter into the bewildering mazes of Japanese society; and this pause in the journey will permit the mind to wander at large, backwards to what I already knew, and forwards to what subsequent inquiries revealed. For

my companion's statement that these beautiful girls were 'sold to become *jiu* and *geisha*' cannot be understood unless it is placed in relation to the whole Japanese social scheme.

That the Japanese social system is so little understood by foreigners is not surprising: for the Japanese, whilst insatiably curious to learn every detail of foreign customs and manners, are extraordinarily reticent to let a foreigner into the details of their own. Even to become acquainted at all intimately with the inside of a Japanese home is a comparatively rare experience for a foreigner, and, *a fortiori*, still rarer for him to be taken inside a Japanese heart. One cannot altogether blame the Japanese for this reticence, and for two good reasons. The first is that they know that their own culture is still fundamentally different from that of the West, and so fear misapprehension and ignorant disapproval. The second is that, under Western influence and their own eager desire to adapt themselves to the needs of the modern world they have so adventurously and successfully entered, their social system is undergoing rapid modification and may, in time, be abandoned altogether. Although the going is still painfully slow, yet this result is rendered eventually possible, because, old as the present system is, it is yet of foreign origin and on the whole opposed to the natural genius of the people.

One of the most significant features of the system is its definite subordination of women and this is integral to the Confucian ethics on which it is based. But before the teaching of Confucius came from China to take shrewd and implacable control of the budding mind of Japan, the women of this country were at least as independent as those German women of whom Tacitus, in his *Germania* wrote with such astonishment. This fact was a 'scandal' in the eyes of pre-Meiji Japan and for hundreds of years the histories and legends were doctored so as to give the impression that women were always in a subordinate position. But, *inter alia*, a piece of research on which I am engaged promises to show that to a vastly greater extent than has been hitherto realised, not only was the aboriginal Japanese culture matriarchal, but also that the women played a decisive part in the origin of the empire and the development of literature and art.

The reason for the subordination of women lies in the fact that, in the Confucian scheme, filial piety is the supreme virtue. Sometimes, in the development of the scheme by the followers of Confucius, the virtue of loyalty has challenged that of filial piety for pride of place. Probably among many of the governing class in Japan loyalty tends to be placed higher, but certainly the most widely spread form of Confucian ethics in Japan is that especially represented by Nakae Tōjō, the Saint of Ōmi, where

filial piety is definitely placed first. Although Tōju lived nearly 300 years ago, his exposition of the *Ye-mei* school of Confucianism is still authoritative, and the *Onna Daigaku*, the Greater Learning for Women, which is the recognised code of female culture, derives mainly from him. 'Filial piety,' says Tōju, 'is the weightier and loyality the lighter duty' 'Filial piety is the root of a man.' 'Children are to take care of their parents, loving them better than their own bodies, and being ready to serve them even at the expense of suffering to themselves' Inevitably, this filial piety means the glorification of the family within which it is exercised, and so, compared with the family, the individual counts for nothing.

Children are thus placed in subjection to a *patria potestas* like that of ancient Rome—a condition scarcely in accordance with the natural feelings of the Japanese. For I know of no place in the world where children are treated with a more playful tenderness and allowed so much freedom and so great a share of their parents' pleasures. But under the influence of Confucian teaching about the family, quite admirable Japanese parents will often do things with their children which average Western parents would find revolting. Thus, a childless couple, in order to avoid the disaster of their ancestral cult dying out, which would be a failure in filial duty, will adopt a child and make it entirely their own. This child is usually one of a poorer man's quiverful; and readiness rather than reluctance is shown in parting with it, because, apart from the probability that the child will benefit materially, its parents feel under a moral obligation to help a childless household maintain the virtue of filial piety. Much more objectionable from the Western point of view is the custom of 'selling' a child in order to free the family from debt. The word 'selling' expresses the fact, although not the law, for recent legislation forbids selling. The procedure generally followed is that the father borrows the money required, and gives his child, usually (but not inevitably) a girl, as a hostage for a certain term of years, on the understanding that any profit, over and above her expenses, made out of her shall go towards paying off the debt and so redeeming her. What we might term ordinary service or apprenticeship sometimes takes this form; but, usually, the girls sold are intended for the *yokosawa* and *geisha* houses. Going up and down the country are certain persons who would receive short shrift in the West, but who are held in comparatively respect here. These are the *shasensyu*, or brokers, on the look out for girls suitable for *jore* or *geisha*.

Once in the *yokosawa* or the *geisha* house, there is (unless a lover redeems them) little likelihood of the girls ever becoming free—at least, so long as their attractions last, because the

expenses of education and maintenance are so judiciously devised as to prevent little or any profit being made. Despite the beautiful appearance of their clothes and the scenes of luxury in which they often move, their usual scale of living is penurious and comfortable clothing scant. But the geisha is not regarded as a social outcast by the Japanese, nor even is the joru, or her parents would never devote her to such a life, and no man would ever be willing to redeem and marry her, as is quite often done, thus making what we should call an honest woman of her. It is generally agreed that many girls allow themselves to be devoted to this miserable career in the proud consciousness that their families are thus redeemed from want, and the very stews are therefore not altogether unhallowed by the incense of filial piety.

On the relation of husband and wife Tôju has an important passage which, although it would hardly command the assent of many modern-minded Japanese, is obeyed in practically every detail by the great majority of the people.

The husband is to love his wife and yet not overmuch, lest he neglect his parents and brothers. The men who have brought ruin on family and kingdom by disregarding this rule have been unnumbered. And yet not to love at all is also an evil, since by his wife he has the blessing of offspring and the worship of descendants. Yet let the love have limits as above set forth. The wife is to reverence and obey her husband. She must be gentle, quiet and faithful. Her husband is in the place of heaven. His parents take the place of her parents and thus obedience to father-in-law and mother-in-law becomes the first of her duties. She must be a peace-maker, practice the virtues of a good housekeeper and raise children. A man has his duties out of the house, and a wife within, and so it is written in the third place. *Fu fu* beam on. Marriage involves different duties, or 'Husband and wife have different duties.'

The subordination of women in the domestic régime soon strikes any foreigner who sees much of the real Japan. In the home the father comes first, with the sons a close second, and the wife and daughters almost mental. The husband's meal is served to him alone by his wife or daughters; in the order of the hot bath he always has the first immersion and the wife and mother probably the last, and he generally does all the outside pleasure-seeking for the family. Should he and his wife happen to go out together on foot or by horse, they never travel side by side, but with the wife in her husband's wake. So fixed is this rule that I cannot persuade the Anzaimiya to vary it even in my case, so that my wife has to ride behind me and grin and bear it as best she may. Every girl is definitely brought up to the notion that the men must always take precedence—her father and brothers whilst she is at home, and, when she marries, her husband and his parents. She is married by arrangement to suit the tastes or needs of her family, and enters the home of her

husband's parents for a career not dissimilar from that of a purchased slave.

Many things can doubtless be said in favour of arranged marriages, but in Japan the system is tainted by the Confucian inheritance of entire female subordination. Yet the fine natural qualities of the Japanese women have wrought such exquisite results out of their humiliating discipline that we may say they have stooped to conquer, proving themselves superior to those who deem them inferior. I have referred to the influence and authority of the Japanese women in the distant past, before Confucius took them in hand, and the same influence and authority breaks through their discipline of self-repression. In the ordinary domestic duties a wife brings so much courteous and charming thoughtfulness to bear as to be in truth a ministering angel. Again, so far is she from being a 'pretty toy' as her Western sisters were in less enlightened days, kept from any contact with every kind of business outside ordinary domestic duties, that she becomes, in almost all cases, her husband's business manager. What happens rarely in the West, and then only among the working classes, is the rule in Japan: the wife receives practically all her husband's salary, pays all the bills and the rates and taxes, and frequently manages even the investments. She is in truth, much more than a better half, being nothing less than the presiding genius of family life. Japanese wives and elder sisters (they must never be forgotten) are worthy of the highest reverence. Speaking generally, a wife will sacrifice every shred of comfort for the sake of husband and home; and, in the event of the mother's death, the elder sister, *neesan*, will carry on in the same spirit. All around one can see evidences of *neesan's* devotion to her orphaned brothers; she will, if necessary, go out and earn a living, as a waitress, clerk, accountant, anything, in order to pay for the education of her brother or brothers.

But the burden of over-much serving tends to hide the halo of the ministrant from the sight of those ministered to. Human nature being what it is, a wife's very virtue often cheapens her to her husband. She is, at her best, too much like a fond parent indulging all his whims and making life easy for him to become the recipient of his more adventurous passions. It needs a man of more sense than the average husband anywhere to penetrate to the beauty of such perfect serviceableness, especially if he has any strong inclination

To sport with Amaryllis in the shade
Or with the tangles of Nerissa's hair

Yet, despite the fact that the Japanese, unlike the Western, husband has never been led to expect to find his wife a companion

as well as a helpmeet, he is on the whole inclined to put up with that defect, out of his esteem for her many golden qualities: that is to say, the Japanese marriage *de communione* does not lead to anything like as much infidelity as might have been expected. Unfaithful husbands in the main belong to those classes with either too much time or too much money on their hands: and that is the case everywhere. Also, it is worth noting that a Japanese marriage is not a religious sacrament in our sense of the term, in which a man and woman solemnly pledge themselves before God to mutual faithfulness. Any immorality there may be in Japan is, at any rate, not made more repulsive by hypocrisy.

So far as Tôjû, the Saint of Onn, is concerned, there is no Seventh Commandment. Thus he writes

Not to commit adultery and propriety look somewhat alike, but propriety includes the duty of reverence and consideration for others from the Emperor to the lowest of men, with the duty of kindly intercourse and all the ceremonies of life and death. To compare the two is to put a gill of water against the great sea. The command not to commit adultery is against nature, for it forbids the possession of more than one wife—a command adapted to the common people. But as we consider the importance of offspring, we see that it is proper for the higher ranks to have more than one, and that according to degree, the Emperor to have most.

The sanction for sexual fidelity is neither a jealous god nor a wrathful society, but—surely much to the credit of the Japanese character—sheer goodwill towards the sharer of one's home. The ruling classes, least of all, have been expected to show a clean bill of monogamous devotion, and any conscience they may have developed in recent times arises from the fact that it is they who have been brought into closest contact with Western ideals and also Western hypocrisy.

It may be remembered that, under the leadership of Francis Xavier, a mighty attempt was made to Christianise Japan, and one of the main reasons for its failure was the missionaries' uncompromising insistence on the Seventh Commandment. For, although this presented no difficulty to the common people, who heard the missionaries gladly and, by their thousands, were converted into Christians capable of enduring a most harrowing persecution, the ruling classes refused to obey the commandment and, more honest than their contemporaries in the West, felt this to be an insuperable obstacle to the profession of Christianity. It was the ruling classes, including the warriors, who, as far back as the twelfth century, instituted a definite system of prostitution, from which have sprung eventually the two classes of *yore*, or concubine, and *grake*, or entertainer. At this point it might perhaps be well to complete our excursion to the village of Monkey-hill.

This mountain village, with its hundred or so of small farmers' houses, most of them roughly built of wood and straw-thatch, proved a somewhat meagre gem for so richly jewelled a setting. Maybe my companion's plan of the place had predisposed me, but certainly as we walked along its irregular ways I felt at once a marked difference between this and countless other small Japanese villages I knew. 'Sweet Auburn,' I caught myself murmuring, and knew that this was the Deserted Village. Although school was just over on our arrival, the streets, instead of being noisy and alert with a swarm of children, sent out but a few stray ripples of dismembered joy. Probably there may have been more children about than I was conscious of, but I knew that no small proportion of those who should have been playing there, little blue-eyed girls in their bright-flowered kimono, had been sold to the great cities to serve the blind appetite of vagrant-minded men.

It is no exaggeration to say that almost half the houses were officially recorded as having 'sold' their children. One had sold as many as four, some three, and most of them two. In the very short lane leading to the village temple, as if to furnish the Japanese exemplar of 'The nearer the church, the further from grace,' there stood, close to the temple steps, two houses, from one of which four, from the other two, daughters, and not many yards away another house, whence three had gone to the slave-market of pleasure. Gaze around for the usual brisk succession of rice-field terraces, and behold how comparatively few fields there are to afford sustenance, still less profit, to this village of rice-farming people! But Nature scant in her bequest of the wealth of the field, had been lavish here in her bestowal of human beauty; and, by its vending, the lack of the harvest had been made good.

So far I have referred indifferently to *joro* or *gisha*, and in the minds of those most intimately concerned there is little or no distinction made. A certain amount of beauty is essential for either career, but if bodily grace and mental ability be added, then that inclines the scales in favour of a *gisha*'s career. The girls are usually bought some years before they reach their teens—certainly if they are to become *gisha*, for the training for that career is peculiarly thorough and prolonged; and, of course, either as *joro* or *gisha*, graceful manners and witty minds make them the more attractive to clients and the more profitable for their employers or owners.

The *joro* is nothing more nor less than a prostitute. That she is regarded by Japan as a social necessity is shown by the fact that every town has its *joro* quarters, often called *yokushura*, although that name really belongs only to the *joro* quarters of

Tokyo. But for over 300 years she has been treated as a regrettable necessity. She must have a Government licence, pay a Government tax, submit to frequent medical inspection, and never leave the narrow bounds of the jave district without special police permission. If one walks through that segregated area, he will still see at each house the long barred windows through which the sisterhood of vice, arrayed in gay paint and rich garments, were once compelled to display their charms to the expectant passer-by; which custom, I believe, is now practically in abeyance. I shall never be able to pass by these prison houses in future without wondering whether there is some sad soul within who, amidst the garish shadows around, 'sees a mountain ascending, a vision of trees,' such as my companion and I saw then.

The lot of the *geisha* must be much more enviable. Her prime function is to entertain, and, frequently from the early age of seven, she receives a strenuous training in various arts. To reach the highest grade in her calling she must acquire the most charming social graces, become acquainted with the art of poetic composition and achieve mastery in song, instrumental playing and dancing. She is chiefly requisitioned for official functions, ceremonial feasts, dinner-parties, and all the more important social affairs, where, in addition to performing the lighter part of a waitresses's duties, she will, as desired, sing and dance. Dinner-parties, according to Japanese custom are in the main male affairs, although now ladies are beginning to attend them. At these parties the *geisha* is most truly and exquisitely herself as an entertainer—nothing more. No dinner-party at a restaurant, even the smallest, would be complete without two or three *geisha*, and they make a Japanese dinner-party one of the most delightful experiences on earth. It is I know, frequently said by foreigners that the *geisha*, with her twanging samisen and her strange, high-pitched voice, is a very misappreciated entertainer, but those who speak thus can have no sense whatever of the *mas en scène*. One must see the *geisha* as part of her setting and also not surrender too easily to the vice of dismissing as ridiculous that which lies outside our usual narrow tastes and interests.

The fees paid for securing the privilege of her attendance are strictly fixed in accordance with her grade. There are ten grades expressed by the word *gyaku*, and a full *geisha* is called *ippou-geku*. An *ippou-geku geisha* is indeed a graduate in the art of entertainment, for she must pass a Government examination to secure the coveted title. Like a leading music-hall or operatic star in the Western world, she is rarely to be seen outside the metropolis. The highest grade of *geisha* to be met with in the provinces is *hachibu-geku* (eight-tenths), and the fee paid for her

is 3 yen (6s.) for the first two hours, and after that 1 yen an hour. It is customary to engage one or two *ken-gyoku*, half-*geisha*, with each *hachibu-gyoku*, and their fee is exactly half. Then a generous tip is expected for each girl, say 3 yen (10s.) for each *hachibu-gyoku*. These tips are called *hana*, or flower, and in the interesting grading of the *geisha* this pretty term also has its place. Thus a very useful kind of *geisha*, who is too old to be a *ken-gyoku*, and not attractive enough to attain to a higher rank, is called a *hana*-or flower-*geisha*, because her fee is not fixed, taking rather the form of a tip, or *hana*.

Also, outside the *kabuki* theatre, practically all the best public exhibitions of dancing are given by *geisha*. Even in the provincial cities the local *geisha* are capable, on special occasions, of organising a dancing pageant of so high an order that, for its artistic equivalent in the West, one would have to visit the metropolis. In such great centres as Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto spring and autumn dancing festivals are now a recognised institution, and they alone are quite enough to justify a trip to Japan. The *geisha* are undoubtedly the glory of Japan's artistic life; hence when a group of foreign missionaries went out of their way to protest against the admission of a party of *geisha* to America, stigmatising the majority of them as prostitutes, a feeling of bitter resentment was aroused.

Let us first consider the actual facts, with which far too few seem to have acquaintance. If a *geisha* is only licensed as an entertainer, then she breaks the law by acting as a prostitute. But, if she wishes, she can take out a double licence, and undoubtedly a large number—how many I cannot accurately say—of the inferior grades of *geisha* have this double licence. Then I am assured on good authority that it is quite impossible as a rule for a *geisha* to retain her virginity since her first step is to take a *danna*, or protector, who in return for the favour of her body, supplies it with the expensive and beautiful dresses necessary for her calling. Then how can we get over the fact that there are Government-licensed houses, called *machian*? Simple-minded foreigners are usually asked to regard these places as harmless waiting houses, but the Japanese lexicographer baldly defines them as 'places of assignation.' It is here that patrons receive the visits of *geisha*, paying a heavy fee to the *machian* for the privilege; for no assignations are allowed in the *geisha* houses, which are reserved for the *geisha*'s living and training. Nor can it be denied that many of Japan's greatest men in various spheres (not altogether unlike many of the greatest men of the West of no very remote period) have had, and still have, love affairs with the *geisha*, who, in this respect, play very much the same part as the *hetaira* of ancient Greece. 'For,' to quote Chamberlain's *Things*

Japanese, "she alone of all her countrywomen has divined something of the art of conversation." He also outlines some of the romantic possibilities inherent in an ambitious young man's infatuation for a geisha:

His friends, hearing of what they deem evil sources, stop supplying. The geisha supports her lover, who thereupon passes brilliant examinations, and obtains an official post. They are married, and he rises to be one of the leading men of the empire, while she of course is a great lady, with her carriage and her weekly reception days. Such is the outline of more than one modern Japanese romance in real life.

When we call the geisha a prostitute we are merely choosing the most offensive word possible, not the one which fits most fully all the facts. If a foreigner uses this word to describe her of whom he has probably had no other experience than as a most charming and intensely restrained artist what will he call those poor wretches in his own country, whose open solicitations are, I know well, one of the first astonishments for many a Japanese traveller in a Christian land? I do not for one moment wish to gloss over the offensive fact, but a foreigner owes the country that harbours him the courtesy of a sense of proportion. After all, in the last resort, immorality does depend on the state of mind of the persons involved. Whether our own "moderns" would admit it or not, sexual infidelity is in England, immorality, because a large proportion at any rate of the persons guilty of it either have taken a solemn vow of faithfulness or at any rate, if they are in any sense Christians, are pledged to an ideal of human personality which makes all such infidelity excusable. The Japanese have a different social code. Whereas in the West the very men who avail themselves of these unfortunate women are ready to snuff them as social outcasts, the Japanese will frequently marry them, and, so doing, give them a place in normal society, where, be it noted, they will, with scarce an exception, conduct themselves with the utmost fidelity to their husbands. Sometimes a man is too poor to reform his beloved at once, and then, just as an ardent swain in the West sets to work to save money to buy a home, he of the East will struggle to save money to buy his wife out of her servitude as a geisha or *yuu*. There is so vast a difference between the outcasts of Western society and the geisha, at least, that one finds it difficult to account for the insulting protest of the missionaries except as a most pathetic example of casting out the mote in your neighbour's eye without regard to the beam in your own.

My purpose in writing has been to show that one of the great difficulties which the West has to face when it ventures to sit in moral judgment on Japan is that what is dubbed immorality is not, as in the West, a hypocritical defiance of the whole social

code, but is in the closest possible relation to it. Certain evils may be evils anyhow, but, at any rate, in Japan the evil of sexual immorality is modified by certain qualities which are lacking elsewhere. Even in the *yeshimura* a woman can retain some shreds of self-respect, and, with them, possibilities of noble and devoted conduct, probably as a recognised servant of society, certainly as a loyal helper of her family. So that when she is redeemed she is allowed, and is able, to take her place alongside Japan's noble order of wives and mothers; whilst the *geisha* is more and more demanding to be taken solely as a serious artist, and the other side of her life is becoming less and less prominent. Like their 'respectable' sisters who have, out of their very servitude to husband and home, made a thing of gracious beauty, so the *geisha*, out of their servitude to pleasure, have built a veritable palace of refined and beautiful art, which is likely to endure and develop long after its crude foundations have sunk far out of sight. But let no one imagine that I am putting up the poor excuse of the unfortunate girl in Captain Marryat's novel and am defending the evil of immorality in Japan on the ground that, like the baby, it is a very little one. I am but asking that it should be judged in relation to the social scheme. It is an evil anywhere, especially when it takes the form of violating the sacredness of human personality. That is where the Japanese social code, excellent though it may be in many respects, is, I venture to say, seriously deficient.

Japan's development from medieval feudalism towards a more modern conception of individual rights is already great enough to deserve our astonished congratulations. In this development Christianity has directly played a much larger part than the *amour propre* of the Japanese will allow them readily to concede; and, also, what the Government has persecuted as 'dangerous thoughts' among the younger generation, the students especially—thoughts derived from the Socialist and Communist movements in Europe—these are playing an increasingly important part in the growth of a noble ideal of free womanhood and of individual rights generally. Yet probably the most important influence is simply the broadening effect of the opening of Japan on the minds of the leaders in every sphere of activity. Slow though some foreigners may be to grant it, yet anyone who has lived for some time on any kind of intimacy with the Japanese, and is able to make due allowance for the still inevitable differences in turns of thought and speech, must admit that their minds are beginning to move quite easily within the modern comity of thought and aspiration. Thus we may well hope that it will not be long when Japanese saints, like Nakae Tōju of Ōmi, will cease to declare that sexual fidelity is unnatural.

As we began the ascent of Monkey-hill on our homeward way I felt I could still hear amidst its trees the simian gibberings of Lust glinting over its prey below. And then I recollected the strange stone image of Jine standing on its further side. At one time that stone image was no image, but the shamanic stone or wooden symbol of 'Nature'. Then, unnatural or not, man found he wanted something more; and so, although the ancient odour of the beast still hangs around, that stone has become the gracious symbol of a Power that will heal the children of men of the very evils with which man has afflicted them. Some day man may feel so 'unnaturally' powerful as to be able to abolish these evils, by himself, for himself and from himself, here and throughout the world.

I believe my student murmured 'The Social Revolution'. But I think something more than that will be required.

ERNEST PICKERING

ALBERT THE GOOD

There have been only two Prince Consorts in the history of the British Throne, for the first Mary's husband was King of Spain and the husband of the second Mary secured equal and kingly rank when the unhial pair usurped the rights and possessions of James II. George of Denmark, the first Prince Consort as the husband of Anne, was a feeble and negligible person. He suffered as much adoration and exaltation from his wife as Albert of Saxe-Coburg was to experience from Victoria in the succeeding century, and more, for Anne established him both as Generalissimo of the Army and Lord High Admiral of the Navy, and secured a settlement upon him, should he survive her, of the tremendous income of £100,000 a year, whereas Albert was apportioned in the lifetime of his wife but £30,000, though that sum was large for a younger son of a petty German principality. But, like Albert, Prince George of Denmark predeceased his wife: he had twenty-five years of wedlock, Prince Albert twenty-one; and there were some points of resemblance in their spouses, for both queens were obstinate and emotional.

But Albert of Saxe-Coburg's personality was very different to that of his one and invertebrate predecessor. Victoria had a strong and determined nature, but her youthful husband's was far stronger, and even more resolved, for he dominated and moulded her to his will and opinions, though at the time of their marriage she was a spoilt, self-willed child, compact of arrogance and personal prejudices, and quite unfit to govern her great Empire: he transformed her into what the historians have termed 'a great sovereign'. She was vastly fortunate in the fact that her reign synchronised with a most remarkable flowering of genius and talent among the British people, men and women, born for the most part some years before the Queen, who would in any case have achieved their immense accomplishments in science, medicine, invention, literature and the arts in exactly the same way if she had never existed. These aspects of the Victorian era owed nothing to Victoria as queen and received but little encouragement from her. Queen Victoria in the popular and Tennysonian conception—'She wrought her people lasting

good"—was entirely the creation of the Prince Consort, and for this reason, if for no other, he deserved better treatment than he received from his contemporaries in England, who in the main distorted and misunderstood his still and silent outward bearing. As for the present-day attitude of ridicule for Albertine qualities, it is based on ignorance of the real character of the man and the foolish picture presented of him in the diaries and letters of his adoring wife and the memorials erected by his desolate widow. He did not create the Albert Memorial at Kensington Gore, but he had much to do with the creation of the glorious collections of works of art now fittingly housed in the Victoria and Albert Museum near to his 'Memorial.' And if you must have a 'memorial' at all, I see nothing funny in his, which is stately and ornate, with quite excellent high relief carvings: imitation elsewhere of the Gothic Renaissance style is not regarded as humorous or 'Victorian.' The English people ought to be grateful to the Prince Consort for introducing from his native Germany the now highly popular custom of the Christmas tree. He was a connoisseur and collector of primitive pictures long before 'high-brow' quidnuncs of art knew much about them; and if Albert did wear whiskers and go to church like a respectable married man, why so did most of the famous statesmen and men of affairs who were his contemporaries. It is very true he made England respectable in its standards of outward morals and public behaviour—no mean achievement for a young foreigner who began his campaign when only twenty years old, and began it in the first instance with the personality of his youthful bride in lieu of joining with her in the frivolities and pleasures natural to their age and high station. Let these things be accounted unto righteousness in an estimation of this remarkable and unusual young man. When he married Victoria she loved London and dancing and all manner of gaieties, but he soon persuaded her that the greatest joy in life was to be found in quiet domestic bliss amid the sylvan groves of Windsor and devotion to official duties at the desk, or in the privacy and seclusion of Balmoral and Osborne. Being an exceptional young man, he was untroubled by sex, for, as Greville heard from the Duchess of Bedford, 'the Queen is excessively in love with him, but he not a bit with her. All the courtiers point with admiration to them walking together arm-in-arm in the garden, and say how charming it is to see such signs of mutual passion, but the Duchess does not think it is unusual, and he gives her the impression of not being happy.'

Albert was entirely indifferent to women; not the slightest breath of scandal ever hung for a moment about his name; never once, amid all the blaze of Tennyson's 'floral light which

looks upon a Frenchman, and he came to look upon the ladies of the Court even with the eyes of a Frenchman, with courtesy. The more remarkable perhaps was his physical coldness in view of the fact that his mother was put away for adultery, and that for many years the stigma of illegitimacy was attached to his birth by the scandalous chroniclers. I am glad to see that Mr. Hector Bolitho, in his recent biography of the Prince Consort,¹ supplies a refutation of this story, which alleged that the Duchess Louise's son Albert was born of her intercourse with a Jew in the service of the Court of Saxe-Coburg, with the result that Semitic blood was brought into the Royal Family of England, and consequently into the Hohenzollerns and other Royal Houses of Europe. Lytton Strachey, in his *Queen Victoria*, spoke of scandals about Albert's mother—'one of the Court Chamberlains, a charming and cultivated man of Jewish extraction, was talked of.' The Duchess Louise was divorced by reason of her relations with Lieutenant von Hanstein, whom she subsequently married. But all this was in 1826, when Prince Albert was six years old, and there is no evidence that his mother was guilty in 1818; indeed, the letters of that time seem to prove that she was then living happily with her husband—as happy, that is, as any royal lady of that period could expect to be in the Courts of Germany, where the lax morality of the eighteenth century still survived (as it did also at the Court of Hanoverian St. James's), for the Duke of Saxe-Coburg took his pleasures promiscuously abroad as well as in the Rouman, where Prince Albert was born. The child's birth was superintended by the same midwife who had officiated three months earlier at the arrival of his first cousin and future wife, Victoria, at Kensington Palace.

Prince Albert, as he grew up, intensely reacted from the immoral traditions of his family and of his wife's near relatives (for even her mother, the Duchess of Kent, his aunt, had not avoided scandalous conduct), and when he arrived in England to be the Queen's youthful husband he had a very difficult, self-appointed task in scouring the Court of England. For it must be borne in mind that, though Early Victorianism had commenced and he had at once raised the banner-example of respectable domestic life for all to see, English society was still Georgian and accustomed, and in many cases subscribing, to the immoralities and coarse standards of that era. The older people were contemporary with the upheaval of the codes of behaviour at the time of the French Revolution, and the younger men and women had spent their youth amid the splendid sins of the Regency when the royal mistresses were the models for deportment and the female form more unveiled than at almost any other phase of

¹ *Albert the Good*, by Hector Bolitho (Cobden-Sanderson, 25s. net)

English dress, though the mode in question was French, for it was Madame Récamier, walking in Kensington Gardens when she was over here during the Peace of Amiens, in her scanty muslin gown showing every swelling line of her figure, who gave the amazed English their first glimpse of costume *à l'antique*—or Greek, as the wicked Parisians conceived it.

Queen Victoria before her marriage was altogether a Georgian in temperament, and without the dominating influence for good of her husband might have developed on very different lines and become one of the coarse, indolent princesses of her House. Greville records as late as 1841 that the Duke of Wellington had said it was 'the Prince who insisted on spotless character (the Queen not caring a straw about it),' and that he was 'extremely strait-laced and a great stickler for morality, whereas she was rather the other way.' But the Queen soon conformed, and it was only a year later that she supported Prince Albert in the unfortunate prudery which generated the awkward *tracasserie* concerning Prince George of Cambridge and Lady Augusta Somerset. The Prince Consort was over-youthful, twenty-three, for his position of Court Moralist and Censorist, but his power was amazing, for in a very short time the old habits of social behaviour were abolished for ever. It became no longer the thing for the men to sit over their wine until they rolled off the chairs, and instead of telling each other unclean stories they had very soon to join the ladies, but not for cards and gaming, as in the times of the Queen's uncles, but for looking at prints, admiring drawings, the drinking of tea, and what Mrs. Major Ponto called 'ung pu de musick o salong.'

The ladies of England no longer displayed their figures in diaphanous and clinging attire, their clothes grew heavier and more voluminous, with many petticoats, their skirts swept the ground and were finally expanded into the vast gasometers of the crinolines of 1860, by which time the Prince Consort was nearing the end of his short life. He had dictated many changes in manners, morals, and dress, and had given a new impetus, under his personal aid, to art and science and the general improvement and well-being of his adopted country. He overwhelmed himself with work as the years passed by, and weakened his physical powers by strenuous efforts with the conduct of public affairs, for he was king in everything but name: the most intricate of details and statistics had his intensive attention; he had all the thoroughness of the German mentality in the ordering of business. By 1856, when he was still only thirty-six, he was an aging man and going bald, but his labours for his adopted country never ceased. They intensified, and he even invaded the prerogatives of the Foreign Office when he wrote direct to the Emperor

Napoleon III. underlining the advantages to both countries of an Anglo-French entente at the time, following the end of the Crimean War, when Russia was making overtures for an alliance with France. The Emperor came to Osborne the same year, 1857, when Albert counselled, corrected, and guided this man who was his senior by eleven years, for Louis Napoleon himself recorded, 'One goes away from him more disposed to do good.' As Mr Bohitho truly observes.

It is indeed difficult to judge within common standards this lonely cold man who, at the age of eighteen, sat beside the Pope and talked for half an hour about Etruscan art, and who, risen to power and middle age, spent his evenings at Windsor in correcting the copy books of his workmen from the Park.

He was almost the modern Crichton, and so perfect in character as to be a modern saint, for his motto was 'From my heart I mean well towards all men.' But his Utopian desires did not blind him to the duplicities of European politics of the nineteenth century, and though Louis Napoleon had received his chastening advice with pleasing humility, Albert was perfectly well aware that Victoria's Gallie ally was not to be trusted. He constantly warned the English politicians and warring generals of the danger of unpreparedness for war, and in one of his memoranda, this time of twenty-eight pages, he urged them not to forget the wandals and bitterly learned lessons of the recent Crimean campaign.

All that he accomplished was but in small measure credited to him. At times his schemes were not brought to a successful consummation. His lack of the sense of humour often stultified his high aspirations and laboured endeavours, as in the absurd programme he drew up for the education of the Prince of Wales, a system based on ceaseless work, constant supervision by dour tutors, and the absence of the society of boys of the young Prince's age. That pastoralist scheme to create another Coburg on the pattern laid down by Leopold of Belgium and Stockmar, entirely failed, the future King Edward VII proclaimed his Hanoverian nature directly he came of age, and of all his relatives he came most to resemble his granduncle, George IV, who had been the particular *idol-mane* of his parents. This *déconfort* represents the Prince Consort's greatest failure. In his manifold other schemes, though he was often ridiculed and misrepresented at the time, his wisdom has been justified and complete success has attended his vision, as in the foundation of a great camp at Aldershot; in the collection of national works of art, natural history objects, and Colonial exhibits, in a group of museums at South Kensington; and in the development of the land in the

same district for superior residential purposes. The latter speculation proved very profitable to the Prince in his lifetime, and the houses which arose in Prince's Gate, Prince Consort Road, and near by, had much to do with the amassing of over a million pounds which Albert bequeathed as his private fortune to the Queen and their younger children, though he had arrived in this country twenty-one years before with, presumably, very little money.

Who can unveil the soul of this strange, quiet man, so outwardly calm and unemotional, a young foreigner who succeeded in almost everything he set out to accomplish in a powerful country that at first was hostile and always somewhat contemptuous towards him? From his infancy he knew he was to marry his cousin, the future Queen, and he trained himself for his destiny even as a young boy. Yet the motives which swayed him remain a mystery, for as soon as the power and the riches were his he appeared a tired and bored man—excitement and *jeu-de-revers* he never displayed. He is an enigma. There is a remoteness, an almost inhuman mystery, about his real and inner nature which has baffled all his biographers. We know he had an implacable will, that there was a resolute whinner behind the primness and propriety which formed the outward mask of 'Albert the Good'—the Prince as he was seen and presented by Theodore Martin and Tennyson. The tribute of the poet is fine and true (as far as it goes), but Tennyson glimpses none of the essential man—only his public actions and good deeds and the setting for the white flower of his blameless life. It is a cold statue, as Queen Victoria wished her husband to be seen, but the wildly beating heart, the troubled brain, are unseen, for in creating the paragon the human man was forgotten, and it is not from the sorrowing widow and the eulogists that the real Albert will transpire. Was he another Michel, who found that though all he touched turned to gold, yet was he starved spiritually, and stifled by the heavy atmosphere of his all-pervading domesticity?

That is a problem Mr. Frothingham does not attempt to solve, and, indeed, it can but remain ever matter for conjecture. He has, however, written an excellent memoir, on the short side, and perhaps too much broken up by paragraphs divided into numbered sections, which suggest rather the form of a handbook. He has a sincere interest in his subject, and treats it sympathetically, which will be a surprise for those who anticipated an ironical travesty in the manner of Lytton Strachey. The title of the book announces something of that kind, and even more so do the delightful illustrations in colour, reproductions of contemporary pictures and humorous to modern eyes by reason of the quaint clothes and the costume and the general suggestion of the

given-fall. It is fortunate that Mr. Strachey never accomplished his threatened book on Prince Albert, for his cleverness in parillage would have established the subject as a figure of ridicule for all time. It is bad enough to have this author's *Queen Victoria* termed a 'biography'—for that it never was, but merely a vehicle for displaying Strachey's picturesque style and marked gifts of irony; yet it will, in all probability, be quoted as the stock 'Life' of the Queen in the future, just as Thackeray's absurd libel on George IV is accepted as a 'brilliant estimate' of that king, whereas it was simply intended as a popular 'lecture' with designedly purple patches and sentimental appeals to the virtue of the gallery, only lacking, as one of Thackeray's friends said, 'a panner' to accompany the performance.

Mr. Bobtho has obtained some valuable new material for his book in the letters addressed from England by Prince Albert to his brother, Duke Ernest. These are still preserved in the archives of Coburg, where they have been inspected by the author with the permission of the present Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, a grandson of the Prince Consort and Queen Victoria. A passage in one of these letters shows the Prince in an unamiable light and more excited and self-assertive than was his usual habit. The affair arose from the presence in England of Ernest King of Hanover, who as the next heir to the Throne of Great Britain after Victoria and her descendants was always cordially disliked by the Queen and her husband, though their pace of objection was mainly based on his immoral character, for this terrible uncle cheerfully boasted that he had committed all the capital crimes of the Newgate Calendar. The scene in question was a fiasco for precedence at the marriage of the Princess Augusta of Cambridge, when Prince Albert relates

It almost came to a fight with the King. He insisted on having the place at the altar where we stood. He wanted to kiss me away and, against all custom, he wanted to accompany Victoria and lead her. I was to go behind him. I was forced to give him a strong push and drive him down a few steps where the Ford Master of Ceremonies took him and led him out of the chapel. We had a second scene when he would not allow me to sign the register with Victoria. He laid his hat on the book. We murmured round the table and Victoria had the book handed to her across the table. Now the table was between us and he could see what was being done. After a third trial to force Victoria to do what he commanded, but in vain, he left the party in great wrath. Since then we let him go and happily he fell over some stones in Rome and damaged some ribs.

Albert and Victoria were, of course, quite in the wrong about this matter. Ernest, as a reigning sovereign, naturally would have precedence over a prince consort, and but for the accident

of Victoria's birth he would have been King of England; and the hilarious allusion to a serious accident to a man of seventy-two is remarkably callous. It is one of the curious exceptions to the rule of Albert's generally kind and gentle disposition. Another exception was the pleasure he took in the easy slaughter of driven and almost tame stags as a form of 'sport.' Even his wife, who was by no means a humanitarian in her attitude to the 'pleasures' of the chase, found these battues and the weltering gore of the victims rather too much for her nerves, ready as she was to admire everything that was German, for Albert had brought his dear-stalking prowess from his native Coburg. In the Queen's journals of *Life in the Highlands* it comes with something of a shock to read how she and her husband would be sketching on the hills, seated near a butt, with their little son, aged six, beside them, when the keepers announced 'stags' and 'Albert fired through the branches' and Albert felt certain he had hit a stag. Not one thought for the wounded animal in dire pain, or regret that a splendid living thing should be robbed of life on that lovely September day instead of roaming free on its native hills. But Albert had been brought up from childhood in the Jäger tradition of his Thuringian forests, and his memories ever looked back to his early days in the green toy principality which cradled his remarkable family. Mr Holtho well pictures the beauty of the Prince's first home of the Romanen - how

the yellow stone castle shone in the sunlight. Near to it were hawthorn clump, ash, and oaks. Beyond the park were the high peaks of the dark and solemn Thuringian Forest, stretching from state to state. Above the Romanen, the light was bright and the fields were beautiful with meadow saffron and red clover. Year after year he dreamed of the Romanen, he wrote of the trees, the scents he remembered, the gardens, the little castle.

Albert was the true son of that petty yet powerful race of Saxe-Coburg, who might be called the king makers, for their blood flows in most of the royal houses of Europe. Mysterious and phlegmatic, they have dictated the course of history, and in one generation they rose to extreme power. Most influential of them all was Leopold, who became King of the Belgians. But previously his future seemed marked out to be the same as that of his nephew, Prince Alfred, for he had married Princess Charlotte, the heiress to the British Throne. Her tragic death in 1817 apparently shattered all his hopes. In the following year the marriage of his sister, Victoria, to the Duke of Kent, fourth in succession to the English Crown, and the birth of their daughter in 1819, provided fresh means for ambition; for with the birth of a son, Albert, to their eldest brother, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, came the resolve that the cousins should marry as early as possible.

For twenty years Leopold and his sister and their trusty counsellor, Stockmar, worked for the consummation of their scheme, and with what success is a matter of history. It is remarkable that the young people should so obligingly have agreed with their relatives' views, and seldom can a marriage of convenience have turned out so well for the contracting parties, and in this case for the country they governed. Further aggrandisement came to the Coburgs through Leopold's brother, Ferdinand, whose descendants included the Kings of Portugal, Bulgaria, and Roumania.

Prince Albert much resembled his uncle, Leopold, in temperament. Both had the cool, phlegmatic bearing which veiled an inscrutable resolve and an inveterate schemer. Despite all that he accomplished, Albert ever gave the impression of indolent somnolency. He was always feeling sleepy. As a boy, he yawned as a youth of seventeen through the leaves at the Court of William IV., and as the young bridegroom of twenty he was seen nodding on the sofa as early as half past ten. Towards the end of his life he was undoubtedly tired and worn out by excess of mental work and unflinching devotion to official duties and desk routine. He seemed to be tired of everything—of his pomp and power and state of his wife and of life itself, for he quietly slipped away, making no effort to defy Death, and was gone at the age of forty-two. He might well have lived another span as long. Before the end, he had won the respect and some measure of affection from the great middle class of England; he had done much to create the aristocracy never used him. But all classes were shocked and grieved by the untimely tragedy of his death. An acute observer of the manners of the time, William Hardman, wrote on the morrow of the Prince's end:

The entire nation mourns the loss of one whose admirable qualities in the position which he filled are unperpetrated, and unequalled. Poor Prince Albert! I felt, when the sudden shock of his death paralysed my soul, as if I had lost a near relative. Every shop in London has kept up mourning shrouds, and nothing is seen in all drapers' windows, tailors', and haberdashers shops but black. Everywhere is a deep mourning, black and white, exactly any colour such as marble or velvet being seen. A heavy gloom has been cast on this Christmas.

Yet now, sixty years and more after the Prince's death, but few people remember how he served England and the causes of art and science and social progress. His name survives all over the country as the designation for bridges, embankments, squares, terraces, and roads, but few of the people who use or inhabit the 'Albert' places pause to remember or learn the origin of the name they constantly mention or write. He also gave his name to a watch-chain, but probably most of the 'Alberts' were sold and melted down in the recent 'gold rush'. There is pathos in

the thought how all the schemes of his heart-broken widow to preserve his name and fame have been stultified in the course of thirty years. She intended to found a new line of English kings of the House of Saxe-Coburg who should each be styled Albert. Her heir declined the title of Albert I. when he succeeded and chose the designation of Edward VII., and as his elder son, Albert Victor, had predeceased him, the prospects of a King Albert have faded for ever. The Albert Memorial is a symbol of ridicule for the ignorant, and the Albert Hall, intended only for purposes of music and noble oratory, is now available for all manner of 'free,' rebel speech, and bloodshed from the noses and mouths of hefty boxers, and for the unmetrical cries of all the curious people who follow in the wake of such performances. Posterity has dealt unfairly with Prince Albert: nevertheless, he was the most influential foreigner who ever settled in England, and by his achievements did lasting good.

S. M. ELLIS.

RELIGION AND RATIONALISM

This essay was first written last summer, and entirely rewritten a few months later as the result of what I can only describe as the real religious experience whilst working for the Labour movement during October. This religious experience was of the greatest importance to me not only as a thing in itself, but also as enabling me to see, to some extent from the inside, what the psychological content of religion is or might be. This was the more essential because I had never previously, even in childhood, had any kind of religious experience. Probably this was not a complete religious experience but certainly it was a very near approach and it has encouraged me to try and define both religion and rationalism, not merely as a historian or sociologist, from the outside, but as one who has had experience of both.

When considering what religion is I have been very much helped by two things—first of all by my own experience, and secondly by Gerald Heard's *Social Substance of Religion*. There appeared to be considerable agreement between his theory and my practice. It seems as though the essential thing about religion is communion. It is very unfortunate that we are forced to use words with definitely Christian connotations, and we must take care not to be put off by these connotations. Communion means that the individual, the stander-alone becomes one with a group, perhaps with a common cause (although this common cause need not be moral, political, intellectual, or indeed explicit). All barriers are down. The ego is no longer alone and cut off, it is part of something larger than itself. It is part of the Group. The Group is, or may be, eternal or virtually eternal. It may start as something very small, perhaps the traditional twelve, but it may expand into the whole of humanity, it may become the whole of life. It is organic. As part of it the individual has direct experience of eternal life and so no longer need have any fear of death, or hankering for personal immortality. Having the direct experience of communion there is no need, either, for any mediator or god. The idea of God is an artificial protrusion from religion, a symbol which was perhaps useful during the times before psychology was separated off from philosophy.

But in this sense, this religious faith is not a faith in one object or value or hope. It is a faith in the whole human community—faith that we had better hang together, indeed, as now; for the individual, able at last to go beyond his barriers, must have his neighbors in faith, because they are frail. They are completely intermingled. As statement—at one-moment. As fulfillment—the thing which has been wanted always. As certainty; as happiness; as value. As the thing which makes anything else either worth while or not worth while, according to its relation with the communion and the common cause.

Words are never very adequate to express values; but, roughly, this represents what I mean by religion. It is what is at the beginning of, or still to some extent underlying, all adequate religions. But in general it has been so smothered by other accretions, mostly put on by people who could not stand the thing pure and unmixed, that it is almost unrecognizable. People cannot stand religion unmixed because it is very staggering, and there is very little technique for keeping it steady. Without that technique it is alarming, over-balancing, above all desperately tiring. And this brings me to a definition of rationalism, which will at least be shorter.

Rationalism means keeping one's head about religion. It does not mean refusing to let oneself be seized upon by the communion. It does not mean refusing eternal life; it does not mean refusing happiness. But it does mean that, even with all barriers down, one is *à la dérive*. (One is not drowned in the tide, but wandering with it.) It means, above all, keeping one's sense of direction. Rationalism is the understanding of the religious certainty and the religious value, this new sense of worth-wholeness. The rationalist, understanding and accepting, will not want to make symbols, will not be afraid. He will not want to decorate the central fact of the religious experience with dogma and myth. He will not try to stylize it or bend it in or check its manifestations. But, perhaps, he will try to have some kind of technique about it, designed to make it as perfect as possible and also as lasting, to enable himself to get the strength and joy which the experience gives without any reaction afterwards, above all to enable him to live logically in the light of his values. Now these definitions will certainly not satisfy most people who call themselves religious or most people who call themselves rationalists. Still less are they the best possible definitions. But I should like reasonable people to consider them, for I feel that a combination of religion and rationalism is likely to give a combination in the human spirit which is extremely powerful and which will allow for any amount of growth. I believe a great many people are seeking for just this combination.

that it is in the end, the only religion which is worthy of the name, will come out of the world, and something is necessary, as for instance, the idea of a personal God, popular myths, deities, or even gods, to bring it in and the whole thing becomes modified at once.

Religion without rationalism is extremely dangerous. It means that the pure religious experience may be, and normally is, altered, distorted, passed through external ideas and completely smothered by an accumulation of images. Religion with rationalism is like a living body in health; without rationalism it is like the same body in sickness. It is still powerful, but powerful for evil and unhappiness. Most religions sooner or later become entangled with the idea of sacrifice and vicarious atonement. Obviously, if one has really had the experience of eternal life not in the future, but now (as an Epicurean and Epicurean), or does it necessary, just die for the community, for the value we cannot possibly live against it. It is impossible. The only possible thing is to die for it. There is nothing complicated about that is the person who is sure, no elaborate martyrdom, it just is. As a matter of fact, one man dying for the religion also may be for the people, but that does not automatically give the people consciousness or attachment. It may give them a possibility of it. But if they get it into their heads that the man who dies is a sacrifice for them, that there is something magical happening, something to do with blood, something irrational then they are wrong the wrongest possible kind of wrong. No one is exempt from the business of being religious and also of being rational. That is what we are people for.

But, in the meantime, there is an amount of religion in the world which is going about not only without rationalism but with all kinds of evil and wasteful and harmful accretions and overhangs. From being a necessity it has become a danger. Let us take a survey of it and consider it in detail. In England the present position is, roughly, this. There are a number of people, in all classes, who are without religious experience. They are unhappy, uncertain, insecure, without adequate values. They do not know what to do next. They are on the defensive all the time, so they find it very difficult to create or go ahead in any way. There are a number of people who have had the religious experience in some way unconnected with any so-called religion. Very often they refuse to recognize it as a religious experience, and that is a pity, because it makes it harder for them to be rational about it, they are likely to let it get twisted by some external considerations - political, aesthetic or scientific. I take it that pure scientists, who are absolutely certain of their values, are probably among those who have had

this experience, though their communion is truth rather than humanity, but this is really a different and very difficult question. Then there are also an even larger number of people who think themselves religious and who would definitely be angry if one said they were not religious. These are the people who are members of the various Christian Churches in this country. Other religions in Great Britain are unimportant, because those who adhere to them are comparatively few, and many of the odder religions are, in practice, only historically late branches of Christianity, as, for instance, Spiritualism. Of course, many people who say they are religious have definitely not had the religious experience ever in their lives, or if they had at one time, have now lost it, and might not even want to have it. But many have the religious experience in a more or less muddled and perverted form.

The two main forms in which the present-day official European religion, Church Christianity, appears are Roman Catholicism (whose main feature is the Mass, the insertion of a priesthood between the individual and the communion) and extreme Protestantism or Puritanism (whose main feature is the quiet selfish search for personal salvation with an extremely materialist symbolism connected with sacrifice and pain). That is to say, the Pope and 'Jiv.' Both these forms of Church Christianity have built up an impressive and logical accumulation of dogma and myth. Both demand authority and power over men and women. Both conceive of morality in the form of rewards and punishments. Both have a complicated system of rules and prohibitions. Each hates the other, and, still more, hates religion in its pure form and also rationalism. Each is dangerous and narrowing and makes ultimately, if not immediately, for human unhappiness. Each form has its own peculiar stylisation, its own methods. To the good religious rationalist, Catholicism is the more obvious danger. It has a curious charm, both for the intellectual who has not had the pure religious experience, and is unhappy and unsatisfied in spite of his good environment, and for the poor and oppressed who have not had it, or have not had it satisfactorily, and is unhappy largely because of his bad environment. It offers more certainty with less effort—once the initial step, the shutting off the eyes, the acceptance of faith, is taken. And it demands more. It insists on interference with man's ordinary lives. It sets itself above the State and any other law which men have made. This is only logical, granted the Church's premises, and it is obviously dangerous, the more so as the rules and laws of the Catholic Church were made for a southern Mediterranean community, living under the conditions of many centuries ago. In certain ways these rules can be

modified as to appear acceptable to modern northern peoples, but fundamentally they are the same as they always were.

Pure religion is, obviously, to some extent propagandist, for if one has had the experience of happiness and value one naturally wants to pass it on; Church Christianity is also propagandist. The Catholic Church has an extremely intelligent (if irrational) priesthood, and its methods are extremely efficient. The whole thing has been worked out by people whose only business is to work it out. In writing about the dangers of a Church, of a religion which has become twisted and blotted out with dogmas and false materialist assumptions, I mean dangers from the point of view of a rationalist—a religious rationalist—who is also a member of a State. I do not hold that the kind of State of which we are members is the right kind of State, nor is this the place to consider the right kind of States. But I do hold that we have to consider the position not merely as individuals, not just from the anarchist point of view but as citizens of something which we may visualize either as a national State or as a rather arbitrary division of the great world-state of mankind. As rational British citizens, then, let us consider what is happening in this country.

One of the methods of the Catholic Church is to bring in converts and children at times when its rules are apparently, relaxed. At these periods its members are living fairly ordinary lives, apparently much like those of the rest of the community. Then, as it were, it takes a breath and tightens up the rules, heels in the children and converts, nearer nearer to the heart and the power. The reason for the tightening is fundamentally psychological, but it may be evoked by something external—for instance, changes in the policy of some State with which the Church has particularly intimate contact. In the last two years or so we have watched this process of tightening up going on, seen the publication of encyclicals, and restatements and sharpenings of blessed points of view. We have probably realized that they have something to do with the policy of Fascist Italy. But, equally, we have realized that they are pointing at us as well, and that they are a danger to the northern countries, and especially to England.

The three most relevant Encyclicals are those on Education, on Marriage, and on the Social Order. There is nothing very new in any of them, but all three represent a tightening-up of the Catholic rules and customs. All three stress one common point which is of great importance for all of us—the necessity for Catholics to insist on similar action being taken by their State so as to enforce the Church's point of view. We have now already how Catholics have to take whatever action their

blatantly side them over the question of education. Labour members were forced to oppose a Labour Education Bill. Catholics, who only a century ago were glad of any kind of toleration in England, now insist on the State giving them money for their schools, in which, naturally, the Catholic point of view will be put, not only over definite religious questions, but throughout the teaching of history, science, or whatever it may be. I do not assert that the Catholic Church has been any different from the various other Churches who have started clamouring about education. But as the Catholic Church is so much more efficient it must expect to have more attention paid to it.

The Encyclical on Marriage is, in parts, very sound, with a curious likeness to the modern D. H. Lawrence interpretation of the closeness of the relation between men and women. In parts it is, to my mind, really shocking and disgusting, besides being based on a historical idea which does not go back for more than 2000 years, but claims to be universal and eternal. But again, like its predecessor on Education, it cuts across the rights and laws of the State. It lays down not only what Catholics should do in their own communion, but what they should do in relation to other people. Modern States are very, very gradually coming to realise that intelligent opinion with regard to matters of sex has changed quite a lot in the last few hundred years. Usually, and through the most delicate compromises and half measures, the laws are trailing after opinion. But the Catholic Church is pulling with all its weight in the other direction. The Encyclical on Marriage repeats over and over again the very doubtful statement that the foundations of the State and what it calls moral order are based on the family system and the variety of monogamic wedlock which it believes in. Interference is urged very gently and tactfully in the actual text of the Encyclical. 'Governments can assist the Church greatly . . . if in laying down their ordinances, they take account of what is prescribed by divine and ecclesiastical law, and if penalties are fixed for offenders.' The sting lies in that business of penalties for offenders. The secular arm is invoked! We know what that can mean.

In practice there is constant interference by the Church when any alterations are suggested in the laws connected with marriage or sex in any form, or when new regulations are suggested. Catholic opposition to birth-control teaching at centres financed by the Ministry of Health is an old story. So is the opposition to all suggested reforms of the marriage or divorce laws. Here, again, the opposition is not wholly Catholic. The Church of England feels disturbed; the mothers' meetings, controlled by country parsons and their wives, are up in arms against any

violation of the sanctity of the home. But the main opposition is Catholic and Anglo-Catholic. On the whole, the few Churches who tend to believe in the education of the individual by his own efforts, not through any laws, have not shown so much opposition.

The third Encyclical, that on the Social Order, has had a more direct political effect. It was, probably, primarily meant for the Continent, but it has been applied in this country too. It reasserts a doctrine which the Church has generally held since the end of the Middle Ages and to some extent earlier, but which had rather lapsed in the minds of many good Catholics. It says in so many words that it is impossible to be at the same time a good Catholic and a good Socialist. Here, I think, for the first time, the Church denounces a great political body of people, many of whom do not at all want to be denounced. This is primarily because the Socialist conception of property and the Church's conception are different. The Encyclical quotes from the doctors of the Church that 'the right to own private property has been given to man by nature or rather by the Creator Himself, not only in order that individuals may be able to provide for their own needs and those of their families, but also that by means of it, the goods which the Creator has destined for the human race may truly serve this purpose'. Once the claims of private property are completely allowed, as they are by this, the structure of capitalist society is allowed too. Naturally the Church does not approve of it as it is, but the Church's remedies still leave the wage contract as the basis of society.

Some Catholic opinion holds that private property is not a divine arrangement, but a result of the Fall; but that does not really alter the position. There are some very sound remarks in the Encyclical about the passing and disorganising of various institutions and associations which at one time held society together, how 'social life lost entirely its organic form, the State, which now was encumbered with all the burdens once borne by associations rendered extinct by it was in consequence submerged and overwhelmed by an infinity of affairs and duties'. The Church's remedy for this is a system of craft guilds, within which employers and employed should be organised. I take it that something of the sort is happening in Italy now, but it does not in practice seem likely to remedy the evils which Socialism seeks to remedy, nor is it, as far as one can see, at all likely to become a practical proposition in this country, whereas Socialism may be.

Part of the Encyclical is, of course, directed specifically against Russia, as also was part of the Encyclical on Marriage. Russianism, I suppose, is the real horror for the Church. It seems that people in Russia manage to be really and religiously—

...the common sense of the people. The thing is self-evident: that for any religion to be a religion is thoroughly untrue. But no form of Socialism is allowed, however much it may claim to be really Christian. This is an interference with the social life of the individual such as the Catholic Church has not attempted for some time. It has caused a great deal of heart-souring, and, of course, a great deal of quibbling. When is a Socialist not a Socialist? Does the answer 'When he is a member of the British Labour Party' fit? Some people would say not.

Between them, these three Encyclicals, all interfering with the non-religious life of individuals, are enough to make men and women very angry, especially citizens of a country like ours, where we pay great lip-service to liberty of thought and action and even allow it to a remarkable extent. We have lately been tolerant, and even friendly, to the Roman Catholic Church. But we are beginning to feel that the time has come to end that. The State has been attacked, we look to the State to hit back. But let us be careful. If the State hits back, rescinding toleration to Catholics, putting what penalties it chooses on to the practice and preaching of Catholicism, what happens then? What shall we get instead? Is there anything to be gained by substituting for the undoubtedly benign and paternal smiles and spectacles of Pius XI the comparatively grim visage of Lord Bunsford? For that is the polly alternative which is lying in wait for us. It would be quite easy to be funny about 'Jix' and 'Jimmy', about the censorship and the British Sunday, about tin tabernacles and black gloves and the fear of hell, about the state of the parks and the picture galleries. But that has been done before. Anyone who remembers Low's great cartoons of the 'Jix' family will have it all. We have to discover what lies behind the 'Jimmy'.

The Catholic Church is both a religion and a system, so intertwined that they cannot be separated. But the Low Church is more a system than a religion. It has thrown its weight more and more into the moral scale—acts as opposed to grace. From the outside it appears to offer no religious satisfaction and happiness comparable with the Mass. I have had opportunities of watching the adherents of both Churches, in England and in Scotland, and the Sunday Mass-goes seemed to come back from their ceremonies with a constant joy and sense of rebirth which was lacking in those who had partaken of the Lord's Supper; they had a communion and a common cause, however much these were overlaid and hidden by the Roman Catholic system.

I believe that the only way to get the best out of the people is to get them to work for a good end together. The only way to get them to work for a good end together is to get them to work for a good end together. They will come out from their isolation, or else to work for the betterment of other people's lives. The only way to get them to work for a good end together is to get them to work for a good end together. They will come out from their isolation, or else to work for the betterment of other people's lives. The only way to get them to work for a good end together is to get them to work for a good end together. They will come out from their isolation, or else to work for the betterment of other people's lives.

In England neither Romanism nor its fellow-group Anglicanism nor the Salvation Army, nor the Friends, are the alternative of the State taken action against Roman Catholicism. The alternative is definitely the Low Church and the Non-Resistant in one sense or another. They are much the same. Both of them are essentially a moral system, especially concerned with morality in its English sense of sexual morality. Both of them have made such a close connexion between sex and the work of sin that many English people can act in the most accountable way ever after on all their desires without having to worry of shame which has been set man's act connected with the most trivial fornication. Justice is a convenient word to use for the Catholics of Popery is essentially a compromised inner religion. It has compromised so as to admit not only marriage but married priests having done that it has taken care and pains by rules and prohibitions that thus far you may go but no further. It does not give the real ascetic satisfaction; I am extremely uncomfortable now but look what a much better time I shall have in heaven. Because it is not comfortable enough, nor does it provide as the Catholic Church has the spectacle of other people's pains and martyr and to a slightly less degree, priests being made so uncomfortable that even ordinary folk acquire merit through their discomfort. The only real spectacle of discomfort which it dwells on is the Crucifixion, those long-past but real enough pains of one man among the many whom the Romans in accordance with their moral system, put to death on the cross. It is not for nothing that those hymns sung by Non-Resistantists have such an emphasis on blood. Blood, the sacred, magic, forbidden thing, the joy of the ascetic! This is the evil because of vicious statements of which I have written already. It is extremely

connected with the savage sacrifices of the Eber Rival, the Jewish tribes, whose bloody and barbarous history is daily read in churches, and even in homes. It has less than nothing to do with pure religion. Already the 'Jixtas' have done a good deal of interfering. They, too, have tampered with the State over the laws relating to education and to sex in any form; they, too, have mobilised their forces for the preservation of the English form of monogamy, but their chief field is more local. It is they who are responsible for all the fantastic rules and regulations about decency and order and Sabbatarianism which we are all liable to run into at any moment. Witness the opposition to the Sunday Cinema Bill. They have made the terrible Sunday of the Midlands; they have insisted on keeping the King's Proctor, symbol of all Noisy Parkers. It is they who have made English lovemaking furtive and ashamed. We are all so soaked in Protestantism that we probably do not yet see how bad it is or how dangerous.

It seems probable, both historically and psychologically, that religious excitement should come in waves. It has done so in the past, sweeping across civilisations and then dying down. It comes, naturally, when people are disturbed, unhappy, in a state of uncertainty. At these times most of all they need a reconciliation with life, a sense that things are not really as bad as they seem. They need values. In practice at some times in history, social and political institutions are fairly satisfactory to most people; they give them their sense of value and communion. But sooner or later, whether through external or internal forces and pressures, these institutions collapse. It is at such periods of breakdown that the great religious movements of the past have happened. To take one obvious example—the Greek democracies, the city-states, were completely satisfactory for several generations—at any rate, to the men of the communities. They were designed for men by men. More, they were designed for freemen—citizens—by citizens. Nobody knows at present whether life in fifth-century Athens was satisfactory for women or slaves. But we are concerned with the citizens. The system satisfied them. Then it broke down, partly because of the constant warfare between one State and another, the actual destruction of the citizens. Partly because, with the progress of thought, men began to ask questions and demand answers which are not contained within the city-state pattern, and partly, of course, by the force from without—the coming of Macedonia. As the city-states ceased to be satisfying, so men turned more and more to religions—not the formal and ancient religions, bound up with the State and acting for the good of the mass of the citizens, but personal, soul-saving religions. The alternative was an

obviously very unsatisfactory philosophic system. There was a choice of these: stoicism was the simplest, though for intelligent people epicureanism was probably the least unsatisfying. This went on for some time with people getting hungrier and hungrier for satisfaction, and finding more and more curious and esoteric religions. When the wave of interest in and longing for religion was at its height Christianity came into the Mediterranean world—first for a few years in its early and completely excellent form, as a religion of communism, of small groups, of true equality and true charity—a religion of intense love, with the love-feast as its only technique; then, very soon afterwards in its later form, losing equality, and substituting the Mass for the love-feast—a religion, like so many other religions, full of hates and strains and unsatisfied longings, the central experience almost hidden by a mass of gradual accretions.

Since then Christianity has been the formal and recognized religion of the Western civilizations. Within it there have been many waves and wavelets of religious enthusiasm. People who had been satisfied for a time found themselves increasingly unhappy and unsatisfied; they hungered for religion and found what seemed to them, for the time at least, to be a satisfactory religion, satisfactory enough for them to cling to it in face of death and torture. That is the meaning of the heresies. There was one great wave that brought the Reformation. And after the wave subsided the Reformation was left the Protestant Church—a black wreck above the falling tide. Another wave brought Quakers and Methodists. Then came a period of comparative calm, the eighteenth century. Social conditions were rather good for a great many people—at any rate for the people who could express themselves and who have left a record. Life seemed to be opening out. Thought had been released and had taken a jump; nothing seemed beyond the reach of a good intellect. Science got going; art was put in its place. Science and medicine disentangled themselves from many of the more obvious superstitions.

I am not historian enough to be able to untangle religion and rationalism in the past. As I see it rationalism was sometimes victorious in men's minds and sometimes not. Many of the Greeks were consciously rationalist and a few of the Romans. They kept their heads. Then it seems to have died down. Religion, either fairly pure or with accretions and dogmas, had to all its own way through dark ages and middle ages. In the eighteenth century rationalism was back again, but there was no religion for it to work with. Then, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the people who had not been able to express themselves up till then began to move, to speak, to show their

selves and their unhappiness. And then came the French Revolution. Undoubtedly, for those who took part in it, the French Revolution was a supremely religious thing, all-satisfying, all-loving within its own communion, something to live or die for, an expression of eternal life. That is, after all, what makes revolutions successful. Again, I am not enough of a historian to be able to advance any theories as to what happened. All I can see is the crested wave of religious feeling overwhelming a whole people and reaching out from them to all the peoples of Europe.

In England conditions only became intolerable for the oppressed and inexpressive people some years later—or at least, the breaking-point did not come until then. The early nineteenth-century Church was incredibly unsatisfying, even to its practitioners, there was practically no Protestant religion at all, though there were a great many rules, customs and vestiges of a garbled Christian tradition. The religious revival affected High and Low Church, Methodism and Wesleyanism flared like torches in some places, supplying men and women with the bread of life. In other parts of England it was the Tractarians who provided the satisfaction, or even the Evangelicals, though when the Church of England went 'high' and earnest it was very apt to tip over the edge into Roman Catholicism. Looking back on this period is, perhaps, less like looking back on a wave than on a series of ironing crests, often obscured by their own foam. Sometimes the movements were mainly religious in the most narrow sense, sometimes they were mainly political. The Chartists had their churches and so had other smaller political movements. The great Christian Socialist time came later. In Scotland, and still more in Ireland, Nationalism and the Church were inextricably bound together. If only the Irish Nationalists at the end of the eighteenth century had got their way we should have seen the Irish political revolution put through, not by Catholics, but mainly by Protestants and very vaguely Protestant freethinkers, and it seems likely that Ireland would be a better and more free country now. But that did not happen. England's stupidity and cruelty was the Catholic Church's opportunity.

But as Victorian England became ever more prosperous and secure, as conditions became more and more tolerable for the working classes, as hours of work were shortened, trade unions allowed or even encouraged, housing improved out of all measure and children given a chance of happiness, so the intense interest in and passion for religion died down. Other things became more interesting—politics first, and, increasingly in the last hundred years, science. Man saw the world of knowledge

opening out before him; he saw himself, the thinker, as centre of the universe. Everything seemed possible. Progress was a real, visible, tangible thing for men and women. This seems to have been a time of rationalism without religion, and during the end of the nineteenth century the whole theory of irreligious rationalism crystallised out. And a gloomy theory it was! It was a brave thing to stand alone, the captain of one's Fate—an some ways a splendid thing. But it was not the supreme thing for humanity. Probably it was a necessary consequence of the doctrine of Evolution, which took man down from his place at the centre of the universe and made him only one cog on an endless chain. In taking away man's sense of his own importance, his own value, it took away the possibility of the assertion of those purely human (or, as we are beginning to discover, anthropoid) values which are at the back of religion. At the same time, by separating man from his church and God, it made him glory in being an individual and unwilling to sink himself into any communion, however fundamentally rational. This same individualism, attaching itself to the feminist movement which it made possible, has also made it harder for women to let themselves go in any communal living, although even here there was a generation who were united and willing to suffer martyrdom for 'The Cause'.

It is incredibly hard to get a historian's eye-view of the time immediately preceding one's own, and the time during which one was a child or adolescent. Looking back on it now, the time before the war seems as charged with fate as a thunder cloud. Yet no one noticed. To the people who were literate, who were capable of expressing themselves, who were moulding thought and feeling, things were not too bad. Institutions seemed permanent and satisfying. Above all science was queen, science was in command, everything was possible to man. Everything was possible, including the war. Science had come beautifully into her own, replacing cavalry by tanks, swords by bombs, spears by flamethrowers and gas shells. Science, the ash-maid, had turned her back, and it was hollow and rotting, and the rationalists without religion saw it, and many of them saw despair. Suddenly unhappiness had become a general thing. The bottom had dropped out. The trough was being prepared for the next wave of religious emotion. The first signs came during the war itself. Small, non-religious superstitions came back, the inventors and dealers in mascots made money. People were caught in such a giant and invisible grip that it seemed no use doing anything real. Direct action was hopeless, but they might squeeze ideologically past some crack. There was, too, a certain amount of real religious fervour, but not nearly as much as one might have expected. No doubt this lack of enthusiasm

can be accounted for by the action of the State Church in various countries, and especially in England, where the spectacle of the bishops saving their faces was one of the really amazing features of the war. The regimental chaplain was almost always a joke, and stood quite apart from any hope or longing or enthusiasm. Things were rather different in Scotland, where ministers were thought ill of if they did not enlist in the ranks, but even so the breakdown was fairly obvious. No amount of talk about Tec H can lessen the fact that Church Christianity did badly out of the Great War.

Then came the peace. At first it seemed as if things might recover of themselves. People might still be crippled and dying, but the boom time was a definite phase in people's minds. Wages were up in England and all over Europe. Men coming back still thought that the promises of the politicians would be, and could be, honoured. Women had not lost their new-found position and power. Everyone was looking ahead. Science, the ash-maid, had turned her beautiful face on to the world again; the lightnings of relativity played about her forehead, and she graciously gave her blessing to the H.B.C. There was, of course, no real security, either of the soul or of the bank account, but yet security seemed possible. There was America, apparently so solid, something to think restfully about. In a decade whose keyword is reconstruction people must necessarily think that somewhere down below they have solid rock to lay their foundations upon. After the Armistice year even the dear old British morality was coming back. Nothing was really changed. Those who had been worst hurt by the war stayed still in bruised and lonely quiet. Progress went on.

During all that time there was no very great interest in religion. The militant atheism of last century had rather died out; militancy in general was out of fashion. But a neat and rather quiet scepticism was general. These were my first years of really grown-up life and the making of grown-up friends. I remember how astonished one was if one found that any intelligent person at that time was anything but a freethinker. Those persons who happened to be Christians of one kind or another were slightly ashamed. It was a shy-making avowal, among the young and young-middle-aged. Then came the slump, not the temporary slump of 1926, when the middle classes felt secure enough to smash the General Strike, but the slump which has been going on for two years or more and which does not look like stopping. In general people are unhappy, insecure, lonely, terrified of the future, in a fit state for a religious wave to come and overwhelm them.

In the minds of most intelligent people, both men and women,

there is a constant conflict, more or less open, between intellect and emotion—roughly, between rationalism and religion. This is the conflict which is constantly coming up in D. H. Lawrence's books. But is the conflict necessary? I think not. I think they are no more incompatible than rationalism and religion really are. It is only the accretions and perversions which have made them seem incompatible. But all this means that the way is prepared for a religious revival, that people really want it. The thing is waiting under our noses in England. We have definitely to face the wave. It comes, for good or for ill. I believe we can make it come for good. Either it is a wave of the religion which has in one form or another devastated Europe for eighteen hundred years. Church Christianity or else it is something else. If it is Church Christianity, it will appear in the form either of Roman Catholicism or of extreme Protestantism in some form. It will be either the Pope or 'Ju. Can we stand that? Can we stand having our lives interfered with by these obviously muddled and perverted religions or shall we try for something better?

For the alternative exists. The alternative is pure religious experience with rationalism either in itself or with politics. When I say with politics I mean for the moment with Socialism. I prove it would seem dangerous to combine religion with any political aim—dangerous both for the religion and for the politics. Yet I believe it is possible and still more I believe it is sensible, because there is the thing ready and waiting. It is one of the purest forms of religious experience which is at present offered us. It means, of course, that rationalism will be absolutely necessary. It will be of fundamental importance not to let the religious experience be permanently entangled with any dogma, political or otherwise. Socialism provides a framework, a technique of meeting and communion, a way of providing the religious experience without making people think they are making bricks of themselves. But when Socialism is achieved and the face of the world is pointing to some other and further end, then the religious experience must not be hampered by any Socialist dogma, or myth, or book. Pure religion must be free to go on with the new framework and technique which will be necessary or probably necessary—for its satisfactory existence.

But perhaps there are impossible dreams. Perhaps no one yet knows enough about the religious experience to be able to combine it and make it go where they like. Yet, surely, one may be hopeful! The one thing which is clear is that if this is impossible, if the religious wave is on us and we have nothing of our own to put into its face and form, then we shall have something evil. We shall have the Pope or 'Ju. And then,

If that happens, nationalists will have to stand together. They will have to make common cause. They will have to forget all smaller quarrels and fight the common enemy of liberty and peace. And in doing that it may be that they will, out of chaos, find a communion of their own.

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